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Abstract 
As a system of hereditary social stratification, caste is associated primarily with South Asia, 
particularly India, but it also exists in South Asian diaspora communities including in the 
United Kingdom. Discrimination based on caste affects around 167 million Dalits – formerly 
‘Untouchables’ – in India alone. In the United Kingdom it is estimated that there are at least 
200,000 people of Dalit origin, possibly many more. Government-commissioned research 
suggests strongly that discrimination and harassment based on caste also exist in this country. 
This thesis discusses the legal regulation of caste discrimination in India, in international 
human rights law and in the United Kingdom. In order to contribute to an understanding of 
how caste can be conceptualised legally and how caste discrimination can be regulated legally, 
the thesis examines how the concept of caste and the phenomenon of discrimination and 
inequality on grounds of caste have been defined, constructed and addressed by law. It traces 
the evolution of the religious, social and legal rationales for caste discrimination, and 
conversely the evolution of legal remedies for its elimination. Caste is a complex social 
phenomenon; this thesis explains and addresses the legal challenges of capturing caste in 
national and international law and examines the advantages and limitations of existing legal 
analyses and frameworks for tackling discrimination based on caste. In India, caste 
discrimination and inequality persist, despite constitutional and legislative measures for their 
elimination; this thesis examines why this is the case, identifies the lessons learned from 
India’s experience and suggests ways in which India could extend and improve its legal and 
policy responses to caste discrimination. International human rights law engagement with 
caste discrimination dates from the mid-1990s. The thesis explains and analyses the 
prohibition of caste discrimination in international human rights law and the reasons for and 
implications of the refusal by India, the world’s largest caste-affected country, to accept the 
conceptualisation of caste discrimination as a form of internationally-prohibited racial 
discrimination. Other international law approaches to caste discrimination (for example 
minority rights) are also considered and assessed. A particular focus of the research is the legal 
regulation of caste discrimination in the United Kingdom. Hence, the thesis undertakes a 
detailed analysis of the capacity of domestic discrimination law to capture caste. The Equality 
Act 2010 provides for the introduction, by ministerial order, of a statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination by adding caste to the definition of the protected characteristic of race, but 
reservations have been raised about the appropriateness of legislating for caste discrimination, 
and as at 1 April 2013 no such order had been made. This thesis challenges the reservations to 
caste discrimination legislation. It explains why existing discrimination law is inadequate to 
capture caste, and it argues in favour of an express statutory prohibition of caste discrimination 
in national law, in accordance with the UK’s international human rights law obligations, as an 
essential – although not the sole – element of a strategy to tackle such discrimination. In doing 
so, the thesis also reveals the role and contribution of domestic grassroots activism in securing 
legal change.  
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Introduction 
Context of the research 
Caste as a system of social stratification is around 3,000 years old.
1
 It is associated 
predominantly with South Asia and its diaspora, in particular India, where it is 
deeply embedded. Discrimination, subordination and oppression on grounds of caste 
affect almost 167 million Dalits (formerly known as ‘Untouchables’) in India alone, 
where they number over sixteen per cent of the population.
2
 Significantly, caste also 
exists among South Asian diaspora communities, including in the United Kingdom. 
Caste is distinguished from other forms of social stratification based on inherited 
status by its religious underpinnings in orthodox Hinduism and by the concept of 
‘Untouchability’, by which certain humans are considered intrinsically, permanently 
and irredeemably polluted. Although doctrinally caste is associated only with 
Hinduism, distinctions and discrimination based on caste are found among South 
Asian adherents of Islam, Sikhism and Christianity notwithstanding the absence of a 
doctrinal basis for caste in these religions, so that it can no longer be said to be solely 
a Hindu religious phenomenon. Dalits in contemporary India continue to suffer from 
widespread discrimination and violations of their civil, political, economic and social 
rights, ranging from discriminatory and oppressive behaviour in the public, social 
and private spheres to severe deprivation and extreme violence. Amid ongoing 
debate about the nature of caste, institutionalised caste-based inequality persists in 
India despite constitutional and legislative prohibitions of caste discrimination and 
caste-based violence, the criminalisation of the practice of Untouchability, and 
                                                 
1
 S. Bayly, Caste, Society and Politics in Modern India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern 
Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (CUP), 1999) 13. 
2
 Census of India 2001, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Population, at 
 http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_Glance/scst.aspx (visited 24 November 
2012). 
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constitutional affirmative action policies in favour of Dalits. Moreover, the social and 
economic impact on Dalits of India’s post-1991 economic liberalisation has been to 
reinforce rather than to overturn their historically subordinate social and economic 
position in the Hindu social order. The political equality for Dalits introduced on 
independence has not led to economic equality.
3
  Since the late 1990s, Dalit activists 
and their supporters have brought the existence of political, social and economic 
discrimination, exclusion, deprivation and mistreatment on grounds of caste in India 
and elsewhere to the attention of UN human rights bodies, the EU Parliament and the 
British Parliament. Using the language of human rights they have reframed caste 
discrimination as a domestic and international human rights issue. In the UN arena 
and in the UK their demand has been, inter alia, for the legal regulation of caste 
discrimination, while in India their demand has been for the implementation and 
enforcement of existing laws, and for new strategies and policies to remedy 
economic and social inequality. Given that caste is such a complicated phenomenon, 
it is not necessarily surprising that law, both national and international, has found it 
difficult to capture caste and to address discrimination on grounds thereon. This 
thesis is concerned with how we attempt to capture caste in law and how we deal 
with caste discrimination through law. The thesis critically examines a series of legal 
responses to, and legal frameworks for addressing, caste discrimination. It analyses 
the legal scope of these responses and frameworks, and their successes and 
shortcomings. It also makes recommendations for improvements in existing law, and 
offers suggestions for alternative strategies.  
                                                 
3
 In January 1950, on the eve of the adoption of independent India’s new Constitution, Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar, Dalit activist, lawyer and chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, warned that 
the contradiction between the political equality introduced by the 1950 Constitution and the reality of 
entrenched economic and social inequalities posed a threat to India’s democracy. This contradiction 
has not been resolved; Constituent Assembly Debates, 25 November 1949, cited in ‘Dr Ambedkar: 
The Principal Architect of the Constitution of India’, Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, 
Vol. 13 (Govt. of Maharasthra Education Dept., Mumbai, 1994) 1216. 
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The phenomenon of caste has been the subject of extensive academic 
examination and analysis by Western and South Asian anthropologists, historians, 
sociologists, political scientists and economists, as well as by scholars from 
disciplines such as religious studies, education, cultural studies and psychology. 
There is a vast body of scholarship on caste in modern India by scholars from a wide 
range of disciplines. However, caste and caste discrimination have attracted limited 
academic attention from lawyers.
4
 This thesis looks at caste and caste discrimination 
through the prism of law. It is concerned with the legal regulation of caste in Indian 
law, in international human rights law and in British law. To this end, the thesis 
provides an account of the evolution of legal conceptualisations and legal regulation 
of caste and caste discrimination over centuries in India, over decades in the UN and 
over three decades or so in the UK. A primary theme of the thesis is the difficulty of 
capturing caste in law. International lawyers have struggled and continue to struggle 
with this challenge. Now British lawyers are faced with the same challenge. Part of 
the original contribution of this thesis is its particular focus on the UK. A detailed 
analysis of the capacity of domestic discrimination law to address caste 
discrimination is undertaken. The thesis argues that existing discrimination law is 
inadequate to capture and address caste and discrimination on the basis thereof, and 
recommends inter alia the introduction of a statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination. The Equality Act 2010 (EQA),
5
 in an enabling provision contained in 
s. 9(5)(a), envisages the introduction of such a prohibition at a future date, by adding 
caste to the definition of race. However, as at 1 April 2013, the enabling provision 
had not been activated. The thesis provides an account of the process and the 
                                                 
4
 Exceptions include the work of B.R. Ambedkar, Upendra Baxi, Krishna Iyer, Marc Galanter, Patrick 
Thornberry, David Keane, Smita Narula and the present author; see Bibliography. 
5
 Equality Act 2010 c15; see http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/pdf/ukpga_20100015_en.pdf 
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challenges of securing the enabling provision in the EQA, and analyses government 
deliberations following the enactment of the EQA on whether to bring the 
prohibition of caste discrimination fully into domestic legislation. 
 
Research Questions   
The thesis addresses four principal research questions. Firstly, how have the concept 
of caste and the phenomenon of discrimination and inequality on grounds of caste 
been defined, constructed and addressed by law? Secondly, what has been the 
historical evolution of caste discrimination, of religious, social and legal rationales 
for such discrimination and for its elimination and the evolution of legal remedies? 
Thirdly, what are the benefits and limitations of existing legal analyses of, and 
strategies for addressing, caste discrimination in India, in international law and in the 
UK? Fourthly, what have been the factors influencing, and the obstacles to, the 
development of new legal analyses and strategies for the elimination of caste 
discrimination? This thesis will consider what lessons can be learned from the 
answers to these questions, and will make recommendations for how policy may be 
shaped in the future. The research is thus both expository, in the sense of analysing 
existing legal frameworks – ‘the way the (legal) world is’ – and evaluative/critical, in 
the sense of providing an assessment of the (legal) world, appraising it from the point 
of view of coherence by reference to, for example, international human rights 
standards or domestic discrimination law, identifying shortfalls and offering 
suggestions for improvement.
6
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 See R. Cryer, T .Hervey and B. Sokhi-Bulley, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law 
(Oxford: Hart, 2011) 9-10. 
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Conceptual and analytical approaches 
The thesis approaches the problem of how caste can be captured in law and how we 
can deal with caste discrimination through law, holistically, from a number of 
perspectives or approaches rather than from just one perspective.
7
 Sometimes these 
perspectives or approaches are articulated explicitly, sometimes not. The thesis 
combines elements of doctrinal research (providing a systematic exposition, and 
critique, of the legal rules under examination) and what Pendleton describes as 
‘problem, policy and law reform-based non-doctrinal research’.8 The research is 
socio-legal in nature, where ‘socio’ refers to the ‘interface with [the] context within 
which law exists’.9 It is interdisciplinary, incorporating knowledge and contributions 
from other disciplines. It examines and evaluates the interface and interlinkage 
between national and international legal orders (including the ‘added value’ of 
international law). The thesis straddles human rights law, minority rights, and 
national discrimination and criminal law as well as two geographical areas, namely 
India and the United Kingdom.   
Chapters 1 and 2 outline the legal history of caste as a religio-legal construct, 
and caste discrimination as a form of legalised inequality, through a historico-socio-
legal lens. After Indian independence in 1947 the expected decline of caste did not 
                                                 
7
 Following Cryer, Harvey and Sokhi-Bulley, the terms ‘approach’ and ‘perspective’ are used 
synonymously; the terms ‘theory’, ‘theoretical base’ or ‘methodology’ could also be used; ibid., 5. 
Cryer et al. observe that ‘in real life, legal research projects do not always adopt a pure version of just 
one theoretical or methodological perspective’; the various approaches are thus ‘not hermetically 
sealed, but fluid and negotiable’. 
8
 M. Pendleton, ‘Non-Empirical Discovery in Legal Scholarship – Choosing, Researching and Writing 
a Traditional Scholarly Article’ in M. McConville and W. Hong Chui (eds.), Research Methods for 
Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 159-180, 159. Pendleton interprets the term 
‘research’ in the context of legal scholarship to cover ‘a whole range of investigative, analytical, 
critical, theoretical and/or synthesising intellectual activity by academic lawyers’; ibid., 161. 
9
 R. Banakar and M. Travers, ‘Introduction’ in  R. Banakar and M. Travers (eds.) Theory and Method 
in Socio-Legal Research (Oxford: Hart, 2005) ix-xvi, xii. Cryer et al. do not use the labels ‘socio-
legal’ and ‘doctrinal’; instead, they identify two ‘main jurisprudential approaches’ – natural law and 
legal positivism – and three ‘extensions and negations’ – ‘modern’, ‘critical’ and ‘law and’ 
approaches; Cryer et al., n 6 above, 10-11. A human rights approach combines elements of both 
natural law and legal positivism. 
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happen, leading Dalit activists to raise their grievances before the UN human rights 
mechanisms using the language of human rights. By shifting the terms of the debate, 
caste discrimination was transformed into an international human rights issue. In 
particular, securing the ‘racial discrimination’ label for caste discrimination ensured 
that India would be required to account at the UN level, legally and politically, for its 
progress (or lack thereof) in eliminating such discrimination. Chapter 3 examines 
India’s successes and failures in using law to tackle caste discrimination through the 
lenses of (implicitly) human rights and social justice, while in Chapters 4 and 5 the 
conceptual approach is that of international human rights law. A social justice 
approach is one which illuminates the structural causes of inequality. Fraser 
identifies three dimensions to the concept of social justice: redistribution (meaning 
socio-economic redistribution, but beyond that access to resources more generally), 
recognition (meaning identifying and acknowledging the claims of historically 
marginalised, low-status groups suffering from institutionalised stigma, which may 
also involve the revaluing of devalued traits and the celebration, not the elimination, 
of group differences), and parity of participation (the right of individuals and groups 
to have their voices equally heard, which is at the core of Fraser’s conception of 
social justice).
10
 Throughout the thesis, elements of a social justice analysis can be 
detected. A human rights approach is an approach that is normatively based on 
international human rights standards. Rights discourse has been criticised for 
reducing the concept of rights to legal rights only, rather than viewing rights as 
                                                 
10
 N. Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and 
Participation’ in N. Fraser and A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical 
Exchange (London: Verso, 2003) 7-109, 7-11, 36; N. Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political 
Space in a Globalizing World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). See also S. Fredman, 
‘Combating Racism with Human Rights: The Right to Equality’ in S. Fredman (ed.), Discrimination 
and Human Rights: The Case of Racism (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 9-44, 15. 
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having a moral as well as a legal component.
11
 However, human rights instruments 
are concerned with the moral dimension (for example, references to the notion of 
respect for human dignity and worth)
12
 underpinned by the fundamental principles of 
equality and non-discrimination.
13
 Human rights provides an appropriate framework 
for looking at the legal regulation of caste discrimination precisely because, as 
Rabinder Singh points out, ‘[t]he idea that all human beings are equal is a very recent 
notion. For most of history people have been divided precisely in accordance with 
notions of inequality;’14 it is only since 1945 that non-discrimination and equality 
have become fundamental normative elements of national, regional and international 
legal systems. Equality is a broad concept with a variety of meanings. Increasingly, 
freedom from discrimination is seen as one aspect of this concept – necessary but not 
sufficient for achieving equality.
15
 Chapters 6-9 examine the legal regulation of caste 
discrimination in the United Kingdom through the lenses of British discrimination 
law and human rights.  In relation to caste, the concept of human dignity (described 
by Moon as ‘at the core of the major human rights texts’)16 is especially relevant. 
Shultziner and Rabinovici define human dignity (which they describe as the central 
value and legal concept underlying human rights) as self-worth, and violations of 
dignity in terms of humiliation and other threats and injuries to a person’s positive 
                                                 
11
 See e.g. I. Robeyns, ‘Rights, capabilities and human capital: three models of education’, 4(1) 
Theory and Research in Education (2006) 69-84, 76. 
12
 Thus the UDHR Preamble recognises the ‘inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family’, while UDHR Article 1 asserts that ‘all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights’.   
13
 ‘Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without 
any discrimination, constitutes a basic principle in the protection of human rights’; CERD General 
Recommendation No.14, 22 March 1993. 
14
 R. Singh, ‘Equality: The Neglected Virtue’, 2 European Human Rights Law Review (2004) 141-
157, 141. See also Fredman (2001), n 10 above, 14-15 on the ideal of equality as a ‘relatively modern 
notion’ and the selective, limited nature of the notion of equality as enshrined in early liberalism. 
15
 B. Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 12. Thornberry describes the 
non-discrimination principle as ‘a way of getting to equality in the enjoyment of human rights by 
addressing negative practices denying equality’; P. Thornberry, ‘Confronting Racial Discrimination: 
A CERD Perspective’, 5 Human Rights Law Review (2005) 239-268, 255. 
16
 G. Moon, ‘Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: A Better Route to Equality?’, 6 European 
Human Rights Law Review (2006) 610-649, 610. 
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self-worth.
17
 Respect for human dignity has been articulated as a human right in 
various jurisdictions,
18
 despite debate as to its legal content and justiciability.
19
 Thus, 
for example, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) is charged inter 
alia with encouraging and supporting the development of a society in which there is 
respect for the dignity and worth of each individual.
20
 Section 26(1) of the EQA 
defines one of the three forms of harassment in the EQA as unwanted conduct related 
to a relevant protected characteristic which has the purpose or effect of violating the 
complainant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment for the complainant. This thesis asserts the potential of 
harassment in the EQA as particularly relevant to caste discrimination, precisely 
because it defines violation of dignity, humiliation and degradation – key features of 
caste discrimination – as a civil wrong. 
 
Methods  
The research is qualitative (in the sense used by Dobinson and Johns, meaning non-
numerical, whether or not involving empirical method)
21
 and largely desk-based, 
involving analysis of a wide range of primary and secondary documentary material 
from credible, authoritative and objective sources. India and the UK are treated as 
‘case studies’ in a loose, layperson’s sense – India as the world’s largest and oldest 
caste-affected state and the UK as the first diaspora state where the introduction of a 
                                                 
17
 D. Shultziner and I. Rabinovici, ‘Human Dignity, Self-Worth and Humiliation: A Comparative 
Legal-Psychological Approach’, 18 Psychology, Public Policy and Law (2012) 105-137. 
18
 Hepple, n 15 above, 15; S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 19-21; Moon, n 16 
above. 
19
 Hepple, ibid. On dignity as a legal value see D. Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 1’, 
Public Law (1999) (winter) 682-702. On dignity discourse and dignity as a justiciable concept see 
Moon, ibid. Conversely, see C. McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights’, 19(4) European Journal of International Law (2008) 655-724. 
20
 Equality Act 2006 s. 3. 
21
 I. Dobinson and F. Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in McConville and Hong Chui (eds.), n 8 
above, 16-45. 
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statutory prohibition of caste discrimination in domestic law has been contemplated. 
Written sources consist of UN documents; UK and Indian legislation and case-law; 
government publications and official statistics from the UK and India; UK 
parliamentary records; India’s Constituent Assembly Debates; press and other media 
material (relied on for its contemporaneous capture of events and the public mood, 
rather than  its objectivity); material produced by non-governmental organisations 
and inter-governmental organisations (NGOs and IGOs) (so-called grey literature); 
correspondence produced by a variety of actors which may depict that actor’s view 
of events; and the author’s contemporaneous records of meetings and discussions. 
Government and NGO websites were also consulted. In addition, peer-reviewed 
academic journals and books were widely consulted. 
 
Personal stance 
As one of the few academic lawyers researching and writing on caste discrimination 
and its legal regulation in the UK, I have been involved directly in some of the most 
important domestic developments in this field since the early 2000s. This has given 
me access to sources such as contemporaneous documents, correspondence and 
materials, as well as opportunities for discussion and debate (for example as an 
expert speaker at meetings and conferences) and the sharing of views which have 
informed the thesis.
22
 I have endeavoured to approach all material in a professional 
and scholarly fashion, drawing on Feldman’s definition of scholarship as ‘an action 
informed by a distinctive attitude of mind’ and legal scholarship as ‘a conception 
which results from the application of the concept of scholarship to the special kinds 
                                                 
22
 Note, however, that this was not participant observation research; for a definition see M. 
Denscombe, The Good Research Guide (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2007) 217. 
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of problems that are discovered in the study of laws and legal systems’.23 The 
problems ‘may not necessarily all be legal but the focus for analysis is the law, 
whether… reasoning internal to the law or… law in context’.24 Feldman’s 
scholarship ideals include ‘(1) a commitment to employing methods of investigation 
and analysis best suited to satisfying [a] curiosity [about the world]; (2) self-
conscious and reflective open-mindedness, so that one does not assume the desired 
result and adopt a procedure designed to verify it, or even pervert one’s material to 
support a chosen conclusion; (3) the desire to publish the work for the illumination of 
students, fellow-scholars or the general public and to enable others to evaluate and 
criticise it’.25 There is an argument that the ‘ethical premises’ underpinning scholarly 
research and writing should be transparent,
26
 for example in this case the premise 
that caste discrimination, as a form of discrimination prohibited by international 
human rights law, should be subject to effective legal regulation domestically as well 
as internationally. 
 
Overview of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Caste is complicated to understand and 
theorise. For this reason the thesis starts by explaining how it can be understood in 
sociological, historical, religious, cultural and ideological terms. Part 1 (Chapters 1-
3) explores, in Chapters 1 and 2, the socio-historical framework of caste and 
introduces some of the issues relating to its complexity. The paradox of caste’s 
persistence and tenacity is also addressed. Chapter 3 sets out the nature of caste 
discrimination in contemporary India, its political, social and economic features, and 
                                                 
23
 D. Feldman, ‘The Nature of Legal Scholarship’, 52(4) Modern Law Review (1989) 498-517, 502. 
24
 E. Fisher and others, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law 
Scholarship’, 21(2) Journal of Environmental Law (2009) 213-250, 216. 
25
 See n 22 above, 503. 
26
 See n 8 above, 164-165. 
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examines and critiques the legal responses introduced by India to combat it. Under 
British rule, limited inroads were made into dismantling inequality and 
discrimination based on caste by means of secular law, but these were piecemeal, 
timid, and contradictory, addressing certain aspects of caste inequality and 
discrimination while ignoring or even reinforcing others. The turning point came 
when India gained her independence from British rule in 1947. The Constitution of 
India 1950 (COI) abolished Untouchability and provided for the introduction of 
affirmative action policies for the ‘Scheduled Castes’ (the constitutional, legal and 
administrative term for Dalits in India). Domestic legislation followed, criminalising 
Untouchability, caste discrimination and caste-based hate crimes; yet, despite their 
progressive nature, these legal and policy measures have not succeeded in 
eliminating caste discrimination and oppression in India. The thesis examines why 
this is the case, identifies the lessons learned from India’s experience, and suggests 
possible strategies for the future. Chapter 3 also examines the contradictions inherent 
in India’s legal categorisation of the Dalits, specifically the religious restrictions on 
entry into the category, and argues why and how the law should be reformed to 
remove these contradictions. 
Part 2 of the thesis (Chapters 4 and 5) focuses on the engagement of 
international human rights law with caste discrimination. It examines the 
internationalisation of caste and the ‘added value’ of this strategy for Dalit advocacy, 
given that positive provisions on caste in India’s constitution and domestic 
legislation were already in place. International law uses a ‘categories’ approach in 
order to combat discrimination and inequality, but caste does not appear as a 
category in any international human rights instrument. This has led to the subsuming 
of caste within categories which do not completely overlap with it, as well as the 
12 
 
interpretation of existing categories and the creation of new ones to cover caste and 
analogous systems of inherited status. Chapter 4 examines the conceptualisation of 
caste by the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) as 
a form of discrimination based on descent and hence a form of racial discrimination 
prohibited by Article 1 of the International Convention for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD).
27
 CERD’s interpretation of descent in ICERD as including 
‘forms of social stratification such as caste and analogous systems of inherited 
status’28 is rejected by India because of the linkage between caste and racial 
discrimination that this entails. India, rather, considers caste to be an internal social 
problem falling outside the purview of ICERD, and has challenged CERD’s 
authority to interpret the ICERD ‘umbrella’ as including caste.29 Dalits have also 
pursued minority rights and indigenous people’s approaches before UN forums, 
despite not readily meeting the internationally-agreed criteria for minorities or 
indigenous peoples. Chapter 5 provides a brief evaluation of the value of these 
approaches for Dalits,
30
 as well as the engagement with caste issues of other treaties 
with wider grounds.  
Since 2000, caste discrimination has also been conceptualised by the UN as a 
violation of international human rights law as a form of discrimination based on 
work and descent (DWD), a new legal category which includes but is not limited to 
caste. Given the reluctance of India to accept the conceptualisation of caste 
discrimination as a violation of ICERD, Dalit activists and advocacy organisations 
have recently argued for a ‘re-strategising of the Dalit stand’ away from a ‘caste as 
                                                 
27
 Adopted 21 December 1965. In force 4 January 1969. 660 UNTS 195. Indian ratification 3 
December 1968. UK ratification 7 March 1969. 
28
 CERD General Recommendation No. 29 (2002). 
29
 Thornberry, n 15 above, 239, 250. 
30
 A lengthier treatment of Dalit rights as minority rights in international law, as well as Dalits and 
minorities in Indian constitutional law, can be found in A. Waughray, ‘Caste Discrimination and 
Minority Rights: The Case of India’s Dalits’, 17 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
(2010) 327-353. 
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racial discrimination’ perspective towards a discourse based on ‘descent and work-
based discrimination and violence’.31 This discourse draws on the Draft Principles 
and Guidelines for the effective elimination of DWD, drawn up by two UN Special 
Rapporteurs on DWD and published by the UN Human Rights Council in 2009. 
However, the political reality is that not all states accept that existing normative 
frameworks apply to caste discrimination, or that caste discrimination is a legitimate 
area of international human rights concern, or that the prohibition of caste 
discrimination (or DWD) applies to them. From a practical perspective the challenge 
is to engage states such as India in acknowledging the legitimacy of UN involvement 
and to regard mechanisms such as ICERD and the DPGs not as a threat but as an 
opportunity to challenge caste discrimination. In the medium term the question 
remains whether a caste-specific international instrument is desirable on the grounds 
that caste constitutes a sui generis category which existing categorisations cannot 
adequately account for, and, if desirable, whether such an aim is realistic and 
realisable. 
Part 3 of the thesis (Chapters 6-9) focuses on the UK and the challenge of 
capturing caste legally. Caste exists in the UK: this is not in dispute. Moreover, the 
evidence suggests strongly that caste discrimination and harassment, including of the 
type which would fall under the EQA, also exist.
32
 The cornerstone of the UK’s 
equality regime is now the EQA, which, as explained, provides for the introduction 
of a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination. However, as noted, as at 1 April 
2013 such a prohibition had not been introduced, despite the recommendations to this 
effect of CERD and the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR). This means that to 
                                                 
31
 See Decade of Dalit Rights UN 2011-20, Strategy Building Conference, Report, 24-25 June 2011 at 
http://www.idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/UN/Report_DecadeDalitRights.pdf 
(visited 2 January 2013). 
32
 H. Metcalfe and H. Rolfe, Caste Discrimination and Harassment in Great Britain (London: 
Government Equalities Office, 2010) 14. 
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bring a claim of caste discrimination, claimants must argue that caste is subsumed 
within an existing protected characteristic such as race or religion or belief as 
currently defined. The limits of discrimination law (for example, the ‘categories’ 
approach) are well-known. Nonetheless, discrimination law is very effective when it 
works, as has been seen in relation to race, sex, disability, age, religion and, 
increasingly, sexual orientation. This thesis identifies and explores the limitations of 
race and religion or belief as categories for capturing caste and recommends the 
express extension of equality legislation to caste. Chapter 6 contextualises the 
problem, outlining the history of the Dalit presence in the UK, caste divisions and the 
discrimination encountered by Dalits at the hands of higher-caste South Asian 
migrants. Chapter 7 examines the British discrimination law model and analyses the 
shortcomings of the protected characteristics of race and religion or belief as ‘legal 
homes’ for caste. Chapter 8 analyses the debates during the passage of the Equality 
Bill through Parliament on the inclusion of an express prohibition of caste 
discrimination in the new legislation, which resulted in caste being introduced at the 
margins of that law. The legal and political arguments of government, 
parliamentarians and other actors against a statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination, as well as the counterarguments, are dissected. Chapter 9 is 
concerned with legal and political developments since the enactment of the EQA in 
April 2010 until 1 April 2013. It provides an account of the efforts of Dalits and their 
supporters to secure a case-law prohibition of caste discrimination via a test case, as 
well as their continued campaign for the activation of s. 9(5)(a). It also offers a view 
of the role of activism in connecting UN human rights standards to national law, and 
in this way it links Dalit activism in the UK with the wider question of international 
legal and political responses to the elimination of caste discrimination. 
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Chapter 1 
 What is Caste? 
 
 
Caste is a complex social phenomenon which has to be understood in sociological, 
historical, religious, cultural, psychological and ideological as well as legal terms. 
This chapter introduces the concept of caste and examines what is meant by caste, 
sociologically and legally. It identifies and explains the operative features of caste as 
an ideological construct, and describes the ways in which caste has been 
conceptualised, theorised and analysed as a sociological and legal phenomenon. 
Section 1 introduces the key concepts associated with caste as well as various 
elements and aspects of caste as a sociological and legal category. Section 2 sets out 
the religious and historical origins of a caste society, while Section 3 summarises the 
principal sociological theories and interpretations of caste.  
 
1.1    Introductory concepts  
1.1.1 Context and terminology 
 
Caste is associated primarily with India, where it has existed as a system of social 
stratification for over three thousand years,
1
 but it also occurs in other South Asian 
countries (Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) and the South Asian diaspora, 
while communities suffering from discrimination based on descent and ‘work and 
descent’ – wider international legal categories of which caste discrimination is a sub-
                                                 
1
 S. Bayly, Caste, Society and Politics in Modern India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern 
Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (CUP), 1999) 13; G. S. Ghurye, Caste and Race in 
India (Mumbai: Popular Prakashan Pvt. Ltd., 1969). 
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category – exist worldwide.2 Discrimination, subordination and oppression on the 
grounds of caste affect almost 167 million Dalits – formerly known as 
‘Untouchables’ – in India alone, where they amount to over 16 per cent of the 
population,
3
 while caste discrimination affects up to 200,000 people in the UK.
4
 
 
1.1.1.1 Caste  
 
The term ‘caste’ comes from the Portuguese casta, meaning species, race or pure 
breed. It was first used in India in the sixteenth century by the Portuguese to 
distinguish between ‘Moors’ (Muslims) and non-Muslims, and to denote the system 
of communities based on birth groups which the Europeans encountered in India.
5
 As 
Galanter and Ballard show, whilst caste is not the only feature of South Asian social 
organisation either in Britain or on the sub-continent – individuals have multiple 
overlapping affiliations of kinship, language, region and religion as well as caste – 
nevertheless in a traditionally highly compartmentalised social order, caste remains 
significant as a mechanism for and a source of social stratification, stigmatisation, 
social exclusion and discrimination on the sub-continent as well as the South Asian 
diaspora.
6
  
                                                 
2
 See A. Eide and Y. Yokota, expanded working paper on discrimination based on work and descent 
(DWD), UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights (UN Sub-Commission); UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/24, 26 June 2003, paras. 10-43; 
Y. Yokota and C. Chung, final report on DWD; Human Rights Council; A/HRC/11/CRP.3, 18 May 
2009. See also UN Sub-Commission, Resolution 2000/4 DWD, 11 August 2000; 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/46, 23 November 2000, 25. 
3
 Census of India 2001, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Population, at 
 http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_Glance/scst.aspx (visited 24 November 
2012).  
4
 H. Metcalfe and H. Rolfe, Caste Discrimination and Harassment in Great Britain (London: 
Government Equalities Office, 2010) 20. 
5
 Bayly (1999), n 1 above, 105-107; U. Sharma, Caste (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2002) 1; M. Galanter, 
Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1984) 7.  
6
 R. Ballard, ‘The Emergence of Desh Pardesh’ in R. Ballard (ed.), Desh Pardesh: The South Asian 
Presence in Britain (London: Hurst & Co, 1994) 5-9; Galanter (1984), ibid., 7-17; O. Mendelsohn and 
M. Vicziany, The Untouchables: Subordination, Poverty and the State in Modern India (Cambridge: 
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1.1.1.2 Descent  
Descent is an international legal category which includes but is not limited to caste. 
Legal usage of the term originates in the 1833 Government of India Act, which 
prohibited discrimination against Indians (‘natives’) in employment with the British 
East India Company on grounds of religion, place of birth, descent or colour. Indians 
were distinguished from Europeans by virtue of their ‘descent’, meaning racial and 
ethnic origins. As a ground of discrimination, descent was included in the 
Government of India (GOI) Act 1935 and the Constitution of India (COI) 1950. In 
1965, it was included (at India’s behest) in the definition of racial discrimination in 
the UN International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD),
7
 prompted in part by Indian concern to address discrimination against 
persons of Indian origin in apartheid South Africa. The UN Committee for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) – ICERD’s monitoring body8 – has 
affirmed that discrimination based on descent includes discrimination on the basis of 
caste and analogous systems of inherited status.
9
 
 
1.1.2 Varna, Jati and Biraderi   
1.1.2.1 Varna  
 
Castes are closed, endogamous,
10
 hereditary-membership status groups characterised 
by separation and ranked within a strict hierarchical framework ‘in which status is 
                                                                                                                                          
CUP, 1998); S. Jodhka and G. Shah, ‘Comparative Contexts of Discrimination: Caste and 
Untouchability in South Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), 27 November 2010, 99-106. 
7
 Adopted 21 December 1965. In force 4 January 1969. 660 UNTS 195. 
8
 See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/ (visited 31 July 2012). 
9
 CERD, General Recommendation No. 29 on Article 1, Paragraph 1 (Descent), 22 August 2002, UN 
Doc. A/57/18 (2002) 111. 
10
 Endogamy ‘confines the ties of kinship and marriage within a small and defined group and thereby 
enables it to maintain clear social boundaries with other groups of the same kind’; A. Beteille, ‘The 
Peculiar Tenacity of Caste’, EPW, 31 March 2012, 41-48, 44. 
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usually privileged over power and wealth’.11 According to the Explanatory Notes to 
the UK’s Equality Act 2010, 
[t]he term “caste” denotes a hereditary, endogamous (marrying within the group) community 
associated with a traditional occupation and ranked accordingly on a perceived scale of ritual 
purity. It is generally (but not exclusively) associated with South Asia, particularly India, and 
its diaspora. It can encompass the four classes (varnas) of Hindu tradition (the Brahmin, 
Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shudra communities); the thousands of regional Hindu, Sikh, 
Christian, Muslim or other religious groups known as jatis; and groups amongst South Asian 
Muslims called biradaris. Some jatis regarded as below the varna hierarchy (once termed 
“untouchable”) are known as Dalit.12 
 
Traditionally, marriage between castes and commensality (the sharing of food and 
drink), including the taking of water by so-called ‘high’ castes from ‘lower’ castes, is 
prohibited. Whilst caste is not purely a religious phenomenon, nevertheless religious 
sanction for the caste system can be found in orthodox Hindu creation mythology 
and its hierarchical division of society into four broad groups or varnas traditionally 
linked to occupation or social function – Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors and 
rulers), Vaisyas (traders and artisans) and Shudras (serfs and labourers).
13
 The first 
three groups comprise the so-called ‘twice-born’14 or dvija castes, while the fourth 
                                                 
11
 H. Gorringe and I. Rafanell, ‘The Embodiment of Caste: Oppression, Protest and Social Change’ 41 
Sociology (2007) 97-114, 102. In the leading case of Indra Sawhney v Union of India, A.I.R.1993 SC 
477 para. 82, the Indian Supreme Court defined caste as a socially homogenous class and also an 
occupational grouping, membership of which is involuntary and hereditary: ‘Lowlier the hereditary 
occupation, lowlier the social standing of the class in the graded hierarchy.’ Even where the individual 
does not follow that occupation, ‘still the label remains and his identity is not changed’. 
12
 Equality Act 2010 Explanatory Notes, 10 August 2010, para. 49, drafted by the Government 
Equalities Office (GEO) with the advice of the present author and others; see 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/contents (visited 2 December 2012). 
13
 G. Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism (Cambridge: CUP, 1998) 11-12, 48-49, 58-61. Varna means 
colour, referring not to skin colour or racial characteristics but to a system of colour symbolism 
reflecting the social hierarchy; ibid., 59. 
14
 Male children of the three ‘twice-born’ castes are eligible to undergo upanayana (an initiation 
ceremony that confers twice-born status) where they are invested with a ‘sacred thread’ worn 
permanently across the body except when bathing. The sacred thread (yajnopavita) has ‘largely 
become a hallmark of Brahmin-hood’ and ‘a mark of social status rather than of religious knowledge’; 
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group, the Shudras (over half the Indian population), consists of the ‘low’ castes 
(known in Indian constitutional, legal and administrative terminology as ‘other 
backward classes’ or OBCs).15 Within the four-fold varna (‘chaturvarna’) system a 
distinction can thus be drawn between the three dvija groups on the one hand, and 
the non-dvija or Shudras on the other. 
 
1.1.2.2 Dalits: outside the varna system  
 
Outside the varna system, comprising a fifth group at the very bottom of the social 
hierarchy, are the Dalits, formerly known as Untouchables or ‘Depressed Classes’. A 
fundamental structural distinction thus exists between Dalits and ‘caste Hindus’. 
Dalit is a South Asian political term of self-identification first used by Jotirao Phule, 
the nineteenth-century campaigner against caste oppression.
16
 Meaning ‘crushed’ or 
‘broken’ in Marathi, a regional language of western India, Dalit came into popular 
usage in India in the 1970s via the Dalit Panther Party and the Dalit literary 
movement in Maharasthra
17
 as a militant, assertive category,
18
 replacing Gandhi’s 
term Harijan (‘children of God’), which became widely seen as condescending and 
demeaning. Now commonly associated with Ambedkar,
19
 Dalit seeks to capture the 
                                                                                                                                          
M. McGee, ‘Samskara’, in S. Mittal and G. Thursby (eds.), The Hindu World (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2004) 332-356, 345. 
15
 The OBCs are less severely socially and educationally disadvantaged groups who do not suffer 
from the stigma of Untouchability.  
16
 E. Zelliot, ‘Dalit – new cultural context for an old Marathi word’ in E. Zelliot, From Untouchable to 
Dalit: Essays on the Ambedkar Movement (New Delhi: Manohar, 1998) 267-292, 271. On Phule see 
R. O’Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low Caste Protest in 
Nineteenth Century Western India (Cambridge: CUP, 1985). 
17
 S. Paik, ‘Mahar-Dalit-Buddhist: The history and politics of naming in Maharasthra’, 45(2) 
Contributions to Indian Sociology (2011) 217-241, 218, fn 1, 228; Zelliot, ibid.  
18
 Paik, ibid. 
19
 Dr B.R. Ambedkar (1891-1956), lawyer, Dalit, and Chairman of independent India’s Constitution 
Drafting Committee, was one of India’s greatest political leaders and campaigners for the eradication 
of caste; see C. Jaffrelot, Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste (New 
Delhi: Permanent Black, 2005). Ambedkar used the word Untouchable ‘for those castes lowest in the 
Hindu scale of pollution’; Zelliot, n 16 above, 74, fn 1. He also used the term Dalit, the first time 
being in his Journal ‘Outcaste India’ in 1928 ‘where he characterised being Dalit as the experience of 
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particular stigmatisation, exploitation, and economic, social, cultural, political and 
psychological domination of the Untouchables by the ‘upper’ castes.20 ‘Dalit’ is not 
official terminology; in post-independence India the constitutional, legal and 
administrative term for Dalits is ‘Scheduled Castes’, meaning those formerly 
Untouchable castes listed in a Schedule to the Constitution.
21
 Scheduled Caste (SC) 
status is established by means of a Caste Certificate issued by the authorities attesting 
to the bearer’s membership of a Scheduled caste and entitling them to the benefit of 
constitutional affirmative action policies and other legal and administrative 
measures.
22
  
 
1.1.2.3 Use of Dalit in the thesis  
 
In this thesis I use Dalit as a generic term while recognising that caste terminology is 
highly politicised. In India Dalit is adopted by many, but not all, people of so-called 
Untouchable origin,
23
 whilst in Britain its use is less widespread. In both countries 
some reject Dalit, arguing that by reinforcing notions of ‘broken’ and ‘oppressed’, 
Dalit has become yet another denigrating label, alternatively that is primarily 
                                                                                                                                          
deprivation, marginalisation and stigmatisation’; A. Rao, The Caste Question (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2009) 15. 
20
 Paik, n 17 above, 228.  
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 Constitution of India, Article 341, at http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm (visited 24 November 2012); The 
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 (C.O. 19), at http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/subord/rule3a.htm 
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there; Jodhka and Shah, n 6 above, 100.  
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religion, the STs also suffer severe discrimination and depredations; Galanter, n 5 above, 147-153; 
Census of India 2001, n 3 above. The constitutional term ‘Backward Classes’ is sometimes used both 
to denote the OBCs alone, and generically to denote the SCs, STs and OBCs combined; Galanter, n 5 
above, 121.  
23
 Dalit, alternatively Dalit-Bahujan (Bahujan meaning ‘majority’), is also used as a political umbrella 
term encompassing Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Classes and Scheduled Tribes, together 
comprising around three-quarters of India’s population.  
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associated with the new, middle class ‘Dalit elite’ rather than the masses.24 
Increasingly, in both countries, those who do not self-refer as Dalit may instead 
assert traditional caste names,
25
 or they may self-identify by reference to religion, for 
example as Buddhists, Ravidassias or Valmikis. Conversely, Dalits may seek to hide 
rather than assert their caste identity while others reject caste-associated labels 
altogether.
26
 
 
1.1.2.4 Jati  
While the varna system provides an overarching ideological framework for the 
organisation and classification of Hindu society and its members, in concrete terms 
social relations are governed by an individual’s membership of one of over four 
thousand closed groups or jatis – local or regional endogamous kinship groups, 
hierarchically ranked within a restricted geographical locality and effectively the 
operational units of the caste system.
27
 Unlike varna, the concept of jati is not 
exclusive to Hinduism but is found in all the major South Asian religious 
communities.
28
 The term ‘caste’ thus subsumes two concepts – the broad Hindu 
concept of varna and the South Asian regional concept of jati.  
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 C. Dogra, ‘The First Law: Sing my Name’, Outlook India, 11 July 2011. 
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1.1.2.5 Biraderi  
Amongst South Asian Muslims the term biraderi denotes a not dissimilar system of 
endogamous, hierarchically ranked groups.
29
 Biraderi has a variety of meanings 
depending on context, from extended kinship group or zat (equivalent to jati) to a 
small group of intermarrying close kin,
30
 but it is generally translated as kinship 
group or brotherhood, with implied descent from a common male ancestor
31
 and 
entailing complex dynamics of support, reciprocity, obligation and control. In 
Britain, caste is used interchangeably for varna, jati and, increasingly, biraderi. 
 
1.1.3 Caste membership and mobility  
While there are only four varnas, the precise number of jatis cannot be known, as jati 
groups may merge or sub-divide to form new groups.
32
 Similarly, while the ranking 
of the four Hindu varnas is fixed and immutable, the possibility of movement in jati 
ranking has always existed and there is ‘not always agreement as to where a 
particular jati fits’.33 Crucially, however, both individual varna and jati membership 
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ibid., 114-115. 
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 Shaw, ibid., 141. 
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are permanent and hereditary, that is, determined by birth.
34
 Unlike class, a key 
feature of caste is individual inability or restricted ability to alter one’s inherited 
status;
35
 social mobility is dependent on the re-ranking of the entire caste or jati: 
‘You are born into [your caste], you cannot choose your caste, buy it or graduate into 
a different caste’.36 Exceptionally, individual jati mobility may sometimes occur in 
the context of inter-caste marriage or adoption – but this is not automatic.37  
 
1.1.4 Untouchability  
1.1.4.1 Untouchability, pollution and stigma 
Two features distinguish caste discrimination from other forms of discrimination 
based on inherited status; firstly its religious underpinnings and secondly the concept 
of Untouchability.
38
 Dalits have traditionally been considered by dominant castes to 
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Hinduism and the Case of Valmiki (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) 40-45. On Brahmin status as earned, 
not inherited, see A. Sharma, Human Rights and Hinduism: A Conceptual Approach (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press (OUP), 2004) 66-69. 
35
 CERD, n 9 above, Article 1(a).  
36
 Paul Divakar, Convenor of the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights, cited in A. Waughray, 
‘Caste Discrimination: A Twenty-First Century Challenge for UK Discrimination Law?’, 72(2) 
Modern Law Review (2009) 182-219, 187; see V. V. Giri v D. Suri Dora (1960) 1SCR 42, cited in 
Shrivastava v The State of Maharasthra, Bombay High Court, Criminal Application No. 2347 (2009) 
para. 8: ‘It is well-known that a person who belongs by birth to a depressed caste or tribe would find it 
very difficult, if not impossible, to attain the status of a higher caste amongst the Hindus by virtue of 
his volition, education, culture and status. The history of social reform for the last century and more 
has shown how difficult it is to break or even to relax the rigour of the inflexible and exclusive 
character of the caste system’. 
37
 Galanter, n 5 above, 282-362; L. Dudley Jenkins, Identity and Identification in India; Defining the 
Disadvantaged (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) 31-39, 76-79. Traditionally it was assumed that 
a woman took her husband’s social identity on marriage, but Indian courts have held that a Scheduled 
Caste woman’s status does not change by virtue of her marriage to a higher caste man, nor does a 
‘Forward Caste’ woman assume her husband’s status on marriage to a Scheduled Caste man; see 
Urmila Ginda v Union of India A.I.R. 1975 Del. 115, cited in Galanter, n 5 above, 340; Shrivastava v 
The State of Maharasthra, ibid., paras. 11-12. 
38
 The nexus between Untouchability and humiliation is explored in many contemporary analyses of 
Untouchability; see G. Guru, ‘Power of Touch’, 23(25) Frontline (2006); V. Geetha, ‘The 
Humiliations of Untouchability’ in G. Guru (ed.), Humiliation: Claims and Context (New Delhi: 
OUP, 2011) 95-107; G. Alex, ‘A Sense of Belonging and Exclusion: “Touchability” and 
“Untouchability” in Tamil Nadu’, 73(4) Ethos (2008) 523-543; S. Sarukkai, ‘Phenomenology of 
Untouchability’, 44(37) EPW , 12 September 2009, 39-48; G. Guru, ‘Archaeology of Untouchability’, 
EPW, 12 September 2009, 49-56. On dignity, self-worth and humiliation see D. Shultziner and I. 
Rabnovici, ‘Human Dignity, Self-Worth and Humiliation: A Comparative Legal-Psychological 
Approach’, 18 Psychology, Public Policy and Law (2012) 105-137. 
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be irredeemably and permanently polluted, hence ‘Untouchable’, people with whom 
all physical and social contact is to be avoided for fear of defilement.
39
 Ambedkar 
described the concept as a notional ‘cordon sanitaire’ separating the Untouchables 
from the rest of Indian society.
40
 The concepts of pollution and Untouchability are 
ritual and religious in origin rather than hygiene-based, Untouchability deriving 
ostensibly from one’s own or one’s ancestors’ engagement in ritually ‘unclean’ 
occupations
41
 as a result of impure birth related to conduct in previous life. Despite 
the ritual and religious origin of this imagined ‘pollution’, the discrimination it 
engenders is circular; many Dalits are constrained to work in ritually polluting jobs 
which are also objectively dangerous, dirty and low paid, thereby reinforcing their 
Untouchable status. Despite its purely notional nature, caste is conceived as a 
physical attribute, hence permanent and immutable. The conceptualisation of 
Untouchability in corporeal terms as a ‘property of the body’42 and its supposedly 
inherited and immutable nature means that it cannot be shed by engagement in 
‘clean’ work or by professional or economic advancement. Caste, argues Jaspal, is a 
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see G. Ramaswamy, India Stinking: Manual Scavengers in Andhra Pradesh and Their Work 
(Pondicherry: Navayana Publishing, 2005); A. Zaidi, “India’s Shame,” Frontline, 22 September 2006; 
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 Flood (1998), n 13 above, 219: ‘Apart from everyday pollution caused by the body and contact with 
polluting substances, there is a deeper level of purity and pollution which is regarded as a property of 
the body, a bodily substance. Brahmins have a pure bodily substance while the substance of their 
bodies means that Untouchables are in a permanent state of pollution’. 
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fundamentally psychological construct and the concept of stigma ‘vital [to] 
understanding how caste identity affects the lives of South Asians’;43 the pervasive 
social stigmatisation of Dalits in the subcontinent and in the diaspora means that 
Dalits remain stigmatised, regardless of any increase in social mobility: ‘[C]aste 
essentialism ensures that Dalits’ dis-identification with the demeaning occupations 
traditionally associated with their group has had little or no impact on their position 
within the social hierarchy’.44 
 
1.1.4.2 ‘Touch’ as a category   
 
Indian philosophy distinguishes between ‘contact’ - a quality which is present in both 
the toucher and the touched - and ‘touch’, which is not about contact (which is a 
relation), but is a quality that inheres in the object.
45
 This means that an Untouchable 
person is untouchable – a ‘carrier of pollution’ – whether or not they come into 
contact with another person; the Untouchable can do nothing to ‘get rid’ of his/her 
Untouchability.
46
 Thus, ‘the real site of [U]ntouchability is the person who refuses to 
touch the untouchable’.47 According to Indian sociologist Gopal Guru, 
Untouchability is a unique form of discrimination which privileges the corporeal 
body of the dominant caste individual (the Touchable) as ‘sacred’ primarily in 
contrast to its logical counterpart, the ritually defiling or profane body (the ‘Un-
touchable’).48 Paradoxically, writes Guru, this assigns a negative power to the 
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Untouchable, whose Untouchability can become a ‘poison weapon’ for the 
Touchable; the Untouchable thus presents a ‘sociological danger’ which must be 
detected and controlled. Consequently, Untouchability in India is linked directly to 
the effective social, residential, educational and economic ‘quarantine’ of large 
sections of the population.
49
 Kautalya – author of the ancient Hindu religio-legal text 
the Arthasastra – was ‘the first lawgiver to specify touch as a penal offence’.50 
Today, Guru identifies touch as the ‘primary category for caste relations’.51  
 
1.1.4.3 Untouchability, social exclusion and violence  
 
Untouchability is both a cause of and a mechanism for social exclusion.
52
 In India, it 
continues to manifest in practices such as the avoidance of physical touch or even 
physical proximity (for example, avoiding sitting next to a Dalit pupil or student in 
class), taboos on inter-dining and the taking of water from castes considered 
‘polluting’, residential segregation,53 taboos and restrictions on Dalits’ use of 
facilities such as roads, wells, bathing ghats (tanks), shops, restaurants, tea rooms,
54
 
and of certain modes of transport such as bicycles, restrictions on the clothing Dalits 
can wear, occupational segregation and restrictions on choice of occupation and the 
practice of endogamy.
55
 Despite the abolition of Untouchability and its 
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criminalisation in the Constitution of India 1950 and in subsequent legislation,
56
 and 
constitutional and legislative prohibitions of discrimination on grounds of caste,
57
 
many Dalits in contemporary India are subject to severe socio-economic deprivation 
and exclusion and well-documented violations of their civil, political, economic and 
social rights,
58
 their subordinated status maintained via the dual enforcement 
mechanisms of Untouchability practices and systemic violence or ‘atrocities’,59 
frequently of a highly gendered nature.
60
 While this level of caste-based 
discrimination, social exclusion and violence is not replicated in Britain, evidence 
from government-commissioned research suggests the existence of caste-based 
discrimination and harassment in this country.
61
  
 
1.1.4.4 Untouchability as separable from caste  
A fundamental ideological distinction exists between those who believe caste is 
essentially non-invidious, associational and communitarian
62
 and those who believe 
caste as an institution is inherently exclusionary, inegalitarian and inseparable from 
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caste-ism and, by extension, from discrimination on grounds thereof.
63
 Article 17 of 
the Constitution of India 1950 abolishes Untouchability but not the caste system 
itself. This reflects a Gandhian view of Untouchability as an aberration of Hinduism 
and caste, but the caste system itself as non-objectionable or even positive if cleansed 
of Untouchability. J. H. Hutton, India’s 1931 Census Commissioner, regarded ‘the 
problem of Untouchability as quite separable from that of caste’,64 disputing that 
Untouchability was ‘a necessary condition of the survival of Hinduism’ or essential 
to the (caste) system.
65
 As for the caste system itself, he warned of the difficulties 
and ‘perhaps the dangers’ of getting rid of it, saying that if ‘carried out at a stroke’, 
such an undertaking would ‘wreck the edifice of Hindu society’.66  
 
1.1.4.5 Ambedkar, Untouchability, Hinduism and caste  
 
Ambedkar considered Untouchability, Hinduism and caste to be inextricably linked, 
and caste (the ‘four- varna’ system) and Untouchability as India’s ‘two great social 
evils’.67 Caste was divisive and antisocial; a Hindu’s loyalty was to his caste,68 while 
to the Untouchables,  
[H]induism is a veritable chamber of horrors. The sanctity… of the Vedas, Smrtis and 
Shastras… the senseless law of status by birth are to the Untouchables veritable instruments 
of torture which Hinduism [has forged] against the Untouchables.
69
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Hindus observe caste, he said, ‘not because they are inhuman or wrong-headed [but] 
because they are deeply religious’.70 For Hindus, caste is a sacred institution, and ‘to 
ask people to give up their caste is to go contrary to their fundamental religious 
notions’71 – ‘a Hindu’s whole life is one anxious effort to preserve his caste’.72 
Ambedkar’s crucial question was how to bring about the reform of the Hindu social 
order, how to abolish caste.
73
 The answer lay in attacking its divine basis.
74
 The 
difficulty is that caste is an economic as well as a religious system, one which 
‘permits unmitigated economic exploitation without obligation’.75 As to whether the 
Hindus would ‘agree to give up the economic and social advantages’ of 
Untouchability, he observed that ‘vested interests have never been known to have 
willingly divested themselves unless there was sufficient force to compel them’ – 
hence his fear that independence would leave the Untouchables at the mercy of the 
Hindus,
76
 and his determination to secure Constitutional safeguards for the 
Untouchables when independence came.
77
  
 
1.1.5 Markers for caste  
 
Caste has been endowed with a quasi-physical quality, yet it is not a physical 
attribute but rather ‘a notion… a state of the mind’.78 Accordingly, the markers 
identifying an individual’s caste are not purely physical. Jati groupings are 
territorially defined, being local or regional, not national. The local ‘caste map’ is a 
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matter of local knowledge, especially in rural areas where seventy per cent of India’s 
population live; moreover, this knowledge travels with migration.
79
 Markers for caste 
include place of origin and residence (actual or ancestral), name (although names can 
be changed to obscure caste status), current or ancestral occupation, religion or 
religious practices, education, skin colour (although this is not determinative),
80
 
appearance, body language, demeanour, comportment and bodily expression.
81
 In the 
UK, while such markers may not have the same cultural resonance, name, ancestral 
occupation, place of origin, residence and religious affiliation and place of worship 
are used to identify caste background. For Indians there is a further marker – 
‘Scheduled Caste’ membership (explained above). Although context-specific, 
‘Scheduled Caste’ has entered diaspora usage, for example on matrimonial 
websites.
82
 
 
1.1.6 Caste and occupation  
 
Despite the doctrinal association between caste and occupation, the link has never 
been watertight or so rigid that individuals could not – theoretically at least – give up 
a hereditary occupation or enjoy occupational mobility across caste boundaries.
83
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Yet, in the ‘closed economy’ of the village, Dalits were traditionally economically 
dependent on the upper castes as agricultural wage labourers or service providers, 
with little possibility of choice in employment. Post-independence affirmative action 
policies have enabled some Dalits to enter public employment (although few reach 
the highest echelons), and India’s post-1991 economic liberalisation has created 
some private sector opportunities. However, it remains the case that certain jobs, 
such as those considered ritually unclean, are carried out exclusively by Dalits.
84
 
Moreover, they often find themselves excluded from ‘high caste’ jobs, albeit now on 
grounds of ‘merit’ rather than overtly because of caste.85  
 
1.1.7 Caste and religion  
 
Doctrinally, caste is associated only with Hinduism,
86
 yet in the UK as in the Indian 
sub-continent distinctions and discrimination on grounds of caste are found among 
South Asian adherents of Christianity
87
 and Islam,
88
 notwithstanding the absence of a 
doctrinal basis for caste in Islam, and Christianity’s doctrinal espousal of 
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egalitarianism; and among the Sikhs despite Sikhism’s doctrinal rejection of caste.89 
Hence, despite its doctrinal and ideological basis in Hinduism, in practical terms 
caste cannot be said to be solely a Hindu phenomenon.
90
 Conversion from Hinduism 
to another religion (Islam, Sikhism, Christianity, Buddhism) as a means of 
emancipation from caste oppression has a long history in India,
91
 but in reality caste 
status, in particular Dalit status, frequently accompanies the convert into his or her 
new religion.
92
 Caste categories are ‘terminologically (and behaviourally) 
distinguished in all religious groups, with or without a religious designation 
appended (e.g. “high caste Muslim”)’.93 South Asian Christians of Untouchable 
origins may be known – and may choose to self-identify - as Dalit Christians, 
reflecting their own or their ancestors’ pre-conversion caste status, while 
discrimination based on caste among Christians in India and in the diaspora is well-
documented.
94
 Conversion to Buddhism has been a popular emancipatory strategy 
since Ambedkar’s 1956 conversion (along with thousands of his followers) to that 
religion, chosen for its egalitarianism and its disavowal of caste as well as its Indic 
roots,
95
 but this has proved an imperfect means of escaping caste oppression, since 
‘Ambedkarite’ Buddhists (sometimes termed ‘neo-Buddhists’) are commonly 
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identified as ex-Untouchables. Yet, despite the cross-religious nature of 
contemporary caste and associated discrimination, the constitutional Scheduled 
Castes category in India is restricted to members of ‘Indic’ religions, i.e. Hindus 
(including Jains), Sikhs and Buddhists, while Muslim and Christian Dalits are denied 
SC status.
96
 
 
Conversion aside, religion has historically offered Dalits another means of escape 
from the psychological tyranny of caste oppression through devotion to a ‘low caste’ 
or caste-transcending religious figure or sant and the creation of distinct Dalit 
religious identities, for example the radical medieval Indian bhakti movement which 
challenged religious and ritual orthodoxy and the notion that Untouchables could not 
access the divine,
97
 and the Ad-Dharm movement which emerged in north India in 
the 1920s.
98
 Contemporary Ad-Dharm in India and the UK includes Valmikis and 
Ravidassias – religious groupings which by definition comprise individuals from 
diverse religious traditions, including Hinduism and Sikhism with shared 
‘Untouchable’ origins.99  
 
1.1.8 Status differences among Dalits  
 
Ambedkar identified the religious legitimisation of economic exploitation and social 
oppression, and the concept of Untouchability, as the unique and distinguishing 
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features of caste. Yet despite Ambedkar’s framing of Dalit experience in terms of a 
pan-Indian Dalit identity and despite the recent emergence of a discourse of 
transnational Dalit solidarity, Dalits do not constitute a homogenous category but are 
themselves internally hierarchically differentiated.
100
 This appears to be linked to 
assertions of status superiority by more affluent or politically powerful Dalits, 
leading to ‘intra-Dalit’ or internal status-based inequalities and prohibitions.101 Intra-
Dalit status differences may also be reinforced by Dalit ‘origin myths’ whereby 
certain Dalit castes attribute their present subjugated position to the (undeserved) loss 
of a historically higher status.
102
 Such myths commonly contest the position of 
Untouchables within the caste system but not necessarily the system itself – as seen, 
writes Mosse, in the ‘bifurcation’ by Untouchables of low status roles and the 
displacing of the most negative aspects of such roles onto yet lower status groups.
103
 
 
1.1.9 Caste as a cross-cultural concept  
 
The question whether caste is a uniquely Indian social institution incomparable to, 
say, racism in the United States or class, or whether it is merely one among many 
versions of a universal social form involving societal inequality, has been much 
debated.
104
 In other words, can caste be a cross-cultural concept? To what extent is it 
meaningful to talk about caste outside India (and the South Asian diaspora)? How 
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useful is caste as a tool of analysis independent of cultural context, ‘detached from 
any Indian anchorage’?105 Until the late twentieth century this debate had largely 
focussed on the use of caste as an explanatory category for oppression in the US 
based on race and colour (although Hutton wrote of institutions analogous to caste in 
Africa, Japan and Burma in the 1940s).
106
 American sociologist Oliver Cox argued 
that the fundamental bases of caste and the US racial divide are different, race being 
based on ‘physical identifiability’ and caste on cultural heritage.107 The argument is 
that, unlike race relations in the USA, caste ‘commands a degree of collective 
consensus or at least compliance’ from low and high castes alike108 (itself a contested 
argument, examined below). In the past fifteen years the question has been whether 
caste in South Asia (particularly India) can be subsumed, sociologically and/or 
legally, within wider universal concepts such as racial discrimination on grounds of 
descent or discrimination based on work and descent,
109
 and whether ‘caste’ in the 
South Asian sense has any mileage as an explanatory category for analogous forms 
of inherited status discrimination outside South Asia and its diaspora (for example, 
Japan and parts of Africa).
110
 Recent developments in the UK have thrown up 
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another question: whether caste can have mileage as a legal as well as a sociological 
category in the diaspora context. 
 
1.1.10 Caste in the diaspora  
 
The South Asian diaspora exhibits examples of both the dissolution or near-
dissolution of caste (sometimes, paradoxically, alongside the retention of caste 
names traditionally associated with the demarcation of caste status and continued 
adherence to ‘pollution ideologies once associated with caste hierarchies’)111 and the 
persistence of caste and caste consciousness, including endogamy and caste-based 
discrimination.
112
 The picture in individual countries appears to depend largely on 
the history and nature of South Asian migration to the country concerned. In those 
countries where caste persists, the question arises as to the nature and role of caste 
and the possibility – or desirability – of its dissolution.  
 
1.2 Religious and historical origins of a caste society   
1.2.1 Indo-Aryans, the Rg Veda and the origins of varna 
   
The demise of the indigenous bronze-age Indus Valley (Harappan) civilisation in 
northern India, around 1700 BC, left the way open for the Indo-Aryans (arya 
meaning noble) – nomadic, tribal, Indo-European-speaking peoples from Eastern 
Europe and central Asia who had migrated first into Iran and Afghanistan from 
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around 2000 BC, and thence into northern India, bringing with them the horse, iron 
weaponry and worship practices centred on priestly incantations and ritual sacrifices 
to the gods.
113
 Nineteenth-century European scholarship theorised an ‘Aryan 
invasion’ of northern India around 1500 BC, but current scholarly consensus is of a 
prolonged period of intermingling and acculturation of the Aryans and the Indus 
valley peoples, resulting in the emergence of the Indo-Aryans.
114
 Arya social identity 
was determined not racially or biologically, says the Indian historian Romila Thapar, 
but culturally – the Aryans were distinguished from non-Aryan indigenous groups, or 
dasas/ dasyus (initially ‘other’, later ‘slave’) and mleccha (foreigners or barbarians), 
by such characteristics as Aryan speech forms, belief systems and rituals.
115
 
Although initially neither a fixed nor a homogenous category,
116
 what was fixed, 
says Thapar, was the notion of a dominant group ‘with the right to demand 
subservience from others’, a notion underpinned and legitimised by the ideology of 
varna. Subsequently, Arya became identified with membership of the dominant 
culture and superior social status, and dasa with subordinate status – irrespective of 
origins.
117
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The Rg Veda – India’s earliest surviving religious text – was composed orally by the 
Indo-Aryans sometime between 1500 and 900 BC,
118
 although not written down until 
around 600 BC.
119
 It is the earliest of four texts known collectively as the Vedas, 
veda meaning (sacred) knowledge in Sanskrit.
120
 The Rg Veda consists of 1,028 
poems or mantras (incantations)
121
 to the Aryan gods, grouped in ten books, or 
mandalas. The Vedas are considered divine revelation or sruti, meaning ‘revealed’ 
texts seen and heard by inspired ‘seers’ (rsi) who had insight into pre-existing cosmic 
truths. This knowledge was hereditary and was learned and transmitted entirely 
orally, in Sanskrit (the language which evolved from old Indo-Aryan). 
122
 It was the 
role of the Aryan priests, or Brahmans, as ‘custodians of the Veda’123 to memorise 
the Vedic hymns and officiate over sacrifices.  
 
1.2.1.1 Purusa-Sukta: the Creation Myth   
 
In the tenth and last book of the Rg Veda, in verses 11–16, is found, in hymn form, 
the creation myth of Purusa, the primordial or cosmic man, from whose sacrificed 
and dismembered body the gods created the cosmos and society, the latter divided 
into the four hierarchical, social classes or varnas:  
When they divided the Man, into how many parts did they apportion him? What do they call 
his mouth, his two arms and thighs and feet? 
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His mouth became the Brahman; his arms were made into the Warrior, his thighs the People, 
and from his feet the Servants were born.
124
 
 
While the duties of the four social classes are not elaborated in the Purusa myth 
itself, and there is at this stage no mention of a fifth group outside the varna 
system,
125
 the imagery is invoked in later texts, says Holdrege, to provide cosmic 
legitimisation for the division of labour between the varnas, and indeed for the 
hierarchical and immutable nature of the system.
126
 The early Vedic texts introduce 
the key themes and concepts which later Hinduism expands on and develops, and 
which underpin classical Hindu law – the notion of the cosmic whole127 as holistic, 
ordered, balanced and governed by the principle of rta or cosmic order (later, 
dharma), which ‘ensures the integrated functioning of the natural order, the divine 
order, human order and sacrificial order’.128 Pursusa’s head, naval and feet are 
correlated with the heavens, mid-regions and earth, and his mouth, arms, thighs, feet 
with four social classes (Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras).
129
 The 
Purusa hymn is important because it presents hierarchical, hereditary social groups 
as part of the structure of the cosmos.130 Doniger suggests another reason: it ranks 
kings below priests, whereas Buddhist literature puts kings at the top. Doniger 
describes this as ‘one of the earliest documented theocratic takeovers’; the Purusa 
myth, she suggests, may have been the ‘foundational myth’ of the Brahmin class.131  
 
                                                 
124
 W. Doniger (trans), The Rig Veda (London: Penguin Books, 1981) 31. 
125
 V. Jha, ‘Stages in the History of Untouchables’, II(I) Indian Historical Review (1975) 14-31, 14. 
126
 Holdrege, n 123 above, 218.  
127
 W. Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Africa and Asia 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2006) 205. 
128
 Holdrege, n 123 above, 215. 
129
 Holdrege, ibid., 217.  
130
 Flood (1998), n 13 above, 49. 
131
 Doniger (2010), n 121 above, 119. 
40 
 
At first the Vedic people distinguished only two classes or varnas, their own (the 
arya) and that of the people they conquered (dasas or dasyu). Although the ‘rigid 
hereditary system of the professions characteristic of the caste system was not yet in 
place’, by the end of the Vedic period the class system was in position. By now, the 
important social division was not into just two classes but four.
 132
   
 
1.2.2 Origins of jati   
While the origin of varna lies in the Rg Veda, the origin of jati is less easy to 
pinpoint. It is possible, says Thapar, that the genesis of the concept may have been 
the clan (with which jati has close parallels as a form of social organisation), and that 
the formation of jatis preceded varna.
133
 Wolpert and Thapar suggest that the roots 
of the jati system may lie in India’s pre-Aryan past; floor plans in different quarters 
of the ancient Indus Valley city of Mohenjo-daro indicate a social hierarchy based on 
occupational status and fear of pollution through miscegenation or commensality.
134
 
Fear of contamination or pollution through drinking water, later associated with caste 
distinctions, may also have originated at this time.
135
 In the later Aryan era, 
occupational specialisations are listed in Brahmana religious texts
136
 which, as 
sacred books, confer a sanctity and significance to the work performed by different 
groups in society. But occupation alone cannot explain the emergence of a caste 
social order, which is as much about totem and taboo as about occupation. Wolpert 
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suggests fear of losing power dictated marriage only within the limits of a trusted 
group, while tribal fears of losing ‘identity’, or racial fears of losing ‘purity’, 
contributed to the creation of a system of thousands of jatis.
137
 Vivekanand Jha 
disputes that the varna system came to India with the Aryans, or that Untouchability 
originated with the Harappans. Rather, he argues, the four-fold varna system was an 
‘indigenous development’ of the later Vedic period. However, Jha concurs that varna 
was ‘in essence exploitative in nature and content’ – sacrifices were ‘consciously 
designed to help rulers overcome internal conflicts and to make the Vaisya and the 
Shudra submissive’, and in this process the role of the Brahmans was crucial.138 
 
1.2.3 Hierarchy, heredity and endogamy   
 
The chief characteristics of the caste social order as it emerged in India were 
hierarchy (inherent in the varna-jati system) and hereditary occupation, essential to 
maintaining a division of labour.
139
 The ideological legitimisation of the system was 
its sanction by religion, while the principle of heredity was maintained by the twin 
practices of endogamy and commensality.
140
 The control of women was central to 
the Brahminical social order.
141
 Endogamy (described by Ambedkar as the vehicle 
by which caste is maintained and replicated)
142
 and the subordination of women are 
closely linked.
143
 Traditionally, marriages (especially among the upper castes) were 
arranged and girls were married very young, as arranged and child marriages were 
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easier to regulate according to the rules of caste.
144
 Upper-caste restrictions on 
widow remarriage similarly served to maintain caste boundaries. While ideologies of 
chastity and caste purity regulated upper caste women and girls, Dalit women 
experienced the ‘expropriation of manual and sexual labour’,145 including rape and 
sexual exploitation via the devadasi system and prostitution.  
 
1.2.4 Origin of Untouchability  
 
The Rg Veda does not mention Untouchability.
146
 Hanumanthan argues that 
Untouchability is a ‘by-product’ of the varna system, which separates the three 
twice-born varnas from the once-born Shudras. It also separates those within the 
system – savarnas - from those outside the system, or avarnas (the Untouchables), 
identified as Candalas in the later Vedic texts.
147
 Candalas may be Untouchable by 
birth/occupation or they may have become Untouchable through bad conduct. 
Buddhist and Jaina literature also refers to degraded castes (based on occupation or 
profession), leading Hanumanthan to attribute the growth of Untouchability to the 
various taboos which existed among ancient Indians, irrespective of religion.
148
 Jha 
considers the Candalas were most likely one of the indigenous tribes known to the 
Aryans, living on the perimeters of Aryan settlements, with whom the process of 
assimilation had begun;
149
 they do not appear in the Rg Veda but are mentioned in 
later Vedic literature. Jha argues that ‘ideology and force were both systematically 
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employed’ to slowly develop caste and Untouchability in India.150 Those tribes with 
‘poor material background fared badly in the unequal encounter with the Aryans’; 
these were the first peoples to become ‘tabooed and damned as Untouchables’, 
relegated to the ritually lowest social position.
151
  
 
1.3 Sociological theories and interpretations of caste   
1.3.1 Introduction  
 
Sociological theories of caste
152
 have fallen traditionally into two broad categories, 
the ‘essentialist’ or idealist, which focuses on religious and ideological factors, 
portraying India as a timeless society of which caste is the defining and essential 
feature,
153
 and the secular or materialist, focussing on socio-economic and political 
factors.
154
 It is submitted that Ambedkar has succeeded best in capturing the 
complexities of caste as a multi-faceted, religious, economic and social phenomenon. 
Since the 1990s, public and academic debate on caste in India has shifted from the 
merits and de-merits of the various theories of caste, to the changing nature of caste – 
whether it is dissolving in the face of democracy, modernisation and economic 
liberalisation, whether ‘it is becoming more a political than a social category, or 
whether it remains as oppressive as it always has been’.155 In the UK, caste has not 
been dissolved. Instead, caste consciousness persists in the maintenance of caste-
based identities as social/cultural identities;
156
 the question then arises whether it is 
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possible for caste-based identities to be decoupled from the prejudice and 
discrimination of the caste system and to be egalitarian in practice.
157
  
 
1.3.2 Colonialism and the origins of caste as a sociological concept 
 
Caste as a sociological concept, writes Sharma, originated in the systematic attempts 
by colonial administrators and scholars to explain, theorise and interpret caste, and to 
classify Indians by caste.
158
 As a consequence, pre-existing caste norms, conventions 
and observances were ‘expanded and sharpened’ and caste language and ideology 
became incorporated into the structures of government, albeit that ‘Indians as much 
as Britons… took the initiative in this process’.159 Nonetheless, until the mid-
nineteenth century, caste was subsidiary to race in colonial analyses of Indian 
society.
160
 One reason for the rise of caste as a sociological category, suggests Bayly, 
was the role of literate Brahmins who acted as interpreters of the Sastric texts which 
the British authorities treated as authoritative sources of native law. This privileged 
the Brahminical view ‘as the correct interpretation of Hindu culture and custom’,161 
giving Brahmins unprecedented influence
162
 and a ‘larger than legitimate role in the 
conception of Indian society’.163 Another reason was the launch in 1871–2 of the 
decennial All-India Census, which sought to collect systematic information about 
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Indian society and the economy, inter alia by classifying all Indians by religion, 
caste or tribal community, occupation, age and sex.
164
  
 
1.3.3 Racial theories of caste  
 
Initially, race was defined by the orientalists linguistically and culturally rather than 
in a physiological sense.
165
 Caste, nation, tribe and race were used interchangeably to 
convey ties of affinity.
166
 From the early nineteenth century, however, European 
ideas about race were influenced by the rise of ‘race science’ – evolutionary theories 
about the moral and biological characteristics of civilised (and degenerate) races or 
nations and the construction of global comparative schemes of racial ranking based 
on physiological ‘types’.167 The idea that castes reflected racial differences was first 
mooted by Sir William Jones, the eighteenth-century scholar-official and translator, 
who proposed that Sanskrit and European languages were of common stock.
168
 
Colonial ideas of race as the basis of caste and the caste system were cemented by 
the colonial administrator H. H. Risley, the 1901 Census Commissioner.
169
 Based on 
the interpretation of varna as colour in Hindu texts, he argued that the caste system 
was based on racial antagonism between light-skinned Aryan invaders and dark-
skinned indigenous Dravidians.
170
 Risley devised a hierarchical classification scheme 
based on anthropometric measurements which divided Indians into seven basic racial 
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types,
171
 with Dravidians considered the most primitive and Indo-Aryans the most 
ethnologically advanced.
172
 Caste, he believed, was an evolutionary weapon adopted 
by the superior Aryans to preserve their purity of blood and racial stock from the 
perils of miscegenation with the darker indigenous populations, i.e. castes were races 
and the distinction between high and low castes was really a distinction between 
peoples of supposedly superior and inferior racial endowment.
173
  
 
The Indian ‘non-Brahmin movement’ of the early twentieth century also espoused a 
racial analysis of caste, arguing that Brahmins and non-Brahmins were different 
races with correspondingly divergent interests.
174
 Ambedkar, however, dismissed 
arguments that castes constituted separate racial groups, either in the biological or the 
social sciences sense of the term: 
[T]he caste system came into being long after the different races in India had commingled in 
blood and culture. To hold that distinctions of caste are really distinctions of race and to treat 
different castes as though they were so many different races is a gross perversion of facts 
(sic) (italics added). 
175
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In this he pre-empted the position of later Indian governments on the ‘caste as race’ 
question, but for different reasons. Ambedkar’s objection was to biological 
arguments justifying the caste system as a mechanism for preserving the perceived 
racial and genetic purity – and superiority – of the dominant castes. He argued that 
‘men (sic) of pure race exist nowhere’, that this was especially true of the people of 
India and that the caste system ‘does not demarcate racial division’ but is ‘a social 
division of people of the same race’.176 Likewise India, before CERD, has 
maintained that the caste system is based on the ancient functional division of Indian 
society rather than racial distinctions, although this argument may be motivated less 
by ideological objections to notions of biological or genetic caste purity than by 
concern to shield caste from international scrutiny as a form of racial discrimination. 
 
1.3.3.1 Caste and genetics  
 
Recent research by population geneticists indicates that, broadly speaking, the so-
called ‘upper castes’ show closer genetic affinities with West-Eurasian populations 
than do the so-called ‘lower castes’, who show greater affinity to Asian 
populations.
177
 However, the existence of such genetic affinities does not mean that 
caste groups are genetically homogenous or distinct; indeed, the opposite has been 
established:
178
 there is ‘no clear congruence of genetic and geographical or 
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sociocultural affinities’ among caste groups.179 Moreover, ‘while genes may reflect 
social patterns, social status is not genetic’.180 The argument that Dalits as a whole or 
individual caste groups can be distinguished from each other on biological or genetic 
grounds was addressed by the Supreme Court of India in 2000, when a scientist tried 
to sue his in-laws for luring him into marrying their daughter by claiming that they 
came from a high caste family, when in fact they were of low caste origins; the court 
rejected his argument that the caste origins of his wife could be scientifically 
proven.
181
  
 
1.3.4 Louis Dumont and his critics  
 
In 1966, Louis Dumont, a French anthropologist, devised a theory of caste based on 
what he believed to be the underlying ideological principles and values of Hindu 
civilisation.
182
 His influential book, Homo Hierarchicus, was a response to the ultra-
empirical fieldwork studies of the 1950s and 1960s,
183
 which he attacked as failing to 
grasp India’s historic essence and unique difference from the West. Dumont 
identified a system of oppositions as the structure underlying the caste order,
184
 and 
the opposition of the pure and the impure as the fundamental principle underlying 
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caste (an idea articulated earlier by Indian historian S.V. Ketkar).
185
 Dumont viewed 
caste as the essence of Indian society – a cohesive, integrated system, culturally and 
ideologically rooted in Hinduism where ‘each particular man in his place must 
contribute to the global order’186 – in contrast to the atomised individualism of 
Western society. Despite its inherent hierarchy and inequality, Dumont argued that 
caste society was not exploitative because it was oriented to the collectivity rather 
than the individual; functionally, the system provided social cohesion.
187
  
 
Dumont’s model of caste society as a system of consensual interdependence has been 
widely criticised as ignoring the material (economic) basis of caste. ‘Materialists’ 
accuse Dumont and his supporters of failing to recognise the empirical realities of 
caste oppression;
188
 caste is about power, ‘institutionalised inequality, guaranteed 
differential access to the valued things in life’.189 Caste systems generate ‘enormous 
conflict’190 and are maintained not by consensus or ideological acquiescence but 
through the threat or exercise of power.
191
 They are marked by mobility striving, 
whether in the form of status emulation (‘Sanskritisation’)192 or constant 
contestation. Many Dalits reject the religious criteria by which caste is ranked; caste 
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members ‘may describe their position in the social hierarchy’, but this is not 
necessarily ‘a reflection of their own estimates of their social worth’.193 Dalit legends 
and origin myths invariably portray Dalits as Brahmans or Kshatriyas in some earlier 
age, whose ‘mythic plunge’ to Untouchable status is explained not by ‘accretion of 
pollution… but rather because of some misfortune. Fate is the culprit’.194 
Nevertheless, scholars recognise that rejecting one’s place in the system is not the 
same as questioning the system itself.
195
  
 
1.3.5 Caste as orientalist invention196  
 
Scholars such as Nicholas Dirks and Ronald Inden have argued that the concept of 
caste and its perceived centrality in Indian life is a product of British rule.
197
 In 1988, 
Dirks asserted that ‘[p]aradoxically, colonialism seems to have created much of what 
is now accepted as Indian “tradition,” including an autonomous caste structure with 
the Brahman clearly and unambiguously at the head’.198 It has even been suggested 
that the ‘birth of caste’ is attributable solely to the colonial Census.199 Other 
accounts, whilst acknowledging the role of colonialism in the ‘construction’ of caste 
as a pan-Indian concept, assert that the roots of caste go far deeper,
200
 and although 
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the Untouchables as an entity were in one sense ‘constructed’ or ‘invented’ in the 
late colonial period, their subordination long predates the colonial era.
201
  
 
1.3.6 The ‘tenacity of caste’  
A vast body of literature exists on the tenacity of caste in post-independence India
202
 
and the way in which it has survived and changed (particularly since India’s 1991 
economic liberalisation), adapting to democracy and capitalism rather than 
disappearing. One narrative holds that the ‘historical fault lines’ of caste, tribe and 
religion have been aggravated in modern India’; a second, conversely, posits that the 
relevance of caste is now ‘mostly limited to selection of marriage partners and has 
little importance in shaping material inequalities’.203 Between these two poles lie 
analyses of caste as ethnic identity,
204
 caste as cultural identity, castes as social 
organisations or communities ‘in which people come together to promote collective 
interest’205 or castes as political alliances or groupings. Dipanker Gupta argues that 
caste identities have strengthened even as caste as a system has collapsed – a result 
of caste competition and caste-based political assertion consequent upon the 
breakdown of the closed village economy and the rise of democratic politics.
206
 
Andre Beteille argues that despite the decline of caste in major areas of social life 
(e.g. rules relating to purity and pollution, commensality, marriage and the relation 
between caste and occupation), caste consciousness is kept alive by politicians, 
political parties and the media.
207
 Balmurli Natrajan warns against three portrayals of 
modern caste as ‘defanged’, i.e. ‘normal, positive and comforting’. These portrayals 
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are (1) political: caste groups not as ‘hierarchized inequalities’ but as ‘modern 
interest groups in political competition adding to the vibrancy of civil society in 
India’s version of democracy’, (2) economic: caste as ‘valorised social capital’ 
enabling caste groups to engage productively in entrepreneurial activities and (3) 
cultural (‘ethnicised’ caste): caste groups ‘simply as communities of identity seeking 
recognition for their cultural differences in a multicultural society… that celebrates 
such difference’.208 Natrajan argues that these portrayals enable caste and casteism to 
‘pass’ as normal, legitimate and ‘everyday’209 even as the educated middle classes 
express ‘increasing distaste’ for the values and ideology of caste.210 Caste inequality, 
‘far from being regarded as invidious, continues to be seen pervasively as normal, 
inevitable, even “natural”’.211 This ‘normalisation’ is what endows caste and 
casteism in India with its durability;
212
 it becomes associated only with its most 
abhorrent or violent manifestations, thus leaving everyday casteism unchallenged. 
Natrajan’s argument is that by camouflaging caste in positive terms as ‘cultural 
identity’ or ‘community’, ‘notions of culture and multiculturalism threaten to allow 
caste to exist with impunity’.213 This argument is explored in Chapter 9 of this thesis 
in relation to caste and caste discrimination in the UK. 
 
1.4 Conclusion  
Not only does caste discrimination run contrary to fundamental human rights 
principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment, and not only has it shown itself 
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resistant to challenge, but also, as this chapter shows, caste itself is a slippery, elusive 
concept, difficult to define and categorise: ‘Attempting to draw sharp lines between 
“race,” “descent” and “caste” will not produce unambiguous results. There is an 
equal slippage of categories in much historical and contemporary writing on the caste 
question’.214 As the understanding of terms such as caste, race and descent evolves 
and their meanings overlap, they become harder to disentangle. Cameron, discussing 
the merits of using the term Dalit for ‘a heterogeneous group of people that shares a 
history of being discriminated against socially, politically, economically and 
religiously by those who are unlike them in social status’,215 observes that while 
there is agreement ‘on who the oppressors are’, there is disagreement ‘on what the 
basis of that oppression is (religious? political? economic?)’ and hence difficulty in 
agreeing ‘on means by which to eliminate the conditions of oppression’.216 As 
Crispin Bates says, ‘before trying to establish “what is caste” we must first ask “who 
wants to define it?”’,217 and, it could be added, ‘for what purpose?’ In attempting to 
understand and combat caste discrimination we must first understand how caste has 
survived for so long and who benefits therefrom. Chapter 2 shows that caste and 
caste discrimination have very deep roots that go back thousands of years and are 
bound up with the evolution of the Hindu religion, its philosophy, rituals, rules and 
codes of conduct. It examines the development of Dalit status as a religio-legal 
construct, concluding with Ambedkar’s efforts to use law both to ‘construct’ the 
Dalits as an oppressed minority/ identity group and to ‘deconstruct’ the oppression 
and discrimination from which they suffer. It is to this discussion that we now turn.
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Chapter 2 
The Construction of Caste Inequality: A Religio-Legal 
History 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the deep-rooted religio-legal rules underpinning contemporary 
caste discrimination which, it is submitted, underlie contemporary difficulties in 
enforcing caste discrimination legislation (in India) or introducing it (in the UK). It 
shows how caste distinctions and inequalities were constructed and maintained by 
law in pre-independence India and explains the Hindu concepts of varna, dharma 
and karma and their role in the construction of caste inequality. Furthermore, the 
chapter considers whether the rules contained in the classical Hindu religio-legal 
literature, known as dharma literature – many of which were directly concerned with 
laying down and enforcing caste distinctions and inequalities – represented ‘real law’ 
in India (at least for Hindus). The answer is important because British colonial 
administrators seized on Hindu religio-legal texts as the authoritative ‘law of the 
Hindus’, treating them as black letter legal codes.1 The most important of these, the 
Manusmrti or ‘Law Code of Manu’, became synonymous with the legal construction 
and maintenance of caste discrimination.
2
 The chapter also examines the relationship 
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between caste and law in the Islamic period and appeals to law by Dalit activists in 
the ‘caste reform period’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
2.2 The Vedic period (c 1500 BC to 500 BC): varna, dharma and karma 
2.2.1 The varna classificatory system 
 
The Vedic period saw the emergence, initially in northern India and then in the 
south, of a caste social order characterised by hierarchy and hereditary occupation 
and related social status determined by birth
3
 – concepts inherent in the notion of 
varna, upon which, writes Smith, the later caste system is ‘ideologically dependent’.4 
Central to Vedism was the principle of distinctions among the orders of reality 
(natural, divine and human)
5
 and the idea that the universe was composed of 
‘interconnected, but also hierarchically distinguished and ranked, components’.6 
Romila Thapar identifies three preconditions for a caste society: (1) recognised social 
disparities, (2) unequal access to economic resources and (3) the legitimisation of 
inequality through a theoretically irreversible hierarchy, itself based on a 
supernatural authority.
7
 The varna system, says Smith, allowed certain humans to 
‘present what was an arbitrary status claim as natural and sacred; that is, social 
hierarchy was presented as inexorably part of the immutable and divinely given order 
of things’.8   
                                                 
3
 A. Parasher-Sen, ‘Introduction’ in A. Parasher-Sen (ed.), Subordinate and Marginal Groups in Early 
India (New Delhi: OUP, 2004) 1-80, 7. 
4
 B. Smith, Classifying the Universe: The Ancient Indian Varna System and the Origins of Caste (New 
York: OUP, 1994) 8. 
5
 B. Holdrege, ‘Dharma’ in S. Mittal and G. Thursby (eds.) The Hindu World (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2007) 213-248, 218. 
6
 Smith, n 4 above, vii (emphasis added). 
7
 R. Thapar, The Penguin History of Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300 (New Delhi: Penguin 
Books, 2003) 63-64. Lingat posits that ‘it is probable that… hierarchy already existed as a fact’, and 
that ‘the “Brahminical theory” not only made it precise but also legitimised it… by deducing it from 
the Veda, presenting it as if it conformed to the natural order of things’; R. Lingat, The Classical Law 
of India (Oxford: OUP, 1973) 39. 
8
 Smith, n 4 above, 7. 
56 
 
2.2.2 Dharma 
 
P.V. Kane defines dharma as 
the privileges, duties and obligations of a man, his standard of conduct as a member of the 
Aryan community, as a member of one of the castes, as a person in a particular stage of life.
9
  
 
Dharma is as much a socio-political as a religious concept. Described as a ‘pivotal 
category’ in ‘the history of Indic religions and cultures’, it is translated variously in 
English as law, religion, rules, duty, obligation, norm, righteousness, morality and 
justice.
10 
Dharma applies to all the elements of the cosmos – sun, water, plants, 
animals, humans – which must each follow their own particular dharma or 
svadharma (the right behaviour) in order to maintain cosmic balance; if an element 
‘deviates from its own dharma… the balance is disturbed’.11 Applied to the Universe, 
says Lingat, dharma ‘signifies the eternal laws which maintain the world’.12 Applied 
to humans, an individual’s dharma is the way they should act or behave according to 
their status or varna and their stage of life (asrama).
13
  
 
Originally limited to correct ritual action, from about 500 BC the term dharma 
underwent a ‘conceptual shift’ to cover not just sacrificial and ritual practices but 
also socio-cultural practices:
14
 
[Dharma] now becomes enlarged and popularised to include all human actions. It is at first 
redefined as expectation of right ritual action for every Hindu, then expanded into the secular 
realm to include any appropriate action at any time.
15
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This expansion of dharma from the purely ritual sphere to the realm of socio-cultural 
norms was a political response by the Vedic elite to alternative interpretations of 
dharma (e.g. by Buddhists and Jains) which were perceived to pose a threat to their 
power.
16
 A Brahminical philosophical school, Purva Mimamsa, grew up, dedicated 
to elaborating on the expansion of dharma. A new genre of literature – the 
Dharmasutras – was generated which reflected the new, expanded understanding of 
dharma.
17
 The underlying purpose was ‘to extend Vedic legitimation beyond the 
ritual realm into the socio-cultural domain and thereby transform the ideological 
framework of Brahminical culture from a discourse of ritual to a discourse of social 
power’.18 In the process, the concept of dharma – despite its supposedly transcendent 
nature – became bound ‘linguistically, ethnically, and culturally to a specific people: 
the Aryans’, who alone were designated as its authoritative exponents and as the 
custodians of the eternal language, Sanskrit, in which the dharma injunctions were 
recorded.19 
 
2.2.3 Karma 
 
Karma, meaning ‘action’, is the doctrine linking conduct in this life with 
consequences in future lives, and conduct in previous lives with personal 
circumstances in this life.
20
 Circumstances in this life (e.g. human or animal, caste) 
result directly from deeds performed in a former life, while existence in future lives 
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is determined by deeds performed in this life. Central to orthodox Hinduism is the 
presupposition that individuals are not empirically equal at birth. Furthermore, 
inequality is the result of ‘freely chosen behaviour in this and previous lives’.21 It 
follows that a person’s caste in this life is entirely ‘of their own making’.22 
Conformity with one’s dharma results in improvement in status in the next life, 
whereas non-conformity will lead to a worse status in future lives. This idea – that 
people ‘are fundamentally but not unfairly, unequal’23 – is encapsulated in the 
concepts of varna, dharma and karma. In legal terms, from c. 500 BC, this notion 
was reflected textually in religious and moral precepts of an increasingly ‘juridical’ 
character contained in what is known as dharma literature, the most well-known text 
being the Manusmriti (see above).  
 
2.2.4 Legal nature of the early Vedic texts 
 
Early Vedic (Indo-Aryan) literature introduces the key themes and concepts which 
underpin classical Hindu law. This literature consists of the four main Vedas – Rg 
Veda, Sama-Veda, Yajur-Veda (in two versions, Black and White) and Atharva-
Veda, each Veda comprising a Samhita (core) of ritual hymns and prayers, 
accompanied by Brahmanas which interpret the rituals in the Samhitas – Aranyakas, 
concerned with mysticism rather than ritual, and Upanishads, which raise advanced 
philosophical and spiritual questions.
24
 As to whether these texts are ‘legal 
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literature’, Menski says they were not law books but ritual manuals25 on the 
performance of sacrificial rituals by the Vedic priests or Brahmans.
26
 Lingat, 
conversely, argues that the Brahmanas, Aranyakas and Upanishads (although not the 
Samhitas) contain numerous rules governing behaviour,
27
 while for Derrett, they are 
the ‘earliest surviving texts containing legal rules’.28 Although the four varnas are 
mentioned by name only in the Rg Veda, other Vedic hymns distinguish between 
Aryans and non-Aryans or dasyu (later to become the Shudras), with the Aryas 
divided into three categories which, Lingat argues, are origins of the three superior 
varnas.
29
 The legal relevance of the early Vedic texts lies first in the articulation of 
the concept of varna, whereby social hierarchy was presented as an inexorable part 
of the immutable and divinely given order of things and hence not open to 
challenge,
30
 and secondly, the insight they provide into Vedic understanding of the 
Universe, in particular the concept of dharma, which in its widened form was 
integral to the development of classical Hindu law.  
 
2.3 The later Vedic and classical period: dharma literature 500 BC–700 AD 
The Veda corpus provided the ideological underpinnings for the development of 
classical Hindu law teachings on caste in the dharma literature.31 From the third 
century BC onwards, says Lingat, with the expansion of dharma and the formulation 
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of the dharma literature, ‘there is the appearance of something resembling 
legislation’.32  
 
2.3.1 Dharmasutras 
 
In addition to the sruti (‘revealed’) texts is a body of secondary sacred texts known 
as smrti (meaning ‘remembered’ or ‘tradition’), composed by Vedic sages between 
the eighth and fourth centuries BC.
33
 These texts include the epic poems the 
Mahabharata and the Ramayana, as well as the Dharmasutras (c 600 BC–200 BC), 
a set of codes concerned with ‘regulating and defining social relationships within and 
between groups’.34 The Dharmasutras contain rules on duties, behaviour, domestic 
and dietary matters, family, social and sexual relationships, and lay down religio-
penal sanctions (an embryonic form of criminal law).
35
 The sources of law (dharma) 
are (1) the entire Veda, (2) tradition (smrti) and (3) the conventions, practices and 
conduct of ‘good people’ (those who know the Veda); additionally, Lingat 
distinguishes between custom (‘habitual practices of a group’) as a source of law, 
although not as a source of dharma.
36
 The notion of pollution in relation to certain 
social groups first appears in the Dharmasutras.
37
 Nevertheless, says Lingat, the 
treatment of legal matters in the Dharmasutras is indirect, disorganised and 
unsystematic
38
 – they contain ‘norms of correct behaviour and action’, says Olivelle, 
but they ‘do not tell us what people actually did’.39 
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2.3.2 Kautilya’s Arthasasthra 
 
This treatise by Kautilya, the chief minister of the emperor Chandragupta Maurya 
(321 BC–296 BC), 40 describes a society based on Vedic codes of conduct and a 
well-organised legal system with the king at the head, village tribunals in rural areas 
and law courts in urban centres,
41
 although the extent to which it reflects the actual 
administration of justice is uncertain.
42
 It explicitly addresses the maintenance of 
caste boundaries and the construction of caste inequality. It was the Shudra’s duty to 
serve the twice-born.
43
 Punishments were caste-based and unequal; the severity of 
the punishment increased the lower the caste of the offender and the higher the caste 
of the victim. A Shudra committing adultery with a Brahmin woman was to be ‘burnt 
alive wound round in mats’; a Kshatriya should be fined the highest fine and a 
Vaisya deprived of all his property.
44
 A man committing adultery with a low caste 
woman was to be branded and banished or degraded to the same caste.
45
  
 
2.3.3 Dharmasastras 
 
Dharmasastra means ‘the teaching or science of righteousness’.46 The 
Dharmasastras contain legal and religious rules and a variety of dietary, hygienic 
and moral injunctions.
47
 They differ from the Sutras in form and in content – they are 
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composed in verse, include more emphasis on civil and criminal law
48
 and, says 
Holdrege, crystallise and formalise in ‘law codes’ dharmic ritual and social 
obligations.
49
  
 
2.3.3.1 Manusmrti 
 
The oldest and most important Dharmasastra is the Manavadharmasastra (Mdh), or 
Manusmrti, composed sometime between 200 BC and 200 AD,
50
 a text which has 
become synonymous with caste and gender oppression.
51
 It consists of twelve books 
in the form of a dialogue between an exalted being or teacher, Manu, his pupil or 
disciple, Bhgru, and a group of others wishing to learn the law of dharma from him. 
Manu is presented as the son of the primeval Lawgiver, the Creator himself, the 
‘Self-existent One’52 – a device intended, says Olivelle, to make the work more 
authoritative.
53
 The Purusa myth is invoked twice in the first book
54
 as legitimisation 
for the varna system and Aryan social order. For all social classes, but especially 
Brahmins (the custodians of the Veda), ‘proper conduct’ is declared ‘the highest 
Law’.55 On caste, Manu is very clear that there are only four ‘classes’ (or varnas): 
‘there is no fifth’.56 Untouchables (Candalas) are consciously excluded from the 
varna system; unfit for association by Brahmins,
57
 they are likened to a dog or a 
pig.
58
 In a frequently quoted passage Manu declares: 
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[The Candalas] must live outside the village; their property consists of dogs and donkeys, 
their garments are the clothes of the dead; they eat in broken vessels; their ornaments are of 
iron, and they constantly roam about. A man who follows the Law should never seek any 
dealings with them. All their transactions shall be among themselves, and they must marry 
their own kind. They depend on others for their food, and it should be in a broken vessel. 
They must not go about in villages and towns at night, they may go around during the day to 
perform [tasks but must wear] distinguishing marks.
59
  
 
A similar enmity is directed towards Shudras, who must ‘render obedient service to 
distinguished Brahmin householders, for a pure, obedient, soft-spoken and humble 
Shudra obtains a higher birth’.60 The Shudra’s role is to serve the Brahmin, from 
whom the Shudra is entitled to receive ‘leftover food, old clothes, grain that has been 
cast aside, and the old household items’, but he must not accumulate wealth.61 
Punishments remained caste-based; the lower the offender’s caste, the harsher the 
punishment. For physically assaulting a superior person the low-born must lose the 
part of his body which caused the injury; if a low-born man attempts to occupy the 
same seat as a man of high rank he should be branded on the hip or buttocks; if he 
spits at him, his lips should be cut off; and so on.
62
 The ‘virulence in these 
injunctions’63 reflects the very real threat, says Olivelle, which the lowest classes of 
society were perceived by the author of the text to pose to the social order and to 
Brahminical hegemony and privilege.64  
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2.3.4 Legal nature of the Dharmasastras 
 
Scholars are divided as to the legal nature of the Dharmasastras. Hinduism has been 
described as a ‘legal tradition’ and Hindu theologies as ‘pervaded by legal rules, 
legal categories and legal reasoning’.65 As Davis observes, while law and religion 
have come to be defined ‘as separable and mutually exclusive categories, despite 
their interdependence in every part of Europe prior to the Enlightenment… in most 
parts of the world and in most times in history, religion and law were intimately 
connected and largely not distinguished from each other’.66 Thus, the elements of 
Hindu law cannot ‘easily be disentangled’ or labelled as essentially religious or 
legal,
67
 as it does not ‘sharply differentiate between positive law and morality’68 – 
the Indian tradition, says Larivière ‘is simply more overt and bold about the 
theological underpinnings of its legal system’.69 Larivière considers that the 
difference between the Dharmasastras and positive law in the Western sense has 
been overstated. Hindu law, says Michaels, does not aim at neutrality or consistency; 
on the contrary, classical Hindu law is the law ‘of castes and regions’,70 i.e. it is 
relative to specific groups, times, places, castes and life stages.
71
 The Dharmasastras 
‘were not law codes in the European sense of the word, nor were they legislation 
passed by an organ having legislative power’, 72 but ‘if by positive law we mean law 
enacted by a properly constituted authority for the government of society’, they 
                                                 
65
 D. Davis, ‘Hinduism as a Legal Tradition’, 75(2) Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
(2007) 241-267, 241, 242. 
66
 Davis ibid., 260-261. 
67
 Rocher (1978), n 11 above, 1286, 1289. 
68
 A. Michaels, ‘The practice of classical Hindu law’ in T. Lubin, D. Davis and J. Krishnan (eds.), 
Hinduism and Law: An Introduction (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) 58-77, 77. 
69
 R. Larivière, ‘Dharmasastra, Custom, “Real Law” and “Apocryphal” Smrtis’, 32 Journal of Indian 
Philosophy (2004) 611-62, 615. 
70
 Michaels, n 68 above, 77. 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 Lingat, n 7 above, 141. 
65 
 
qualify because they are ‘based on the normative values… of specific groups’.73 
Corporate groups (merchants, traders, guilds, soldiers, pastoralists, farmers, castes 
and family lineages, as well as village affiliations and temples) were among the 
principal legal actors in early India.
74
 Individuals would have been members of 
several groups simultaneously. These corporate associations administered a body of 
substantive laws to their own members.
75
 We know, says Rocher, that the dharma 
texts recognise a wide variety of unwritten sources of dharma, including custom and 
the laws of ‘countries, castes, and families’ (as long as not opposed to the sacred 
texts).
76
 On the one hand, Olivelle is correct to distinguish the sastras from modern-
day legal codes
77
 in the sense that the law on the ground was subject to any number 
of variables;78 clearly, additional, ‘extra-sastric’, legal knowledge was required to 
actually judge lawsuits.79 On the other hand, says Lariviere, although it is correct that 
the Dharmasastras were general guidelines rather than a legal template, nevertheless 
the Dharmasastra literature ‘represents in very definite terms the law of the land’.80  
 
2.3.5 The feudal era: c. 800–1200 AD 
 
The period between c. 800 and 1200 AD witnessed the production of a vast array of 
commentaries and digests on the dharma texts, variously seeking to interpret, 
construe, explain, synthesise and codify (a process which continued into the 
nineteenth century).
81
 Derrett expresses no doubt as to the penetration of sastric rules 
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into actual legal usage during this period.
82
 Socially, during this period, while there 
was some relaxation of the sastric precepts on caste duties, Untouchability, says 
Derrett, was now defined – segregated dining occurred and devadasis were allotted a 
formal place in the system: in short, ‘everyone believed in caste’.83 There was a 
growth in sectarianism and in group attempts at social ‘rearrangement’ to counter the 
impossibility of individual advancement. The law in practice fostered advance by 
groups rather than individual improvement: ‘[T]he public accepted the umbrella of 
the caste theory but within its shade attempted to rearrange the relative superiority of 
actual groups’.84 Social groups (‘communities’) possessed the power of 
excommunication for religious or social (caste) offences, a power perceived as 
promoting group/social cohesion.
85
 In practical terms, law was exercised by caste 
and community groups, which ‘legislated at their pleasure’, calling upon the king to 
sanction their decisions. The king was the final arbiter, the custodian and also the 
censor of customs, determining those repugnant to the sastra.
86
  
 
2.4 Medieval/ Islamic India: c. 1206–1707 
2.4.1 The wider setting 
 
Turkic Muslim incursions into India began in 1000. In 1526, the Mughal empire, 
which was to last for more than three hundred years, was established following the 
defeat of the Delhi Sultanate (founded in 1206).
87
 As Menski indicates, the Muslim 
political centre did not have the numbers to impose Islamic law on India’s 
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population, the vast majority of whom remained rural Hindus.
88
 Islamic law applied 
fully to Muslims, but to Hindus its jurisdiction extended only to crime and 
‘constitutional and fiscal administration’.89 Although not equal to Muslims under 
Islamic law, non-Muslims were allowed to maintain their own institutions, forms of 
worship and personal (i.e. religious) law.
90
 In addition, Hindus were free to settle 
disputes among themselves ‘according to their own laws and customs’91 (which 
differed according to caste and locality). Writes Menski, ‘the substance of Hindu law 
did not change as a result of Muslim domination’;92 simply, it operated as a personal 
law within the Mughal Empire rather than as the official law of a Hindu state.
93
 
During this period, as previously, loyalty was to family, group and caste rather than 
to the wider community, and not at all to the State.
94
 Sastric injunctions – whose 
authority was independent of the State – were enforced by ‘a variety of moral, social 
and other sanctions,
95
 operating ‘in civil society as part of the general ideology of 
everyday life’.96 Each village had a panchayat or tribunal which decided civil and 
criminal cases. In addition, each caste had its own caste panchayat issuing judgments 
and inflicting fines, public degradation or social exclusion by way of punishment.
97
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2.4.2 Smrti commentarial texts and digests 
 
During the Islamic period a large corpus of Brahminical commentaries and legal 
digests on the smrtis was produced, which repeated the caste rules elaborated in the 
earlier smrti literature.
98
 Majumdar observes that the texts produced during this 
period often repeated discriminatory clauses on caste in smrti penal law, upholding 
the principle of punishment for the same offence on an ascending scale, the lower the 
caste of the perpetrator.
99
 However, even though smrti law may have been accepted 
in theory, Majumdar also comments that local Hindu rulers were often ‘unable to put 
[these punishments] into effect for fear of rousing popular discontent’.100 The 
degraded status of the despised classes is recapitulated.
101
 Between 1350 and 1700, a 
body of commentarial texts was produced on the topic of Sudradharma (the dharma 
of the Shudra)
102
 which, says Vajpeyi, reveals the importance of caste in pre-colonial 
India. The purpose of these texts was to assist courts in determining who was a 
Shudra.
103
 The authors use language ‘both as a measure of lowliness and as a weapon 
of humiliation’ to ‘describe, police, revile, punish and exclude the Sudra from the 
realms of upper-caste privilege’.104 From records of legal disputes from this period, 
involving twice-born groups and Shudras, it appears that ‘all the Sudra ever wants is 
not to be [a Sudra]’ but to be recognised instead as a ‘higher’ caste.105 These texts, 
says Vajpeyi, show that the legal treatment of caste ‘was by no means the outcome 
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exclusively of India’s long engagement with the colonizing Other’.106 The ‘centrality 
of caste to pre-colonial intellectual life and legal practice’ is also evidenced by the 
existence of ‘caste experts’ – specialist jurists and caste scholars – who were called 
upon to pronounce on legal matters involving caste and to adjudicate in caste 
disputes including, famously, the transformation of ‘Shivaji, a Maratha chieftain… 
heretofore deemed a Sudra, into Chatrapati Shivaji, a Ksatriya king’.107  
 
2.5 British India, law and caste inequality 1600–1900 
By the 1720s, the Mughal Empire was in decline. Between 1739 and 1762, Delhi was 
invaded by the Persian ruler Nadir Shah, northern India was repeatedly invaded by 
the Afghans and central India was attacked by the Marathas from the south. Chaos, 
anarchy and a breakdown in authority ensued, leaving the door open to the 
Europeans.  
 
2.5.1 1600–1772 
 
British rule in India originated in a Charter granted by Queen Elizabeth I in 1600 to a 
body of merchants conferring on them a monopoly of trade with the East. In 1709, 
this became the British East India Company. Trade for profit (albeit trade backed by 
military force) was the principal object of the East India Company.
108
 What made it 
unique as a commercial body was not its administrative structure but the special 
legislative and judicial powers of a quasi-sovereign nature, essential to enable it to 
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conduct trade at such long distances.
109
 It exercised these powers in three 
autonomous ‘Presidencies’ at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. The 1726 Charter Act 
established ‘Mayor’s Courts’ in each of the three Presidencies and vested the 
Company’s agents with legislative powers for the first time. At this stage British 
interest in India was still purely commercial.
110
 British (i.e. East India Company) 
victory against the Nawab of Bengal at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 ‘started the East 
India Company on its great career as a territorial ruler’.111  
 
When the British set foot in India, Muslim law was fairly uniform throughout the 
country, Hindu law less so. Hindu law was contained in the ancient smrti treatises, in 
the smrti commentaries and digests and in custom, mostly unwritten, which varied 
widely according to region. Accaryya notes that there were no laws relating to public 
and constitutional rights ‘because such rights did not exist’.112 Under the British, a 
‘haphazard’113 legislative system developed, based on the governments of the three 
Presidencies. English law applied in the Presidency towns and for British-born 
subjects in the ‘mofussil’ (rural) areas. Hindus and Muslims in the Presidency towns 
were governed by their own laws in relation to inheritance, succession, private 
contracts and matters relating to caste.
114
 As early as 1673, the authority of local 
panchayats over inter-caste disputes had been recognised, observes Bannerjee, and 
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judicial powers were gradually conferred on caste headmen,
115
 but in other matters 
English law applied. Outside the Presidency towns both Muslim and Hindu criminal 
law applied, resulting in a multiplicity of different provisions. In civil matters, later 
British policy of ‘non-intervention’ in caste matters was presaged by the policy of the 
East India Company Court of Directors: 
‘[T]hat the Gent[ues] and other Natives be allowed to live in the full enjoyment of the 
privileges of their respective Casts, provided they do nothing to the prejudice of the English 
Government’.116  
 
2.5.2 1772–1857: Company rule, Anglo-Hindu law and caste 117 
 
Between 1765 and 1858, over half of the territorial area of India was controlled 
directly by the East India Company (the Company) under a Charter renewed at 
intervals by the British Parliament (the remaining territory that the Company did not 
wish to control directly, or found difficult to conquer, being supervised by a system 
of indirect rule).
118
 Between 1773 and 1853, the Company’s Charter was renewed at 
twenty-yearly intervals. In 1858, the British Government assumed the running of the 
direct control areas (the Presidencies and Provinces) while continuing with indirect 
rule over the rest of India.
119
  
 
In 1772, the Company, under Governor-General Warren Hastings, assumed direct 
control of Bengal. Hastings was reluctant to impose British law on Indians in the 
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spheres of religion, caste, marriage and the family, for fear of provoking social 
unrest. However, if ‘native’ law was to be applied in these spheres, the question was 
where was Indian law to be found?
120
 The answer was in the ‘personal laws’ of the 
Muslim and Hindu religious communities (‘personal laws’ because they are ‘based 
on personal, or ascriptive, status regardless of territorial location’).121 Thus, ‘Anglo-
Hindu law’ was born, and Hastings declared that ‘in all suits regarding inheritance, 
marriage, caste and other religious usages or institutions, the laws of the Koran with 
respect to Mahomedans, and those of the Shaster with respect to Gentoos [Hindus], 
shall be invariably adhered to’.122 The ‘naive simplicity’123 of this instruction 
overlooked the fact that neither Hindu nor Muslim law was contained only in the 
sastras or the Koran but was also to be found in legal literature and customs and 
usages which varied from caste to caste and region to region.
124
 Initially, British 
India courts were assisted in the application of Hindu law by native ‘Law Officers’ 
(pandits), experts in the sastras who promoted the notion that, for Hindus, the 
sastras represented the law of the land as practised in classical India. In 1794, the 
Manusmrti was translated into English as the ‘Institutes of Hindu Law’, enabling 
British India courts to apply ‘Hindu law’ directly, bypassing the opinions of the 
pandits (of whom they had become increasingly suspicious) while simultaneously 
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confirming the impression that the smrti literature had the status of ‘black letter’ 
law.
125
  
 
In the period to 1857, various English translations and digests of ‘Hindu’ law were 
produced to assist British judges; pandits continued to be used, but British courts 
also increasingly applied unwritten custom and established usage. Consistency in 
legal decisions, explains Rosane Rocher, was one of the primary aims of the colonial 
administration; consequently, a system of case law (a hallmark of English common 
law but alien to Hindu law) developed, alongside a greater willingness not only to 
apply but also to shape Hindu law by outlawing practices deemed unacceptable, even 
if sanctioned by the sastra texts.
126
 British judges, says Rocher, were determined to 
distinguish between ‘what was religious and what was legal’.127 Consequently, 
Anglo-Hindu law came to lose much of its ‘Hindu’ identity128 and ‘Hindu law’ 
became reduced to ‘personal’ (i.e. religious) law.129 Personal law – essentially family 
law – was conceptualised as a ‘separate legal domain’ operating ‘within the 
overarching jurisdiction of the State’ but supposedly ‘free from colonial 
intervention’.130 As Galanter explains, under ‘personal law’ different rules were 
applied to members of different varnas – usually one rule for the Shudras and 
another for the three twice-born varnas.
131
 Thus, for the courts, a key issue was how 
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to determine who was a Shudra.
132
 The colonial courts developed tests, based on 
Hindu textual law, to determine the varna standing of particular castes, within an 
overarching Hindu framework – a religious or ‘sacral’ view of caste which assumes 
that all groups within Hinduism can be subsumed within a varna and which locates 
Untouchability in the realm of the religious and ritual.
133
 However, the courts 
accepted that textual law could be modified by custom. Where issues of caste (group) 
classification arose, caste groups pleaded ‘caste customs’ before the courts, seeking 
to associate themselves with a distinctive set of cultural traits which distinguished the 
caste as a ‘corporate body culturally distinct from its neighbours’. McCormack 
argues that most alleged ‘caste’ customs were actually regional, not caste-specific, 
customs. Nevertheless, ‘the courts accepted a presumption that for each “caste” there 
was one distinctive set of customs or “culture”’.134 McCormack argues that modern 
caste organisation in India, specifically the ‘regional integration’ of castes and the 
notion of distinct ‘caste cultures’ (what Natrajan terms the ‘culturalisation’ of 
caste),
135
 has been informed by the conceptualisation, in British India courts, of 
castes as distinct ‘corporate’ groups, each with their own distinct culture.136  
 
The British administration became increasingly unwilling to involve itself in claims 
concerning caste privileges and disabilities, which they characterised as religious 
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matters,
137
 resulting in a non-committal attitude to both the maintenance and 
modification of the caste structure.
138
 Jurisdiction was abdicated to the caste 
panchayats whose decisions were allowed to stand with no interference, but equally 
no support, from the State.
139
 Yet, the fact that personal law fell within the 
jurisdiction of colonial courts (despite constituting a ‘separate legal domain’) meant 
that inevitably there was State intervention in such matters.
140
 For low castes, 
especially women, such intervention was often not to their legal advantage, e.g. ‘non-
elite marriage forms’, which historically had recognised the economic contribution of 
women, were replaced by elite practices such as dowry marriage.
141
 Similarly, the 
1860 Indian Penal Code criminalised lower caste customs such as divorce and 
remarriage (practices which were forbidden for high caste Hindu females) as bigamy 
or adultery.
142
  
 
2.5.3 1858–1900: the Crown and caste inequality 
 
Company rule, and the remnants of the Mughal Empire, ended in 1858 with British 
victory over the Indian uprising of 1857–1858. By the Government of India Act 
1858, all Company rights and territories in India were transferred directly to Crown 
control.
143
 Codification and standardisation of law began, with the creation of the 
first Law Commission and the enactment of statutes such as the Indian Penal Code in 
1860. At the same time the policy of non-interference with caste customs and 
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religious law in personal and family matters continued.
144
 In 1858, Queen Victoria 
proclaimed that that no Indians would be favoured or molested by reason of their 
religion or observances – suggesting that the caste-based discriminatory practices of 
the high castes would not be challenged.
145
 Wolpert explains that ‘fears concerning 
“native” sensibilities to socio-religious changes’ resulted in an era of ‘socio-religious 
laissez faire’ and a ‘policy of indifference to the plight of women, [U]ntouchables 
and exploited children’, couched in terms of religious tolerance and equality146 and 
driven by concern that ‘upsetting caste hierarchies amounted to interfering with the 
religious beliefs of Hindus’.147 The ‘personal law’ sphere governed by classical 
Hindu legal concepts and doctrines was preserved alongside the developing body of 
national, secular law, a situation that carried over into the post-independence era. The 
use of caste in general civil, criminal and commercial cases was abandoned, sastric 
and customary law was supplanted by universally applicable law in all except the 
personal law fields and ‘British law did not recognize or try to maintain the caste 
order as such’.148 Nonetheless, the law did recognise the autonomy of caste groups, 
and the courts did not intervene to prevent high castes enforcing their ‘prerogatives’ 
against lower castes by extra-judicial means, nor did they interfere with the 
disciplinary powers of caste tribunals.
149
 ‘Exclusionary practices’ of caste groups 
regarding the use of religious premises were upheld by the courts, although not in 
regard to secular public facilities such as roads; but ‘even where the lower castes 
enjoyed rights that were formally enforceable’, they did not have the resources to 
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litigate to secure redress. Higher castes were thus able to use the legal system, or 
exploit its shortcomings, to protect their status, privileges and claims for precedence, 
while access to the law was effectively denied to the lower castes.
150
 
 
2.6 Nepal: the Muluki Ain (Nepali Royal Law Code) 1854  
Contemporaneously with British attempts to codify Indian law, Nepal produced an 
express codification of caste inequality in a national, secular law code: the Nepali 
Royal Law Code 1854, or Muluki Ain (MA), composed at the behest of Prime 
Minister Rana, who had seized power in 1846. The MA was a national legal code, 
central to which was the concept of ascribed caste status.
151
 An exercise in legal (and 
social) control, it sought to impose national unity on a diverse and multi-ethnic 
society by laying down a hierarchical order based on caste. Regional laws were to 
discontinue and subjects punished ‘uniformly according to their guilt and caste’.152 
The MA contains detailed rules on identification and deprivation of caste status; 
positioning within the caste hierarchy; inter-caste commensality, proximity and 
contact; Untouchability; purity rules, including transgression of the ‘water-line’ 
separating pure from impure castes, transfer of impurity and temporary impurity; and 
inter- and intra-caste social and sexual relations.  
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While the Indian legal tradition required that the king respect not only dharma but 
also customary law (‘the internal jurisdiction of local groups, castes, villages and 
guilds’), his power was subject to the spiritual power of the Brahmins,153 whereas 
under the MA, customary law and religion were only applicable if they had become 
ain law. Whatever related to caste was subject to the executive and judicial powers of 
the State,
154
 revealing a level of State involvement in and regulation of caste-related 
behaviour and events in an individual’s daily life which reached deep into the private 
sphere.
155
 Following Nepal’s 1951 revolution, the MA was re-issued in 1955. Under 
the 1959 Constitution all citizens were equal before the law, and discrimination in 
public employment on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste and tribe was prohibited, 
but under both the re-issued MA and the 1959 Constitution social groups (meaning 
castes) were assured ‘the right to self-determination with regard to religion, customs 
and social intercourse with other groups’. Discrimination against members of other 
social groups could thus be justified on grounds of protecting one’s own religion and 
custom:
156
 if an Untouchable entered a ‘cult place’ used hitherto only by Brahmins, 
such an act could be interpreted ‘as an infringement of the Brahmin’s religion and 
customs’.157 Under the MA, caste was the chief factor determining an individual’s 
juridical status; it ‘interfered’ in marriage, inheritance and occupation, in the 
relationship between patient and healer and between individual and the State. It is 
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thus simply incorrect, says Hofer, to claim that caste in the sub-continent was a 
creation of British census compilers.
158
 
 
2.7 Caste reform: 1858–1947 
With British rule came new opportunities for education and advancement, mostly for 
the Indian elite but also for a small fraction of the lower castes. New ideas were 
introduced by European and Indian intellectuals, European missionaries and Indian 
religious reformers. Alongside the growth of nationalism, nineteenth-century India 
saw the emergence of various reform issues in Indian society, including social issues 
such as caste, and the emergence of regional and region-wide caste organisations, 
Hindu reform groups and low caste ‘Non-Brahmin’ movements and organisations.159 
Initially, caste reform was associated with lower caste self-improvement and 
advancement, often measured in terms of improved status via the adoption of upper 
caste practices (ironically sometimes the very practices opposed by high caste social 
reformers, such as the ban on widow remarriage and child marriage) and the 
achievement of a more prestigious Census entry.
160
 It was not until the end of the 
nineteenth century, writes Galanter, that ‘mainstream reformers saw caste hierarchy 
and inequality as problems in their own right’.161 Galanter identifies two approaches 
to the eradication of caste inequality, namely the ‘evangelical’ and the ‘secular’. The 
                                                 
158
 Ibid., 211. In 2011 Nepal introduced new legislation criminalising caste discrimination and 
Untouchability; see ‘Nepal: UN welcomes new law on caste-based discrimination’ at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=38496; see also Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, 
‘Caste-based Discrimination in Nepal’, Working Paper Series Vol. 3, No. 8 (2009) at 
http://www.dalitstudies.org.in/wp/0908.pdf (both visited 2 April 2013). 
159
 Galanter (1984), n 133 above, 22-23; E. Zelliot, From Untouchable to Dalit: Essays on the 
Ambedkar Movement (New Delhi: Manohar, 1998) 33-50; Rao, n 133 above, Chapter 1. 
160
 Galanter (1984), ibid., 23. European missionaries saw conversion as the solution to caste 
inequality. 
161
 Galanter (1984), ibid., 24. From the 1870s, the caste reform movement used the label ‘Depressed 
Classes’ to refer to those at the bottom of the caste hierarchy; see S. Charsley, ‘Untouchable: What is 
in a Name?’, 23(1) Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1996) 1-23, 6. 
80 
 
evangelical approach, personified by Gandhi, involved ‘the uplift of [U]ntouchables 
to higher Hindu standards and the penance of caste Hindus for [U]ntouchability, 
which is seen not as an integral part of Hinduism but as some external impurity. 
Uplifted [U]ntouchables and repentant Hindus will join together in a purified and 
redeemed Hinduism’.162 In contrast, the secular approach, personified in the first half 
of the twentieth century by Ambedkar, saw Untouchability as an integral part of 
Hinduism and stressed the denial of civil, economic and social rights to 
Untouchables, which it sought to combat by vigorous government (legal and policy) 
intervention achieved through political action.
163
  
 
The early twentieth century also saw the emergence of Untouchable ‘Adi’ 
movements (Adi meaning ‘first’ or ‘original’), first in south India and then in the 
north, the most well-known example being the north Indian Ad-Dharm Untouchable 
religious movement.
164
 However, it was Ambedkar who was primarily responsible, 
in the two decades before independence, for the construction of the Untouchables as 
a pan-Indian social and political minority, distinct from the Hindus. While Gandhi 
urged voluntary private action on the part of caste Hindus to reject and combat 
Untouchability, Ambedkar advocated legal solutions in the form of legislative 
change and affirmative action quotas for the Untouchables qua minority group 
outside the Hindu fold, initially in the fields of political representation and 
employment and then, on independence, in political representation, public sector 
employment and education through the Constitution of independent India (of which 
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he was ‘one of the principal architects’).165 Until the early twentieth century, the 
Dalits were not conceptualised as a pan-Indian category, nor was the extent of their 
oppression a matter of public or national concern except to caste reform activists.
166
 
The rhetorical potential of the term ‘Untouchability’ – coined around 1909 to 
describe the particular, ritual discrimination suffered by the Dalits
167
 – was identified 
by Ambedkar, who transformed the term Untouchable from a description into a name 
designating an all-India political identity and a new social and legal category.
168
 In 
the two decades prior to independence, Ambedkar ensured that the concepts of 
‘Untouchablility’ and ‘Untouchable’ became ‘embedded in Indian understanding of 
the structure of their society’ and ultimately embodied in the Constitution of India 
(COI).
169
 
 
The term ‘Scheduled Castes’ originates in the Government of India Act 1935, which 
identified by means of an official list those socially-excluded castes – previously 
termed ‘Depressed Classes’ or ‘Untouchables’ – eligible for preferential electoral 
treatment under the Act.
170
 The Schedule was incorporated into the COI and has 
remained in use ever since. COI Article 366(24) defines Scheduled Castes as those 
castes notified as such by Presidential Order pursuant to COI Article 341.
171
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Thereafter, they can be de-listed only by Parliament.
172
 Currently, over eleven 
hundred castes are Scheduled.
173
 Scheduled status is established by means of a Caste 
Certificate issued by the authorities, attesting to the bearer’s membership of a 
Scheduled Caste.
174
 The list has changed little since the original Schedule was drawn 
up by the British in 1936, the basis for inclusion in which was Untouchability – 
measured not according to ‘secular’ disadvantages such as poverty or illiteracy but 
according to the extent of social disabilities accruing from low social and ritual status 
in the traditional Hindu social hierarchy (although almost total synchronicity existed 
between ritual disabilities and socio-economic deprivation).
175
 In 1931, the Census 
Commissioner, J.H. Hutton, attempted to specify the criteria by which Untouchable 
groups could be identified, but it proved impossible to devise an all-India test due to 
different regional practices.
176
 The Constituent Assembly – the body charged with 
drafting independent India’s new Constitution – abolished but did not define 
Untouchability.
177
 However, the understanding was of a ritual, status-based 
characteristic grossly damaging both to the individual and to society, giving rise to a 
unique type of social stigma and discrimination which was distinct from 
discrimination on other grounds, for example religion.
178
 Crucially, Untouchability 
was seen by the Constituent Assembly as a function of caste alone – an amendment 
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by a Muslim member that ‘“no-one shall on account of his religion or caste be 
treated or regarded as an ‘untouchable”’ was rejected by the Assembly.179  
 
Ambedkar linked Untouchable emancipation from caste oppression with India’s 
emancipation from the British.
180
 Central to his strategy was the assertion that the 
Untouchables were a minority group, ‘distinct and separate from the Hindus’,181 
entitled to recognition ‘as a separate entity for political and constitutional 
purposes’.182 Gandhi, by contrast, insisted that the Untouchables should not be 
separated politically from the Hindu fold, a prospect which he viewed as damaging 
to Hindu unity and therefore to the nationalist movement and swaraj (the struggle for 
independence).
183
 In 1946, the Constituent Assembly was established. Assembly 
members were to be elected from the three main ‘communities’ recognised by the 
British – Muslim, Sikh and ‘general’, the latter to include all persons who were not 
Muslims or Sikhs,
184
 with an Advisory Committee on Minorities and Fundamental 
Rights (the ‘Minorities Committee’) to report on measures for the protection of 
minorities.
185
 Ambedkar, concerned to ensure Untouchable representation in the 
Assembly and on the Minorities Committee as a separate political minority rather as 
a sub-group within the Hindus, sought, unsuccessfully, a declaration from the British 
that ‘minorities’ included the SCs. Clement Atlee, the British Prime Minister, wrote 
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privately to Ambedkar, saying, “We ourselves consider the Scheduled Castes to be 
an important minority which should be represented on the Minority Advisory 
Committee,” but he was unwilling to dictate to the Assembly the composition of the 
Minorities Committee.
186
 In the event, the SCs and STs, as well as Christians, Parsis, 
Anglo-Indians and women, were brought into the Constituent Assembly by 
Jawarharlal Nehru’s Congress Party – India’s biggest political party – under the 
‘general’ category.187 Ambedkar was duly elected to the Assembly and appointed to 
the Constitution’s Drafting Committee (of which he was elected Chair), the 
Minorities Committee, and the Minorities Sub-Committee. In 1935, Ambedkar had 
famously declared, ‘I was born in the Hindu religion; but I will not die in the Hindu 
religion’; twenty years later, in October 1956, two months before his death, he led a 
mass conversion of half a million Dalits to Buddhism in Nagpur, Maharasthra. Since 
then, ‘Ambedkarite Buddhist’ has become commonplace as a term of reference and 
self-reference with respect to Dalit converts to Buddhism.
188
  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
In 1945, Ambedkar described the caste system as ‘a legal system maintained at the 
point of a bayonet’.189 Historically, law has been used in India not only to define and 
categorise the Dalits but also to lay down the very parameters of their existence. It is 
only since 1950 that the principle of non-discrimination has applied de jure to the 
Dalits. Prior to 1950, the reverse was the case: Dalits were explicitly subject, de jure 
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and de facto, to the principle of discrimination on grounds of caste.
190
 ‘Inequality in 
India, as in most places, is a matter not merely of unequal distribution of material 
resources, but of ideas, values and meanings’.191  Writes Dhavan, the sastra corpus  
was calculated to achieve what we might call a kind of in-egalitarian harmony between races 
and in support of a particular view of the relationship between various groups… As a 
testament on race relations, the sastra presents a hierarchical solution to the problems of 
race and group differentiation. Awkward though this may seem to our contemporary images 
of an egalitarian society, this hierarchical view was founded on a cosmological understanding 
of the order of things.
192
  
 
Dhavan’s argument is that the sastra in contemporary Hindu society comprises ‘a 
second order reservoir of ideas and beliefs’ which people draw on to make decisions 
and which influence how they view themselves and their relationship with others and 
things around them.
193
 He argues that ‘too little attention is paid to the ideology of 
everyday life, which is concerned with what we believe and our reasons for action or 
inaction’.194 The sastras, he argues, authoritatively pronounce on the relationship 
between persons inter se and the State, while diluting the difference between legal 
and moral obligation – they prescribe and settle the basis on which group life is to 
exist in civil society, yet they do not draw their authority from the State.
195
 Dhavan 
goes on to argue that after Indian independence ‘it was assumed that the unit of 
interpretive concern was the individual who must, prima facie, be treated as equal to 
other individuals unless the purpose of the law suggested otherwise’, but this 
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 Menski (1993), n 2 above, 302. 
191
 M. Schwartz, ‘Indian Untouchable Texts of Resistance: Symbolic Domination and Historical 
Knowledge’ in H.L. Seneviratne (ed.), Identity, Consciousness and the Past: Forging of Caste and 
Community in India and Sri Lanka (New Delhi: OUP, 1999) 177. 
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fundamental principle, on which modern law was founded, was at variance with the 
sastra.
196
 Yet, he says, the contemporary defence of Hinduism is not a defence of the 
sastric way of life but a more amorphous general defence of the faith which seeks to 
draw Hindus together. Thus, in India, arguments about affirmative action policies for 
Dalits ‘are not based on religion but on the rational argument that [they are] 
unworkable, unfair, inegalitarian and contrary to public interest’.197 It is submitted 
that many of these elements of Dhavan’s analysis are also relevant to current 
discussions in the UK concerning the legal regulation of caste discrimination, the 
opponents of which make similar arguments to those explained by Dhavan, above. 
 
The ideas and beliefs underlying caste and caste discrimination in Indian society are 
deeply rooted in traditions, rituals and rules that have developed over centuries, and 
they continue to play a role in the shaping of people’s attitudes and behaviours in 
contemporary India, particularly in rural areas. Breaking down such deeply held 
beliefs and practices cannot be achieved solely by legal regulation; corresponding 
social and political action is also required.
198
 Nevertheless, legal regulation is 
essential.
199
 Before turning to examine the legal regulation of caste discrimination in 
the international and UK arenas we must first examine the legal regulation of caste 
and caste discrimination introduced by post-independence India in an attempt to 
eradicate caste discrimination and the practice of Untouchability, analysing in 
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particular what has and has not worked, in order to draw lessons for the UK. This is 
the focus of Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 
The Legal Regulation of Caste Discrimination in India: 
Lessons Learned
1
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Like an octopus, caste has its tentacles in every aspect of Indian life. It bedevils carefully 
drawn plans of economic development. It defeats legislative effort to bring about social 
reform. It assumes a dominant role in power processes and imparts its distinctive flavour to 
Indian politics. Even the administrative and the academic elites are not free from its over-
powering influence. So how can it be ignored as a social force?
2
  
 
This description of caste in India, written in 1968, was echoed some thirty-five years 
later in Myron Weiner’s observation that caste is still very much alive as a lived-in 
social reality, even though its ideological grip has somewhat weakened.
3
 In 1936, 
B.R. Ambedkar published his seminal essay ‘The Annihilation of Caste’,4 calling for 
an end to the caste system and the oppression associated with it, but sixty-five years 
since Indian independence
5
 and the adoption of a Constitution
6
 heralding a society 
free from poverty, inequality and discrimination, caste has not been annihilated in 
India, and neither has Untouchability despite its legal abolition.
7
 Far from becoming 
a caste-neutral or caste-less society, India - despite its huge diversity - remains a 
                                                 
1
 For a comprehensive discussion of caste discrimination in contemporary India, and strategies for its 
elimination, see A. Waughray, ‘India and the Paradox of Caste Discrimination’, 8 European Yearbook 
of Minority Issues (2009) 413-452.   
2. C. S. Dube, Foreword in Y. Atal, The Changing Frontiers of Caste (New Delhi: National 
Publishing House,1968) vii. 
3
 M. Weiner, ‘The struggle for equality: caste in Indian politics’ in A. Kohli (ed.), The Success of 
India’s Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2001) 193-225, 195. 
4
 B.R. Ambedkar, ‘The Annihilation of Caste’ in V. Moon (ed.), Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and 
Speeches (BAWS) Vol. 1 (Bombay: The Education Dept., Govt. of Maharasthra, 1989).  
5
 India became independent at midnight on 14-15 August 1947; D. Lapierre and L. Collins, Freedom 
at Midnight (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1997). 
6
 Constitution of India 1950 (COI), in force 26 January 1950. Full text available at 
http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm (visited 26 July 2012). 
7
 COI, Article 17. 
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society where caste matters. Paradoxically, says Weiner, ‘the movement for change 
is not a struggle to end caste [but] to use caste as an instrument of social change... 
[W]hat is emerging in India is a social and political system which institutionalises 
and transforms but does not abolish caste’.8 India is the world’s largest caste-affected 
country and has the oldest legal framework for addressing discrimination on grounds 
of caste, yet there is a glaring disconnect between India’s legal (and policy) 
framework and the de facto situation on the ground. This chapter explains and 
critiques India’s legal and policy framework for the elimination of discrimination on 
grounds of caste, identifies the weaknesses and limitations of India’s approach and 
suggests how these might be overcome in India and avoided elsewhere, e.g. the UK. 
In order to do this, the chapter first identifies and explains the contemporary context 
and manifestations of caste discrimination in India today. 
 
3.2 Caste discrimination in India: contemporary context9 
3.2.1 Poverty and Untouchability 
 
In a country with huge numbers of poor by any international standards, India’s Dalits 
suffer disproportionately from socio-economic deprivation and economic 
exploitation.
10
 However, material poverty is not the only source of Dalits’ 
oppression; rather – despite regional, linguistic, cultural and religious differences – 
                                                 
8
 Weiner, n 3 above, 196. 
9
 See Waughray (2009), n 1 above. 
10
 K. Parikh and R. Radadkhrishna (eds.) India Development Report 2004-5 (New Delhi: OUP, 2005) 
49; S. Alkire and M. Santos, ‘Acute Multidimensional Poverty: A New Index for Developing 
Countries’, Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative Working Paper No. 38, University of 
Oxford, July 2010, 13-17, 32, 43, 49. On the concept of economic citizenship see B. Harriss-White 
and A. Prakash, ‘Social Discrimination in India: A Case for Economic Citizenship’ (University of 
Oxford South Asia Work in Progress Research Papers No. 5 (2011-12) at 
http://www.southasia.ox.ac.uk/south-asia-work-progress-research-papers (visited 25 March 2013). On 
India’s poor see P. Sainath, Everyone Loves a Good Drought: Stories from India’s Poorest Districts 
(London: Review, 1996); H. Mander, Unheard Voices: Stories of Forgotten Lives (New Delhi: 
Penguin, 2001). 
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they are distinguished by a shared experience of Untouchability-based exclusion, 
discrimination and violence.
11
 Although commentators argue that Untouchability has 
‘changed character and lost intensity since independence’,12 and despite a decline in 
some of the most blatant practices,
13
 a 2006 study of rural Untouchability in eleven 
States found ‘almost universal residential segregation in villages’14 and 
Untouchability practised in various forms in almost eighty per cent of the villages 
studied, despite its constitutional abolition. In urban areas higher-status Indians 
remain occupationally, residentially and socially separated from the lower castes.
15
  
 
3.2.2 Occupational inequalities 
 
Economic activity remains skewed along caste lines, with sharp disparities in 
occupational mobility, status and income between Dalits and the higher castes. 
Bonded labour, subsistence-level agricultural day labour and low-level or menial 
jobs (whether in the private or public sector) are all associated with the lowest castes, 
in particular Dalits, who struggle to accumulate the social and cultural capital 
necessary to compete on a level playing field.
16
 The view in modern corporate India 
                                                 
11
 O. Mendelsohn and M. Vicziany, The Untouchables: Poverty, Subordination and the State in 
Modern India (Cambridge: CUP, 1998) 12; B. R. Ambedkar, ‘Outside the Fold’ in V. Moon (ed.), 
BAWS Vol. 5 (Bombay: The Education Dept., Govt. of Maharasthra, 1989) 19-26. 
12
 Mendelsohn and Vicziany, ibid., 36. See also G. Shah, ‘Dalit Politics: Has It Reached An Impasse?’ 
in N. Jayal and S. Pai (eds.), Democratic Governance in India: Challenges of Poverty, Development 
and Identity (New Delhi: Sage, 2001) 221-231, 227. 
13
 G. Shah, H. Mander, S. Thorat et al., Untouchability in Rural India (New Delhi: Sage, 2006)166. 
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 Ibid., 67. See also B. Bhatia, ‘Dalit rebellion against untouchability in Chakwada, Rajasthan’, 40 
Contributions to Indian Sociology (2006) 29-61. 
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 Mendelsohn and Vicziany, n 11 above, 40-41; H. Gorringe and I. Rafanell, ‘The Embodiment of 
Caste: Oppression, Protest and Social Change’ 41 Sociology (2007) 97-114, 106-7. 
16
 S. Thorat and K. Newman, ‘Caste and Economic Discrimination: Causes, Consequences and 
Remedies’, Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), 13 October 2007, 4121-24; S. Jodhka and K. 
Newman, ‘In the Name of Globalisation: Meritocracy, Productivity and the Hidden Language of 
Caste’, EPW , 13 October 2007, 4125-4132, 4127-8; T. Weisskopf, ‘Impact of Reservations on 
Admissions to Higher Education in India’, EPW, 25 September 2004, 4339-4349, 4344; M. Mohanty, 
‘Social Inequality, Labour Market Dynamics and Reservation’, EPW, 2 September 2006, 3777-3789; 
S. Thorat and K. Newman, Blocked by Caste: Economic Discrimination in Modern India (New Delhi: 
OUP, 2012); A Deshpande, The Grammar of Caste: Economic Discrimination in Contemporary India 
(New Delhi: OUP, 2011). 
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that recruitment is governed strictly by merit (itself a contested concept)
17
 is not 
borne out by the research:
18
 ‘[F]ar from disappearing as the economy modernises’, 
argue Thorat and Newman, the formal, urban labour market shows ‘serious evidence 
of continued discriminatory barriers even for highly qualified [D]alits’.19  
 
3.2.3 Educational inequalities 
 
Dalit secondary school enrolment rates are lower and drop-out rates higher than for 
the general population
20
 (and the figures are worse for girls), due partly to the high 
direct costs of schooling and the need for Dalit children to work.
21
 Consequently, 
Dalit literacy levels remain below the national average
22
 and Dalits are significantly 
under-represented in the ranks of higher degree graduates,
23
 forming around twelve 
per cent of the urban population but just 3.6 per cent of urban non-technical subject 
graduates and under two per cent of urban medical graduates.
24
 Dalit children are 
more likely to attend State-run, poor quality, rural, non-English-medium schools, 
which means that they are less likely to meet college admissions requirements.
25
 By 
2000, the representation of Dalits in higher education was still only half their 
representation in the population as a whole; two-thirds of Dalit students are enrolled 
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 S. Fredman, ‘Reversing Discrimination’, 113 Law Quarterly Review (1997) 575-600, 580.  
18
 S. Thorat and P. Attewell, ‘The Legacy of Social Exclusion: A Correspondence Study of Job 
Discrimination in India’, EPW, 13 October 2007, 4141-4145; Jodhka and Newman (2007), ibid.  
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 Thorat and Newman (2007), n 16 above, 4123. See also D. Ajit, H. Donker and R. Saxena, 
‘Corporate Boards in India: Blocked by Caste?’ EPW, 11 August 2012, 39-43; Thorat and Newman 
(2012), n 16 above; Deshpande, n 16 above; Shah (2001), n 12 above, 229. 
20
 Government of India (GOI), Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD), Department of 
Higher Education (DHE), New Delhi; Selected Educational Statistics (SES) 2005-6, Gross Enrolment 
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 GOI, National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC), New Delhi, Report 2004-5, 16. 
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 NCSC Report 2004-5, ibid., 118.  
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 H. Jain and C. S. Venkata Ratnam, ‘Affirmative Action in Employment for the Scheduled Castes 
and the Scheduled Tribes in India’, 15(7) International Journal of Manpower (1994) 6-25, 22. 
24
 S. Deshpande, ‘Exclusive Inequalities’ in S. Thorat and N. Kumar (eds.), In Search of Inclusive 
Policy: Addressing Graded Inequality (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2008) 323-24. 
25
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on low-prestige programmes and they are disproportionately under-represented in 
Masters’ and PhD programmes.26 
 
3.2.4 Violence 
 
Violence against Dalits (‘atrocities’)27 is often committed with the knowledge and 
acquiescence, or at the hands, of the law enforcement agencies.
28
 Non-governmental 
monitoring groups and statutory bodies link atrocities to greater competition between 
Dalits and higher castes for scarce resources such as land and water,
29
 as well as with 
attempts by intermediate and higher caste groups to protect their status or to punish 
those perceived to have transgressed social boundaries.
30
 Both the UN Committee for 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) have noted allegations of police 
failure to register, investigate and properly assist victims of atrocities and caste 
discrimination.
31
 Paradoxically, Untouchability offers no protection against caste-
based sexual violence. Punitive or coercive violence against Dalits is often 
characterised by its highly gendered nature, with women and girls the deliberate 
targets of gendered Untouchability practices and sexual violence, and rape and 
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 Weisskopf (2004a), n 16 above, 4339.  
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 On violence against Dalits see K. B. Saxena, Report on Prevention of Atrocities Against Scheduled 
Castes: Policy and Performance – Suggested Interventions and Initiatives for NHRC (New Delhi: 
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sexual torture are an integral element of retaliatory and punishment crimes against 
Dalit families.
32
  
 
3.3 Constitutional vision 
The framers of India’s 1950 Constitution aspired to achieve an end to poverty and a 
radical restructuring of Indian society.
33
 The Constitution of India (COI) embodies a 
three-pronged strategy for the emancipation of the Dalits which owes much to the 
legal and political vision of Dr. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee, and his skills as a legal negotiator and draftsman. The first legal scholar 
to conceptualise caste and Untouchability-based exclusion as a civil and political and 
social and economic rights issue, as well as a socio-religious matter, Ambedkar 
transformed the Untouchables into a pan-Indian social and political entity and 
secured their status as a sui generis legal category.
34
 The Constitutional framework 
consists of, firstly, legal protection from the ideology and practice of Untouchability 
and from inequality and discrimination in the social and economic fields; second, 
affirmative action provisions, known as reservations, in the spheres of political 
representation, government and public sector employment and higher education; and 
third, measures for socio-economic development. The purpose was to protect the 
Dalits from the imposition of Untouchability-based disabilities, compensate them for 
the historical injustices and disadvantages inflicted by Untouchability, increase their 
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representation in the reserved fields and facilitate and promote their economic and 
social advancement. 
 
3.4 Caste, equality and non-discrimination: legal framework 
The COI establishes India as a ‘Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic 
Republic’.35 Articles 14-31 COI guarantee to all citizens various individual 
fundamental rights, corresponding to civil and political rights. Social and economic 
rights are incorporated in Articles 39-51 as ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ 
which must be applied by the State in making laws.
36
 Article 14 guarantees equality 
before the law, while Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination by the State ‘against any 
citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them’. 
Article 17 abolishes Untouchability (although not the caste system per se) and 
criminalises its practice in any form. Articles 16(1) and 16(2), respectively, 
guarantee equality of opportunity and prohibit discrimination based on religion, race, 
caste, sex, descent, place of birth, or residence in public employment or State office. 
Article 15(2) provides that ‘[n]o citizen shall be subject, on grounds of religion, race, 
caste, sex or place of birth, to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with 
regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels or places of public entertainment, 
or the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads or places of public resort maintained 
out of State funds or for general public use’ – these being the major forms in which 
Untouchability is practised by private actors in the public sphere. India’s 
constitutional provisions relating to Untouchability are operationalised by criminal 
legislation. Caste-based crimes, including Untouchability offences, are punishable 
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 COI, Preamble. The words ‘Socialist, Secular’ were added after ‘Sovereign’ by the Constitution 
(Forty-second) Amendment Act 1976, S.2. 
36
 COI, Article 37. 
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under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and/or under special ‘hate crimes’ legislation. The 
Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955 (PCRA)
37
 defines certain acts as offences if 
committed because of Untouchability, while the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 (POAA or ‘Atrocities Act’) lists twenty-
two ‘hate crimes’ where the victim (but not the perpetrator) is an SC/ST.38 The very 
enactment of the POAA and the nature of the offences it prohibits is indicative of the 
persistence and severity of abuses suffered by Dalits in contemporary India.  
 
Although commonly thought of as an American phenomenon, India’s affirmative 
action policies pre-date America’s policies by many decades.39 The COI provides for 
special measures of affirmative action (‘reservations’) at national and regional levels 
by way of quotas in electoral seats, public sector and government employment and 
seats in higher education institutions to three historically disadvantaged and under-
represented groups: Scheduled Castes (SCs) (the only group afflicted by 
Untouchability), Scheduled Tribes or STs (adivasis) and Other Backward Classes 
(OBCs).
40
 Reservations in public employment and higher education in India originate 
                                                 
37
 Formerly the Untouchability (Offences) Act 1955, amended and renamed in 1976 to enlarge its 
scope and to strengthen its penal provisions; see 
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(visited 18 December 2012). 
38
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in special measures for non-Brahmins introduced by certain Princely States and 
Provinces in the early twentieth century,
41
 while reserved seats in the national and 
provincial legislatures originate in British concessions to Muslims at around the same 
time.
42
 The COI mandates reservations for SCs and STs (but not OBCs) in political 
representation at local, provincial and national level on the basis of their population 
share.
43
 Article 15(4)
44
 authorises (but does not mandate) the reservation of seats in 
State higher education institutions for SCs and STs and, since 2006, for OBCs
45
 and 
in private educational institutions other than minority institutions covered by Article 
30(1).
46
 Article 16(4) authorises (but does not mandate) reserved posts in public 
sector (but not private sector) employment for SCs and STs in provincial and Central 
government services
47
 and for OBCs in provincial and (since 1993) in Central 
services.
48
 In the absence of a constitutional ceiling on reservations in higher 
education and public employment, case law has established a fifty per cent ceiling.
49
 
The quota for SCs is 17 per cent and for STs 7.5 per cent
50
 (roughly their percentage 
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of the overall population), and for OBCs 27 per cent, such that the combined 
reservation quota for the three categories does not exceed 50 per cent.
51
  
 
Legislation has also been introduced to protect Dalits – the majority of whom work 
in the unorganised sector
52
 – from degrading and humiliating customs and 
employment practices, and from economic exploitation. The Employment of Manual 
Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act 1993 prohibits 
manual scavenging and criminalises the employment of scavengers by public actors 
and has been adopted by most States and Union Territories
53
 – yet, according to a 
recent academic study, there are still an estimated 1.2 million manual scavengers in 
India, many of whom are employed by local authorities and public bodies such as the 
railways.
54
 Dalit girls are subject to the pseudo-religious practice of ritualised 
prostitution, known as Devadasi or Jogini, where pre-pubescents are dedicated to a 
temple or deity and condemned to a life of sexual exploitation as temple prostitutes.
55
 
Devadasi has been abolished in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh,
56
 but the practice 
persists. The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 abolishes and criminalises 
bonded labour, while the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 
prohibits child labour in certain employments and regulates it in others. These 
statutes do not specifically mention Dalits, but since the majority of bonded labourers 
and many child labourers are Dalits, the provisions are particularly relevant to them. 
The Minimum Wage Act 1948 prevents employers appropriating the fruits of labour 
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of the poor. Finally, laws have been introduced to reduce the concentration of 
productive assets and economic resources in the hands of the higher castes and to 
secure more equitable distribution of economic assets, for example through land 
reform and debt relief legislation.
57
 
 
3.5   India: weaknesses and limitations 
3.5.1 Overview 
 
Constitutional and legislative prohibitions of Untouchability and caste discrimination 
have enshrined formal equality, but nevertheless caste ‘continues to define access to 
food, jobs, education and marriage partners’.58 The Constitution guarantees Dalits 
formal equality yet substantive (de facto) equality remains elusive. Since 
independence, observes one scholar, Dalits have become at one level more unified 
‘and at the same time more stratified than [in] the past’.59 Upward mobility (due to 
affirmative action in education and employment) has created hope of improvement 
which, combined with reservations in political representation, has created 
unprecedented political consciousness among the Dalits.
60
 Nevertheless, a ‘vast 
majority’ of Dalits continue to suffer from discrimination and exclusion in the public 
and private spheres
61
 in the economic, occupational, educational and social fields, as 
well as from caste-based violence and gross human rights abuses.  
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3.5.2 Reservations 
 
Despite their longevity it is difficult to assess the impact of India’s reservation 
policies. Although information on the numbers of Dalits in government and public 
employment is available, quantitative data on educational reservations is less readily 
available and qualitative data in both fields is lacking. Studies of take-up of reserved 
posts or seats, the experience of beneficiaries, the long-term impact of reservations 
on individual socio-economic mobility or on the families and communities of 
beneficiaries, or the broader social impact of the policies on reducing inequality and 
discrimination, are few; surprisingly, for a programme of such size, comprehensive 
monitoring and evaluation is largely absent beyond the collection by the authorities 
of basic-level statistics.
62
 In its 2009 General Recommendation (GR) on special 
measures, CERD recommended that special measures should be temporary, fair and 
proportionate, designed and implemented on the basis of the current need of the 
individuals and communities concerned, and should be continually monitored.
63
 
Whilst employment reservations have opened up coveted government and public 
sector jobs previously barred to Dalits, in Central services they remain clustered in 
lower level jobs and under-represented in senior posts.
64
 Moreover, employment 
reservations are restricted to the shrinking public sector, representing only a fraction 
of India’s total economic activity.65  
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It is difficult to assess how much difference education reservations have made.
66
 If, 
says Weisskopf, they are understood as a strategy to increase the representation of 
specific communities in elite occupations and decision-making positions – rather 
than a mechanism for improving educational opportunities for the disadvantaged – 
effectiveness must be judged on whether reservation beneficiaries complete their 
programmes and achieve successful careers;
67
 however, studies of the performance 
of beneficiaries and their post-university careers are limited.  
 
In contrast, commentators assert that political reservations have had ‘a profound 
effect on the Indian political landscape’.68 In Uttar Pradesh (UP) the ‘representation 
of Dalits in bureaucracy, thanks to the reservation policy’69 led in the 1980s to the 
emergence of the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party, or ‘party of the majority’),70 a Dalit-
based political party whose leaders – beneficiaries of affirmative action – have 
become a new ‘counter-elite’ responsible for leading political mobilisation.71 In 
2007, the BSP, under its female Dalit leader Mayawati, won a decisive electoral 
victory in the UP state elections, having previously held power three times in 
coalition governments in 1995, 1997 and 2003.
72
 Nevertheless, the success of north 
India’s Dalit ‘new politicians’ in improving the economic position of the Dalits and 
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effecting a fundamental shift in traditional social relations is questioned by some 
scholars.
73
 According to Weiner, for instance, the increase in Dalit bureaucrats and 
politicians has not led to more effective public policies for overcoming the immense 
poverty persisting in India which disproportionately affects their communities.
74
 
Meanwhile, CERD notes that in India generally, Dalits still find themselves denied 
the right to vote, and Dalit candidates, especially women, are frequently prevented 
from standing for election or, if elected, are pressured to resign.
75
  
 
The impact of reservations on Indian democracy, political development and social 
order is much debated. On the one hand the very scheme which was designed as part 
of a strategy to eliminate caste inequality by bringing Dalits ‘into the fold’ has 
played a major role in entrenching caste as a political as well as a social identity, and 
in institutionalising caste in the political system.
76
 On the other hand, says Varshney, 
the political rise of the lower castes, deploying caste identity and a ‘reinvented’ caste 
history, is resulting in a ‘caste-based restructuration’ of power such that caste ‘can 
paradoxically be an instrument of equalisation and dignity’.77   
 
3.5.3  ‘Protective’ legislation 
India’s legislation to tackle Untouchability and discrimination on grounds of caste – 
as with legislation on caste violence and caste hate crimes – imposes criminal 
sanctions on those who violate the law. Mendelsohn and Vicziany argue, based on 
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the widespread continuing discrimination against Dalits and the small number of 
cases registered by the police and disposed of by the courts, that ‘very few Indians 
have been directly affected’ by this legislation, and that the best that can be said is 
that ‘[legislation] has contributed to stripping away the legitimacy of Untouchability, 
but it is difficult to measure such an effect’.78 Caste crimes suffer low conviction 
rates and high year-on-year pendency of cases.
79
 In 2007, only fourteen thousand 
people were convicted of caste crimes out of forty-seven thousand whose trials were 
completed, leaving one hundred and eighty-six thousand whose trials remained 
pending.
80
 India’s Ministry of Justice and Social Empowerment (MJSE) cites a 
conviction rate of just 12.8 per cent for PCRA crimes and 32.1 per cent for POAA 
cases for 2008.
81
 National and international human rights bodies, activists and 
scholars have repeatedly highlighted the poor enforcement of existing legislation, 
including in cases where atrocities have been committed by the law enforcement 
agencies themselves.
82
 The fundamental problem underlying this ‘culture of under-
enforcement’ is that the legislation lacks cultural legitimacy – a huge gulf exists 
between the content of the legislation and the social values and attitudes of society at 
large. As Galanter has remarked, ‘the law goes counter to perceived self-interest and 
valued sentiments and deeply ingrained behavioural patterns’.83 There is little 
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cultural imperative to obey the law or to prosecute offenders.
84
 CERD has noted 
‘with concern’ the entrenched nature of ‘caste bias’ in India and the social 
acceptance of caste-based discrimination.
85
  
 
In addition to an absence of cultural consensus in favour of existing legislation, the 
current legislative approach itself is too narrow in focus. Ambedkar conceptualised 
Untouchability and caste discrimination in structural and institutional terms
86
 (unlike 
Gandhi, for whom Untouchability was an individual religious and moral issue).
87
 
Yet, India’s existing legislative framework is ill-suited to addressing 
institutionalised, structural forms of discrimination. The PCRA and the POAA, as 
criminal statutes, focus legal attention on individual, worst-case manifestations of 
caste-based discrimination and violence. While it is important that such behaviour is 
punished, criminal law treats each instance of discrimination or violence as a single, 
disaggregated act committed by an individual offender or offenders, ‘shorn’ of its 
social and historical context. Moreover, conviction depends on the prosecution 
meeting the criminal standard of proof.
88
 Recognising discrimination as problematic 
only in its most overt or violent manifestations
89
 entails a dangerous ‘conceptual 
disconnection between extremism and the general culture’.90 India lacks broader civil 
equality legislation designed to address ‘everyday’ acts of discrimination, for 
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example in recruitment, which fall outside the ambit of existing criminal law. 
Whereas criminal law gives control to the State to take action on behalf of the victim 
– whose role quickly becomes peripheral – civil anti-discrimination legislation can 
actively involve the victim in pursuing their case. Absent civil equality legislation to 
address discriminatory behaviour which falls short of the criminal threshold, the goal 
of challenging entrenched beliefs and promoting changed behaviour through legal 
means is unlikely to be realised.  
 
3.5.4 Scheduled Castes and religious restrictions  
 
Despite widespread recognition that the ideology and practice of caste exists in other 
religions¸ the constitutional framework treats it as a Hindu phenomenon. Under the 
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950, only Hindus, Sikhs or Buddhists can be 
classified as SCs.
91
 As ‘minorities within minorities’, Muslim and Christian Dalits 
are widely recognised to suffer greater socio-economic and educational 
disadvantages than their non-Dalit co-religionists while suffering discrimination on 
grounds of caste at the hands of both the wider community and their co-religionists;
92
 
yet, they are excluded on grounds of religion from the SC category and hence from 
accessing SC reservations. Lack of SC status also means that Muslim and Christian 
Dalits who are victims of atrocities cannot file complaints under the POAA, as the 
                                                 
91
 ‘[N]o person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion 
shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste’; see Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 
1950 (C.O. 19) para. 3, at http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/subord/rule3a.htm, (visited 19 December 2012). 
Sikhs and Buddhists were originally excluded from the SC category (apart from Sikh members of four 
specific castes; CAD Vol. VIII, 25 May 1949, 272, 311). Sikhs were included in 1956 and Buddhists 
in 1990, on the grounds that these were indigenous religions, essentially variants of Hinduism; 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act 1956 and Constitution (Scheduled 
Castes) Orders (Amendment) Act 1990; http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/subord/rule3a.htm and 
http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/subord/rule4a.htm (visited 2 July 2010). The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) 
Order 1950 (C.O. 22) is religion-neutral; it contains no provisions akin to C.O. 19 para. 3. 
92
 See S. Deshpande, Dalits in the Muslim and Christian Communities: A Status Report on Current 
Social Scientific Knowledge (New Delhi: GOI, National Commission for Minorities, 2008).  
105 
 
victim must be a member of a Scheduled Caste for the Act to be triggered.
93
 This 
anomaly has led to national and international calls to open the SC category to 
Muslim and Christian Dalits and for the 1950 Order to be made religion-neutral.
94
 In 
2007, CERD recommended that eligibility for affirmative action benefits be extended 
to SC and ST converts to religions other than Sikhism or Buddhism,
95
 while in 2009, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the freedom of religion or belief highlighted as 
‘problematic in terms of human rights standards’ the legal link between SC status 
and religious affiliation in her report on India.
96
 Given that India has repeatedly 
insisted before CERD that caste is a social/class system, not a religious system,
97
 it is 
submitted that it should accord SC status to Muslim and Christian Dalits without 
delay.
98
  
 
3.6 Lessons learned 
Allott identifies four stages in the ‘business of producing a major social 
transformation through law’: (1) determine social (policy) goals, (2) consider what 
legal and administrative means to use to attain these goals, (3) introduce the legal and 
administrative programme and (4) monitor performance and rectify failures in 
effectiveness (this fourth stage ‘ought to follow but rarely does’, says Allott).99 The 
success of a law genuinely intended to achieve a certain (social) end, says 
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Lustgarten, depends inter alia on whether it contains well-designed, effective 
enforcement procedures and whether adequate resources are allocated to bringing 
about the desired end.
100
 The beneficiaries also need to be clearly definable and 
identifiable – although, as will be seen in later in this thesis, ‘category challenge’ is 
an inherent feature of the grounds-based or ‘protected categories’ approach to 
protection. India’s current legislative approach – criminalising the most overt and 
extreme manifestations of caste discrimination and violence – constitutes only a 
partial legal response to endemic, institutionalised discrimination and inequality. Its 
criminal legislation is not enforced; disinterest and/or unwillingness within State 
institutions must be recognised and tackled by regular, mandatory human rights 
training of law enforcement agents and the judiciary,
101
 coupled with education and 
awareness-raising among Dalits and the wider population.
102
 The progress of cases 
should be monitored by State or central monitoring commissions. Furthermore, civil 
anti-caste discrimination legislation is lacking. From a liberal perspective, civil 
equality law (if well-designed, implemented and enforced) would serve both as a 
coercive tool and an educative device,
103
 providing concrete protection and redress 
for victims of discrimination whilst redefining behaviour hitherto considered 
acceptable as socially unacceptable as well as actionable legally.
104
 A legal 
obligation on public bodies and agencies to have regard in the exercise of their 
functions to caste-based discrimination and disadvantage and the need to eliminate it, 
is required (such as the obligation imposed on public authorities in the UK by the 
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‘public sector equality duty’ in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010); compliance 
should be monitored. 
 
However, legislation alone is not sufficient to tackle deep-rooted social phenomena 
such as caste discrimination. The Indian experience shows that to produce effective 
social transformation, law must be accompanied by social policy, including 
education: a comprehensive approach is needed in order to compel social reform.
105
 
Detailed data collection and wide-ranging qualitative studies are necessary for the 
design of appropriate policy interventions – both law and policy must be adequately 
resourced, including (in the case of law) resources for enforcement. Legislative and 
policy programmes must be monitored for effectiveness, and effective mechanisms 
of government accountability must be introduced.  
 
India’s reservations policy was originally conceived as a short-term, ten-year 
measure,
106
 but it has been repeatedly extended, most recently in August 2009,
107
 
becoming the primary terrain and political focus of caste equality activity in India. 
The high political investment in reservations, and India’s continuing social and 
economic disparities, have until recently hindered development of a broader national 
‘equality debate’. However, recent proposals include the creation of a national Equal 
Opportunities Commission (EOC), the introduction of a ‘Diversity Index’ to 
incentivise organisations and companies to measure and improve their ‘diversity 
                                                 
105
 Special Rapporteur on racism, interim report, n 101 above, paras. 68, 71. See also J. Goldston, 
‘The Struggle for Roma Rights: Arguments that Have Worked’, 32(2) Human Rights Quarterly 
(2010) 311-35, 311. 
106
 See Constituent Assembly Debates of India (CAD) Vol. VIII (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat) 
331. 
107
 See http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-07-31/india/28212116_1_st-quota-
constitutional-amendment-bill-109th-amendment; 
http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=663866 (both visited 19 December 2012). 
108 
 
performance’108 and the establishment of a national data bank and an autonomous 
assessment and monitoring authority to provide a source of reliable data on 
discriminated-against groups, as well as for the design and monitoring of policies, 
initiatives and programmes and for ensuring transparency.
109
 As yet, however, these 
have not materialised.
110
  
 
There is currently a huge gap in India between the legal status of Dalits and their 
sociological status.
111
 Government policies ‘have granted Dalits the right to [legal] 
equality but not necessarily the right to be treated as equals’.112 Legislation 
‘guarantees Dalits the right to touch’ (for example, to enter temples, hotels and 
restaurants) but it cannot guarantee the right ‘to be touched’.113 It is submitted that 
the absence of a comprehensive, proactive approach to the eradication of caste 
discrimination which compels reform on the ground increases the likelihood of 
domestic social unrest, international political opprobrium (or at least 
embarrassment), and holds India back on the world economic and political stage. 
 
In 1936, Ambedkar observed:  
[U]nless you change your social order you can achieve little by way of progress […] you 
cannot build on the foundation of caste. You cannot build up a nation, you cannot build up a 
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morality. Anything that you will build on the foundations of caste will crack and will never 
be whole.
114
   
 
In an interesting twist, Ambedkar’s analysis was echoed over seventy-five years later 
by Bollywood actor and social activist Aamir Khan in a 2012 column in The Hindu 
newspaper in which he argued that India cannot be a superpower while 
Untouchability and discrimination based on caste exist; instead, what is required is to 
implement the vision of ‘shared social good’ laid down in India’s Constitution:  
Our forefathers […] have laid down laws that tell us that discrimination based on caste and 
religion [is] illegal. Now, we have to find [a] place in our hearts to follow them. We also 
have to find [a] place in our hearts to accept that discrimination between people is against the 
very concept of humanity.
 115 
 
This chapter has outlined and critiqued India’s legal and policy framework for the 
elimination of caste discrimination, highlighting the problems with the SC category 
as well as the need for a holistic approach involving law and policies geared to 
effecting socio-cultural and economic change. This chapter concludes Part 1 of the 
thesis. We now turn to Part 2, which considers the ‘internationalisation’ of caste and 
the engagement of international human rights law with caste discrimination. We start 
with Chapter 4, which examines the conceptualisation of caste discrimination as a 
form of descent-based racial discrimination prohibited by Article 1 of the 
International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 
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Chapter 4 
Caste Discrimination and International Human Rights 
Law Standards: International Convention for the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Until the mid-1990s, few human rights lawyers outside the traditionally caste-
affected countries of South Asia were aware of caste discrimination, its nature or 
extent. The peculiarity of caste eluded Western conceptualisation,
1
 while 
governments of traditionally caste-affected states treated caste discrimination as an 
internal, social matter. Caste discrimination was conspicuous in international human 
rights law discourse only by its absence. It was not until the latter part of the 1990s 
that Dalit activists and their supporters succeeded in bringing caste discrimination to 
the attention of the UN, resulting in its condemnation as a human rights violation by 
treaty and charter mechanisms alike.
2
 Two bodies were at the forefront of this UN 
activity on caste discrimination: the former UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights (UN Sub-Commission, now replaced by the Human 
Rights Council Advisory Committee) and the UN Committee for the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD),
3
 the monitoring body of the International Convention 
for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 (ICERD).
4
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The landscape of international human rights law in relation to caste discrimination, 
its development, implementation and enforcement, is broad and complex. Part 2 of 
this thesis, in Chapters 4 and 5, identifies and examines those aspects of international 
human rights law which contribute to an understanding of caste discrimination and 
its legal regulation in India and the UK. This chapter sets out the international legal 
framework for caste discrimination with a focus on ICERD, showing how the 
framework has been developed, and the challenges of conceptualising and 
problematising caste discrimination in international human rights law. The chapter 
also identifies and explains the major actors and debates, and in conjunction with 
Chapter 5 considers how international human rights law might develop in the future 
in relation to caste discrimination, descent-based discrimination and discrimination 
based on work and descent. 
 
The principal difficulty in the conceptualisation of caste discrimination as a violation 
of international human rights law is the absence of caste as a category in any 
international human rights instrument. This has led to the subsuming of caste within 
categories which do not completely overlap with it, and the interpretation of existing 
categories and the creation of new ones to cover caste and analogous systems of 
inherited status. In the case of CERD this has resulted in objections from states such 
as India and Japan who do not accept this approach. Since 1996, caste discrimination 
has been affirmed by CERD as a form of descent-based racial discrimination under 
ICERD,
5
 and since 2000, by the UN Commission on Human Rights (now the Human 
Rights Council) and the UN Sub-Commission, as a subset of a new, wider legal 
                                                                                                                                          
December 1968); United Kingdom (7 March 1969); Nepal (30 January 1971); Bangladesh (11 June 
1979); Sri Lanka (18 February 1982). 
5
 Concluding Observations – India; CERD, Report; UN Doc. A/51/18 (1996), para. 352. 
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category, discrimination based on work and descent (DWD).
6
 Both categories – 
descent-based racial discrimination and DWD – include, but are not limited to, caste-
based discrimination. Caste has been deemed to fall within the protected grounds of 
the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
7
 and the UN 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
8
 while 
caste discrimination has been identified as an impediment to the enjoyment of rights 
under the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
9
 and the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC).
10
 This chapter shows how adopting a dynamic approach to 
human rights treaty interpretation
11
 has enabled treaty bodies to address caste 
discrimination within the parameters of existing human rights treaties. Chapter 5 
considers how caste discrimination has also been addressed by the UN special 
procedures (in particular by successive Special Rapporteurs on Racism), by the 
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review mechanism (UPR) and by the 
UN minority rights and indigenous people’s mechanisms.  
 
In 2007, a UN experts’ study on the gaps in the existing international instruments to 
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance concluded 
that, ‘given the steps taken by CERD to extend the applicability of ICERD to 
descent-based communities’, there were ‘no substantive gaps as regards the 
protection of members of descent-based communities from racism, racial 
                                                 
6
 UN Sub-Commission, Resolution 2000/4, Discrimination based on work and descent, 11August 
2000; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/46, 23 November 2000, 25. 
7
 Adopted 16 December 1966. In force 23 March 1976. 999 UNTS 171.  
8
 Adopted 16 December 1966. In force 3 January 1976. 999 UNTS 3. 
9
 Adopted 18 December 1979. In force 3 September 1981.1249 UNTS 13. 
10
 Adopted 20 November 1989. In force 2 September 1990. 1577 UNTS 3. 
11
 See CERD, Replies to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
Questionnaire; UN Doc. A/CONF.211/PC.2/CRP.5, 23 April 2008, 15, para. 9. 
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discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’.12 In contrast, Navi Pillay, UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, is quoted as suggesting in 2009 that ‘there 
may well have to be a new international convention written to apply directly to caste’ 
on the basis that ‘the subject of caste has been hidden too long by obfuscation on the 
part of governments, not only in India, that have successfully argued in UN 
conferences that existing international conventions against human rights abuses do 
not apply’.13 This conundrum is explored further in this chapter. 
 
4.2 Caste in international human rights instruments: International Bill of 
Rights 
4.2.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) 
 
‘Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of 
the law without any discrimination, constitutes a basic principle in the protection of 
human rights’.14 This principle applies to all human rights.15 Caste is not included as 
a ground of discrimination in any international human rights instrument, and until 
recently caste discrimination was not conceptualised as a violation of international 
human rights law. Nonetheless, caste has been present, implicitly and explicitly, in 
debates about categories from the very start of the post-1945 human rights 
movement, starting with the drafting of the UDHR.  
 
The non-discrimination provision (Article 2) of the UDHR 
16
 provides, 
                                                 
12
 Report on the study by the five experts on the content and scope of substantive gaps in the existing 
international instruments to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; 
UN Doc. A/HRC/4/WG.3/6, 27 August 2007, paras. 71-76, 76. 
13
 B. Crossette, ‘Putting Caste on Notice’, The Nation, 9 November 2009. 
14
 CERD, General Recommendation (GR) No. 14 (1993), Definition of discrimination (Art. 1, par. 1), 
para. 1. 
15
 S. Skogly, ‘Article 2’ in A. Eide & G. Alfredsson (eds.), The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: A Commentary (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992) 57-72, 71. 
16
 UN Doc. A/RES/217 A (III), 10 December 1948. 
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[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
While Article 2 UDHR thus limits the general principle of non-discrimination to the 
rights enshrined in the UDHR,
17
 the expression ‘such as’ was included at the behest 
of the Sub-Commission to indicate that the enumerated grounds of discrimination did 
not constitute an exhaustive list.
18
 The UDHR was drafted by a sub-committee of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights.
19
 The initial text of Article 2 prohibited 
discrimination in the enjoyment of UDHR rights on five grounds – race, sex, 
language, religion or political belief.
20
 These were amended by the then UN Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities 
(subsequently the UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights) to ‘race, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property status, or 
national or social origin’.21 ‘Colour’ was not included, as the Sub-Commission 
considered it to be embodied in the word ‘race’;22 it was introduced into Article 2 at 
the behest of Minochecher Masani (India) and Hansa Mehta (India), Sub-
Commission and Human Rights Commission members. Masani felt that 
discrimination on the basis of colour and race were not identical: ‘race and colour 
were two conceptions that did not necessarily cover one another’.23 Masani was 
supported by Commission member Habib Malik (Lebanon), who agreed that ‘“race” 
                                                 
17
 Skogly (1992), n 15 above. 
18
 UN Doc. E/CN.4/52, cited in Skogly (1992), n 15 above, 62. 
19
 See J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). 
20
 Morsink, ibid., 93.  
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Morsink, ibid., 102. See also Skogly (1992), n 15 above, 61. 
23
 Morsink, ibid.; S. Skogly, ‘Article 2’ in A. Eide and G. Alfredsson (eds.) The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1999) 75-87, 78; Skogly (1992), ibid. 
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and “colour” did not mean the same thing, neither was the conception of colour 
included in the term “race”’.24  
 
The ‘national origin’ element of ‘national or social origin’ was proposed by the Sub-
Commission’s Soviet member, explaining that the concept was to be interpreted ‘not 
in the sense of a citizen of a State but in the sense of national characteristics’ – 
which, argues Morsink, links it to race and colour.
25
 The Commission’s acceptance 
of this ‘gloss’, he says, makes it ‘an authoritative interpretation’ of the term.26 It was 
disagreement over the meaning of ‘national origin’ which led India, two decades 
later, to propose adding ‘descent’ to the definition of racial discrimination in ICERD. 
‘Birth’ was added to the draft text of UDHR Article 2 in October 1948 by the 
General Assembly’s Third Committee, in lieu of the term ‘class’ proposed by the 
Soviet delegate, which was aimed ‘at the abolition of differences based on social 
conditions as well as the privileges enjoyed by certain groups in the economic and 
legal fields’.27 Morsink writes that the substitution of birth for class was accepted by 
the Soviet delegate because it was agreed that the Russian word ‘soslovie’ – literally, 
‘etat’ in French and ‘estate’ in English, in modern parlance ‘naissance’ in French 
and ‘birth’ in English –  
referred to a legally-sanctioned inequality such as had existed in feudal Europe when 
different groups of people had, by reason of their birth, different rights and privileges. 
Although such inequalities no longer existed in most countries, there were still some 
remnants of that social structure left; and the fight against those remnants should be 
continued by a definite statement in the draft declaration. 
28
 
 
                                                 
24
 Morsink, n 19 above, 103.  
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid., 104. 
27
 Ibid., 114. 
28
 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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‘In other words’, says Morsink, ‘the meaning of… birth [in Article 2] is to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of inherited legal, social and economic differences’.29 On 
the inclusion of birth, Morsink mentions that Mohammed Habib (India) ‘said he 
“favoured the use of the word ‘caste’ rather than ‘birth’ as the latter was already 
implied in the Article”’.  Later, A. Appadorai (India) explained ‘that “his delegation 
had only proposed the word ‘caste’ because it objected to the word ‘birth’. The 
words ‘other status’ and ‘social origin’ were sufficiently broad to cover the whole 
field”’.30 Appadorai’s comment suggests that, even though caste was not explicitly 
included in the UDHR, it was understood to be covered by birth and social origin 
(subsequently included in the prohibited grounds of discrimination in the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR). 
31
 
 
4.2.2 ICCPR 1966 and ICESCR 1966 
 
In the hierarchy of human rights norms the principle of non-discrimination, together 
with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any 
discrimination, is considered a peremptory norm of jus cogens.
32
 It is elaborated 
internationally in legally-binding form in Article 26 ICCPR: 
                                                 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid., 115. See also P. Prove, ‘Caste and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, Lutheran 
World Foundation, unpublished paper (2003), copy on file with author; P. Thornberry, ‘CERD, 
Indigenous Peoples and Caste/Descent-based Discrimination’ in J. Castellino and N. Walsh (eds.), 
International Law and Indigenous Peoples (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) 37, fn 107.  
31
 The interpretation of ‘birth’ as covering legally-sanctioned inequality resulting in differing rights 
and privileges by reason of birth accords with definitions of caste. The absence in the UDHR of an 
explicit reference to caste, says Dalit academic Thorat, is because at the time discrimination and 
racism were understood in the context of the decline and dismantling of European colonialism, and the 
internal struggles of discriminated groups within the different colonies in Africa and Asia were 
overshadowed by the wider anti-colonialism struggle; see Thorat and Umakant, n 2 above, xxix. 
32
 Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment (GC) No. 18 (1989), Non-discrimination, 
para. 1. See also HRC GC No. 31 (2004), The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
State Parties to the Covenant, para. 2: ‘The “rules concerning the basic rights of the human person” 
are erga omnes obligations and there is a United Nations Charter obligation to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms’. See also Restatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Third), Part VII, Chapter 1, s 701, Reporters’ Note 3 (St 
Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute, 1987) 155. On the historical significance and development 
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All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.
 
 
 
In contrast to Article 2 UDHR and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1950 (which provides only an accessory right to non-discrimination), Article 
26 contains both an independent right to equality and an autonomous, freestanding 
guarantee of non-discrimination, not limited only to ICCPR rights.
33 
Subordinate 
provisions (rather than autonomous guarantees)
34
 are found in Article 2(1) ICCPR 
and Article 2(2) ICESCR, which obligate States parties to guarantee the rights 
recognised in the Covenants without discrimination or distinction of any kind such as 
(in the case of the ICCPR) and as to (in the case of the ICESCR) race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.
35
  
 
Most non-discrimination provisions (including the UK’s Equality Act 2010) prohibit 
discrimination on specified grounds. These grounds are ‘suspect classifications’,36 
and distinctions on these grounds will be prima facie discriminatory absent a 
                                                                                                                                          
of the principle of equality, see M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary, (Kehl: N. P. Engel, 2005, 2
nd
 edition) 598-60.  
33
 HRC GC No. 18, ibid., para. 12. See also Nowak, ibid., 604. 
34
 M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on 
its Development (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) 178. 
35
 Nowak, n 32 above, 604. 
36‘Suspect classification’ is a US judicial concept whereby certain groups are recognised as deserving 
special protection due to past discriminatory treatment and political powerlessness experienced by the 
group. There is no fixed definition of which groups merit suspect or quasi-suspect status, but the US 
Supreme Court has afforded suspect classification to groups which have experienced a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, or which have been relegated to a position of political powerlessness; 
see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944). The principal suspect classifications in 
US law are race, nationality and alienage; see J. Watson, ‘When No Place Is Home: Why the 
Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification’, 88 Iowa Law Review (2003) 502-537, 508-511.  
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reasonable and objective justification.
37
 The prohibited grounds of discrimination in 
Articles 2(1) and 26 ICCPR and Article 2(2) ICESCR replicate those in Article 2 
UDHR. The lists are not exhaustive. The Human Rights Committee (HRC – the 
monitoring body of the ICCPR) treats the ‘other status’ category as a residual 
category which captures grounds not expressly listed in Article 26 ICCPR,
38
 while 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR – the monitoring 
body of the ICESCR) expressly treats the ‘other status’ category as open-ended.39 
Article 26 omits certain grounds of distinction now commonly accepted as deserving 
of scrutiny, for example sexual orientation, disability and age. Some of these non-
enumerated grounds have been found by the HRC to constitute ‘other statuses’ for 
the purposes of admissibility of individual communications,
40
 for example 
nationality
41
 and marital status,
42
 illustrating the HRC’s application of the living 
instrument principle to interpreting the ICCPR.
43
 As regards which ‘other status’ 
grounds would be viewed as ‘important grounds’, i.e. ‘inherently more suspect and 
deserving of greater scrutiny’,44 Joseph et al. identify the most common characteristic 
of an important ground as being that it ‘describes a group which has historically 
suffered from unjustifiable discrimination’.45 Since 1997, caste discrimination and 
the caste system in India have been treated by the HRC as contributing to violations 
of ICCPR rights and as an impediment to its implementation, suggesting that caste is 
                                                 
37
 See Craven, n 34 above, 167; Nowak, n 32 above, 629. 
38
 HRC GC No. 18, n 32 above, para. 7; Nowak, ibid., 618. 
39
 CESCR GC No. 20 (2009), Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights, para. 15. 
This was not always the case; see Craven, n 34 above, 168. 
40
 S. Joseph, J. Schulz and M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2000) 530. 
41
 Gueye v France (195/85). 
42
 Danning v The Netherlands (180/84). The HRC has included sexual orientation in sex rather than as 
a sub-category of other status; Toonen v Australia (488/92) para. 8.7. 
43
 Nowak, n 32 above, 628. The living instrument principle is a notion first introduced by the ECtHR 
in 1978 in Tyrer v United Kingdom. The European Court of Human Rights stated that the Convention 
‘was a living instrument which… must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’; Tyrer v 
United Kingdom, Application 5856/72, Judgment 25 April 1978, para. 31. 
44
 Joseph et al., n 40 above, 532. 
45
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a status falling within the Article 26 ‘other status’ category attracting ICCPR non-
discrimination protection.
46
  
 
The CESCR has long scrutinised differential treatment on grounds other than those 
enumerated in Article 2(2) ICESCR – for example age, disability, sexual orientation 
– indicating that it considers these to be additional grounds on which discrimination 
is prohibited.
47
 The list in Article 2(2) is not exhaustive. Alongside the express 
grounds, CESCR has identified other (implied) grounds within the ‘other status’ 
category.
48
 In its General Comment (GC) No. 20 on Article 2(2) ICESCR (2009), the 
CESCR explicitly recognised caste as falling within the ambit of the ICESCR–
prohibited grounds of discrimination. Descent and caste are included in two express 
grounds (social origin and birth)
49
 and as a sub-category of ‘economic and social 
situation status’ (an ‘other status’ category).50 
 
Thus, although caste is not itself an express ground in the international bill of rights, 
it is suggested that it was implicitly included in the birth and social origin categories 
in the UDHR. Moreover, caste is implicitly included in the birth, social origin and 
other status categories of the ICCPR, and since 2009 it has been explicitly included 
in the birth and social origin categories of the ICESCR as well as within the ‘other 
status’ implied ground of economic and social situation. 
 
                                                 
46
 Concluding Observations – India; CCPR, Report; A/52/40 (1997), paras. 420, 430. 
47
 Craven, n 34 above, 170. 
48
 CESCR GC No. 20, n 39 above. 
49
 ‘The prohibited ground of birth also includes descent, especially on the basis of caste and analogous 
systems of inherited status’; CESCR GC No. 20, ibid., para. 26; ‘“Social origin” refers to a person’s 
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 Ibid., para. 24. ‘Individuals and groups of individuals must not be arbitrarily treated on account of 
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4.3 Caste in ICERD: drafting and text 
4.3.1 ICERD: context and background 
 
ICERD was the first of the nine core UN human rights treaties to be adopted (in 
1965) and to come into force (in 1969).
51
 It is also one of the most widely ratified 
treaties, with 175 ratifications as at 1 April 2013.
52
 The prohibition of racial 
discrimination is central to the development of international human rights law – the 
UN human rights regime ‘originated in the search for an effective response to racism 
and racial discrimination’53 – and it has ‘a strong claim to the status of a peremptory 
norm of international law’.54 Initially conceived as a response to anti-Semitic 
incidents in 1959-1960, ICERD also reflected the desire of newly independent 
countries emerging from colonial rule for an ‘international statement against 
apartheid and colonialism’.55 Consequently, in the early days, ICERD was concerned 
primarily with decolonisation, apartheid and self-determination. For many states, 
racial discrimination was considered ‘integral to the colonial system, and by 
extension to the “internal colonialism” of apartheid South Africa and South West 
Africa’.56 Discrimination was seen as a foreign policy issue; compliance with ICERD 
obligations primarily entailed public condemnation of the policies of such states.
57
 
By extension, many states were reluctant to acknowledge the existence of any racial 
discrimination ‘at home’.58 According to former CERD member Banton, ‘most states 
                                                 
51
 See n 3 above.  
52
 See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&lang=en 
 (visited 1 April 2013). 
53
 K. Boyle & A. Baldaccini, ‘International Human Rights Approaches to Racism’ in S. Fredman 
(ed.), Discrimination and Human Rights: The Case of Racism (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 135-191, 141. 
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 P. Thornberry, ‘Confronting Racial Discrimination: A CERD Perspective’, 5(2) Human Rights Law 
Review (2005) 239-268, 240. 
55
 D. Keane, Caste-based Discrimination in International Human Rights Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007) 161, 168. Keane’s book was the first on this topic and hence seminal. 
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 Thornberry (2005), n 54 above, 241. 
57
 Thornberry. ibid. 
58
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saw accession to the Convention as a matter of foreign policy. Many perceived it as a 
way of establishing their anti-apartheid credentials with but few implications for their 
internal affairs’.59 As Banton remarked in 1996, ‘[h]ad the scope of [ICERD] been 
apparent to them at the outset, maybe fewer states would have acceded to it’.60  
 
4.3.1.1 UNGA Resolution 44(I) 1946 Treatment of Indians in South Africa 
 
In 1946, India secured the adoption by the new UN General Assembly (UNGA) of 
Resolution 44(I) declaring that the treatment of Indians in South Africa ‘should be in 
conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded 
between the two Governments and the relevant provisions of the [UN] Charter’.61 
The resolution had been prompted by South Africa’s enactment of the 1946 Asiatic 
Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act No. 28 (the ‘Ghetto Act’) restricting the 
property rights of Asians.
62
 India argued that South Africa’s discriminatory treatment 
of its Indian population was in violation of the UN Charter.
63
 Manu Bhagavan 
explains that India’s leaders at that time envisioned the UN as a supranational body 
capable of acting beyond the limits of national sovereignty where human rights were 
at stake, its purpose to ‘uphold and defend the fundamental rights and the common 
good of all humanity’.64 In her memoirs, Laxmi Pandit (Indian representative to the 
UN and sister of Nehru, independent India’s first prime minister) recounts that 
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 Banton, ibid., viii. 
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during the UNGA debate on Resolution 44(I) South Africa ‘raised the plea of 
domestic jurisdiction under Article 2(7) of the Charter’ (similarly to India’s position 
some fifty years later in relation to the Dalits). Pandit’s response was that this was a 
moral, not simply a legal, issue. For India, South Africa’s actions were ‘primarily a 
challenge to our dignity and self-respect’:  
India has resisted every attempt to divert the debate to a consideration of the legal aspects of 
the issue… what the world needs is not more charters, not more committees to define and 
courts of justice to interpret, but a more willing implementation of the principles of the 
Charter by all governments.
65
 
 
The adoption of Resolution 44(I) secured India’s status as a champion of anti-
apartheid and anti-racism. In a revealing aside, Pandit adds (seemingly without 
irony) that the South African Law Minister apparently sought to ‘humiliate India by 
accusations that were entirely irrelevant to the matter under discussion… treatment 
of our Harijans (untouchables) was of course emphasized…’66   
 
4.3.2 ICERD Article 1(1): Racial Discrimination 
  
Article 1(1) of ICERD defines racial discrimination as 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or 
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. 
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Racial discrimination is thus an ‘umbrella term’67 covering discrimination on five 
grounds – race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin68 – but these grounds are 
not defined in the Convention. In its General Recommendation No. 14 (1993) on the 
definition of racial discrimination, CERD explained that a distinction based on the 
above grounds is contrary to ICERD if it has either the purpose or the effect of 
impairing particular rights and freedoms. A differentiation of treatment will not 
constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the 
objectives and purposes of ICERD, are legitimate or fall within the scope of ICERD 
Article 1(4). In determining whether an action has an effect contrary to ICERD, 
CERD will consider whether that action ‘has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a 
group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’.69 In the 
absence of an express reference to caste as a ground of discrimination in ICERD, 
‘descent’ was the vehicle by which caste entered international human rights 
discourse – an interpretation of descent which India, since 1996, has explicitly 
rejected. 
 
4.3.3 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 1963 
 
ICERD was preceded in 1963 by a Declaration on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination,
70
 which prohibited discrimination on grounds of race, colour or 
ethnic origin. During the drafting of the Declaration, Indian and Pakistani delegates 
explained that their respective Constitutions prohibited discrimination based on 
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 Thornberry (2005), n 54 above, 239, 250. 
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 In a contemporaneous commentary on ICERD, Schwelb described the definition of racial 
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colour, religion and caste, as well as (in the case of India) race.
71
 In the general 
debate on manifestations of racial prejudice in the UNGA Third Committee, the 
Indian representative had argued for an expansive understanding of the concept of 
racial discrimination covering ‘all manifestations of racial prejudice’, arguing that 
‘the youth of the world had to be taught that all forms of racism and discrimination 
were meaningless and dangerous’.72 India, he said, had legislation punishing any acts 
prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between the different religions, racial and 
language groups, castes and communities, and would therefore ‘have no 
constitutional or legal difficulties in implementing such a convention’.73 India also 
stressed that the goal of any convention should be de facto equality: ‘[T]he important 
thing was not to delve into the origins of discrimination but to rid the body politic of 
its ill-effects’.74  
 
4.3.4 ICERD and the meaning of descent 
 
ICERD was prepared by the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities in January 1964.
75
 The original 
definition of racial discrimination contained four grounds – ‘race, colour, national or 
ethnic origin’.76 It is widely known that descent was introduced into the definition in 
October 1965 in an amendment originally proposed by India
77
 which was intended 
‘to meet the objections raised by many delegations to the words “national origin”’.78 
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India’s amendment proposed to replace ‘national origin’ with ‘descent’ and ‘place of 
origin’.79 Four days later, this was withdrawn and replaced with an amendment 
proposed jointly by Ghana, India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Poland and Senegal which omitted ‘place of origin’ but retained ‘descent’ and 
‘national origin’.80 This second amendment was adopted unanimously in October 
1965 to become Article 1(1) of the Convention.
81
  
 
The meaning of ‘national origin’ was extensively debated in the Third Committee of 
the General Assembly.
82
 The United States representative distinguished national 
origin from nationality in that national origin relates to previous or ancestral 
nationality and geographical origins, covering people residing in foreign countries 
which were not the countries of their ancestors; ethnic origin, in contrast, relates to 
racial and cultural characteristics.83 This interpretation of national origin was 
endorsed by the Ghanaian representative, who felt that these notions were 
‘adequately represented’ by ‘descent’ and ‘place of origin’ in India’s initial 
amendment.
84
 The travaux preparatoires are silent on the intended meaning of 
‘descent’, however, and no discussion or debate on this is recorded.85 India denies 
that descent was intended to include caste.
86
 CERD member Thornberry observes 
that descent is ‘not employed in the key pre-ICERD texts on discrimination, and 
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neither is caste’.87 In his 1966 commentary on the then new Convention, Schwelb 
noted the absence of descent in any of the other international instruments or draft 
instruments dealing with related subjects and the lack of any indication of the 
distinction between the concept of descent and the concepts of national or ethnic 
origin.
88
 Schwelb suggested that ‘[i]t is reasonable to assume that the term “descent” 
includes the notion of “caste” which is a prohibited ground of discrimination in 
Indian Constitutional Law (sic)… which, however, also uses the expression 
“descent” side-by-side with “caste”’.89  
 
There is an explanation for the conundrum identified above by Schwelb and 
Thornberry. ‘Descent’ originates in the Government of India Act 1833 in a provision 
introduced to prohibit discrimination against Indians (‘natives’) seeking employment 
in British India with the East India Company:  
No Native of the said Territories [British India], nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty 
resident therein shall, by reason only of his Religion, Place of Birth, Descent, Colour, or any 
of them, be disabled from holding any Place, Office or Employment under the said 
Company.
 90
 
 
The characteristics by which Indians were distinguished from Europeans, and hence 
the prohibited grounds of discrimination, were religion, place of birth, descent and 
colour. At the time ICERD was drafted, India’s concerns were, first, the treatment of 
Indians (i.e. persons of Indian origin, irrespective of legal nationality) in the foreign 
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land of South Africa, and secondly, the legacy of colonialism whereby Indians had 
suffered racial discrimination in their own land.
91
 It is submitted that the terms ‘place 
of origin’ or ‘national origin’ and ‘descent’ were put forward by India in 1965 to 
meet these twin concerns. However, this does not mean that caste was not in the 
minds of the drafters of ICERD. That it was in the minds of the Indian delegates, at 
least, is evident from the debates on the provision which became Article 1(4) on 
special measures. 
 
4.3.5 ICERD Articles 1(4) and 2(2): special measures 
 
Article 2(2) ICERD provides that States parties shall, when the circumstances so 
warrant, 
take, in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to 
ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals 
belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
92
 
 
Article 1(4) ICERD ensures that special measures taken in compliance with Article 
2(2) shall not be deemed racial discrimination: 
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain 
racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order 
to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that 
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such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for 
different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they 
were taken have been achieved.
93
 
 
During discussions on the provision which was to become Article 1(4), the 
Scheduled Castes were clearly envisaged by the Indian representatives in the UNGA 
Third Committee, Saksena and Pant, as falling within its ambit.
94
 Both delegates, 
whilst acknowledging that the Scheduled Castes were ‘of the same racial stock and 
ethnic origin as their fellow citizens’,95 explicitly identified them as groups to which 
Article 1(4) would apply.
96
 The provision, said Saksena, had been included in the 
draft Convention, 
in order to provide for special and temporary measures to help certain groups of people, 
including one in his country, who, though of the same racial stock and ethnic origin as their 
fellow citizens, had for centuries been relegated by the caste system to a miserable and 
downtrodden condition.
97
 
 
Their concern was to ensure that India’s constitutional special measures, or 
affirmative action policies, for the Scheduled Castes would not be condemned as 
discriminatory under ICERD. It is difficult to read this as anything other than an 
assumption of the reach of ICERD to caste issues, at least as regards Article 1(4), in 
which case it is difficult to reconcile this with India’s subsequent insistence that the 
                                                 
93
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definition of racial discrimination in Article 1(1) of ICERD cannot be interpreted as 
including caste.
98
  
 
Logically, India should have argued, both during the drafting of ICERD and later in 
its State Reports, that Article 1(4) had no application to its special measures for 
Scheduled Castes, on the grounds that caste was not covered by Article 1(1); 
however, it did not. Until 1987, its expressed position was that Scheduled Caste 
reservations fell within Article 1(4). By implication, caste must have been covered 
also by Article 1(1). Conversely, from 1987, India’s position has been that caste does 
not fall within Article 1(1) and that information on the situation of the Scheduled 
Castes would be provided only as ‘a matter of courtesy’.99 As CERD member Van 
Boven observed in 1996, there was ‘some discrepancy’ between the contribution of 
the Indian delegation during the ICERD drafting process to Article 1(4) ‘which 
advocated affirmative action’ and India’s subsequent attitude that caste is not 
covered by ICERD Article 1(1).
100
 
 
4.4 CERD and Caste: interpretation and practice 
4.4.1 India  
 
India has been a State party to ICERD since 1969.
101
 It has submitted nineteen 
periodic reports pursuant to Article 9 of ICERD, the first seven individually between 
1970 and 1982, the eighth and ninth combined in 1986, the tenth to fourteenth 
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combined in 1996 and the fifteenth to nineteenth combined in 2006.
102
 India has 
repeatedly maintained that it has no racial discrimination at home.
103
 Instead, 
successive Indian governments have identified the elimination of racial 
discrimination primarily with the fight against apartheid and the anti-colonial 
struggle.
104
 From its initial report in 1970 until its combined eighth and ninth reports 
in 1986, successive Indian governments provided CERD with detailed information 
on India’s special measures for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which 
CERD repeatedly acknowledged as conforming with Article 1(4).
105
 It was not until 
1987, during CERD’s examination of India’s ninth report, that India first stated 
expressly that it did not consider caste to fall within ICERD Article 1(1). In its report 
India had stated that ‘measures in favour of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes 
are in conformity with Article 1(4) of the Convention’,106 but during examination 
India’s representative stated that, in his view, ‘Article 1 of the Convention did not 
apply to India’ and that information in the report on Scheduled Castes had been 
provided solely in response to the many questions by CERD members on the issue of 
caste.
107
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India’s first categorical written denial of the application of ICERD Article 1(1) to 
caste came in its tenth to fourteenth report in 1996, where it argued that caste 
denoted a social and class distinction and was not based on race but had its origins in 
the functional division of Indian society during ancient times.
108
 It was ‘obvious’, 
said India, that the use of descent in ICERD clearly refers to race; given that the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes ‘are unique to Indian society and its 
historical process’, India’s policies relating to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes 
therefore do not come under the purview of ICERD Article 1(1).
109 India’s 
interpretation of descent was rejected categorically by CERD in 1996 during its 
examination of the report.
110
 The fact that castes and tribes were based on descent 
brought them strictly within the Convention, under the terms of Article 1.
111
 If 
descent was the equivalent of race, it would not have been necessary to include both 
concepts in the Convention.
112
 Although the concept of Scheduled Castes and Tribes 
was not based on race, it did have an ethnic connotation, and discrimination against 
members of those groups was therefore within the purview of Article 1.
113
 Even if 
caste denoted a social distinction and was not based on race, it was unacceptable to 
say that the serious discrimination against certain castes, especially the 
Untouchables, was not within the Committee’s competence.114 In its concluding 
observations CERD stated that the term ‘descent’, in Article 1, did not refer solely to 
race, and affirmed that the situation of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes fell within 
the scope of the Convention.
115
 What CERD should have made absolutely clear, but 
did not, was that the concept of racial discrimination is wider than race, that descent 
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and race are not interchangeable but constitute complementary grounds of 
discrimination under Article 1(1) and that CERD considered caste to come within the 
descent limb – not the race limb – of racial discrimination. The issue was not 
whether the concepts of caste and race were synonymous; rather, it was that caste 
falls within a sub-category (descent) of racial discrimination as defined in ICERD 
Article 1(1). 
 
Ten years later, in its fifteenth to nineteenth report, India reiterated ‘that “caste” 
cannot be equated with “race,” nor is it covered under “descent” under Article 1 of 
the Convention’.116 During CERD’s examination of India’s report in February 2007, 
India again reiterated its position that caste-based discrimination was an issue outside 
the purview of racial discrimination under Article 1(1) of ICERD.
117
 India’s 
Constitution drew a distinction between caste, race and descent, considering them as 
separate concepts – India’s government  
had no doubt that the ordinary meaning of the term “racial discrimination” did not include 
caste. It was firmly accepted that the Indian caste system was not racial in origin. Caste was 
an institution unique to India, and had not entered into the considerations of those who 
drafted the Convention… [t]he term “descent” had a definite meaning in the Indian 
Constitution and occurred in reference to discrimination in public employment.
 118
 
 
On India’s proposal to include descent among the grounds of prohibited 
discrimination during the ICERD travaux préparatoires, India stated that it ‘had 
been based on concerns regarding discriminatory treatment against Indians in their 
own land while under colonial rule, and to persons of Indian descent in countries 
where they had settled in large numbers’; there was nothing that supported the 
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contention that descent was intended to include caste as an aspect of racial 
discrimination.
119
 Saksena’s reference, during the drafting of ICERD, to the 
Scheduled Castes in the context of what was to become Article 1(4) was in the 
context of debates on exceptions to the general rule prohibiting racial 
discrimination:
120
  
It is… clear that the reference to the Scheduled Castes by the Indian Delegation during the 
Travaux Preparatoire (sic) of 1965 was for the limited purpose of protecting, in a future 
scenario, the constitutionally sanctioned special measures of 1950 for the historically 
disadvantaged Scheduled Castes. It had no relation to the definition of racial discrimination 
nor did it have anything to do with the word “descent.” On the contrary, Mr. Saksena’s 
assertion that the Scheduled Castes are of the same racial stock and ethnic origin as their 
fellow citizens puts the position beyond doubt or argument.
121
 
 
Logically, however, if India’s constitutional special measures for the Scheduled 
Castes had nothing to do with racial discrimination, there was no need to refer to 
them during the preparatory debates, and no need for protection for such measures 
‘in a future scenario’ to be built in to ICERD. Put another way, Saksena’s assertion 
in 1965, that Article 1(4) applied to India’s system of reservations for the Scheduled 
Castes, makes no sense unless caste is included, expressly or impliedly, within the 
ambit of ICERD Article 1(1).
122
  
 
India challenged CERD’s authority to interpret ICERD, as well as its interpretation 
of descent, arguing that CERD ‘had first raised the issue of caste-based 
discrimination within the concept of discrimination based on descent over thirty 
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years after its establishment’123 and suggesting that CERD had ‘redefined’ – and 
therefore acted outwith - its mandate: 
We believe that this Committee’s core competence and raison d’être is in the area of 
combating racial discrimination and should be preserved. A redefinition of its mandate 
would, in our view, result in loss of specificity which should be avoided, since it can have 
unpredictable consequences.
124
 
 
Although India’s domestic distinctions between caste, race and descent are not 
binding on CERD, and cannot relieve India of its obligations under ICERD, India 
asserted that all discussion on the concept of caste ‘must be within the parameters set 
out by the [Indian] Constitution’; consequently, India was ‘not in a position to accept 
reporting obligations on that issue under the Convention’.125   
 
4.4.2 CERD 
4.4.2.1 Competence to interpret 
 
By asserting in 1997 that India’s interpretation of descent (as referring solely to race 
and hence inapplicable to caste) was ‘unacceptable’, CERD assumed an unequivocal 
authority to interpret ICERD. CERD’s competence to interpret ICERD stems from 
Article 9 by which CERD is mandated to receive and consider State party reports on 
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the legislative, judicial, administrative and other measures which they have adopted 
to give effect to ICERD and is empowered to make suggestions and General 
Recommendations on examination of the reports and information received from the 
States parties.   
 
4.4.2.2 CERD: interpretative approach 
 
The starting point for interpretation of treaties under international law is the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT),
126
 which sets out the general rule 
of treaty interpretation: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
127
 
 
As a general principle of international law, a treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties and must be performed by them in good faith.
128
 However, human rights 
treaties differ from traditional multilateral treaties in that their object and purpose is 
not the ‘exchange of reciprocal rights between a limited number of States’129 or the 
protection or advancement of State interests
130
 but ‘the protection of the basic rights 
of individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, against the State of their 
nationality and all other contracting states’.131 Thus, in interpreting human rights 
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treaties, it is necessary ‘to seek the interpretation that is most appropriate in order to 
realise the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to 
the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties’.132 Moreover, 
the legal rights and obligations enshrined in human rights treaties are widely 
considered to be rights and obligations erga omnes.
133
 
 
Article 1 of ICERD ‘does not specify the groups which fall under its protection, nor 
does it define such terms as “race,” “descent” or “national or ethnic origin”’.134 In 
common with other UN treaty bodies, CERD has adopted a dynamic or evolutive 
approach to interpreting ICERD, treating it as a living instrument.135 From its initial 
focus on apartheid and racial segregation, CERD has addressed issues of ethnic 
discrimination (e.g. in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia), discrimination against 
Roma,
136
 indigenous people’s rights,137 the right to self-determination138 and, more 
recently, the rights of non-citizens
139
 and descent-based discrimination and racial 
discrimination against people of African descent.
140
 CERD has also taken into 
account the evolution of ‘racial discrimination’ from conceptualisations which 
emphasise biological features to contemporary forms of racial discrimination 
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justified by cultural differences
141
 and has interpreted the definition of racial 
discrimination in ICERD in order to address multiple or aggravated forms of racial 
discrimination.
142
 CERD has repeatedly clarified the meaning of the grounds 
enumerated in Article 1, in Concluding Observations and in various General 
Recommendations, emphasising that the concept of racial discrimination ‘is much 
broader than that perceived by many States which argue that there is no racial 
discrimination on their territory’143 and expressing regret at the ‘limited 
understanding by many States parties regarding the meaning and scope of the 
definition of the concept of racial discrimination in Article 1 of the Convention… 
which may lead some States to deny or minimize the extent of racial discrimination 
in their territory’.144 In relation to descent it has affirmed that ‘the term descent has 
its own meaning and is not to be confused with race or ethnic or national origin’.145   
 
4.4.2.3 CERD and the meaning of racial discrimination: General Recommendation 
No. 14 (1993) 
 
As at the beginning of 2013, CERD had made thirty-four General Recommendations. 
GR No. 14 (1993) sets out CERD’s interpretation of the definition of discrimination 
in ICERD Article 1(1), discussed in section 3.2, above. A distinction is contrary to 
the Convention if it has either the purpose or the effect of impairing particular rights 
and freedoms. ‘In seeking to determine whether an action has an effect contrary to 
the Convention, [CERD] will look to see whether that action has an unjustifiable 
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disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin’.146   
 
GR No. 14 was issued three years before CERD’s 1996 affirmation that caste is 
included in the descent limb of racial discrimination, reaffirmed in GR No. 29 (2002) 
(see below). As CERD member Thornberry pointed out in 2001 (in the context of 
CERD’s examination of Japan’s initial and second report), the expression ‘racial 
discrimination’ in Article 1(1) of ICERD 
covered different categories of discrimination, including that based on descent, in order to 
cover all cases and to apply to all countries no matter their specific cultural 
characteristics.
147
 
 
Pursuant to GR No. 14, actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on a group 
distinguished by caste will be contrary to ICERD. 
 
4.4.2.4 CERD and the meaning of racial segregation and apartheid: General 
Recommendation No. 19 (1995) 
 
CERD observed that while in some countries government policies created conditions 
of complete or partial racial segregation, partial segregation may also arise as an 
‘unintended by-product’ of private actions: 
In many cities residential patterns are influenced by group differences in income, which are 
sometimes combined with differences of race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin, 
so that inhabitants can be stigmatised and individuals suffer a form of discrimination in 
which racial grounds are mixed with other grounds.
148
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Racial segregation can thus arise ‘at home’, without any initiative or direct 
involvement by the public authorities. In its concluding observations in May 2007 on 
India’s fifteenth to nineteenth reports, CERD expressed concern at the persistence of 
de facto segregation of Dalits
149
 and urged India to intensify its efforts to enforce 
legislation prohibiting and punishing Untouchability and to take effective measures 
against segregation.
150
 
 
4.4.2.5 CERD and the meaning of descent 
 
In 1996, during its examination of India’s fifteenth to nineteenth reports, CERD 
categorically affirmed for the first time that caste discrimination falls within the 
definition of racial discrimination in Article 1(1) of ICERD as a sub-category of 
discrimination based on descent: 
[T]he term descent mentioned in Article 1 of the Convention does not solely refer to race. 
The Committee affirms that the situation of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes falls 
within the scope of the Convention.
151
 
 
Since 1996, CERD has repeatedly affirmed that caste discrimination falls under 
Article 1(1) as a form of discrimination based on descent, and that descent has its 
own distinct meaning and should not be ‘confused with race or ethnic or national 
origin’.152 Using ‘descent’, CERD has enquired into and commented on caste-based 
discriminatory practices in India,
153
 Nepal,
154
 Pakistan
155
 and Bangladesh
156
 and has 
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raised the issue of caste-based discrimination occurring in countries with a 
significant South Asian diaspora population, such as the UK.
157
 CERD has also used 
‘descent’ in its wider sense to enquire into discriminatory practices in countries 
outside South Asia (e.g. Japan and certain African states) based on analogous 
systems of inherited status, often related to inherited occupation.
158
  
 
4.4.2.6 CERD General Recommendation No. 29 (2002) on Article 1, paragraph 1 
(descent) 
 
In August 2002, CERD issued GR No. 29 on Article 1, paragraph 1 (descent),
159
 in 
which it reiterated its interpretation of descent. The Preamble confirms ‘CERD’s 
consistent view… that the term “descent” in Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Convention 
does not refer solely to “race” and has a meaning and application which 
complements the other prohibited grounds of discrimination’;160 ‘strongly reaffirms 
that discrimination based on “descent” includes discrimination against members of 
communities based on forms of social stratification such as caste and analogous 
systems of inherited status which nullify or impair their equal enjoyment of human 
rights’161 and ‘strongly condemn[s] descent-based discrimination, such as 
discrimination on the basis of caste and analogous systems of inherited status, as a 
violation of the Convention’. State parties are recommended to take steps to identify 
‘descent-based communities under their jurisdiction… suffer[ing] from 
discrimination, especially on the basis of caste and analogous systems of inherited 
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status’,162 inter alia to ‘review and enact or amend legislation in order to outlaw all 
forms of discrimination based on descent in accordance with the Convention’163 and 
to ‘resolutely implement legislation and other measures already in force’.164  
 
GR No 29 was partly a reaction to the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Other Related Forms of Intolerance 
(WCAR) in Durban,
165
 where Dalit activists sought, ultimately unsuccessfully, to 
secure official recognition of caste as a form of racism, but in the process succeeded 
in internationalising caste discrimination as a ‘new’, global, human rights issue. It 
was preceded by a thematic discussion in CERD on discrimination based on 
descent.
166
 It uses the wider terms ‘descent-based discrimination’, ‘members of 
descent-based communities’ and ‘analogous systems of inherited status’ to avoid 
focussing solely on caste discrimination or on specific states. As a basis of 
discrimination, the term ‘descent’ signified forms of inherited status, said CERD 
member Thornberry.167 Caste systems, he argued, represented hierarchy, not equality; 
segregation, not integration; bondage, not freedom; and value determined at birth 
without regard for morality, achievement, intelligence or character.
168
 The issue of 
descent was wider than the notion of caste – rather than trying to find a definition for 
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the concept, the GR sought to identify a set of indicators which would also be of 
assistance to governments.
169
   
 
General Comments and General Recommendations are not formally binding on 
States parties, but the status of the treaty-monitoring committees gives them ‘a 
special claim for attention’.170 All treaty bodies with competence to adopt general 
comments or recommendations have used them to interpret the provisions of the 
treaties which they monitor, despite the absence of explicit authority to do so.171 Yet, 
‘their reception in the world of practice’ is mixed.172 Governments, says Alston, have 
challenged them as ‘representing an unwarranted and unacceptable attempt to 
attribute to treaty provisions a meaning which they do not have’.173 However, such 
challenges serve to draw attention to the relevant interpretation and ‘help to establish 
it as a benchmark against which alternative interpretations will be forced to compete 
at something of a disadvantage’.174 Mechlem contends that states generally concur 
with treaty bodies on questions of interpretation and ‘rarely put forward their own 
interpretations of specific rights’.175 Clearly this is not always the case. India claims 
that CERD’s interpretation of descent as covering caste amounts to ‘a redefinition of 
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its mandate’.176 By refusing to accept CERD’s interpretation, India has refused to 
afford CERD exclusive competence to interpret ICERD and has asserted a right to an 
equal interpretive role. Japan has also rejected CERD’s interpretation of descent and 
its application to Japan’s Buraku people, a group which CERD has repeatedly 
identified as falling within the ambit of ICERD.
177
 
 
4.5 Descent  
4.5.1 Origins of descent as a legal category 
 
The term ‘descent’ was probably not intended (or at least not intended by India) at 
the time of its introduction into ICERD to include caste.
178
 It appears in Article 16(2) 
of the Constitution of India 1950 (COI) – which lists the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination in relation to public sector or State employment – where it is 
enumerated separately from caste.
179
 It was inserted in order to cover discrimination 
‘in the matter of distribution of offices and appointments in the State’ on account of 
descent,
180
 by which was meant discrimination ‘on account of dynasty or family 
status’.181 As a social category in India, descent calls up notions of common ancestry, 
common blood and membership of closed, birth-status groups, whether based on 
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caste, lineage affiliation, religion or language.
182
 As a legal category, descent is of 
British origin. As explained above, descent originates in s. 87 of the Government of 
India (‘Charter’) Act 1833,183 the purpose of which was to prohibit racial and 
religious discrimination against Indians in employment under the East India 
Company (the forerunner in India of State employment), who at that time were 
employed almost exclusively in subordinate positions irrespective of ability or 
competence.
184
 ‘Descent’ connoted geographical origins and racial ancestry.185 It 
appears again, a century later, in s. 298(1) of the Government of India (GOI) Act 
1935 – on which the Constitution of India 1950 was based – as a prohibited ground 
of discrimination in State employment, alongside religion, place of birth and 
colour.186 The notion of descent as a characteristic distinct from caste is reinforced by 
s. 298(2)(b) of the 1935 Act, which qualifies the prohibition of discrimination in s. 
298(1): 
Nothing in this section shall affect the operation of any law which recognizes the existence of 
some right, privilege or disability attaching to members of a community by virtue of some 
personal law or custom.
187
 
 
The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of descent was thus subordinated in 
the GOI Act 1935 to any caste-based (‘community’) disabilities – or privileges – 
deriving from personal or customary law in force at the time. In other words, while 
discrimination between Europeans and Indians in the fields of employment, trade 
and business was prohibited by s. 298(1) of the 1935 Act on grounds of religion, 
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place of birth, descent or colour, discrimination between Indians in the same fields 
on grounds of caste was explicitly exempted. 
 
4.5.2 Descent in Indian jurisprudence post-1947  
 
In the 1948 Constituent Assembly debates, the prohibition of discrimination based on 
descent in Article 16(2) was explained as meaning a prohibition, in the context of 
State employment, of nepotism, favouritism or preferential treatment for those from a 
particular family or dynastic background.
188
 Indian case law since 1950 indicates that 
the term has been applied in the context of public sector employment to prohibit 
‘hereditary’ appointments or appointments ‘by succession’.189 Prima facie the 
appointment of a son, daughter, widow or near relative of a government employee to 
that employee’s post, for example where the employee has retired, or to a post in the 
same department because of a familial connection to the employee, would be 
tantamount to an appointment on the basis of descent and therefore violative of 
Article 16(2) – unless an exception applies, for example in the event of an 
employee’s death in service.190 Descent in the Indian legal context has thus been a 
‘chameleon’ term whose meaning and usage have evolved over time to meet 
changing legal and social needs. 
 
4.5.3 The international usage of descent 
Keane argues that descent is ultimately ‘a term of convenience’ which ‘allows 
international bodies to examine legitimate claims of continuing caste-based 
discrimination’, but ‘CERD should not pretend that descent originally meant caste 
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when it did not’; it ‘should recognize that it has re-interpreted the term’.191 This, 
argues Keane, would involve ending the description of discriminatory practices in 
certain African states as caste, while at the same time informing India ‘that it does 
not believe that its caste structure is based on differences of skin colour’, nor that 
caste is synonymous with race, ‘but that this does not mean that caste is excluded 
from the purview of the ICERD’.192 I agree with Keane that the cross-cultural 
application of the term caste is problematic; I suggest that the term ‘analogous 
systems of inherited status’, used by CERD in GR No. 29, is preferable outside the 
context of South Asia and its diaspora. However, I disagree that CERD has re-
interpreted or re-crafted descent to cover caste; if this were the case, it would 
drastically weaken CERD’s authority to examine caste-based discrimination under 
the rubric of descent. The living instrument doctrine does not extend to the 
introduction into the treaty of new or additional rights or obligations that the treaty 
drafters did not intend to include; rather, it enables the recognition of hitherto 
unidentified, latent rights or obligations implicit in the terms of the text. From the 
moment it first directed its attention to discrimination based on caste, CERD has 
maintained that, for the purposes of ICERD, caste discrimination is captured by the 
concept of discrimination based on descent. In February 2007, during CERD’s 
examination of India’s fifteenth to nineteenth reports, CERD member Thornberry 
explained, 
[i]n international law, an evolutionary interpretation of terms was common practice; [CERD] 
had, over time, developed a broad interpretation of the term ‘descent’ and was of the view 
that the language contained in the Convention was adequate to capture the notion of caste-
based discrimination. It was important to bear in mind the main purpose of investigating 
racial discrimination as practiced by institutions, individuals or organisations – namely, to 
                                                 
191
 Keane (2007), n 55 above, 237. 
192
 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
147 
 
engage in public reflection and dialogue and thereby address deep-rooted social patterns of 
discrimination.
193
  
 
According to Thornberry, the ‘overwhelming evidence of oppression’ suffered by the 
Dalits as subjects of the caste system ‘could hardly escape the attention of CERD in 
the light of its duty to be faithful to the norms of the Convention’.194 Descent, he 
argues, is the ‘closest descriptor’ for caste and analogous forms of social 
stratification; it has the ‘most open character, since all human beings have a descent’, 
and is  
an appropriate term to act as a normative safety net for clear cases of group-based 
discrimination based on inherited characteristics which are not easily caught by other, 
narrower descriptors.
195
   
 
Keane argues that, even though CERD has re-interpreted descent, ‘this does not 
mean that caste is excluded from the purview of the ICERD’. This argument can only 
be correct if caste is covered by one or more of the other limbs of racial 
discrimination. A treaty body has no authority to re-interpret a treaty. If a 
characteristic is not included, either expressly, impliedly or latently, within the terms 
contained in the treaty, then it is excluded. The point is a fine one, but the logical 
outcome of the argument that caste was not originally included, expressly or 
impliedly, in the treaty, and that in order to address caste discrimination CERD has 
re-interpreted the treaty, is that caste is not covered by, and therefore cannot be 
addressed under, ICERD. This is the position taken by India. 
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In contrast, CERD has affirmed the place of caste discrimination within the 
framework of ICERD through the use of descent – an illustration, says Thornberry, 
of ‘the possibilities inherent in elaborating existing instruments on human rights to 
benefit particular communities, even in the absence of direct reference to the 
community in question’.196 Both CERD and India have called up the ICERD travaux 
preparatoires in support of their interpretation of descent. Treaty interpretation, 
argues Klabbers, is ‘a highly political exercise, continuing the politics of negotiation 
after the treaty’s entry into force’.197 Travaux preparatoires constitute a political and 
historical, as well as a legal, record,
198
 yet they remain ‘an elusive concept’.199 As 
Klabbers points out, the intentions of the drafters may not always be cognisable; 
indeed, there ‘may not be much of a common intention among treaty drafters’ and 
states may ‘enter into negotiations with various, possibly widely diverging goals in 
mind’.200 Invoking the travaux preparatoires may ‘introduc[e] a static element into a 
treaty’, generally considered undesirable in the context of human rights treaties, but 
which, for particular actors – usually states – may be a desirable outcome. 
Conversely, notes Klabbers, the travaux preparatoires may be invoked to show that 
the drafting history does not preclude a particular (often more teleological) 
interpretation of the text.
201
 Either way, he argues, recourse to the travaux 
preparatoires is an acknowledgment of the political nature of treaties. 
 
Faced with India and Japan’s recourse to the ICERD travaux preparatoires in 
support of their interpretations of descent, CERD has sought to emphasise the text of 
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ICERD and subsequent practice instead of the travaux. During CERD’s examination 
of Japan’s combined third to sixth reports in February 2010, CERD member 
Thornberry, referring to the debates in the travaux préparatoires on the substitution 
of descent for national origin,
202
 stressed that the travaux ‘were supplementary; the 
text of the Convention and subsequent practice should be used as the primary means 
of interpretation’.203  
 
4.5.4 Domestic jurisdiction, sovereignty and caste 
 
According to Eide and Alfredsson, during the drafting of the UDHR the Americans 
‘emphasised that the Declaration was not binding and that “the present treatment of 
Negroes in this country involves only issues which are matters ‘essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction’ of the United States” – according to their interpretation of the 
Charter’.204 In similar fashion India has construed enquiry by CERD into caste issues 
as intervention in its internal affairs,
205
 its approach to caste discrimination being that 
it is essentially an internal matter, outside the scope of ICERD, and that there are 
sufficient laws in India to deal with it accordingly.
206
 In February 2007, before 
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CERD, India stated that any dialogue and discussion with international bodies on 
caste discrimination issues must be ‘within the parameters of the Constitution’ and 
that therefore India was not in a position to accept reporting obligations under 
ICERD on the issue of caste discrimination.
207
   
 
India also suggested that international scrutiny by CERD of caste discrimination may 
hinder domestic efforts to overcome the problem, referring to its ‘impressive array of 
constitutional, legal and administrative measures’ to ‘empower the Scheduled 
Castes’ which ‘enjoyed broad political consensus’.208 Given the ‘impressive gains’ 
since the Constitution, it was India’s concern that ‘nothing should be done to 
introduce elements which can only detract from such endeavours’.209 Moreover, 
there were ‘enormous political and social sensitivities involved’.210 India’s position 
that its national Constitution must form the sole legal basis for addressing caste 
discrimination
211
 is in marked contrast to its argument in 1946 that South Africa’s 
‘domestic jurisdiction’ defence of its discrimination against persons of Indian origin 
was morally as well as legally untenable. 
 
4.5.5 Beyond India and beyond caste: CERD and descent-based discrimination 
worldwide 
 
Nepal and Pakistan, as caste-affected countries within South Asia, have, unlike India, 
accepted (or at least not objected to) CERD’s interpretation of descent as including 
caste – and hence CERD’s authority to enquire about and to scrutinise measures 
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taken in their countries to prevent, prohibit and eliminate caste-based 
discrimination.
212
 Yet, despite the existence of constitutional provisions in both 
countries prohibiting discrimination on grounds of caste,
213
 and a constitutional 
provision in Nepal prohibiting and criminalising Untouchability,
214
 CERD in its 
concluding observations to both countries has expressed concern about continuing de 
facto discrimination against Dalits on grounds of caste, including de facto residential 
and occupational segregation and social exclusion
215
 and, in the case of Pakistan, the 
absence of legislation aimed at the prohibition of caste-based discrimination.
216
  
Bangladesh has not objected to CERD’s position that caste falls within the scope of 
ICERD via descent, claiming in its seventh to eleventh reports in 2000
217
 to take a 
‘broad view of its obligations under the Convention’, including pursuing positive 
discrimination policies in favour of the disadvantaged.
218
 Nevertheless, CERD 
recommended that Bangladesh include in its next report information about the 
enjoyment of the rights in Article 5 of ICERD by all groups, including castes.
219
 
Discrimination based on caste is prohibited under the Sri Lankan Constitution.
220
 
During CERD’s examination of its second report221 in 1986, Sri Lanka acknowledged 
the existence of a caste system in the country, asserting that it was ‘a racial 
phenomenon not based on any religious factor and was to be found among Tamils 
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 Constitution of Nepal 1990, ibid.; Article 11(4). 
215
 CERD, Concluding Observations – Nepal (2004), n 212 above, para. 12; CERD, Concluding 
Observations – Pakistan (2009), n 155 above, paras. 11, 12. 
216
 CERD, Concluding Observations – Pakistan (2009), ibid., para. 12. 
217
 UN Doc. CERD/C/379/Add.1, 30 May 2000. 
218
 Ibid., para. 5. 
219
 Concluding Observations – Bangladesh; CERD, Report (2001), n 145 above, para. 73.  
220
 Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978, Article 12; at  
http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Introduction.htm (visited 28 December 2012). 
221
 Sri Lanka, second report; CERD/C/126/Add.2., 12 September 1985. 
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and Sinhalese’, but also that ‘no racial distinction could be made between the 
Sinhalese and Tamil communities
’
.
222
 Nonetheless, Sri Lanka made no reference to 
caste in its subsequent reports in 1994 and 2000,
223
 and the issue was not raised by 
CERD in its examinations or concluding observations.  
 
Outside South Asia, the existence of descent-based discrimination in its wider sense 
has been raised by CERD in concluding observations to Japan,
224
 Yemen,
225
 
Nigeria,
226
 Madagascar,
227
 Mauritania,
228
 Senegal,
229
 Chad,
230
 Mali,
231
 Ethiopia
232
 
and Ghana.
233
 Japan rejects the application of discrimination based on descent under 
ICERD to discrimination against ‘persons belonging to or descending from the 
Buraku community’.234 Japan’s argument is that CERD has misunderstood the 
meaning of descent in the application of ICERD. According to Japan in 2001, when 
descent (together with place of origin) was proposed as a replacement for national 
origin during the drafting of ICERD, it was not intended to cover social class or 
                                                 
222
 CERD, Report; UN Doc. A/42/18 (1987), para. 293. 
223
 Sri Lanka, third to sixth reports; CERD/C/234/Add.1, 13 September 1994; Sri Lanka, seventh to 
ninth reports; UN Doc. CERD/C/357/Add.3, 20 November 2000. 
224
 UN Doc. CERD/C/304/ADD.114, 27 April 2001, para. 8; CERD/C/JPN/CO/3-6, 6 April 2010, 
para. 8. 
225
 UN Doc. CERD/C/YEM/CO/16, 19 October 2006, paras. 8, 9, 15, 16; CERD/C/YEM/CO/17-18, 4 
April 2011, para. 15. 
226
 UN Doc. CERD/C/NGA/CO/18, 27 March 2007, paras. 15, 18, 25. 
227
 UN Doc. CERD/C/65/CO/4, 10 December 2004, paras. 12, 17. 
228
 UN Doc. CERD/C/65/CO/5, 10 December 2004, para. 15. 
229
 Concluding Observations – Senegal; CERD, Report; UN Doc. A/57/18 (2002), para. 445. 
230
 UN Doc. CERD/C/TCD/CO/15, 21 September 2009, para. 15.  
231
 Concluding Observations – Mali; CERD, Report (2002), n 229 above, para. 406. 
232
 UN Doc. CERD/C/ETH/CO/7-16, 7 September 2009, para. 15. 
233
 UN Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/4, 2 June 2003, para. 22. A caste-like, hereditary system of social 
stratification has recently been identified in North Korea; R. Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun – 
North Korea’s Social Classification System (Washington DC: Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea, 2012); ‘North Korea Caste System “underpins human rights abuses”’, The Telegraph, 6 June 
2012. 
234
 Japan, third to sixth reports, Replies to List of Questions; UN Doc. CERD/C/JPN/Q/3-
6/Add.1/Rev.1, 8 February 2010, para. 10. Historically, Japan’s Buraku people ‘were subjected to 
intense prejudice and discrimination, forbidden to marry or have physical contact with common 
people as such contact was seen as “polluting” the higher classes. They were an outcast population 
confined to living in hamlets, now officially classified as Dowa districts’; although their living 
standard has improved, ‘discrimination in marriage and employment continues’; see Goonesekere 
(2001), n 177 above. 
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social origin235 – it was proposed because of concern that ‘national origin’ could lead 
to a misunderstanding that the term includes the concept of ‘nationality’ (a concept 
based on legal status). In 2010, Japan reiterated its view, arguing that descent in 
ICERD was intended to ‘indicate a concept focusing on the race or skin color of a 
past generation, or the national or ethnic origins of a past generation’.236 In response, 
Thornberry reaffirmed CERD’s position that descent as a ground for discrimination 
‘carried its own meaning, which was distinct from the other grounds set forth in the 
Convention’.237 In its concluding observations CERD reiterated that descent has a 
meaning and application ‘which complement the other prohibited grounds of 
discrimination’ and ‘that discrimination based on “descent” includes discrimination 
against members of communities based on forms of social stratification… and 
analogous systems of inherited status which nullify or impair their equal enjoyment 
of human rights’.238  
 
CERD has also raised descent-based discrimination with the UK. In 2003, CERD – 
recalling that descent-based discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of 
caste and analogous systems of inherited status, is a violation of the Convention – 
recommended that the UK introduce a prohibition of descent-based discrimination in 
domestic legislation and invited information on the issue in the next periodic 
report.
239
 Unlike Japan and India, the UK has not objected to the inclusion of caste in 
the concept of descent, but nevertheless has resisted CERD’s call for legislative 
action. In its 2010 report, the UK noted CERD’s request for information but stated 
that it had ‘seen no firm evidence on whether caste-based discrimination in the fields 
                                                 
235
 UN Doc. CERD/C/SR.1444, 11 June 2001, para. 28. 
236
 Japan, Replies to List of Questions, n 234 above, paras. 9, 10 (emphasis added). 
237
 UN Doc. CERD/C/SR.1987,4 March 2010, para. 10. 
238
 CERD, Concluding Observations – Japan (2010), n 224 above, para. 8. 
239
 CERD, Concluding Observations – UK (2003), n 157 above. 
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covered by [ICERD] exists to any significant extent in the UK’ and had therefore 
‘made a commitment to commission research into caste discrimination’.240 In its 
2011 concluding observations, CERD noted the UK’s assertion about lack of 
evidence of caste discrimination in regulated fields but pointed out that CERD had 
received contrary information that such discrimination did exist; it therefore 
recommended the government to invoke section 9(5)(a) of the EQA in order to 
‘provide remedies to victims of this form of discrimination’.241 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Caste discrimination has been targeted by CERD since 1996 as a subset of descent-
based discrimination, and CERD has consistently taken a robust attitude towards 
states which have failed to fulfil their Convention obligations with regard to descent-
based racial discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of caste and 
analogous systems of inherited status. CERD has repeatedly emphasised that descent 
is a wider category than merely caste, and that descent-based discrimination of 
different types affects a wide range of countries.
242
 Yet, the capture of caste under 
ICERD via its characterisation as a subset of descent has affronted and been rejected 
by India, the world’s largest caste-affected country and one of the early leaders of the 
international anti-racial discrimination movement. Japan has also challenged the use 
of descent to capture discrimination on the basis of inherited status. Turning to the 
UK, with its growing South Asian diaspora, and with evidence of the existence of 
                                                 
240
 UN Doc. CERD/C/GBR/18-20, 13 August 2010, para. 42. 
241
 CERD, Concluding Observations – UK (2011); n 157 above, para. 30. The UK’s stance as at 1 
April 2013 on the introduction of a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination is discussed in 
Chapter 9 of this thesis. 
242
 See, e.g. CERD GR No. 34, n 140 above.  
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caste discrimination as a domestic issue, the absence of explicit caste discrimination 
legislation, drafted, implemented and enforced in accordance with ICERD 
obligations, risks leading to a greater international focus on the UK and its reluctance 
to deal with such discrimination. The UK’s legal response to caste discrimination ‘at 
home’ forms the third part of this thesis. First, however, Chapter 5 examines the 
application of other international human rights law standards to caste discrimination. 
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Chapter 5 
Caste Discrimination: Other International Human 
Rights Law Standards 
 
5.1 India, caste discrimination and other human rights treaty bodies 
This chapter examines the application of other international human rights law 
standards to the problem of caste discrimination. This first section summarises the 
engagement of other UN treaty bodies with caste discrimination in India
1
. India is a 
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
2
 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);
3
 the 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW);
4
 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
5
 and the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),
6
 in addition to the International 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). 
India has not objected to addressing, or answering questions on, caste discrimination 
before the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on Economic, Social 
                                                 
1
 For a compilation on UN human rights bodies and caste discrimination see International Dalit 
Solidarity Network (IDSN), Caste Discrimination and UN Human Rights Bodies (4/E, 2012) at 
http://idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/UN/UNcompilation.pdf  
 (visited 2 January 2013). 
2
 Adopted 16 December1966. In force 23 March 1976. 999 UNTS 171. Indian ratification 10 April 
1979. India has not ratified the ICCPR Optional Protocol allowing individual communications. State 
reports; UN Doc. CCPR/C/10/Add.8 (1983); CCPR/C/37/Add.13 (1989); CCPR/C/76/Add.6 (1996). 
3
 Adopted 16 December 1966. In force 3 January 1976. 993 UNTS 3. Indian ratification 10 April 
1979. India has not ratified the ICESCR Optional Protocol allowing individual communications. State 
reports; UN Doc. E/1980/6/Add.34 (1983, Initial, Arts. 10-12); E/1988/5/Add.5 (1989, Initial, Arts. 
13-15); E/1984/6/Add.13 (1985, Initial, Arts. 6-9); E/C.12/IND/5 (second to fifth, 2006). Until 1990, 
the ICESCR reporting procedure required three reports for three different sets of articles. From 1990, 
the procedure was consolidated; ECOSOC Resolution 1988/4, 24 May 1988.  
4
 Adopted 18 December 1979. In force 3 September 1981. 1249 UNTS 13. Indian ratification 9 July 
1993. State reports; UN Doc. CEDAW/C/IND/1 (1999, Initial); CEDAW/C/IND/2-3 (2005, second 
and third); CEDAW/C/IND/SP.1 (2009, Special).  
5
 Adopted 20 November 1989. In force 2 September 1990. 1577 UNTS 3. Indian ratification 11 
December 1992. State reports; UN Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.10 (1997, Initial); CRC/C/93/Add.5 (2001, 
second); CRC/C/IND/3-4 (2011, third and fourth). India has ratified Optional Protocols 1 and 2. 
6
 Adopted 13 December 2006. In force 3 May 2008. 2515 UNTS 3. Indian ratification 1 October 
2007. 
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and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW/C) or the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC/C), 
despite these bodies’ characterisation of caste discrimination as an impediment to the 
enjoyment of treaty rights and, in the case of the HRC and the CESCR, the 
conceptualisation of caste as a characteristic attracting ICCPR and ICESCR non-
discrimination protection. The accusation of racial discrimination entailed by the 
Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)’s conceptualisation 
of caste discrimination as a form of descent-based racial discrimination appears too 
much for India, given its history of colonisation and its subsequent role in the anti-
colonialism, anti-apartheid and non-aligned movements. Approaches to caste 
discrimination via categories such as birth, social origin or social status appear to be 
more acceptable to India and hence perhaps more likely to result in concrete 
remedies. 
 
The HRC, CESCR, CEDAW/C and CRC/C have all identified caste discrimination 
as an impediment to Indian implementation of the treaties they monitor.
7
 All four 
treaty bodies have highlighted the persistence of de facto caste discrimination; non-
implementation and non-enforcement of legislation and lack of mechanisms to 
monitor enforcement;
8
 the need for greater efforts to eliminate discriminatory 
practices, including Untouchability and caste-motivated violence; and the need to 
prosecute those responsible, both State and private actors.
9
 CESCR General 
Comment (GC) No. 20 (2009) on non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural 
                                                 
7
 See HRC, Report; UN Doc. A/52/40 (1997) para. 420; E/C.12/IND/CO/5 (2008) paras. 13, 14, 40, 
53; CEDAW/C, Report; A/55/38 (2000) para. 52; CRC/C, Report; CRC/C/94, 3 March 2000, para. 41. 
8
 See, e.g. HRC, Report; UN Doc. A/52/40 (1997) paras. 420, 430; CCPR/C/79/Add.81, 4 August 
1997, para. 15; CEDAW/C/IND/CO/3, 2 February 2007, paras. 28-29; CRC/C, Report, 3 March 2000, 
ibid., para. 63; CRC/C/15/Add.228, 26 February 2004, para. 25. 
9
 See e.g. CRC/C, Report (2000), ibid. 
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rights explicitly locates caste within the ICESCR protected categories of social origin 
and birth, and implicitly within the ‘other status’ category of economic or social 
situation.
10
 This opens up opportunities for Dalit advocacy groups, as well as the 
CESCR itself, to make greater use of the ICESCR in challenging the persistence of 
caste discrimination in India. Likewise, Dalit groups could make greater use of the 
possibilities inherent in the ICCPR to challenge India on the persistence of de facto 
caste discrimination and the non-implementation of caste discrimination legislation. 
The CESCR has highlighted India’s lack of progress in combating bonded labour and 
the worst forms of child labour (which disproportionately affect Scheduled Caste 
children) and its failure to eliminate harmful traditional practices such as devadasi.
11
 
CRC/C has identified India’s caste system as compounding ‘poverty, illiteracy, child 
labour, child sexual exploitation and children living and/or working on the streets’.12 
CEDAW/C has repeatedly highlighted the intersectional nature of the discrimination 
suffered by Dalit women (including physical and sexual violence and the institution 
of devadasi).
13
 CRC/C has stressed the importance of comprehensive public 
education campaigns to prevent and combat caste-based discrimination
14
 and the 
need for disaggregated data relating to caste discrimination and violence.
15
 
 
International scrutiny of caste discrimination by CERD as a form of descent-based 
racial discrimination has transformed caste discrimination from a domestic issue into 
                                                 
10
 CESCR GC No. 20; UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, paras. 24, 26. 
11
 See e.g. UN Doc. E/C.12/IND/CO/5, 8 August 2008, paras. 13, 14, 19, 25, 53. On the institution of 
devadasi see Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
12
 See CRC/C, Report, 3 March 2000, n 7 above, para. 41. CRC GC No.7 (2005), Implementing child 
rights in early childhood, explicitly identifies caste as a prohibited ground of discrimination in the 
context of children’s right to non-discrimination; CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, 20 September 2006, para. 
11(b)(iv). 
13
 CEDAW/C, Report, 2000, n 7 above, paras. 43, 68, 69, 74, 75; CEDAW/C/IND/CO/3, 2 February 
2007, paras. 14, 15, 21, 26, 28, 29. 
14
 CRC/C, Report, 3 March 2000, n 7 above, para. 63; Concluding Observations – India; 
CRC/C/15/Add.228, 26 February 2004, para. 28. 
15
 CRC, Concluding Observations – India (2004), ibid., para. 22. 
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an international human rights issue, but, as Chapter 4 explains, the framing of caste 
discrimination as a form of descent-based racial discrimination covered by ICERD is 
rejected by India. Human rights treaties with wider grounds, where caste 
discrimination can be framed as an impediment to the enjoyment of particular rights 
rather than as a form of racial discrimination per se, offer an alternative to ICERD as 
a means of challenging persistent de facto caste discrimination.  
 
5.2 UN Charter mechanisms   
5.2.1 UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: 
discrimination based on work and descent 
 
In 2000, caste discrimination was conceptualised by the former UN Sub-Commission 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (UN Sub-Commission) as a 
subset of a new legal category, ‘discrimination based on work and descent’ (DWD). 
In August 2000, against the backdrop of Dalit lobbying prior to the 2001 UN World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Other Related 
Forms of Intolerance (WCAR) in Durban,
16
 the UN Sub-Commission passed 
Resolution 2000/4 declaring DWD a form of discrimination prohibited by 
international human rights law.
17
 The resolution contained no definition of this form 
of discrimination, instead affirming the non-discrimination provision in Article 2 of 
the UDHR as its legal source and observing that DWD ‘has historically been a 
feature of societies in different regions of the world and has affected a significant 
proportion overall of the world’s population’. The ‘work and descent’ terminology 
was adopted to encompass caste and similar systems of inherited status without 
                                                 
16
 UN WCAR, Declaration, at http://www.un.org/WCAR/durban.pdf (visited 28 December 2012); see 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, n 166. 
17
 UN Sub-Commission, Resolution 2000/4, Discrimination based on work and descent (DWD), 
11August 2000; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/46, 23 November 2000, 25. 
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focussing on any one state, thereby locating caste discrimination as a global human 
rights issue within a wider international human rights category.   
 
Resolution 2000/4 appointed R.K.W. Goonesekere to prepare a working paper on 
DWD, to identify affected communities, examine existing measures for the abolition 
of such discrimination and make recommendations for its effective elimination.
18
 
Although focussed on South Asia, Goonesekere’s report identified work and descent-
based discrimination as a worldwide problem
19
 and recommended further study of 
the human rights violations associated therewith.
20
 Subsequent working papers by 
Aisbjorn Eide and Yozo Yokota, in 2003 and 2004, detailed the extent of such 
discrimination outside South Asia, including in diaspora communities such as the 
UK, and urged greater national and international examination of the problem.
21
 In 
July 2004, the Sub-Commission appointed two Special Rapporteurs, Yozo Yokota 
and Chin-Sung Chung, to prepare, on the basis of the three existing working papers, 
a comprehensive study on DWD and to finalise a set of draft principles and 
guidelines for its effective elimination.
22
 India opposed their appointment, arguing 
that caste discrimination was ‘a complex sociological issue’ with its roots in the way 
Indian society had evolved since ancient times, which could not be resolved by 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 See R Goonesekere, working paper on the topic of DWD, UN Sub-Commission; UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 
Sub.2/2001/16, 14 June 2001, paras. 7- 8. 
20
 Ibid., paras. 49-50. 
21
 A. Eide and Y. Yokota, expanded working paper on DWD, UN Sub-Commission; UN Doc. E/ 
CN.4/Sub.2/2003/24, 26 June 2003; Eide and Yokota, further expanded working paper , UN Sub-
Commission; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/31, 5 July 2004. For an extended discussion of the Sub-
Commission reports on DWD see D. Keane, Caste-based Discrimination in International Human 
Rights Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 220-227. 
22
 UN Sub-Commission, Resolution 2004/17, DWD, 12 August 2004; UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/48, 21 October 2004, 48. The appointment of the Special Rapporteurs was 
approved by the former UN Commission on Human Rights (UN Commission) in December 2005; UN 
Commission, Decision 2005/109; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/134 (Part I) (2005), 340. 
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‘simplistic prescriptions’.23 India ‘did not seek inspiration or guidance from outside’ 
for the simple reason that corrective forces within the country were sufficiently 
robust; it would be a travesty, India stated, ‘to treat this issue as a straightforward 
human rights question’.24 India argued that the proposal to appoint the Special 
Rapporteurs addressed an issue that was ‘covered by other bodies of the UN’ and 
that ‘both on account of duplication and its focus essentially on a specific country’, 
the proposal ‘would breach the boundary of the Sub-Commission’s mandate’.25   
 
5.2.2 UN Draft Principles and Guidelines for the effective elimination of 
discrimination based on work and descent 
 
The Special Rapporteurs were mandated to investigate the phenomenon of DWD, its 
nature and extent, and to produce a set of Draft Principles and Guidelines (DPGs) for 
its effective elimination.
26
 The definition of DWD in the DPGs is modelled on the 
‘composite’ definition of racial discrimination in Article 1(1) of ICERD:  
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on inherited status such as caste, 
including present or ancestral occupation, family, community or social origin, name, birth 
place, place of residence, dialect and accent that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other field of public 
life. This type of discrimination is typically associated with the notion of purity and pollution 
and practices of [U]ntouchability, and is deeply rooted in societies and cultures where this 
discrimination is practiced.
27
 
 
                                                 
23
 Statement by India, 12 August 2004, at http://www.indianet.nl/r040812.html (visited 30 December 
2012). 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 See Y. Yokota and C. Chung, preliminary report; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/30, 21 June 2005 
paras. 4-6.  
27
 Final report containing draft principles and guidelines (DPGs) for the effective elimination of 
DWD; UN Doc. A/HRC/11/CRP.3, 18 May 2009, Chapter III, para. 2. See also preliminary report 
(2005), ibid.; progress report; UN Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/CRP.2, 28 July 2006. 
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The DPGs provide a ‘guiding framework’ for the elimination of DWD,28  reiterate 
that DWD is a form of discrimination prohibited by international human rights law 
and identify DWD as a major obstacle to achieving development.
29
 They set out the 
obligations of states to combat segregation; ensure physical security and protection 
against violence; ensure access to justice and equal political participation; ensure 
equal employment opportunities and free choice of occupation; eradicate forced, 
bonded and child labour; ensure equal access to health care, a safe environment, 
adequate food, water, housing and education and to raise public awareness. 
Multiple/intersectional discrimination against women must be addressed specifically. 
The Guidelines are described as articulating specific measures to be taken by states 
and other actors in order to implement the Principles, thus providing a possible 
template for domestic legislation. Pursuant to Human Rights Council Decision 
10/117 (27 March 2009) the Special Rapporteurs’ final report, including the DPGs, 
was published by the Human Rights Council in May 2009,
30
 and the DPGs have been 
endorsed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
31
 the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
32
 the UN Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism (SSR),
33
 the European Union (EU)
34
 and the 
                                                 
28
 Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism (SRR), Interim Report; UN Doc. A/66/313, 
19 August 2011, para. 41. 
29
 See Final Report and DPGs on DWD, n 27 above, paras. 4, 5. 
30
 See n 27 above. 
31
 See International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN), Report from Side Event on Draft UN Principles 
and Guidelines for the elimination of DWD, Geneva, 16 September 2009, at 
http://idsn.org/international-advocacy/un/un-parallel-events/hrc12-side-event/ (visited 30 December 
2012); N. Pillay, ‘Tearing Down the Wall of Caste’, The Nation, 19 October 2009. Pillay called on the 
Human Rights Council to promote DPGs which ‘complement existing international standards of non-
discrimination’ and urged all states to ‘rally round and endorse these norms’. The OHCHR has 
identified countering caste discrimination in Asia and the Pacific as a thematic priority; OHCHR, 
Strategic Management Plan, 2010-11, 100-101 at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/SMP2010-
2011.pdf (visited 30 December 2012). 
32
 Statement, Ms. M. Kran, OHCHR, Side Event, ibid., at 
 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/30429B61FC0628ECC125764100390D4A?open
document (visited 30 December 2012); IDSN Report, ibid. 
33
 SRR, Statement, 64
th
 Session, UNGA, 2 November 2009; see IDSN Compilation, n 1 above, 83. 
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Government of Nepal.
35
 However, neither the report nor the DPGs have been 
endorsed formally by the HRC, nor has the HRC recommended that states, UN 
agencies and non-State actors make use of them.  
 
Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has suggested that a new 
international Convention applying directly to caste may be needed.
36
 The question 
arises, whether the DPGs could form the basis of a Declaration on the elimination of 
DWD – and whether this would be desirable. There are practical and policy problems 
with developing a Declaration out of the DPGs. First, the definition of DWD, indeed 
the concept itself, lacks precision. The term is artificial, having been devised largely 
in order to avoid focussing on caste discrimination as the principal manifestation of 
such discrimination and India as the country most affected by it. The SSR has 
endorsed the DPGs, yet it is clear that the Special Rapporteur associates the ‘work 
and descent’ terminology principally with caste.37 Second, there was little State input 
into the drafting of the DPGs: input was solicited from all UN member states as well 
as national human rights institutions, UN bodies and specialised agencies and NGOs, 
but only Japan, Columbia, Croatia, Germany and Mauritius responded.
38
 The lack of 
input from the main South Asian caste-affected states, or from the main African 
states affected by descent-based discrimination, weakens the credibility and 
legitimacy of the DPGs. Third, it is questionable whether India would adopt a 
Declaration directed at the elimination of DWD unless the close conceptual linkage 
                                                                                                                                          
34
 Statement, Swedish Presidency of the EU, Side Event, n 31 above, at  
http://idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/UN/Work_Descent.pdf (visited 30 December 
2012); IDSN Report, n 31 above. 
35
Statement, Government of Nepal, Side Event, ibid., at 
 http://idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/UN/HRC12Nepal_statement.pdf (visited 30 
December 2012); IDSN Report, ibid. 
36
 B. Crossette, ‘Putting Caste on Notice’, The Nation, 9 November 2009. 
37
 See, e.g. SRR, Statement (2009), n 33 above. 
38
 See UN Doc. A/HRC/11/CRP.3, 18 May 2009, Introduction, para. 9. 
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between such discrimination and discrimination based on caste was significantly 
weakened. Nevertheless, Dalits and transnational advocacy networks are promoting 
the DPGs as a tool to encourage caste-specific anti-discrimination legislation and 
policy measures which provide ‘an international reference point for action’ and 
which can be applied in their existing format as a framework for the elimination of 
caste discrimination.
39
  
 
5.2.3 UN Special Procedures 
Aside from the Special Rapporteurs on DWD, since the late 1990s, caste 
discrimination has been taken up by a number of UN Special Procedure mandate-
holders, in particular the SSR.
40
  
 
5.2.3.1 UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance  
 
Caste discrimination in India first came to the attention of the then mandate-holder, 
Glélé Ahanhanzo, in 1996.
41
 In 1999, Ahanhanzo identified the basic question as 
‘whether the age-old caste system in India, which had produced several million 
untouchables, could be regarded as racial discrimination’ and hence was within his 
                                                 
39
 See IDSN, UN Principles and Guidelines at http://idsn.org/international-advocacy/un/un-principles-
guidelines/ 
(visited 15 August 2012); Decade of Dalit Rights UN 2011-20, Strategy Building Conference, Report, 
24-25 June 2011 at 
http://www.idsn.org/fileadmin/user_folder/pdf/New_files/UN/Report_DecadeDalitRights.pdf (visited 
2 January 2013). 
40
 On UN Special Procedures see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx 
(visited 14 August 2012). On UN Special Procedures and caste discrimination see n 1 above.  
41
 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/71,16 January 1997, para. 127. The mandate of the SSR was created by the 
UN Human Rights Council in 2008; Human Rights Council resolution 7/34, 28 March 2008. It 
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mandate.
42
 He concluded that ‘specific attention should be given to the situation of 
the untouchables in India’ and that a field mission might be envisaged for that 
purpose, with the agreement of the Indian Government.
43
 Since 2004, successive 
mandate-holders have repeatedly affirmed that caste discrimination falls within their 
mandate.
44
 The legal – and political – basis for this stance is the position taken by 
CERD in its General Recommendation (GR) No. 29, namely that discrimination 
based on descent, as a form of racial discrimination prohibited by ICERD, includes 
discrimination against members of communities based on forms of social 
stratification such as caste and analogous systems of inherited status, so 
discrimination based on caste constitutes a form of descent-based racial 
discrimination.
45
 By interpreting their mandate in alignment with CERD’s 
interpretation of descent-based racial discrimination, successive SSRs have affirmed 
the framing of caste discrimination in international law as a form of racial 
discrimination and hence caste as an aspect of a ‘most suspect’ classification. 
Discrimination based on caste and analogous systems of inherited status has been 
identified by the SSR as a manifestation of ‘societal’ structural racial 
discrimination;
46
 states have been reminded of their obligation to recognise that 
discrimination based on descent – including DWD and discrimination based on caste 
and analogous systems of inherited status – is prohibited by ICERD and not to 
                                                 
42
 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/15, 15 January 1999, para. 88. 
43
 Ibid., para. 100. 
44
 See, e.g. SSR, Report; E/CN.4/2004/18, 21 January 2004, para. 55; SSR, Interim Report; A/64/271, 
10 August 2009, paras. 54-58, 67; SSR, Report; A/HRC/7/19, 20 February 2008, paras. 69-71; SSR, 
Report; A/HRC/11/36, 19 May 2009, paras. 17, 31; Durban Review Conference, Preparatory 
Committee; UN Doc. A/CONF.211/PC/WG.1/5, 31 July 2008, paras. 44-47; SRR, Report; A/ 
HRC/17/40, 24 May 2011, paras. 26-30; SRR, Interim Report, 19 August 2011, n 28 above, paras. 10, 
11, 38-42. 
45
 See CERD GR No. 29 (2002), Article 1, Paragraph 1 (Descent); SRR, Interim Report, 19 August 
2011, ibid., para. 38. 
46
 See SSR, Statement, Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective Implementation of the 
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Thematic discussion on structural discrimination, 18 
October 2010;  SRR, Report; UN Doc. A/HRC/17/40, 24 May 2011, paras. 25-68; SRR, Interim 
Report, 19 August 2011, ibid., paras. 10, 11.   
166 
 
sidestep the question of caste discrimination by claiming that it does not fall under 
the scope of ICERD.
47
 Caste-based discrimination has been described as remaining 
‘deplorably widespread and deeply rooted’,48 so states have been urged to adopt a 
comprehensive, victim-centred approach to addressing the root causes of structural 
discrimination, including legislative and policy measures and investment in 
awareness-raising and education for State agents and the public.
49
  
 
5.2.3.2 Other UN Special Procedures 
Caste discrimination has been taken up by other thematic Special Procedures as a 
root cause of violations of internationally-recognised rights, as well as an 
impediment to access to, and enjoyment of, a spectrum of human rights. Dalits in 
India, Nepal and Bangladesh have been identified by the Special Rapporteurs on 
contemporary forms of slavery;
50
 adequate housing;
51
 the right to food;
52
 the right to 
education;
53
 the situation of human rights defenders;
54
 violence against women;
55
 
freedom of religion or belief;
56
 the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health;
57
 the Independent Expert on water and sanitation
58
 and 
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the Independent Expert on human rights and extreme poverty,
59
 as a vulnerable 
group whose access to and enjoyment of a range of human rights is compromised 
because of discrimination on the basis of caste, itself a violation of international 
human rights law. Within this group, Dalit women and girls are singled out as 
suffering from multiple, intersecting and aggravated forms of discrimination.
 60
 In 
2007, the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery 
was created pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 6/14, replacing the former 
UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery.
61
 The principal focus of the 
mandate is those aspects of contemporary forms of slavery not covered by existing 
Human Rights Council mandates.
62
 The Special Rapporteur on slavery has 
repeatedly highlighted the ‘intrinsic link’ in Asian countries between caste 
discrimination and contemporary forms of slavery, such as domestic servitude and 
debt bondage,
63
 identifying caste discrimination as a root cause of contemporary 
slavery. 
 
5.2.3.3 Competence of the UN Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures to 
consider caste discrimination 
 
India has charged both CERD and the former UN Sub-Commission with lack of 
competence to address caste discrimination.
64
 Based on Alston, Morgan-Foster and 
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Abresch’s examination of a similar charge of ‘mandate breach’ by the USA and the 
UK against the Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures in relation to 
extrajudicial executions in armed conflicts,
65
 we can identify three arguments on 
which India might rely:
66
 (1) Charter bodies, procedures and mechanisms are 
restricted in focus; in the case of caste discrimination this focus excludes caste- and 
descent-based discrimination and precludes the creation of new mechanisms with 
this focus; (2) the development by Charter bodies and mechanisms of a consistent 
practice of examining caste discrimination does not thereby give them the 
competence to address the issue and (3) discrimination based on caste is an internal 
matter falling exclusively within India’s domestic jurisdiction.  
 
Regarding the first argument, Alston et al. point out that the role of the Human 
Rights Council and the former Commission on Human Rights is to further the UN 
Charter’s general commitment to promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights through a range of activities
67
 irrespective of states’ obligations under human 
rights treaties;
68
 moreover, the Commission never treated the principal human rights 
treaties ‘as self-limitations on its competence’:69  
[T]he Commission – and now the Council – has always worked to fulfil its mandate by 
exercising a broad droit de regard over human rights abuses regardless of whether they 
violated the treaty obligations of any particular state. 
70
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This droit de regard, they argue, ‘has been firmly established in customary 
international law’.71 The resolutions establishing the mandates of Special Procedures 
– one of the most important means by which the Council exercises its droit de regard 
– ‘have routinely laid out droits de regard that exceed the scope of the legal 
obligations even for those states that have ratified all relevant treaties’:72   
This greater breadth as compared to treaty bodies is a virtue of the system, which has 
permitted the Commission and Council to respond to abuses and protect victims even when 
they are not effectively covered by international human rights law. 
 
Importantly,  
the space between the Commission and Council’s droits de regard and the legal obligations 
of States has proven to be a fertile zone for normative development, pushing forward that 
aspect of the Commission and Council’s mandates and even resulting in the drafting of new 
normative instruments.
73
 
 
Special Procedure mandates are not ‘frozen in time’ but evolve in response to 
situations ‘which were not explicitly envisaged in the original resolution’, as also 
‘the need to respond to new forms of violations’ and ‘increasing public demands for 
effective responses in specific contexts’.74 Alston et al. argue that organic ‘mandate 
evolution’ is fully reported in the annual reports of the mandate-holders, which are 
subject to stakeholder debate, feedback and responses in the form of resolutions from 
the parent bodies, which in the ‘vast majority of cases’ explicitly endorse the 
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developments reported and often also request the mandate-holder ‘to further develop 
or strengthen certain measures’.75 
 
Regarding the second argument, Alston et al argue that the domestic understanding 
of ultra vires (that a consistent pattern of ultra vires acts does not cure the original 
defect) cannot be applied to international law, because ‘an integral part of the 
international legal framework is its dynamic nature’.76 Mandates are elaborated and 
refined by the Human Rights Council which reviews, accepts, discourages or rejects 
the interpretations proposed by successive mandate-holders.
77
 As to the third 
argument, a fundamental feature of international human rights law is the special 
character of human rights treaties.
78
 Historically marginalised groups can call up the 
language of human rights in order to transform domestic grievances into 
‘internationally cognisable human rights claims’79 subject to scrutiny at the 
international level. A basic premise of the international human rights regime is that 
the characterisation of an issue as an internal or domestic matter is not solely a matter 
for the state concerned – the fact that a particular state denies the application of the 
human rights label to a given issue, or resists international scrutiny of that issue, does 
not deprive the issue of its international character. 
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5.2.4 Universal Periodic Review 
 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a mechanism created by the Human Rights 
Council in 2006 involving State-led reviews of the human rights records of all UN 
member states.
80
 UPR has increased public attention on caste discrimination and the 
involvement of other states in the issue; however, there is an argument that it is only 
really useful with regard to countries which have taken a cooperative approach (such 
as Nepal and Pakistan).
81
 During the first UPR cycle (2008-11), forty-one 
observations and recommendations relating to caste discrimination were made in the 
outcome reports adopted by the UPR Working Group in relation to India, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Mauritania, Madagascar and Nepal.
82
 During India’s review in April 
2008, two recommendations on caste discrimination were made during the 
interactive dialogue process, namely to maintain disaggregated data on caste 
discrimination and to strengthen human rights education in order to address 
effectively caste-based discrimination;
83
 neither was accepted by India, which 
reiterated its position (as expressed to CERD in 2007) that ‘while they recognize that 
caste-based discrimination exists in India, since the caste system, which is unique to 
India, is not racial in origin, caste-based discrimination cannot be considered a form 
of racial discrimination’.84 At India’s second review in May 2012, twelve states 
made oral statements on caste discrimination and the situation of the Dalits, and three 
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states submitted advance questions on caste discrimination and manual scavenging.
85
 
The Working Group Report contained nine recommendations specifically regarding 
caste discrimination and Scheduled Castes, including better enforcement of existing 
law,
86
 the implementation of effective monitoring mechanisms for special measures 
(reservations), including the collection of data disaggregated by caste,
87
 and the 
promotion of women’s rights to choice of marriage independent of caste.88 
Recommendations were also made that India enact comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation and ensure adequate means of redress,
89
 as well as to 
strengthen human rights training of teachers to end caste discrimination in schools.
90
 
These recommendations were not accepted by India.
91
 The UK was also reviewed in 
May 2012 for the second time, by coincidence on the same day as India.
92
 The 
Working Group recommended that the UK put in practice a national strategy to 
eliminate caste discrimination through the immediate adoption of the provision in the 
Equality Act 2010 which prohibits such discrimination, in conformity with its 
international human rights obligations.
93
 The UK did not accept this 
recommendation,
94
 but it has been drawn upon by Dalit advocacy groups in Britain 
in their campaign for a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination.
95
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5.2.5 International Labour Organisation: discrimination on the basis of social origin 
 
The ILO is a tripartite UN agency working with governments, employers and 
workers of UN member states to promote decent work worldwide via the adoption of 
international standards (conventions and recommendations), enforced inter alia via a 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR), which is empowered to issue individual observations and direct requests 
to UN member states. ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention 1958 (No. 111) establishes as a core labour standard the principle of 
non-discrimination, defined in Article 1(1) as 
any distinction, excision or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, 
political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or 
impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation.
96
 
 
ILO jurisprudence and publications show that the ILO regards caste-based 
discrimination as falling within the ‘social origin’ category. Social origin 
discrimination arises, according to the ILO,  
when an individual’s membership of a class, socio-occupational category or caste determines 
or influences his or her occupational situation either by denying access to certain jobs or 
activities or, on the contrary, by assigning that person to certain jobs… prejudices and 
preferences based on social origin may persist even where rigid stratification has 
disappeared.
97
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The ILO’s 2011 Global Report on Equality at Work identifies caste-based 
discrimination as a form of discrimination on the basis of social origin, most 
widespread ‘in the case of the Dalit population of South Asia’.98 The Report observes 
that caste discrimination is manifested by ‘limited access to certain types of jobs and 
wage gaps in comparison with other population groups. There are also considerable 
differences between castes in terms of educational attainment’. Moreover, ‘social 
perceptions about certain castes limit employment opportunities and subject 
members of those castes to humiliation in their everyday lives and at work’.99 
CEACR has used the social origin category to address, via Individual Observations 
and Direct Requests, the persistence of caste discrimination in employment in 
India.
100
 CEACR’s use of the social origin category to address caste issues appears to 
have been accepted by India without challenge; the problem is not the label or 
category used, but India’s repeated failure to provide the detailed information on 
Dalits and work-related issues that CEACR has repeatedly requested. 
 
5.2.6 UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Other Related Forms of Intolerance (WCAR), 2001
101
  
 
The WCAR agenda was based on a Draft Programme of Action (DPA) drawn up 
ahead of the conference.
102
 Dalits sought the inclusion of caste discrimination as a 
form of racism or racial discrimination in the DPA,
103
 as specifically recommended 
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by the WCAR Bellagio Consultation in January 2000
104
 but vehemently opposed by 
India, which gave four reasons for its opposition: (1) caste does not fall within the 
ambit of racism or racial discrimination because it does not denote race or a racial 
grouping, neither is it a sub-category of descent, because descent refers solely to 
racial descent; therefore, caste was not relevant to the conference;
105
 (2) caste 
discrimination is an internal matter not susceptible to UN scrutiny; (3) India already 
has in place internal mechanisms for addressing caste-based discrimination and 
violence which are unparalleled in scale and scope and (4) India is doing everything 
possible to address the issue, but as a longstanding issue it would take time to 
resolve.
106
 Conversely, India’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) argued 
that the WCAR provided a ‘singular opportunity’ to the international community to 
deal ‘openly and courageously’ with issues of discrimination and inequality ‘all over 
the world, in all of their variety, including the forms of discrimination that persist in 
India’, observing that ‘it is not so much the nomenclature of the form of 
discrimination that must engage our attention, but the fact of its persistence that must 
cause concern’.107 Despite India’s objections, Dalits succeeded in securing a ‘work 
and descent’ provision in the draft DPA, urging all governments to put in place 
‘constitutional, legislative and administrative measures, including appropriate forms 
of affirmative action… to prohibit and redress discrimination on the basis of work 
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and descent’.108 Discussion of this provision and its inclusion in the Final 
Programme of Action was blocked by India, and caste discrimination does not appear 
in the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA), the conference’s 
outcome document.
109
 However, Article 2 of the DDPA recognises that racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance occur on the grounds set out in 
ICERD Article 1(1), namely race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. Other 
provisions similarly recognise the problem of racism, discrimination and xenophobia 
based on descent.
110
  
 
Although the DDPA contains no explicit references to caste discrimination, Dalit 
presence at the WCAR process directly contributed to the rapid ‘internationalisation’ 
of caste, which occurred at the end of the twentieth century.
111
 The WCAR opened 
up international debate about whether discrimination based on caste was covered by 
racial discrimination as internationally defined.
112
 The creation of a rebuttable 
presumption that caste discrimination is located within the international framework 
on racial discrimination has resulted in pressure being put on India and other caste-
affected states, by UN bodies and mechanisms as well as by civil society 
organisations, to fulfil their international obligations on caste discrimination, as well 
as their domestic constitutional and legislative obligations. However, the framing of 
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caste discrimination as a form of racial discrimination has provoked huge resistance 
from India. According to Indian sociologist Gopal Guru, the WCAR was a missed 
opportunity to ‘embark on and sustain a thoroughgoing critique of caste 
discrimination’ by revisiting the categories ‘through which discrimination is 
experienced and understood – colour in the case of race, but touch in the case of 
caste’.113  
 
5.2.7 Durban Review Conference 2009 
 
The Durban Review Conference (DRC) in April 2009 was convened ‘to assess and 
accelerate progress’ on implementation of measures adopted at the WCAR in 
2001.
114
 Discrimination based on caste was referred to repeatedly in the preparatory 
sessions by CERD members and the UN Special Procedures, yet the DRC outcome 
document contains no explicit reference to caste discrimination or to discrimination 
based on work and descent.115 CERD members and the Special Rapporteur on racism 
believe that ICERD, if genuinely adhered to by states, constitutes a sufficient 
normative standard for overcoming caste discrimination. In 2007, the OHCHR 
circulated a questionnaire on contemporary manifestations of racism and measures 
and activities taken to implement the DDPA to a range of non-State actors, including 
UN bodies and specialised agencies, CERD and other human rights mechanisms, 
together with Special Procedures.
116
 In April 2008, in response to the OHCHR 
questionnaire, CERD observed that, ‘as is the case with all international normative 
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standards’, ICERD ‘is very useful and effective for States that genuinely wish to 
abide by it’. The key reasons, according to CERD, for states’ failure to implement 
ICERD effectively are lack of political will and lack of a clear understanding of the 
meaning and scope of the definition of the concept of racial discrimination in Article 
1(1) of ICERD, ‘which may lead some States to deny or minimise the extent of racial 
discrimination in their territory’.117 In July 2008, in a joint Special Procedures 
response to the OHCHR questionnaire, the Special Rapporteur on Racism reiterated 
that in the absence of recognition by states that discrimination based on caste and 
other systems of inherited status constitutes a form of discrimination prohibited by 
[ICERD], ‘it will not be possible to effectively address the serious human rights 
violations and discrimination suffered by individuals and groups on grounds of caste 
and other systems of inherited status’. He stressed the responsibility of governments 
and political leaders for shaping public opinion ‘towards fairer societies based on the 
equality of all human beings’, complemented by ‘meaningful legislative amendments 
to ensure equality and prohibit caste-based discrimination’.118 
 
5.2.8 Decade of Dalit Rights UN 2011-20, Conference 24-28 June 2011 
 
In 2011, a decade after the WCAR, Dalit activists and academics at an international 
strategy conference on Dalit rights summed up the strategy of linking caste and race 
as ‘a dead-end’; instead, the way forward was ‘by stressing that caste is not race but 
that caste-based discrimination is nevertheless a violation of international human 
rights law’.119 The preferred category endorsed by the conference was discrimination 
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based on work and descent.
120
 The delegates argued for a re-strategising of the Dalit 
stand – ‘without in any way deflecting the stand taken by CERD’ – away from a 
‘caste as racial discrimination’ perspective towards a discourse based on ‘descent and 
work-based discrimination and violence’.121 This is reflected in the Conference’s 
choice of the DWD terminology, and in the final Declaration which lists as an 
international objective to ‘move beyond the caste-race debate and apply a policy of 
human rights principles of non-discrimination, substantive equality and non-
retrogression’.122 The Declaration calls for promotion of the ‘DWD agenda’ as a 
global and intersectional agenda, the creation of a UN Special Rapporteur or 
Working Group on DWB issues, a UN World Conference on DWD and the wide 
endorsement and implementation of the UN Principles and Guidelines on DWD.
123
  
 
5.3 Dalits, minority rights and the rights of indigenous peoples in 
international law
124
 
One of the first NGOs outside India to address caste discrimination was the UK-
based Minority Rights Group.
125
 Yet, as Castellino and Redondo observe, victims of 
caste discrimination ‘do not easily fit into the universally agreed category of a 
“minority”’,126 and neither do they readily fit the international definition of an 
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indigenous people.
127
 Three observations can be made. First, although Dalits do not 
readily fulfil either the minority or indigenous people’s criteria in international 
human rights law, nevertheless, from the mid-1990s, they have utilised minority and 
indigenous people’s mechanisms to advance their claims at the UN. The minority 
approach has been more successful. In 2009, the UN Forum on Minority Issues
128
 
brought Dalits into the international minority category based on their status as a 
group protected by ICERD, stating that the term ‘minorities’, as used in the UN 
Minorities Declaration,
129
 ‘encompasses the persons and groups protected under the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
from discrimination based on race, colour, descent (caste), national or ethnic origin, 
citizen or non-citizen’.130 Secondly, this illustrates how ICERD status has acted as a 
‘passport’ to the take-up of Dalit/caste issues by other UN mechanisms and 
procedures (another example being the take-up of caste discrimination by successive 
                                                                                                                                          
characteristics that differ sharply from those of the rest of the population, which have been retained 
over time and which members of the group wish to preserve; F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of 
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1981) 96; see also UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Minorities Declaration) (1992); GA Res. 47/135 (1992). 
127
 The key characteristics of the indigenous people’s category are historical or traditional occupation 
of lands or territories; use of and control over resources; distinct cultural and religious traditions, 
customs and ceremonies and distinct histories, philosophies, languages and institutions; J. M. Cobo , 
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, 30 September 1983; UN 
Doc. E/CN.4 Sub.2 /1983/21/Add.8, para. 379; see also UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) 2007; A/Res/61/295. Regarding membership of the indigenous category, Article 
33 UNDRIP emphasises self-identification. On the distinction between minority rights and indigenous 
people’s rights see Working Paper on the relationship and distinction between the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities and those of indigenous peoples; E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10, 19 July 2000. 
Despite not constituting a coherent group defined by the characteristics listed above, aspects of the 
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Religion in Central India (Berkeley: State University of New York Press, 2002).  
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Special Rapporteurs on Racism). Thirdly, the UN Independent Expert on minority 
issues
131
 has emphasised the number of minority rights communications regarding 
violations of human rights that have as their root cause discrimination, racism or 
xenophobia against a minority group and its members. Often the minority rights 
component of such communications is hidden, so the wider context of issues arising 
out of the minority status of the victims may be neglected and even remain 
unaddressed.
132
 The nature of caste discrimination as a global human rights concern, 
due to its ‘unique, distinct and transnational nature’; the need to broaden the concepts 
of general human rights principles of non-discrimination, equality of opportunity and 
universality; the dynamic nature of human rights law and ‘rigid definitions’ as the 
antithesis of the concept of human rights and the ‘urgent need to move beyond the 
caste-race debate’, were highlighted at a UN Experts’ Workshop convened by the 
Independent Expert on minorities at the Decade of Dalit Rights conference in June 
2011 (see above).
133
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Despite persistent objections and opposition, primarily from India, caste 
discrimination has been incorporated under the ICERD umbrella as a form of 
descent-based racial discrimination and has also been framed as a violation of 
international human rights law, as a subset of a new, wider, legal category of 
discrimination based on work and descent. This category is not limited to caste but 
extends to analogous systems of inherited status and is applicable to countries other 
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than India. Dalits have also accessed minority rights and indigenous people’s 
mechanisms, and caste discrimination has been taken up by various UN Special 
Procedures and the UPR. Still, states with vested interests, notably India but also 
others such as Japan, continue to resist (1) the inclusion of caste within the UN 
human rights framework, contesting CERD’s interpretation of descent in Article 1(1) 
of ICERD as covering caste and asserting that caste discrimination is an internal 
matter and (2) the application of descent to groups discriminated against on the basis 
of inherited status or origin, arguing that descent refers to racial and ethnic 
characteristics and was not intended to cover inherited status or social origin 
discrimination. Meanwhile, the UK, while not disputing the application of descent to 
caste discrimination, argues that there is insufficient evidence of such discrimination 
in the UK and/or that there is ‘no consensus’ on the need for legislation among 
‘affected communities’, so there is no need to comply with CERD’s 
recommendations to put in place legislative and policy measures to address descent-
based discrimination, including caste discrimination. 
 
Despite these problems, the UN regime’s conceptualisation of caste discrimination as 
a violation of international human rights law, including the cognisance of caste 
discrimination by the monitoring bodies of wider human rights treaties to which 
countries like India and the UK are signatories, has three important effects. First, the 
creation of a rebuttable presumption that caste discrimination falls foul of 
international human rights standards, including the prohibition of racial 
discrimination, puts states under domestic and international legal and political 
pressure to act on the recommendations of the treaty bodies and UN mechanisms, if 
only to avoid political confrontation or embarrassment. This is important because 
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compliance with the recommendations of treaty bodies and charter mechanisms is as 
much a political as a ‘legal’ issue, as India explained to CERD in 1996: ‘[T]o confer 
a racial character on the caste system would create considerable political problems 
which could not be the Committee’s intention’.134 Secondly, UN engagement with 
caste discrimination, particularly the promotion of tools, mechanisms and 
procedures, increases its visibility and boosts the morale and confidence of victims 
and activists to continue combating violations. Thirdly, the construction of an 
international legal framework for combating caste discrimination provides a template 
for new domestic legislation, e.g. in the UK, which in turn reinforces the 
conceptualisation of caste discrimination as a human rights and discrimination issue.  
 
The Special Rapporteur on racism asserts that the legal framework on caste 
discrimination is ‘unambiguous’,135 while a UN experts’ study on international 
instruments to combat racial discrimination decided that there are ‘no substantive 
gaps’ regarding the protection of members of descent-based communities from racial 
discrimination,
136
 that the DPGs on DWD and the recommendations in CERD GR 
No. 29 would, if implemented, serve both to alleviate the problems resulting from 
discrimination based on descent and the development of existing standards and that 
inadequate implementation and lack of political will remain among the basic barriers 
impeding the elimination of descent-based discrimination.
137
 CERD has reiterated 
that the concept of racial discrimination ‘is much broader than that perceived by 
many states which argue that there is no racial discrimination on their territory’138 
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and that ‘shortcomings in the implementation by States of the Convention stem not 
only from a lack of political will, but also from a clear understanding by many State 
parties regarding the meaning and scope of the definition of the concept of racial 
discrimination’139 (despite the meaning of the grounds in Article 1(1) of ICERD 
having been clarified by CERD in Concluding Observations and General 
Recommendations).  
 
The political reality, however, is that not all states accept that existing normative 
frameworks apply to caste discrimination, or that caste discrimination is a legitimate 
international human rights issue, or that DWD and its prohibition applies to their 
state. Similar problems of equivocal and inconsistent State responses have been 
identified in relation to human rights violations based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity, with states refusing to acknowledge that this constitutes a legitimate 
area of international human rights concern.
140
 The 2011 international strategy 
conference on Dalit rights (above) advocated the de-linking of caste and race/racial 
discrimination in favour of framing caste discrimination in the language of DWD as 
a global human rights concern. The challenge is therefore political as much as legal, 
namely to engage states such as India in acknowledging the legitimacy of UN 
involvement and, if they are ‘truly committed to social cohesion and eliminating 
bigotry and prejudice’, to regard mechanisms such as ICERD and the DPGs not as a 
threat but as an opportunity to challenge caste and DWD.
141
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This chapter concludes Part 2 of the thesis. We now turn in Part 3 to consider the 
problems faced by British Dalits in their efforts to gain protection from caste 
discrimination under domestic equality law.
186 
 
Chapter 6 
Caste in the UK 
 
6.1 The South Asian presence in the UK 
This chapter argues that caste has played a role in the structure and maintenance of 
internal divisions among South Asian communities in the UK since the 1950s, 
moreover that caste in the UK has long been associated with discrimination despite 
insistence by some actors that neither caste nor caste discrimination exist in this 
country. There are over 2.3 million people of South Asian origin in the UK, 
according to the 2001 Census,
1
 comprising over one million Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis (92% of whom are Muslim) and over one million people of Indian 
origin, of whom 471,000 are Hindu and 307,000 are Sikh.
2
 Large-scale South Asian 
migration to the UK took place primarily between the 1950s and 1970s in response 
to Britain’s post-war labour shortage, although there has been a South Asian 
presence in the UK since the seventeenth century.
3
 Between 1961 and 2001, the 
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percentage of South Asians in the UK population increased from 0.23% to 4%.
4
 
Asians and Asian British now account for half of the UK’s non-white population.5  
South Asian immigration to the UK has exhibited two important features: (1) 
immigrants have come from a relatively small number of geographical areas, (2) but 
nevertheless are differentiated by language, region, caste and religion. The bulk of 
South Asian mass immigration to the UK has come from four main regions in the 
subcontinent – Punjab, which on Partition in 1947 was divided between Pakistan and 
India, Gujarat on the western coast of India, Sylhet in northern Bangladesh and, in 
Pakistan, Mirpur District in Azad (‘free’) Kashmir and the North West Frontier 
Province.
6
 According to Talbot and Thandi, ‘by the end of the twentieth century 
Punjabis accounted for well over half of the UK’s South Asian Diaspora 
community’.7 South Asian migrants have primarily been rural, peasant landowner-
cultivators who have arrived not as lone, unconnected individuals but in ‘cascading 
chains... of kinship and friendship’.8 This has given Britain’s South Asian settlements  
a far more parochial character than most outsiders are aware, for specific and highly localised 
castes, sects and kinship groups in the subcontinent have given rise to – and are now 
umbilically linked with – equally tightly structured British-based ethnic colonies.9 
 
Britain’s South Asian communities are not homogenous. Among South Asian 
Muslims (the largest religious group) almost half are Pakistanis,
10
 two-thirds of 
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whom originate from Mirpur District.
11
 Bangladeshi Sylhetis are almost exclusively 
Muslim; of the Punjabis, under half are from India and these are mostly Sikhs, while 
Pakistani Punjabis are mostly Muslims but include ‘a small Christian minority, most 
of whom are of Untouchable descent’.12 The Gujarati community is ‘fragmented by a 
large number of religious, sectarian and caste disjunctions’;13 moreover, many 
Gujaratis are ‘twice migrants’14 who arrived in the UK via a history of prior 
emigration to East Africa and the Middle East.
15
 Indo-Caribbeans constitute a 
separate group – they are the descendants of Indian indentured migrants to Britain’s 
West Indian colonies (such as Trinidad, Mauritius, British Guiana and Fiji) who 
worked as plantation labourers, later as agricultural workers or peasant farmers,
16
 or 
descendants of Indian indentured labour recruited to work in the French colonies 
following the abolition of slavery in 1848.
17
  
 
6.2   Dalits in the UK 
6.2.1 Numbers and groupings 
 
There are no accurate figures for the number of South Asians of Dalit origin in the 
UK, as caste identity is not recorded in any official statistics. The size of the UK’s 
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Dalit-origin population is hence uncertain but is estimated by Dalit organisations as 
anywhere between 50,000 and 200,000 people.
18
 It comprises members of caste-
based religious groups such as Ravidassias,
19
 Valmikis and Ambedkarite Buddhists, 
Dalit Christians, secular Ambedkarites and Dalits of no religious or political 
affiliation. 
 
Dalit presence in the UK dates from the 1950s and the first Punjabi immigrants, 
around 10% of whom were Scheduled Castes, especially Chamars (traditionally 
leatherworking castes).
20
 Dalit immigrants had differing geographical origins and 
religious affinities and differing responses to caste discrimination and approaches to 
dealing with it. Many of the Punjabi Chamars were Ravidassias, adherents of Ad 
Dharm (meaning ‘original religion’), the north Indian Untouchable religious 
movement, and followers of the sixteenth-century poet-saint, or sant, Ravi Das.
21
 
The Valmikis, also Ad Dharmis from north India,
22
 were devotees of the sant 
Bhagwan Valimiki and primarily from the Chuhra (sweeper/scavenger) castes.
23
 By 
the 1950s, the distinction between these two Dalit groups – the mainly Ravidassia 
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Chamars and the mainly Valmiki Churahs – had become a distinction between two 
separate religious groupings.
24
  
 
In addition to racial tensions between South Asian immigrants and the white 
majority, caste-based tensions existed between the Dalits and higher caste 
immigrants,
25
 while tensions also existed between the Dalit groups themselves.
26
 In 
1956, Ravi Das sabhas
27
 were established in Birmingham and Wolverhampton, 
forerunners to the establishment of Ravidassia temples. Ravidassias experienced ‘the 
same prejudice and caste-based discrimination as in India’ when they sought to 
worship at other (high caste) temples; consequently, ‘they decided to set up their own 
temple(s), run by and for the Ravidassia community’.28 Meanwhile, in 1962, 
Ambedkarite Buddhists formed the Indian Buddhist Society and, in 1965, the Indian 
Republican Group of Great Britain.
29
 Ambedkar Memorial Committees were 
established in Wolverhampton and London.
30
 By the mid-1960s, there were several 
hundred active Ambedkarites in Britain,
31
 but the relationship between the 
Ravidassias and the Ambedkarites became increasingly strained, and according to 
Juergensmeyer, in 1965, the Ravidassias established the Indian Mutual Support and 
Social Association which specifically excluded the Ambedkarites.
32
 In 1968, the first 
Ravi Das temple was opened in Wolverhampton,
33
 while in 1971 the Ad Dharm 
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Federation of the UK was established.
34
 According to Hardtmann and 
Juergensmeyer, the Ravidassias and Ambedkarites differed in social vision and 
strategy. Ambedkarites sought a clean break from Hinduism and assimilation into ‘a 
wider egalitarian culture’, whereas Ravidassias sought to consolidate and unite 
behind a religious tradition with links to Hindu culture, albeit the radical, egalitarian 
‘Sant’ tradition of Hinduism.35 The Ad Dharm movement considered Untouchables 
the descendants of the original inhabitants of India, a theory rejected by Ambedkar.
36
   
 
For many years, Valmikis and Ravidassias – religious movements comprising people 
with shared ‘Untouchable’ origins, influenced by aspects of Sikh and Hindu tradition 
but which cannot be conflated with either mainstream Hinduism or Sikhism
37
 – were 
active in their localities, focussed primarily on providing support and places of 
worship for their communities in the UK and maintaining links with their 
communities in India. They established their own associations and temples in 
response to the discrimination and exclusion which they experienced when they 
sought to attend the places of worship established by the dominant castes,
38
 such that 
there now exists in the UK a plethora of temples and Gurdwaras distinguished on 
caste lines. There are twenty-four Ravidass Temples and Gurdwaras, including one 
in Scotland, under the auspices of the Shri Guru Ravidass Sabha UK.
39
 Valmik 
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Sabhas have been established in Southall, Birmingham, Bedford, Coventry, Oxford 
and Wolverhampton.
40
 These groups are becoming increasingly visible due in part to 
the Ravidassias’ campaign to be included as a separate religious group in the 2011 
Census.
41
 
 
6.2.2 ‘New’ Dalit organisations 
 
The ‘internationalisation’ of caste, which occurred from the 1990s onwards, and the 
concomitant development of transnational Dalit advocacy networks
42
 prompted the 
emergence in the UK of new Dalit organisations and solidarity networks concerned 
with Dalit rights, with a UK-focussed political and campaigning agenda. Dalit 
Solidarity Network UK (DSN-UK, founded in 1998 and affiliated to the International 
Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) based in Copenhagen), Voice of Dalit International 
(VODI, 1999), Caste-Watch UK (CWUK, 2004) and Anti-Caste Discrimination 
Alliance (ACDA, 2008) have adopted international discourses of human rights and 
equality in their efforts to engage in the domestic political process on an anti-caste 
discrimination and ‘Dalit rights’ agenda. 
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6.3 Caste and caste discrimination in the UK    
6.3.1 Migration and caste: the early days 
 
‘Caste exists in Britain: this is not in dispute’ affirmed the first government-
commissioned report on caste discrimination in Britain in December 2010.
43
 This 
statement is significant considering that for decades the existence of caste structures 
and practices in the UK was largely overlooked or even denied by many actors, both 
South Asian and non-South Asian. In 1916, Ambedkar described caste as ‘a local 
[i.e. Indian] problem but one capable of much wider mischief’, observing that ‘if 
Hindus migrate to other regions on earth, Indian caste would become a world 
problem’.44 In the early days of mass migration to the UK, when numbers were small 
and the immigrants were predominantly single men, individuals came together in 
linguistic-regional groups (e.g. as Gujaratis) which operated as unified communities 
cutting across caste distinctions.
45
 In 1963, Desai asserted that although caste 
distinctions were present in the UK they did not take the same oppressive form as in 
India, for example that the rules against eating together ‘[did] not apply in the United 
Kingdom’.46 He did not suggest that this was due to a repudiation of caste and caste 
distinctions, rather that (at that time) there was ‘not a sufficient number of castes in 
the United Kingdom’ and castes were economically dependent on the host society, 
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not each other;
47
 moreover, caste remained ‘very much alive’ in immigrants’ 
relationship with society back home in India.48 Whether cross-caste linguistic-
regional groupings were the norm experienced by Dalits, or whether they were 
excluded from such groupings, is hard to tell. Juergensmeyer comments that while, 
generally, life was better for Scheduled Castes in England, ‘in some ways it is 
disturbingly the same... the Jat Sikhs do not hesitate to remind the Chamars that they 
are still Chamars, even in England’.49 
 
6.3.2 ‘Chain migration’ and caste 
 
As Britain increasingly became seen as a place to settle permanently, and with the 
arrival of wives and families, social, religious and cultural institutions – including the 
caste system – were re-established50 and new axes of ‘community fission’ emerged 
alongside the existing linguistic-regional divisions.
51
 The importance of caste as one 
such axis was highlighted by Robinson, citing Michaelson’s analysis of caste identity 
in Britain as ‘institutionalised by the growth of associations and organisations for 
each of the major sub-castes... and by residential concentration’.52 Similarly, 
Ballard’s 1994 account of the settlement strategies of South Asian migrants in 
Britain argues that ‘chain migration’ – migrants with shared caste, language and 
region of origin joining ‘equally specific’ communities in Britain53 – has resulted in 
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caste remaining ‘a crucial feature of social organisation in almost every settlement’.54 
Whilst stressing that the caste system is more fluid than many Western observers 
realise, Ballard observed that in Britain, as in urban India, despite the de-linking of 
caste and occupation, caste loyalties are as active as ever and inter-caste competition 
for status has indeed intensified.
55
 The reason for this, argued Ballard, is that ‘the 
rules of endogamy are still just as strictly followed in the Diaspora as in the 
subcontinent. As a result, all kinship networks remain firmly caste-specific’.56 
Ironically, ‘[d]espite the lack of interest in caste [on the part of the majority society], 
or perhaps because of it, the old caste divisions persisted in the new locations’.57 
 
6.3.3 Survival of caste awareness: critical factors 
 
Clarke, Peach and Vertovec contrast the Indo-Caribbeans – among whom the caste 
system is widely considered to have evolved into ethnicised groupings bearing caste 
or varna names which have lost their original Indian meaning, or to have ‘dissolved 
save for status attributions on the extreme ends of the Brahmin-Chamar scale’, or 
even to have lost its significance entirely – with the Indian ‘urban-based merchants 
and civil servants’ in Africa among whom ‘caste consciousness remained high even 
though a system of caste-based interaction and exchange ceased to function’.58 They 
cite Kuper, who in 1961 argued that caste awareness can survive if members  
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(1) can maintain a ritual exclusiveness from the time they leave India (2) hold a privileged 
position in the economic organization and can avoid proletarianisation (3) retain ties with a 
protected caste nucleus in India (4) isolate their women from intimate cross-caste contact.
59
  
 
Such conditions, say Clarke et al., ‘apply equally for the South Asian migrants in the 
contemporary period’.60 It is submitted that the historical, social and cultural 
particularities of mass South Asian migration to great Britain – ‘chain migration’, 
shared geographical origins, the retention of close ties with ‘home’, the persistence 
of endogamy, control of women’s sexuality through a variety of methods – mean that 
for a significant proportion of the UK’s South Asian population, Kuper’s criteria for 
the survival of caste consciousness and caste hierarchies are met.
61
 This has 
implications for understandings of ‘community cohesion’ (damage to community 
cohesion being an argument put forward against legislating for caste 
discrimination)
62
 and equality, and also for the choice of legal and policy measures to 
enhance formal and substantive equality and to combat caste discrimination in the 
UK.   
 
6.3.4 Caste and caste discrimination in the UK: evidence up to 2009 
 
From the 1970s onwards, caste in Britain attracted sporadic media coverage.
63
 
Academic studies of South Asian communities and identity in Britain refer to the role 
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of caste (or biraderi among British Muslims),
64
 but there was relatively little research 
looking specifically at its nature and caste-based discriminatory practices. An 
important exception is Eleanor Nesbitt’s work on attitudes to and perceptions of 
caste, religion and identity among Gujarati and Punjabi youth in Britain, particularly 
Ravidasis and Valmikis.
65
 In the 1990s, Nesbitt highlighted the existence of caste 
and caste discrimination among Gujaratis and Punjabis in Britain.
66
 Caste was ‘an 
observable dynamic’ among Sikhs in Britain;67 Sikh and Hindu children, including 
children who had never lived in India, identified other children by their caste,
68
 but 
for Ravidasis and Valmikis, such caste awareness was accompanied by experiences 
or fear of caste prejudice.
69
 In 1994, a British-based Dalit suggested that caste was in 
some ways stronger in the UK than in India and that despite Britain’s prevailing 
liberal democratic norms, casteism – particularly among schoolchildren – was worse 
than in the early days of South Asian migration, yet Dalits remained invisible to 
wider society. Consequently, he predicted that many Dalit children born and brought 
up in the UK would face a more confusing and hence psychologically more insidious 
kind of casteism.
70
 Leslie, in her 2003 study of Valmiki, states that ‘the importance 
of caste loyalties in the Diaspora cannot be overstressed’.71 She describes caste as 
affecting and internally dividing all South Asian communities in Britain.
72
 In the 
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context of ethnographic and religious approaches to intercultural education, Nesbitt 
in 2004 highlighted the importance of caste for South Asians as 
part of the lived experience of many millions of Hindus and Sikhs in India and elsewhere. 
These millions include young people, parents, teachers and others involved in the UK 
education system, as well as in North America and other parts of the diaspora.
73
  
 
Three studies in 2006 attested to the reality of caste in contemporary Britain.
74
 
Minorities within Minorities – looking at barriers to community participation among 
South Asians in Bradford, predominantly Pakistani Muslims – found a fractured and 
divided community characterised by divisions and power hierarchies based on caste 
and biraderi as well as region of origin, gender, sexuality and religious affiliation.
75
 
A report by DSN-UK, looking specifically at discrimination based on caste, argued 
that such discrimination was part of the lived experience of many individuals of Dalit 
origin in this country.
76
 Lastly, a government-sponsored study of British Hindu 
identity, commissioned by the Hindu Forum of Britain (HFB) from the Runnymede 
Trust confirmed the importance of caste as a form of social organisation and a source 
of sub-group identity among Hindus in Britain.
77
 Although silent on the hierarchical 
nature of the varna system and those deemed to fall outside it – the Dalits – the study 
did identify caste as a meaningful aspect of contemporary British Hindu life, at least 
for some. Moreover, its recommendations stated, ‘a key task for any Hindu 
leadership is to find ways of respecting traditions but challenging discrimination 
based on family background, religious tradition or jaati (caste) within a 
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community’.78 In 2009, ACDA published Hidden Apartheid – Voice of the 
Community, a study on caste discrimination conducted in collaboration with 
academics (including the present author).
79
 It reported widespread experience by UK 
Dalits of caste discrimination occurring in spheres of activity covered by 
discrimination law, concern about lack of legislation to protect victims and 
significant experiences by children of inter-pupil verbal abuse or threatening 
behaviour.
80
 Dhanda has examined young, urban Punjabi Dalits’ experiences of 
maintaining and crossing caste boundaries in interpersonal relationships, in the 
Indian Punjab and in Britain. She asserted in 2009 that her UK interviewees had all 
experienced caste-related bullying in school via exclusion or, more commonly, 
name-calling, resulting in ‘a reluctance to work in an all-Indian environment for fear 
of caste discrimination’.81 Paramjit Judge, researching Punjabis in the UK in 2002, 
found all aspects of the caste system in existence.
82
 In certain situations, he says, 
caste considerations were more important than race.
83
 Alongside these studies, ‘Jatt 
Pride’ websites, internet chatrooms and the Bhangra music phenomenon testify to the 
existence of caste awareness and sometimes prejudice among sections of South 
Asian youth (in this case, Jatt Sikhs), many of whom have never lived on the sub-
continent.
84
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6.3.5 Caste and marriage in the UK 
 
Caste continues to influence marriage in the UK. Endogamy was identified by 
Ambedkar as the vehicle by which caste is maintained and replicated – and inter-
caste marriage as the ‘solvent of caste’.85 In the UK, marriage ‘within caste’ still 
appears to be the expected or preferred norm, at least among the older generation but 
also for some younger people.
86
 The preference for marriage within caste extends to 
Dalit castes.
87
 Asian matrimonial websites in the UK continue to advertise candidates 
on the basis of caste and community alongside religion and other characteristics,
88
 
although inter-caste marriages also appear to be rising.
89
 Caste has been identified as 
a factor in so-called ‘honour’ crimes in Britain (marriages or relationships which 
transgress caste boundaries being unacceptable to some families)
90
 and also as a 
driver for forced marriage, where an individual is compelled to marry within caste.
91
 
Although endogamy practised by choice is not a matter for the law – unless the 
marriage contravenes legislation restricting marriages within prohibited degrees
92
 – 
endogamous marriages involving force or coercion will be caught by the Forced 
Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007.
93
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6.3.6 Caste and education 
 
According to Nesbitt, caste in the context of education ‘impacts on pupils’ 
relationships and self-esteem in subtle and powerful ways’ and hence concerns ‘not 
only religious educationists but all who are concerned with the welfare of South 
Asian pupils’.94 ACDA’s 2009 report highlighted experiences of caste discrimination 
in schools: forty-seven per cent of respondents reporting being treated differently or 
being on the receiving end of comments based on their caste,
95
 while seven per cent 
claimed to have been subjected to verbal abuse and sixteen per cent to threatening 
behaviour, predominantly by other pupils but to a lesser extent by teaching staff.
96
 In 
contrast, the HFB, while recognising the occurrence in schools and universities of 
caste-based insults, name-calling and derogatory remarks, dismissed such incidents 
as rare and no more than ‘a lighter form of bullying’.97  
 
6.3.7 Caste in the UK disputed 
 
There has been opposition from certain actors within the South Asian community to 
suggestions that caste exists in the UK, let alone that caste discrimination occurs. The 
2006 DSN-UK study was reportedly challenged as exaggerated by the late Piara 
Khabra, former MP for Ealing Southall.
98
 The HFB contend that ‘caste 
discrimination is not endemic in British society and there is no role for caste in the 
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provision of education, employment or goods and services’.99 The Hindu Council 
UK (HCUK) declared itself ‘not aware of caste discrimination here in the UK’;100 
indeed, according to its Director in 2007, the caste system itself had been 
‘demolished’ in the UK in one generation by ‘a change in socio-economic 
landscape’.101 C.T. Kannan argued in 1978 that, just as the caste system in India had 
been ‘severely modified’,102 so in the UK ‘immigrant young people in particular and 
their parents in general’ were ‘not bothered about the caste system here’. Kannan did 
concede that ‘among the parental generation there may be a little awareness left of 
the caste tradition, but these are never shown outside, and as a result free mixing is a 
general pattern in Britain’.103  
 
Such comments underestimate the resilience of caste as an institution and fail to 
engage with the critical factors identified by Kuper as sustaining the caste system in 
the diaspora. Although studies suggest that the younger generation attaches less 
importance to caste than their parents, Nesbitt’s work shows nevertheless that young 
Gujaratis and Punjabis understand caste as a hereditary form of vertical hierarchical 
ranking per Dumont, and they are aware of the expectation of endogamy.
104
 
Repudiation of caste among the young appears to vary according to sphere of 
activity; and the extent to which it is subject to class, religion, education and caste 
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and regional background is unclear.
105
 Recent studies assert the continuance of caste 
consciousness – and discrimination – among Punjabis and Sikhs in Britain.106 
 
6.4 Official recognition of caste discrimination prior to the Equality Bill 2009 
6.4.1 Caste discrimination as an overseas issue 
 
To the extent that caste discrimination was addressed in parliamentary and 
government circles in the UK prior to the Equality Bill 2009, it was as an ‘overseas’ 
issue rather than a domestic problem.
107
 The context was India’s emergence 
following its 1991 economic liberalisation as a global economic power, as well as 
expanding British-India trade and business interaction.
108
 Caste inequality in India 
‘was perceived as being out of step with modern ideas about human rights and a 
limitation on India’s economic development and global political aspirations’.109 
British concern with caste in India was explained on two grounds. The ‘business 
case’ emphasised the threat to India’s social stability and economic growth – and by 
extension British business interests – which caste discrimination was perceived to 
pose.
110
 The ‘moral case’, or ‘human rights case’, emphasised Untouchability and 
caste discrimination as a human rights violation.
111
 In both cases the role of Britain 
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as a friend of India was stressed.
112
 For British companies operating in India, caste 
surfaces primarily in human resources and decision-making, although British staff 
may be oblivious to its manifestations.
113
 In 2006, the House of Commons Trade and 
Industry Committee described caste as ‘a trap for the unwary’,114 advising UK 
companies not to break the letter or spirit of Indian law, to take note of the 
‘Ambedkar Principles’115 (a voluntary code of practice for foreign investors) and to 
monitor their recruitment and employment policies in India. In response the 
government reiterated its support for the Ambedkar Principles and the commitment 
of the Department for International Development (DfID) to address caste-based 
discrimination through its various programmes.
116
 The government also urged UK 
businesses to comply with the laws of the countries in which they operate, noting that 
‘discrimination on the grounds of caste is inconsistent with the standards that the UK 
applies and is illegal in India’.117  
 
6.4.2 Caste discrimination as a domestic issue 
 
The readiness of parliamentary and governmental actors from the late 1990s onwards 
to condemn caste discrimination in India was matched by reluctance to engage with 
                                                 
112
 HL Deb vol 690 col 1434 -1436 26 March 2007. 
113
 O. Morgan, ‘British “failing India’s lowest caste workers”’ The Observer, 24 June 2007; E. 
Wilson, ‘Managing Diversity: Caste and Gender Issues in Organisations in India’ in M. Davidson and 
S. Fielden (eds.), Individual Diversity and Psychology in Organisations (Oxford: Wiley, 2003) 149-
172. 
114
 Trade and Investment Opportunities with India: Third Report of Session 2005–06, Volume I, 
House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, HC 881-I (2006) 21. 
115
 The Ambedkar Principles: Employment and Additional Principles on Economic and Social 
Exclusion Formulated to Assist All Foreign Investors in South Asia to Address Caste Discrimination’, 
at http://idsn.org/business-csr/ambedkar-principles/ (visited 7 September 2012). 
116
 E. Stott, House of Lords Library Note, ‘Government proposals for international development 
policy, including proposals on the situation of the Dalits’, LLN 2011/037, 28 November 2011. 
117
 ‘Trade and Investment Opportunities with India: Government Response to the House of Commons 
Trade and Industry Committee’s Third Report of Session 2005–06, Fifteenth Special Report of 
Session 2005–06’, HC 1671 (2006) 29. There is an obvious irony in these denouncements of caste 
discrimination in India, given Britain’s contribution to the ‘construction’ of caste and its embedding in 
the administrative structures, law and legal system of British India; see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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it as a domestic issue. British Dalits and their supporters struggled to convince the 
political establishment of its existence closer to home.
118
 From 2000, personal 
experience of casteism in Britain was publicly voiced in oral testimonies,
119
 on 
radio
120
 and through theatre.
121
 In 2004, the UN identified caste discrimination as 
continuing to affect diaspora communities (including the UK) ‘whose original 
cultures and traditions include aspects of inherited social exclusion’.122 In 2003, the 
UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) recommended 
that the UK introduce legislation prohibiting descent-based discrimination (including 
caste-based discrimination).
123
 While some respondents cited in the 2006 HFB report 
saw jati and varna as ‘an expression of tradition and positive familial and community 
links’,124 others referred to intra-community prejudice, division and barriers based on 
caste,
125
 and the study highlights as a ‘particular issue for people of Hindu 
backgrounds’ the question of whether caste ‘operates to exclude people from full 
participation in Hindu communities’.126 In 2008, the HFB asserted that while ‘most 
people in the UK do not experience caste discrimination, it could still be a purely 
cultural issue based on personal choices and social interaction in three broad areas’ – 
temples and community centres, schools and marriage.
127
 Convincing the political 
establishment to recognise certain casteist behaviours as discrimination amenable to 
                                                 
118
 Similarly, in the early 1970s, the UK’s Trades Union Congress (TUC) saw racial discrimination as 
an international rather than a domestic issue; race relations ‘was handled by the TUC’s International 
Committee, though clearly this was a home economic and manpower question’; I. MacDonald, Race 
Relations and the Law (London: Butterworths, 1977) 6. Many States Parties to ICERD initially saw 
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thesis. 
119
 See S. Muman, ‘Caste in Britain’, Report of the Proceedings of International Conference on Dalit 
Human Rights (London: Voice of Dalit International, 2000) 71-79, 76. 
120
 E.g. N. Puri, ‘The Caste Divide’, broadcast on BBC Radio 4, April 2003, transcript at 
http://www.countercurrents.org/dalit-puri050704.htm (visited 7 September 2012). 
121
 See http://www.casteawayarts.com (visited 7 September 2012). 
122
 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/31, para. 35. 
123
 UN Doc. CERD A/58/18 (2003) para. 544. 
124
 See Berkeley, n 76 above, 60. 
125
 Ibid., 59-60. 
126
 Ibid., 58. 
127
 Kallidai, n 86 above, 14. 
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legal regulation, rather than as merely a cultural issue or ‘personal choices’, was to 
prove a huge challenge for Dalit activists. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that caste has been a feature of the South Asian presence in the 
UK since the 1950s, but remained largely hidden due in part to lack of interest in – 
and ignorance of – caste on the part of society at large. Caste-based tensions between 
Dalit and ‘higher caste’ communities resulted in the establishment, from the late 
1960s onwards, of separate social and religious facilities distinguished on caste lines. 
Dalits too are divided amongst themselves, but the primary division remains between 
Dalits and higher castes. Unless these fractures within Britain’s South Asian 
communities are addressed as their population expands, further social disunity, 
tensions and frustrations will follow. In 2000, Dalits called explicitly for UK 
discrimination law ‘to be amended and brought up to date’ to address caste 
discrimination.
128
 They argued that, in the context of ‘an ever-increasing Asian 
population in Britain’, caste discrimination was likely to play ‘a key role’ in the 
future. For these reasons, they argued, ‘British law will need to be brought into line 
with an emerging new social order in Britain’.129 The remaining chapters examine 
progress towards this goal. 
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Chapter 7 
Caste and British Discrimination Law Prior To  
the Equality Act 2010 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Prior to the Equality Act 2010 (EQA), British discrimination law had developed in 
an ad hoc fashion since the Race Relations Act 1965 (RRA). Successive pieces of 
legislation prohibited discrimination on various grounds (termed ‘protected 
characteristics’ in the EQA) – age, religion and belief (including lack of religion and 
belief), disability, racial grounds (defined as colour, race, nationality or ethnic and 
national origins), sex (including gender re-assignment and marital or civil partnership 
status, pregnancy and maternity) and sexual orientation.
1
 Of these, only ‘racial 
grounds’ (replaced by ‘race’ in the EQA) or religion or belief contend as possible 
legal homes for caste. This chapter explains the limitations of these categories in 
relation to caste. It shows why race and religion or belief cannot adequately capture 
caste and hence can provide only a partial remedy for victims of caste discrimination. 
It also analyses the implications of successfully using race or religion or belief 
provisions for discrimination based on caste. The inadequacy of existing law for 
capturing caste is the defect of a discrimination law model which uses a fixed list of 
closed categories to identify the beneficiaries of protection – a point which has been 
made in relation to other categories previously excluded from the list, e.g. religion 
and sexual orientation.
2
  
 
 
                                                 
1
 See B. Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 7-12. 
2
 A. McColgan, ‘Reconfiguring discrimination law’, Public Law (Spr 2007) 74-94, 75; S. Fredman, 
Discrimination Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 73-92. 
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7.2 UK discrimination law model 
7.2.1 Purpose of discrimination law 
 
The primary liberal justification for discrimination law is the principle of equality,
3
 
now understood in terms of substantive equality (embracing concepts such as 
equality of results or outcomes as well as respect for human dignity and worth) rather 
than simply equality of opportunity or formal equality.
4
 From a liberal perspective, 
discrimination legislation is both a coercive tool and an educative device,
5
 providing 
concrete protection and redress for victims of discrimination whilst playing an 
important political and symbolic role in the ‘shaping and expressing of social 
messages’.6 Legal regulation of discrimination serves both functions, redefining as 
socially unacceptable behaviour hitherto considered acceptable, as well as actionable 
legally.
7
   
 
7.2.2 Meaning of discrimination 
 
Discrimination in UK law has a narrow, technical meaning.
8
 In contrast to the 
language of UN documents, UK legislation ‘contains no general guarantee of 
equality and prohibits discrimination in a limited range of specific areas of activity. 
Outside these areas discrimination is lawful’.9 Domestic discrimination law is 
                                                 
3
 A. Lester and G. Bindman, Race and Law (London: Longman, 1972) 73; N. Bamforth, M. Malik and 
C. O’Cinneide, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) 167.  
4
 On equality see Hepple, n 1 above, 12-26; Fredman, n 2 above, 4-33 on the legal principle of 
equality and conceptualisations of equality; on equality and discrimination law see Bamforth et al., 
ibid., 166-194 and 194-232 on liberalism and discrimination law. 
5
 Lester and Bindman, n 3 above, 85-87. 
6
 M. Burton, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008) 7. For 
discussion of the argument that ‘law will not itself be formative of the progressive argument’ see B. 
Hudson, ‘Beyond White Man’s Justice: Race, gender and justice in late modernity’, 10(1) Theoretical 
Criminology (2006) 29-47. 
7
 N. Lacey, ‘From individual to group’ in B. Hepple and E. Szyszczak (eds.), Discrimination: The 
Limits of the Law (London: Mansell, 1993) 99-124, 108. 
8
 Bamforth et al., n 3 above, 38-41. 
9
 J. Spencer and M. Spencer, ‘International law and discrimination’ in M. Sargeant (ed.), 
Discrimination Law (Harlow: Pearson, 2004) 46; but see Hepple, n 1 above, 1, 12-14, on the Equality 
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designed largely to respond with individual remedies to individual claims made on 
the basis of legally defined grounds, in relation to certain types of regulated 
behaviour and social goods,
10
 although the EQA Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) 
extends this by imposing a proactive equality promotion duty on public bodies, while 
the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), established by the Equality 
Act 2006, has a broad general duty to protect and promote equality, as well as 
enforcement powers to conduct inquiries and formal investigations into 
discriminatory practices by organisations.
11
 
 
To amount to unlawful discrimination, behaviour must meet three criteria. First, the 
behaviour must be because of a protected characteristic. Secondly, it must occur in a 
legally regulated field such as employment, the provision of goods, facilities and 
services, education and vocational training, management or disposal of premises or 
the exercise of public functions. Discriminatory behaviour occurring in non-
regulated fields is outwith the law (e.g. ‘private sphere’ relations such as intimate 
social interactions or marriage). Thirdly, it must amount to a prohibited type of 
conduct (e.g. direct or indirect discrimination, harassment or victimisation). 
Behaviour which does not meet these criteria may be objectionable but it is not 
unlawful. In order to convince governmental and parliamentary actors of the need for 
an express prohibition of caste discrimination in the Equality Bill, British Dalits first 
                                                                                                                                          
Act 2010 and the ‘unitary human rights perspective’ which shifts the focus from negative duties not to 
discriminate, to positive duties to advance equality, with discrimination law becoming an essential but 
not exclusive part of equality law. See also Fredman, n 2 above, chapter 3. 
10
 Bamforth et al., n 3 above, 18. 
11
Section 3 EQA sets out the general duty of the EHRC; s149 EQA requires public authorities in the 
exercise of their functions to have due regard to the need to eliminate prohibited discrimination, 
advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations; see Hepple, n 1 above, 12 on the general 
duty of the EHRC, 134-140 on the PSED, and 149-154 on EHRC enforcement powers; Fredman, n 2 
above, 7-8 for a critique of s 149 EQA. In May 2012, the government announced a review of the 
PSED ‘to establish whether the Duty is operating as intended’; see 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/equalities/equality-act/equality-duty/equality-duty-review/terms-of-
reference/ (visited 26 January 2013). 
210 
 
had to establish the existence of discrimination based on caste in regulated fields and, 
secondly, that existing grounds of discrimination did not cover, or did not fully 
cover, caste.  
 
7.2.3 Regulated fields and the ‘public-private’ divide 
 
Opponents of caste discrimination legislation argue that caste discrimination (if it 
exists at all) is not caught by discrimination law because it occurs only in non-
regulated fields.
12
 British discrimination law targets behaviour or conduct – the 
outcome of choices or preferences – in particular sectors only, irrespective of 
motivation; opinions, beliefs, preferences and choices are not unlawful unless they 
give rise to prohibited conduct or impacts.
13
 Legal regulation does not extend to 
discriminatory behaviour deemed to be in the private or intimate spheres, and it is the 
‘privacy barrier’ which has been repeatedly called up to exclude caste from the reach 
of discrimination law.14 
 
Nonetheless, the boundary between associational preferences and discrimination in 
regulated fields – for example between ‘personal choices’ in ‘business networks’ (the 
example given by the HFB)
15
 and discrimination in the provision of goods and 
services – may not always be clear-cut.16 Acceptance of a separation between public 
                                                 
12
 R. Kallidai, Caste in the UK: A Summary of the Consultation with the Hindu Community in Britain 
(London: Hindu Forum of Britain, 2008) 16.  
13
 Discrimination law recognises beliefs, choices and preferences as such in very limited 
circumstances only, by the granting of exemptions or exceptions. As an example, under the EQA, 
‘religious beliefs are respected by means of exceptions to the general prohibition on gender 
reassignment discrimination in relation to the religious solemnisation of marriages’; Hepple, n 1 
above, 113, 122-123. 
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 Kallidai, n 12 above, 16.  
15
 R. Berkeley, Connecting British Hindus: An Enquiry into the Identity and Public Engagement of 
Hindus in Britain (London: Hindu Forum of Britain, 2006) 12; Kallidai, ibid., 11.  
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 Regarding Sikhs in the UK, Kalsi argues that endogamous groups organise both their social and 
economic relationships with one another ‘through idioms of ritual purity and avoidance behaviour’; S. 
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and private spheres is a predominant organising principle of liberal legal discourse, 
with the ‘private’ not considered to be a proper subject of State regulation;17 
however, as critical theorists argue, the boundary between private and ‘non-private’ 
behaviour is not immutable but is open to contestation and legal revision (after all, 
the concept of ‘private’ behaviour is itself a socio-political-legal construct: ‘All 
struggles against oppression in the modern world begin by re-defining what had 
previously been considered “private,” non-public and non-political issues as matters 
of public concern…’).18 Over time the spheres deemed ‘private’ and beyond the 
reach of the law have shrunk, while those within the law’s ambit have increased. 
Examples of ‘private’ behaviour which have been brought within the ambit of the 
law include racial discrimination in private contractual relationships,
19
 domestic 
violence,
20
 rape within marriage
21
 and forced marriage.
22
 The public-private 
distinction and the separation between public and private spheres have been 
challenged, particularly by feminist legal theorists,
23
 while the exclusion of ‘private 
contact discrimination’ from legal regulation remains a key criticism of liberal 
discrimination law.
24
   
 
                                                                                                                                          
Singh Kalsi, ‘The Sikhs and Caste: A Study of the Sikh Community in Leeds and Bradford’, PhD 
thesis, University of Leeds, 1989, 71 (emphasis added). 
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 M. Thornton, ‘The Cartography of Public and Private’ in M. Thornton (ed.), Public and Private: 
Feminist Legal Debates (Oxford: OUP, 1995) 2-16, 5; Preface, ibid., xiii. 
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 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Post-modernism in Contemporary Ethics 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) 100, cited in Hudson, n 6 above, 35. Privacy is nevertheless 
recognised as serving important functions; K. Kelly, Domestic Violence and the Politics of Privacy 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 2003) 3-6; Burton, n 6 above, 140-141. 
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 Race Relations Act 1968 c.71. 
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 Kelly, n 18 above; Burton, n 6 above; C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: 
Routledge, 1989); E. Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Law-Making (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000) 87-97.  
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 R v R [1992] 1 AC 599. 
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1996 c 27. 
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 See Smart, n 20 above; Thornton (ed.), n 17 above. 
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7.2.4 Discrimination: grounds-based approach 
 
The grounds-based approach to discrimination, whereby legislation affords 
protection from discrimination on specified grounds, is ‘common to many 
discrimination regimes’.25 In UK (and EU) discrimination legislation the prohibited 
grounds are enumerated in a closed and exhaustive list (compared with the more 
open and general formulation in ICCPR Articles 2(1) and 26). This approach gives 
rise to ‘two obvious questions’ – which grounds are regulated and how are the 
grounds defined?
26
 – as well as to calls to extend the list.27 Although ‘there is no 
inherent reason why legal protection from discrimination is organised on the basis of 
categories’,28 it is inevitable that such a model will give rise to demands for the list of 
grounds or categories to be extended by legislation, or for existing categories to be 
interpreted expansively as forms of discrimination not accommodated by existing 
categories or interpretations emerge.
29
 As scholars have pointed out, categorisation is 
‘not preordained’30 but ‘may have been inevitable given the nature of political 
campaigns for discrimination law’.31 In some cases the addition of categories32 has 
been in response to the obligation to implement EU anti-discrimination law. Absent 
caste as a statutory protected characteristic in its own right or as a statutory subset of 
an existing characteristic, legal protection against caste discrimination depends on 
                                                 
25
 McColgan, n 2 above, 75. In contrast to the UK, section 15 of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms contains a non-exhaustive list of grounds; see G. Moon, ‘From equal treatment to 
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Modern Law Review (2009) 723-749, 723. 
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 McColgan, ibid., 86. 
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establishing in the courts that caste is subsumed within an existing characteristic such 
as race or religion or belief. 
 
7.3 Caste and racial discrimination  
7.3.1 Race Relations Act 1976 
  
Prior to the EQA, protection against racial discrimination was provided by the Race 
Relations Act 1976
33
 (RRA), as amended by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 
2000
34
 and the Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003,
35
 which 
implemented the EC Race Directive 2000.
36
 The RRA introduced a prohibition of 
indirect discrimination (a concept imported from US civil rights legislation) and 
strengthened its enforcement provisions.
37
 It prohibited direct
38
 and indirect 
discrimination,
39
 harassment
40
 and victimisation
41
 on ‘racial grounds’42 or by 
reference to members of a ‘racial group’.43 By 1969, the UK was a party to ICERD, 
which in Article 1(1) defines racial discrimination as any distinction, exclusion, 
                                                 
33
 Race Relations Act 1976, c 74 (London: HMSO, 1995) replacing the earlier legislation in 1965 and 
1968. 
34
 Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 c 34 (London: HMSO, 2000).  
35
 Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003; SI 2003/ 1626 (London: HMSO, 2003).  
36
 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; OJ L180/22, 7 July 2000. Recital 3 of the Directive refers to the 
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 S. 1(1)(a) RRA 1976. 
39
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 S. 1(1)(b) RRA 1976. 
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restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. 
ICERD was implemented by the RRA, which defined ‘racial grounds’ as ‘colour, 
race, nationality or ethnic or national origins’44 – but not descent. There was no 
reference to the international legal definition of racial discrimination in the 1975 
White Paper Racial Discrimination.
45
 Neither was there any reference to the 
international definition in the 1976 Parliamentary Committee debates on the 
interpretation clause of the draft legislation.
46
  
 
7.3.2 Absence of ‘descent’ 
 
As a State Party to ICERD, the UK has an obligation to implement the Convention 
fully and in good faith, including a duty to prohibit and punish, within its 
jurisdiction, those forms of discrimination within its ambit. Absent descent, 
application of the RRA to caste discrimination depended on whether caste was 
deemed subsumed by race, colour, national or ethnic origins or nationality; this 
remains the case under the EQA. There is no link between caste and nationality or 
national origins, and the link between caste and colour is not sufficient to argue that 
people of Dalit origin are members of a group or groups defined by reference to this 
ground. Historically, however, there has long been overlap in the usage and 
application of race and caste.
47
 Discourses of ethnicity are also applied to caste. For 
                                                 
44
 RRA s 3(1). Nationality was introduced following the House of Lords decision in Ealing London 
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Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (CUP), 1999) 103-138; G.S. Ghurye, Caste and Race in 
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these reasons the question of whether castes are groups defined by reference to race 
or ethnic origins is considered below. 
 
7.3.3 Caste and race 
 
Race, in common with the other RRA sub-categories, was not defined and there is 
little RRA case law on the meaning of race,
48
 a notoriously imprecise term. In 1980, 
Lustgarten observed that the only way in which the distinction between race and 
colour in the RRA formula made any sense was if race was understood as meaning 
‘what might more appropriately have been called “ethnic group” – Scottish, Polish, 
West Indian and so forth’.49 From the eighteenth century, Western ideas about race 
were dominated by ‘scientific’ arguments for race and racial difference as innate 
biological categories and for the biological superiority of white people, thereby 
underpinning the colonial project with its utilisation of ‘objective’ racial 
classifications to justify economic exploitation.
50
 In the early twentieth century, new 
analyses emerged of race as a socio-political construct, a product of power relations, 
real in terms of its impact on people’s lives and sense of self ‘but devoid of inherent 
scientific meaning.’51 More recently, academic analysis of the constructed nature of 
race and the racialisation of new social groups has sparked debate about legal 
                                                                                                                                          
Yutzis and R. Onoyama (eds.), Peoples for Human Rights Vol. 9: Descent-Based Discrimination 
(Tokyo: International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism, 2004) 119-137, 
123; K. Kannabiren, ‘Race and Caste: A Response to Andre Beteille’, People’s Union for Civil 
Liberties, August 2001, at http://www.pucl.org/reports/National/2001/beteille.htm (visited 10 
September 2012).  
48
 Connolly, n 7 above, 139. 
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 L. Lustgarten, Legal Control of Racial Discrimination (London: MacMillan Press, 1980) 76. 
50
 D. Ingram, Rights, Democracy, and Fulfilment in the Era of Identity Politics: Principled 
Compromises in a Compromised World (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004) 54.  
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 R. Frankenburg, White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis: 
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protection against emerging forms of racial discrimination such as cultural racism.
52
 
According to Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Mandla v Dowell Lee (1983), the leading 
case on the definition of racial group under the RRA (discussed below), Parliament 
cannot have intended that membership of a particular racial group should depend on 
scientific proof that a person possessed the relevant distinctive biological 
characteristics (assuming that such characteristics exist), as the practical difficulties 
of such proof would be prohibitive; moreover, within the human race, there are very 
few, if any, distinctions which are scientifically recognised as racial.
53
 Race in the 
popular sense calls up wider markers such as culture, language and political and 
economic power, or lack of,
54
 yet the term nevertheless also encompassed shared 
geographical origins and hereditary, immutable physical traits such as skin colour 
and physical or outward appearance, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or 
religious factors.
55
 While caste possesses some features associated with race in its 
wider sense, this does not mean that it is the same as race.
56
 In the nineteenth 
century, scholars searching for a scientific ‘racial’ explanation for the caste system 
failed to identify pan-Indian or regional phenotypical profiles of Untouchable 
groups.57   
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7.3.4    Caste and ethnic origins 
7.3.4.1 Content of ‘ethnic origins’ 
Like race, the meaning of ethnic origins or ethnicity is elusive, but the term is widely 
understood in a culturally-oriented rather than a purely physical sense
58
 as 
‘[acknowledging] the place of history, language and culture in the construction of 
subjectivity and identity’.59 According to Capotorti in his landmark study on 
minorities, the UN Sub-Commission in its 1950 draft resolution on the definition of 
minorities decided to replace the word ‘racial’ with ‘ethnic’ in all references to 
minority groups described by ethnic origin, because so-called racial groupings were 
not based on scientific facts; the word ‘ethnic’ referred to all biological, cultural and 
historical characteristics, whereas ‘racial referred only to inherited physical 
characteristics’.60 Reference was made to the 1948 Genocide Convention,61 wherein 
‘ethnic’ had been used to cover cultural, physical and historical characteristics of a 
group.
62
 Reference was also made to a 1970 UN-sponsored research conference on 
race relations and the observation of one scholar that whereas ‘in the most common 
usage race refers to aggregates of people based upon physical differences, 
particularly skin colour’, ethnic groups ‘may be defined as peoples who conceive of 
themselves as one kind by virtue of their common ancestry (real or imagined) who 
are united by emotional bonds, a common culture, and by concern with preservation 
of their group’.63 Capotorti states that the substitution of ‘ethnic minorities’ for 
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‘racial minorities’ in Article 27 ICCPR ‘reflect[ed] a wish to use the broadest 
expression and to imply that racial and national minorities should therefore be 
regarded as included in the [wider] category of ethnic minorities’.64 
 
7.3.4.2 Mandla v Dowell Lee (1983): wide interpretation of ‘ethnic origins’  
 
In Mandla (Sewa Singh) and another v Dowell Lee and others
65
 (Mandla), a Sikh 
schoolboy brought a claim of indirect racial discrimination against an independent 
school which refused to admit him unless he complied with school uniform rules, 
which required him to remove his turban. The question facing the House of Lords 
was whether Sikhs were a racial group for the purposes of the RRA. It was not 
suggested that Sikhs were a group defined by reference to colour, race, nationality or 
national origins; in none of these respects were they distinguishable from other 
groups living, like most Sikhs, in the Punjab. The argument turned upon whether 
they were a group defined by ethnic origins. It was therefore necessary to ascertain 
the sense in which the word ‘ethnic’ was used in the RRA.66 Lord Fraser rejected 
meanings which treated it as synonymous with race in the narrow, biological sense. 
While recognising that ethnic ‘conveyed a flavour of race’ he held that it could not 
have been used in the RRA ‘in a strictly racial or biological sense’ and that 
Parliament ‘must have used the word in some more popular sense’; indeed, ‘the word 
is used nowadays in an extended sense to include other characteristics which may be 
commonly thought of as being associated with common racial origin’. He therefore 
held that the term ‘ethnic’ was to be construed ‘relatively widely’ in a broad 
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cultural/historic sense.
67
 Citing Richardson J. in King-Ansell v Police (New 
Zealand),
68
 Lord Fraser held that for a group to constitute an ethnic group it must 
regard itself and be regarded by others as a distinct community by virtue of certain 
characteristics, two of which are essential: (1) a distinct, living and long shared 
history as a group and (2) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social 
customs, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance. Additional 
but non-essential characteristics include: (3) common geographical origins or 
descent; (4) a common language (although not necessarily peculiar to the group); (5) 
common literature peculiar to the group; (6) a common religion different from that of 
neighbouring groups or the surrounding community and (7) being a minority or an 
oppressed or dominant group within a larger community.
69
 The House of Lords 
found that Sikhs were a group defined by reference to ethnic origins because they 
possessed ‘a sufficient combination of shared customs, beliefs, traditions and 
characteristics derived from a common or presumed common past’ such as to give 
them ‘an historically determined social identity in their own eyes and in the eyes of 
those outside the group’, even though they were not biologically distinguishable 
from other people in the Punjab.
70
 Jews
71
 and Gypsies (in the narrow sense of Roma 
rather than the wider sense of New Age travellers)
72
 but not Rastafarians
73
 or 
Muslims
74
 have also been held to fall within the purview of ethnic origins.  
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7.3.4.3 Caste and the Mandla criteria 
The ethnicity of caste is a familiar topic among caste scholars, and the question of 
Dalits as an ethnic group has also been raised within CERD.
75
 However, a 
fundamental element of caste is separateness of caste groups. Dalits in India are 
linked by a common experience of oppression and Untouchability but are not 
otherwise a culturally, linguistically or historically homogenous group – for centuries 
they were separated from each other geographically, regionally, linguistically and 
culturally, the distinctions and hierarchies between Dalit jatis sometimes enforced as 
rigorously as those between Dalit and non-Dalit jatis.
76
 It was not until the early 
twentieth century that Dalits emerged as a nationally identifiable political and social 
entity. Although Dalits in India have become an increasingly important political 
category, it is not clear that collectively they could fulfil the Mandla criteria.
77
 In 
Nyazi v Rymans Muslims were denied ethnic group status due to their linguistic, 
geographical and racial heterogeneity.
78
 It is submitted that while individual Dalit 
jatis could possibly fulfil the criteria, collectively Dalits would struggle to 
demonstrate sufficient commonality of geography, language, religion and culture and 
a sufficiently distinct, long shared history as a group.  
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7.3.4.4 Revisiting Mandla: R (E) v Governing Body of JFS (2009) 
In R (E) v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS (2009)
79
 
the UK Supreme Court revisited the Mandla interpretation of ethnic origins. JFS 
(formerly the Jews’ Free School) was a designated ‘faith’ school.80 Such schools 
benefit from an exception to the obligation not to discriminate based on religion or 
belief in the admission and treatment of pupils.
81
 The JFS policy was to admit 
children who were recognised by the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR) as being 
Jewish. The extent of religious observance practised by a family was irrelevant. The 
only consideration was whether the child was, within the OCR’s understanding of the 
Halakah (Jewish law), a Jew. The OCR recognised as Jewish those born of an 
Orthodox Jewish mother or grandmother, or those born of female converts whose 
conversion was recognised by an Orthodox synagogue. E challenged JFS’s refusal to 
admit his son, M, to the school on the grounds that M did not satisfy the admission 
requirement of descent in the matrilineal line from a woman recognised by the OCR 
as Jewish. M’s mother was an Italian Catholic convert who had converted in a 
Reform – not an Orthodox – synagogue. E alleged that the refusal constituted direct 
racial discrimination based on M’s ethnic origins. JFS argued that the refusal to 
admit M was made purely on religious grounds. The question to be determined was 
whether in being denied admission to JFS, M was disadvantaged based on his ethnic 
origins.
82
 The court by five to four held that the JFS/ OCR matrilineal descent 
admission test focussed on genealogical descent; such a test was one based on ethnic 
origins. The reason M was denied admission was because of his mother’s ethnic 
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origins, which were not halachically Jewish. Treating an individual less favourably 
because of his ancestry amounted to discrimination based on ethnic origin. The 
refusal to admit M constituted direct discrimination on racial grounds. The fact that 
the discrimination was based upon a devout, venerable and sincerely held religious 
belief or conviction could not excuse such conduct from liability under the law.
83
   
 
7.3.4.5 Caste and JFS 
 
The Supreme Court in JFS held that the RRA did not only prohibit discrimination 
based on ethnic origin, as defined by the wide Mandla test, but also in the narrower, 
more traditional sense of a person’s lineage or descent; indeed, prior to Mandla, a 
narrow test based on birth or descent would have been regarded as required in order 
for there to be discrimination based on ethnic origin.
84
 The Court referred to 
statements in Ealing 
85
 that discrimination on account of race or ethnic or national 
origins involved consideration of a person’s antecedents and that ‘origin’ signified a 
source, or someone or something, from which someone or something has 
descended.
86
 In JFS, M was at a disadvantage because of his descent.
87
 On the 
meaning of descent, Lord Mance referred, obiter, to the ICERD definition of racial 
discrimination and CERD’s interpretation of descent as including ‘descent-based 
communities... who suffer from discrimination.. .on the basis of caste and analogous 
systems of inherited status’:  
Whether or not “descent” embraces caste, the concepts of inherited status and a descent-
based community both appear wide enough to cover the present situation. That in turn tends 
                                                 
83
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to argue for a wide understanding of the concept of discrimination on grounds of ‘ethnic 
origins’, although the point is a marginal one.88   
 
JFS opened up arguments that caste is subsumed within ethnic origins by virtue of 
the descent aspect of ‘ethnic’. In Naveed v Aslam the Employment Tribunal held that 
it was impossible for the claimant’s caste to fall under the existing definition of 
ethnic origins where the claimant and respondent were members of, but of different 
status within, the same caste where the possibility of movement within the caste was 
accepted by the claimant.
89
 Whether the argument (that caste cannot fall under ethnic 
origins) can apply in different circumstances has yet to be determined by the courts. 
Caste has flavours of both race and ethnicity but also important divergences from 
these categories (for example, its sanctioning by religion). It remains unclear on what 
basis a court would equate varna, jati (or biraderi) with race per se. ‘Ethnicising’ 
caste under British law could lead to the elevation of jati identities into separate 
‘freestanding’ ethnic identities – the antithesis of Ambedkar’s call for the 
‘annihilation of caste’ – whereas conceptualising caste discrimination either as a 
form of descent-based discrimination or simply as itself involves acknowledgment 
but not reification of jati identity. These two legal approaches – treating caste (jati) 
as a form of ethnicity, conversely treating caste as itself, or as a form of descent – 
correspond broadly to the two divergent political strategies which have emerged in 
Dalits’ struggle against casteism in Britain. One strategy advocates the embracing 
and assertion by Dalits of caste (jati) identities, including caste-related religious 
identities (e.g. Ravidassia, Valmiki), as the means for resisting casteism. The other 
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rejects caste in its totality and, with it, caste identity.
90
 Until the EQA is extended to 
cover caste or descent – for example by providing for caste to amount of itself to an 
aspect of race – lawyers must argue that caste is subsumed within race or ethnic 
origins or both. 
 
7.4      Caste and discrimination based on religion or belief 
7.4.1    Religion or belief as a ground of discrimination 
7.4.1.1 Meaning of religion or belief 
Proposals to include religion as a ground of discrimination in the RRA were debated 
but rejected in Parliament in 1976,
91
 and it was not until 2003 that religion or belief 
discrimination legislation was introduced in Britain.
92
 Prior to that, protection from 
religious discrimination was potentially covered by Articles 9 and 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
93
 From 2003, two instruments 
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were in force, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003,
94
 
which implemented the UK’s obligations under the religion and belief strand of the 
EC Employment Equality Directive 2000,
95
 and Part 2 of the Equality Act 2006 (EA 
2006).
96
 Both instruments defined religion or belief as any religion or religious or 
philosophical belief, or lack of religion or belief.
97
 ‘Any religion’ is a broad 
definition in line with Article 9 ECHR, including ‘those religions widely recognised 
in this country’ such as Rastafarianism, Baha’is, Zoroastrianism, Jainism and 
Buddhism, in addition to Judaism, Islam, Christianity and Hinduism, as well as 
denominations or sects within a religion (such as Protestants and Catholics within 
Christianity).
98
 The main limitation is that the religion must have a clear structure 
and belief system
99
 (this being ultimately a matter for the courts to decide). The 
definition of philosophical belief, and what constitutes a philosophical belief for the 
purposes of the legislation, was considered in a number of cases prior to the EQA.
100
 
Grainger plc and ors v Nicholson identified five criteria to be satisfied for a belief to 
qualify for protection: it must (1) be genuinely held; (2) be a belief and not an 
opinion or viewpoint based on information currently available; (3) concern a weighty 
and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; (4) attain a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance and (5) be worthy of respect in a 
democratic society and not incompatible with human dignity and the fundamental 
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rights of others.
101
 These criteria are now contained in the EQA Explanatory Notes 
on belief.
102
 
 
7.4.1.2 Meaning of direct discrimination based on religion or belief  
The 2003 Regulations (as amended) and the EA 2006 provided that direct 
discrimination occurs where, because of the religion or belief of B or of any other 
person except A (whether or not it is also A’s religion or belief), A treats B less 
favourably than he treats or would treat others.
103
 Direct discrimination could thus 
occur if it was not B’s religion or belief but the religion or belief of another person 
which motivated the less favourable treatment by A – and regardless of whether A 
was of the same religion or belief as B.
104
 The legislation excluded from the ambit of 
direct discrimination less favourable treatment of B occurring solely based on A’s 
religion or belief, for example ‘where A feels motivated to take particular action 
because of what his religion or belief requires’.105 For religious discrimination to 
have occurred, the less favourable treatment of B must have occurred based on the 
actual or perceived religion or belief of B, or a person with B. Less favourable 
treatment of B motivated by A’s own religious beliefs but unrelated to B’s religion 
(or belief) would not amount to religious discrimination – although it might amount 
to discrimination on another ground, e.g. sexual orientation. 
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7.4.2    Caste discrimination as religious discrimination 
7.4.2.1 Caste and religion as distinct characteristics 
Caste discrimination is captured by religious discrimination provisions only if the 
victim’s ascribed caste status is considered ‘part of’ or integral to their religion or 
belief. It is submitted that caste is a characteristic distinct from religion or belief and 
that it is misconceived to conflate caste status with religion, notwithstanding the fact 
that caste as an institution finds support in orthodox Hindu texts. In his book 
Religious Discrimination and Hatred Law Neil Addison argues that if a Hindu 
employer (A) refused to employ another Hindu of lower caste (B) and instead offered 
the job to a Hindu of higher caste (C), this would constitute unlawful religious 
discrimination against B even though A, B and C are all Hindus.
106
 Although the 
reason for the discrimination by A is B’s caste, Addison implies that in the case of 
Hindus, B’s religion and ascribed caste status are synonymous rather than distinct 
characteristics, so this is a case of religious discrimination. It is submitted that this 
conflation of caste status and religious identity is erroneous, as discrimination based 
on caste and discrimination based on religion are not the same. By definition, caste 
discrimination is motivated by the known, perceived or assumed caste status of B, 
not the religion or belief to which B is known or thought to subscribe or belong. 
‘Low-caste Hindu’ is an ascribed socio-religious status rather than a distinct religion 
or belief within the meaning of discrimination legislation.
107
 Indeed, because of their 
caste, Dalits have not always been included in the Hindu fold; in the early twentieth 
century, the proposal that for political reasons the Untouchables should be counted as 
                                                 
106
 N. Addison, Religious Discrimination and Hatred Law (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 64. I 
am grateful to Neil Addison for sharing his views on caste discrimination and religious discrimination 
law with me. EQA s 24 provides that it is no defence to a claim of direct discrimination that the 
alleged discriminator shares the protected characteristic (in this case, religion) with the victim. Section 
24 also covers discrimination based on association or perception.  
107 A similar mis-conceptualisation of caste status as a purely religious identity occurred during 
debates on the 1975 Racial Discrimination White Paper on the inclusion of religion as a subset of 
racial grounds; see Racial Discrimination White Paper, Cm 6234 (1975) 23.  
228 
 
Hindus was highly controversial among some Hindus.
108
 It is on the basis of caste 
rather than religion that Dalits have been and continue to be denied entry to temples 
and public places.
109
 By collapsing religion and caste into each other the distinct 
nature of each is lost.  
 
7.4.2.2 Caste-specific religions   
Only in cases involving caste-specific religious groups or movements (e.g. Valmikis, 
Ravidassias, Ambedkarite Buddhists), where religious identity overlaps completely 
with caste status, can discrimination based on caste be captured by provisions on 
religious discrimination. If caste-specific religious groups are found by the courts to 
be distinct sects within Hinduism or Sikhism, or alternatively independent religions 
with clear structures and belief systems, caste discrimination against members of 
such groups, although motivated by caste rather than religious affiliation, could be 
captured theoretically by religious discrimination provisions in the absence of caste-
specific provisions, as caste and religious identity are sufficiently conflated.
110
 
However, using religious discrimination provisions in such cases masks rather than 
exposes the casteist basis of the discrimination. For example, someone who 
discriminates against an Ambedkarite Buddhist may not discriminate against a Sri 
Lankan Buddhist, the underlying reason for the discrimination against the 
Ambedkarite Buddhist being caste, not Buddhism.
111
 Using religious discrimination 
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provisions to address caste discrimination creates an arbitrary divide whereby 
victims of caste discrimination who are members of ‘low caste’ religious movements 
can call up a protected ground which is not available to non-members of such 
groupings. 
 
7.4.2.3 Saini v All Saints Haque Centre & Others (2009)  
Two reported cases illustrate the use of religious discrimination provisions by 
possible or alleged victims of caste discrimination in the absence of caste-specific 
provisions. In both cases the complainants were ‘high caste’ Hindus and the 
respondents were Ravidassias. In Saini v All Saints Haque Centre & Others (2009)
112
 
the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) found that the respondents had subjected 
the claimant to discriminatory harassment based on religion. The case report notes 
that Ravidassias ‘form a distinct group with distinctive religious beliefs that 
distinguish them from both the Sikh and Hindu communities’.113 Caste was not 
brought up explicitly before the EAT, but in the earlier, unreported Employment 
Tribunal hearing, caste makes an appearance in a reference to an article referring to 
the discriminatory treatment meted out in parts of medieval India to lower castes 
such as Ravidassias by high caste Hindus.
114
 It is submitted that caste rather than 
religion (or possibly a combination of the two) was at the root of the dispute in Saini.  
 
 
                                                 
112
 [2009] 1 CMLR 38, 1060-1070; UKEAT/0227/08/ZT. 
113
 2009] 1 CMLR 38, 1060-1070, para. 2. 
114
 Mr J. Chandel & Anor v All Saints Haque Centre & Ors, ET Case No. 1306296/ 2006 & Anor 
(unreported). 
230 
 
7.4.2.4 Sahota & Shergill v Shri Guru Ravidass Sabha Temple (Vancouver) 
(2008)
115
  
 
This case involved a complaint brought before the British Columbia Human Rights 
Tribunal (BCHRT)
116
 by two higher caste Hindus alleging discrimination contrary to 
the British Columbia Human Rights Code 1996 (the Code)
117
 based on ancestry, race 
and religion in the provision of an accommodation, service or facility customarily 
available to the public by the Shri Guru Ravidass Sabha Temple of Vancouver (the 
Sabha). The Sabha had denied them membership because they were not Ravidassias 
of the Chamar caste (formerly an Untouchable caste). The complainants argued that 
discrimination on the basis of caste is religious, cultural and economic 
discrimination
118
 and that therefore the discrimination against them was inter alia 
discrimination based on religion (a form of discrimination covered by the Code 
whereas discrimination based on caste was not); specifically, they complained that 
they were refused membership because of their caste ‘and the religious background 
of the caste’.119 
 
The respondents argued that membership of the Sabha was restricted to the 
Ravidassia community, whose interests the Sabha had been created to promote, and 
that Ravidassias were by definition members of the Chamar caste; furthermore, they 
posited that the Code did not apply to membership of the Sabha because it was a 
private, purely social, religious and cultural organisation.
120
 The BCHRT concurred 
and dismissed the complaint as outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, finding that 
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the organisation was a result of a private selection process based on attributes 
personal to the members,
121
 and as a purely private organisation it had chosen to 
restrict its membership to persons in the Ravidassi community and defined that 
community to include only those of the Chamar caste.
122
 The cases of Saini and 
Sahota both feature caste dimensions – Saini was brought under religious 
discrimination provisions, while in Sahota the complaint was of discrimination based 
on religion, race and ancestry. It is submitted that both cases would have been 
brought under caste discrimination provisions had they been in place.  
 
7.4.3 Religion or belief as defence to discrimination 
Article 9(2) ECHR provides that the right to manifest religion or belief ‘shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society’ for inter alia ‘the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others’. British courts have emphasised the qualified nature of Article 9 protection 
and shown themselves unwilling to allow individuals to manifest their beliefs in a 
way which involves ‘discriminating on grounds which Parliament has provided to be 
unlawful’.123 They have not allowed protection from discrimination based on religion 
or belief to be called up in defence of behaviour which, albeit motivated by religious 
belief, is itself discriminatory on grounds, for example, of ethnic origin
124
 or sexual 
orientation.
125
 In JFS, Munby J. explained that while ‘the civil courts must be slow to 
interfere in the life of any religious minority or to become involved in adjudicating 
on purely religious issues… it is important to realise that reliance on religious belief, 
                                                 
121
 Per Marine Drive Golf Club v Buntain et al. (2007 BCCA 17); ibid., para. 34. 
122
 Ibid. 
123
 Ladele v London Borough of Islington, Liberty intervening [2008] UKEAT/0453/08/RN, 127. 
124
 JFS, n 79 above. 
125
 Ladele v Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357; McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] 
EWCA Civ 880; Bull & Bull v Hall & Preddy [2012] EWCA Civ 83. 
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however conscientious the belief and however ancient and respectable the religion, 
can never of itself immunise the believer from the reach of the secular law. And 
invocation of religious belief does not necessarily provide a defence to what is 
otherwise a valid claim’.126 It has been suggested that a hierarchy of protection is 
developing whereby religion or belief is protected to a lesser extent than other 
protected characteristics
127
 and that the right to freely hold and express beliefs is 
illusory if ‘citizens are not also free to conduct themselves in accordance with those 
beliefs’.128 It has also been argued that the views of religious people should be 
subject to a ‘reasonable accommodation’ based on religious belief from general 
legislative provisions on discrimination, i.e. be tolerated to a certain extent even if 
out of step with equality law.
129
 Aileen McColgan, in contrast, argues that it is a 
mistake to protect religion or belief in the same way as sex, race, sexual orientation 
and disability and warns against accommodation of practices or beliefs categorised as 
religious, because often they are problematic on equality grounds.
130
  
 
It follows from the above that the maintenance of ‘caste boundaries’ may be 
challenged where it occurs in a legally regulated sphere and if caste can be brought 
within a protected characteristic, in which case a defence that the maintenance of 
‘caste boundaries’ is motivated by religious (or philosophical) belief would be 
unlikely to succeed. 
 
                                                 
126
 See JFS, n 79 above. See also Ladele v Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357; McFarlane v 
Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 880; Bull & Bull v Hall & Preddy [2012] EWCA Civ 83. 
127
 Vickers, n 99 above. 
128
 L. West, ‘These Judgments Restrict Freedom’, Church Times Issue 7679, 21 May 2010.  
129
 See R. Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’, 13(2) Ecclesiastical Law Journal (2011) 157-181; 
R. Sandberg, ‘Laws and Religion: Unravelling McFarlane v Avon Relate Ltd’, 12(3) Ecclesiastical 
Law Journal (2010) 361-370.  
130
 A. McColgan, ‘Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the workplace’, 38(1) Industrial Law 
Journal (2009) 1-29, 1. 
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7.5 Conclusion   
This chapter has examined the limitations of domestic discrimination law in relation 
to caste prior to the EQA 2010. The legal capture of caste, and discrimination based 
on caste, presents as much of a theoretical and practical problem to domestic 
discrimination lawyers as it does to international lawyers. UK discrimination law 
provides protection from discrimination occurring in specific sectors and in relation 
to particular grounds only. The ‘grounds-based’ approach to discrimination, whereby 
only specified characteristics are protected, is one of the fundamental concepts 
underpinning the UK’s anti-discrimination regime. This approach is vulnerable to 
two related pressures: first, calls to expand the list of protected characteristics by 
adding more characteristics, or by adding an open ‘other status’ category, or by 
making the list non-exhaustive, and secondly, calls for expansive approaches to 
interpreting the existing list.
131
 In the UK, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the 
RRA ‘came under pressure to accommodate... challenges to discrimination which 
might more obviously have been categorised as relating to sexual orientation and 
religion’.132 Groups suffering from hitherto unrecognised forms of discrimination 
(such as caste discrimination) may be denied legal protection because they are not 
explicitly included in the list, or, says McColgan, because interpretive precedents 
‘become ossified’ such that ‘the courts may be unwilling, or perceive themselves as 
unable, to shape interpretive outcomes so as to make legislation fit for current 
purpose’.133 This chapter has explained why caste did not easily ‘fit’ into any of the 
pre-EQA grounds of discrimination. For the same reasons, the EQA-protected 
characteristics as defined as at 1 April 2013 still do not adequately embrace caste. 
                                                 
131
 McColgan (2007), n 2 above, 75. 
132
 McColgan (2007), ibid. 
133
 McColgan (2007), ibid., 75-6; section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 has provided British courts 
with an additional interpretive tool.  
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Only in specific circumstances can religious discrimination provisions capture caste 
discrimination. Only by ‘racing’ or ‘ethnicising’ caste can caste discrimination be 
caught by race discrimination provisions. The 1975 Racial Discrimination White 
Paper stated: 
To fail to provide a remedy against an injustice strikes at the rule of law. To abandon a whole 
group of people in society without legal redress against unfair discrimination is to leave them 
with no option but to find their own redress. 
134
 
In 2003, and again in 2011, the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) recommended that the UK introduce a domestic prohibition 
of descent-based discrimination (including caste-based discrimination).
135
 Chapter 8 
examines and analyses the debates during the passage of the Equality Bill through 
Parliament about whether to include an express prohibition of caste discrimination in 
domestic legislation and the process which led to the inclusion in the EQA of section 
9(5)(a), which provides for caste to be added, at a future date, to the protected 
characteristic of race. 
                                                 
134
 See Racial Discrimination White Paper, n 37 above, 23. 
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Concluding Observations – UK; UN Doc. CERD/C/GBR/CO/18-20, 14 September 2011, para. 30 
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Chapter 8 
Caste Discrimination and the Equality Act 2010 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The Equality Bill 2009 (the Bill), as introduced in April 2009, did not contain any 
mention of caste.
1
 Four main objections to the legal regulation of caste 
discrimination were advanced at the time by governmental, parliamentary and other 
actors. These were (1) lack of evidence of a problem requiring a legislative solution; 
(2) caste discrimination is already covered by existing law; (3) ‘proliferation of the 
protectorate’ – unjustifiable extension of the list of protected characteristics based on 
which discrimination is prohibited – and (4) undesirable socio-political 
consequences, including negative impacts on community cohesion. This chapter 
traces the passage of the Bill through Parliament and presents and critiques these 
arguments, examining their strengths, inconsistencies and contradictions with a view 
to illustrating the problems faced by British Dalit communities in their efforts to gain 
protection from caste discrimination under equality law.  
 
In 2001, the UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in Durban provided a 
springboard for the transformation of caste discrimination from domestic grievance 
into an international human rights issue.
2
 From 2006 onwards, the prospect of an 
Equality Bill provided a rallying point for British Dalit organisations and activists, an 
opportunity to make the strategic and rhetorical shifts necessary to take their 
                                                 
1
 See 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmbills/085/09085_iw/09085_iw_en_1.htm 
(visited 28 September 2012). 
2
 C. Bob, ‘“Dalit Rights Are Human Rights”: Caste Discrimination, International Activism and the 
Construction of a New Human Rights Issue’, 29(1) Human Rights Quarterly (2007) 167-193. 
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grievances to the highest governmental level and a springboard for debate on the 
inclusion of caste in domestic discrimination legislation, in a context where a range 
of discrimination issues were being debated. The strategic projection of caste 
discrimination as a human rights and discrimination issue challenged the 
conceptualisation of caste as a purely social, cultural or religious matter. Critical to 
the campaign for domestic legal regulation of caste discrimination was, first, the 
organisational and advocacy skills, or resources, of key activists;
3
 secondly, the 
willingness of individuals to provide personal testimony of caste discrimination; 
thirdly, the willingness of Dalit organisations to work together; fourthly, the support 
of a handful of parliamentarians
4
 and academics; and finally, the role of national 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Anti Caste Discrimination Alliance 
(ACDA, formed in 2008), Dalit Solidarity Network UK (DSN-UK) and the National 
Secular Society, and transnational advocacy networks such as International Dalit 
Solidarity Network (IDSN).
5
 Two ‘key moments’ can be identified as turning points 
in the Dalits’ campaign for legal change. The first was the publication in November 
2009 of a study on caste discrimination in the UK, written by ACDA in collaboration 
with four academics.
6
 This study proved instrumental in securing official 
acknowledgement that caste discrimination might exist in the UK. It argued that if 
further evidence was considered necessary, research should be commissioned by 
government. The second was a meeting on 4 February 2010 in the House of Lords on 
                                                 
3
 It seems that a new generation of British-educated, professional Dalits has emerged possessing the 
skills and experience (‘resources’) to engage directly with the political establishment. In social 
movement discourse resources are defined as including the professional and educational background 
of movement personnel; C. Hilson ‘New social movements: the role of legal opportunity’ 9(2) Journal 
of European Public Policy (2002) 238-255, 240. 
4
 The key parliamentarians were Lynne Featherstone MP (Lib Dem); Rob Marris MP (Lab); Jeremy 
Corbyn MP (Lab); John O’Donnell MP (Lab); Evan Harris MP (Lib Dem); Lord Avebury (Lib Dem); 
Lord Lester (Lib Dem); Lord Harries (Lib Dem); Baroness Flather (Lib Dem). 
5
 See http://idsn.org/front-page/ (visited 15 September 2012). 
6
 ACDA, Hidden Apartheid – Voice of the Community: Caste and Caste Discrimination in the UK – A 
Scoping Study (Derby: ACDA, 2009). The academics were Professor Stephen Whittle; Dr. Roger 
Green; Dr. Gurharpal Singh; the present author.  
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caste and the Equality Bill, called by Baroness Thornton, the government minister 
responsible for the passage of the Bill through the Lords, for the purpose of hearing 
from Dalit organisations, community representatives and individuals with direct 
experience of caste discrimination. At this meeting ‘behind the scenes’, government 
support (or at least non-opposition) was secured for an amendment to section 9 of the 
Bill, adding an enabling provision allowing for the future inclusion of caste in the 
definition of race. 
 
The chapter proceeds with an examination of the Equality Review process, followed 
by an analysis of the first three of the four main objections to the regulation of caste 
discrimination as they developed at the time. There follows an account of the 
meeting on caste and the Equality Bill at the House of Lords on 4 February 2010. 
Finally, we look at the fourth objection. 
 
8.2 Equalities Review and Discrimination Law Review 
By the time the Labour Government came to power in 1997, reform of the UK’s anti-
discrimination regime – ‘a tangle of acts and regulations whose variety [owed] little 
to principle and much to happenstance’7 – was long overdue. In February 2005, the 
government announced a two-stage overhaul of the UK’s equality framework, 
leading to a new, single, Equality Act.
8
 The first stage, the Equalities Review,
9
 was 
                                                 
7
 A. McColgan Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 9. 
8
 See http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalitiesreview/background.html (visited 9 September 
2012). The Labour Party committed to introduce a Single Equality Act in its 2005 General Election 
manifesto.  
9
 The Equalities Review was mandated to investigate the causes of persistent discrimination and 
inequality in British society; Interim Report for Consultation (London: The Equalities Review, 2006) 
at 
http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalitiesreview/upload/assets/www.theequalitiesreview.org.uk/int
erim_report.pdf (visited 9 September 2012). 
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completed in February 2007.
10
 In October 2007, the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) was established under the Equality Act 2006.
11
 The second 
stage, the Discrimination Law Review (DLR),
12
 was intended to culminate in the 
drafting of a single piece of new legislation to replace the plethora of existing anti-
discrimination statutes and statutory instruments. A Consultation on the new 
legislation was launched in June 2007.
13
 In June 2008, the government announced its 
intention to proceed with a Bill
14
 with the publication of its key proposals,
15
 followed 
in July 2008 with its written response to the Consultation.
16
  
 
The DLR provided an opportunity to ascertain the existence, forms and extent of 
caste discrimination in Great Britain and to bring it within the new legislative 
framework. The Consultation paper did not mention caste but – partly in response to 
a 2006 study by DSN-UK on caste discrimination in the UK
17
 – the government in 
August 2007 conducted ‘an informal survey of around 20 (sic) key stakeholders to 
determine whether they were aware of any evidence that individuals or communities 
had been discriminated against, based on caste, in the UK’.18 A Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request subsequently revealed that the Department for 
                                                 
10
 Fairness and Freedom: The Final Report of the Equalities Review (Norwich: HMSO, 2007).  
11
 Equality Act 2006 c 3; the EHRC merged the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), the Equal 
Opportunities Commission and the Disability Rights Commission; Equality Act 2006 Part 1 s 1, at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/3/contents and http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/ 
(visited 13 September 2012). 
12
 The Department of Trade and Industry was charged with developing a simpler, fairer legal 
framework, informed by the findings of the Equalities Review; see DLR Terms of Reference, at 
http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalitiesreview/reference_grp/rg_terms_ref.html (visited 15 
September 2012). In 2007, the remit moved to the Government Equalities Office (GEO), a department 
created in October 2007 by Statutory Instrument; see http://homeoffice.gov.uk/equalities/ (visited 15 
September 2012). 
13
 ‘A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain – a consultation 
paper’ (London: HMS0, 2007). 
14
 HC Deb vol 478 col 499, 26 Jun 2008. 
15
 ‘Framework for a Fairer Future: The Equality Bill’ (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2008).  
16
 The Equality Bill – Government response to the Consultation Cm 7454 (2008). 
17
 DSN-UK, No Escape: Caste Discrimination in the UK (London: DSN-UK, 2006); see Chapter 6 of 
this thesis. 
18
 Cm 7454 (2008), n 16 above, 177, 183-184. 
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Communities and Local Government (CLG) sent questionnaires on caste and caste 
discrimination on 15 August 2007 to twenty-three organisations (of which only two 
were Dalit groups), asking for replies by 29 August 2007, to which nineteen 
organisations responded.
19
 On the basis of these responses the government 
concluded:  
We have decided… not to extend protection against caste discrimination. While recognising 
that caste discrimination is unacceptable, we have found no strong evidence of such 
discrimination in Britain, in the context of employment or the provision of goods, facilities or 
services. We would, however, consult the [EHRC] about monitoring the position.
20
   
 
8.3    Equality Bill 2009 
8.3.1 Organisation of the legislation 
 
The Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 24 April 2009. It had two 
stated purposes: to harmonise and in some areas extend existing discrimination law 
and to ‘strengthen the law to support progress on equality’.21 As a ‘flagship bill’22 its 
successful passage through Parliament was of crucial political importance to the 
Labour Government of 1997-2010 in its final months in office. It received Royal 
Assent on 8 April 2010.
23
 Its passage through Parliament occurred against the 
backdrop of an impending General Election of uncertain outcome and government 
anxiety to ensure that the Bill received Royal Assent before Parliament was 
                                                 
19
 A. Ahmed (CLG), letter to P. Lal (ACDA), 2 July 2009, in Hidden Apartheid, n 6 above, 53-55. 
20
 Cm 7454 (2008), n 16 above, 177. See also V. Keter, ‘Equality Bill: Bill 85 of 2008-9’, House of 
Commons Library Research Paper 09/42, 7 May 2009. 
21
 Keter, ibid., 11. 
22
 Ibid., 20. 
23
 On the passage of a Bill see 
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/passage_bill/coms_commons_first_reading.htm’. The 2010 
General Election was called on 6 April 2010 for 6 May 2010. Parliament was formally dissolved on 
12 April 2010. 
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dissolved. Part 1 of the Equality Act 2010 (EQA)
24
 imposed on certain public 
authorities a new (and controversial) public sector duty regarding socio-economic 
inequalities (which the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government decided not to bring into force).
25
 For present purposes the most 
important part of the EQA is Part 2, which establishes the key concepts on which the 
EQA is based, including protected characteristics and prohibited conduct (direct and 
indirect discrimination, harassment and victimisation). Nine protected characteristics 
are listed in Part 2 section 4 and elaborated in sections 5-11: age; disability; gender 
reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race (which 
includes colour, nationality and ethnic or national origin); religion or belief; sex and 
sexual orientation. Dual discrimination (discrimination based on two protected 
characteristics), provided for in section 14, was not brought into force by the 
coalition government.
26
 
 
8.3.2 The ‘caste amendment’ 
 
At Lords’ Report stage on 2 March 2010, following debate, argument and 
negotiation involving government, parliamentarians, Dalit groups and other actors, 
an historic amendment was agreed. Lords Amendment 1, which became EQA s. 
9(5)(a), was an enabling provision providing for caste to be added by ministerial 
order ‘as an aspect of’ the protected characteristic of race in clause 9.27 The effect of 
this clause was to obviate the need for further primary legislation to bring caste 
within the EQA list of protected characteristics; rather, this could be achieved via 
                                                 
24
Equality Act 2010 c15; see http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/pdf/ukpga_20100015_en.pdf.  
25
 B. Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 141-143. 
26
 See The Plan for Growth (Dept. for Business, Innovation and Skills, March 2011) para. 2.51. 
27
 HL Deb vol 717 col 1350 2 Mar 2010; Revised Marshalled List of Amendments to be Moved on 
Report as at 1 March 2010, at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldbills/035/amend/ml035-ir.htm (visited 28 
September 2012). 
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secondary legislation. The amendment was tabled by the humanist Liberal Democrat 
peer Lord Avebury and was unopposed by the government. It was agreed in the 
House of Commons on 6 April 2010,
28
 just two days before Royal Assent and six 
days before Parliament was dissolved. In bringing the concept of caste into domestic 
discrimination legislation for the first time, the ‘caste amendment’ was a huge 
achievement for Dalit activists. However, it was not the outcome originally hoped 
for. First, the goal of the Dalit organisations had been to secure an immediate, 
express prohibition of caste discrimination in the new legislation via the addition of 
caste as a new (tenth) protected characteristic. Instead, the amendment was a 
‘halfway house’ providing government with a power to amend the legislation to 
cover caste at a future date, but not legislating immediately against caste 
discrimination. Secondly, caste was conceptualised not as a new characteristic but, in 
a novel formulation, ‘as an aspect of’ the existing protected characteristic of race. 
Government refusal to concede either on the need to legislate immediately or to add 
caste as a new, tenth strand of discrimination, coupled with pressure to secure the 
successful passage of the Bill through Parliament before dissolution, meant that Dalit 
groups had little option but to accept a compromise solution. Exercise of the power 
in s. 9(5)(a) was linked by the government to the outcome of independent research on 
caste discrimination which was commissioned in March 2010 and published in 
December 2010. As noted, four main objections to caste discrimination legislation 
were raised by government and other actors. Each of these is analysed in turn. 
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 HC Deb vol 508 col 942 6 Apr 2010. 
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8.4 Objections to the legal regulation of caste discrimination: lack of evidence  
8.4.1 Context: evidence and policy 
 
A key objection to proposals for the legal regulation of caste discrimination was lack 
of evidence. The arguments were (1) absence of any evidence of caste discrimination 
in the UK, (2) absence of evidence of caste discrimination in spheres regulated by 
discrimination law and (3) existence of evidence which was merely ‘anecdotal’ and 
hence insufficiently credible to justify a change in the law. These arguments were 
qualified by government assertions of willingness to consider any evidence that 
became available and to legislate, but only if there was ‘sufficient evidence of a real 
problem that can be rectified by discrimination legislation’.29  
 
8.4.1.1 ‘No evidence of a problem’  
 
In 2004 and 2005, the government stated that, while it was happy to consider any 
evidence, it had seen no evidence that there was a particular problem with 
discriminatory practices against the Dalit community
30
 or of descent-based 
discrimination.
31
 The government’s stance was to be inactive, or at best reactive. It 
was unwilling to commit resources to investigate proactively the existence of caste 
discrimination in the UK. 
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 HL Deb vol 716 col 345 11 Jan 2010. 
30
 Fiona MacTaggart, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Home Office; HC Deb vol 419 col 1602-
1603W 1Apr 2004. 
31
 CERD, concluding observations on the UK’s sixteenth and seventeenth reports; UN Doc. CERD 
A/58/18 (2003) para. 544; Fiona MacTaggart, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office, 
letter and Memorandum to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 13 January 2005, reproduced in ‘The 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Fourteenth Report of Session 2004–05’, 
Joint Committee on Human Rights; HL 88 (2005), HC 471 (2005) 42. 
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8.4.1.2 Evidence-Based Policymaking 
 
The ‘evidence’ objection was premised on the principle that policymaking should be 
‘evidence-based’ – an ideological position, central to the Labour Government’s 
political strategy,
32
 which asserted that policymaking should be driven by 
information and knowledge of ‘what works’.33 Evidence-based policymaking 
(EBPM) is underpinned by normative assumptions such as the objective nature of 
information and knowledge and the scientific and rational nature of the EBPM 
approach. As Wells observes: 
[t]he notion that policymaking should be ‘evidence-based’ rather than based on unsupported 
opinion is difficult to refute. However, it also poses a considerable number of normative 
questions, for instance, how should evidence be collected, what evidence should be used and 
how should that evidence be used?
34
  
 
Despite its claims to objectivity, says Wells, the term ‘EBPM’ is used in different 
ways in the policy and academic worlds and with ‘varying degrees of rigour’.35 
Marston and Watts also challenge its neutrality, pointing out that the idea that policy 
should be based on evidence is not new or particularly controversial, but ‘what can 
properly count as evidence in policymaking processes is contentious’. They identify 
a hierarchy of what counts as ‘valid knowledge’, with ‘lay forms of evidence’ being 
placed lower down the hierarchy.
36
 They also draw attention to formal hierarchies in 
policy communities as ‘potentially important factors in framing policy problems and 
                                                 
32
 P. Wells, ‘New Labour and Evidence-Based Policymaking: 1997-2007’, 1(1) People, Place and 
Policy Online (2007) 22-29, 23. 
33
 D. Blunkett, Speech to the ESRC, 2 February 2002, cited in Wells (ibid.), 22. 
34
 Wells, n 32 above, 23, citing W. Parsons, ‘From Muddling Through to Muddling Up – Evidence 
Based Policy Making and the Modernisation of British Government’, 17 (3) Public Policy and 
Administration (2002) 43-60. 
35
 Wells, ibid. 
36
 G. Marston and R. Watts, ‘Tampering with the Evidence: A Critical Appraisal of Evidence-Based 
Policymaking’, 3(3) The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs (2003) 143-163, 
145. 
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solutions’. Furthermore, ‘insiders’, such as senior public servants and ministerial 
advisers, have greater authority in decision-making processes than members of the 
public, while policymakers ‘make complex judgments about the sorts of institutional 
interests represented in the policymaking process’.37 The Dalits’ campaign challenged 
the assumptions underpinning EBPM by questioning what counts as evidence – 
which evidence is deemed to constitute the ‘truth’ and who is considered to be in a 
position to speak the truth or to judge what is or is not the ‘truth’? Moreover, at what 
point does evidence cease to be ‘merely anecdotal’, and how much evidence is 
necessary to establish the existence of a problem requiring policy change and 
legislative solutions? 
 
8.4.1.3 Equality Bill consultation  
 
The Equality Bill consultation process was launched in June 2007. Various Dalit 
groups submitted written representations.
38
 In July 2008, in its formal written 
response to the consultation, the government restated that it had found ‘no strong 
evidence of such discrimination in Britain, in the context of employment or the 
provision of goods, facilities or services’.39 It would, however, consult the [EHRC] 
about monitoring the position.
40
 This statement suggested that such discrimination 
might occur, but only in contexts beyond the reach of discrimination law and that the 
evidence was limited. The same document refers to the results of the government’s 
August 2007 ‘informal survey’ on caste discrimination. It asserted that there is no 
strong evidence of caste discrimination in the UK, in particular in fields regulated by 
                                                 
37
 Ibid., 146. 
38
 See, e.g. DSN-UK, Submission to the Equalities Review (London: DSN-UK, 2006); DSN-UK, 
Submission to the Discrimination Law Review 2007 (London: DSN-UK, 2007). 
39
 Cm 7454 (2008), n 16 above, 177 (emphasis added). 
40
 Ibid. 
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discrimination law, and to the extent that caste was a factor in individual decision-
making, anecdotal evidence suggesting that this was a reflection of social or cultural 
considerations, e.g. choice of marriage partner – which is not a matter for 
discrimination law.
41
 This was a shift from the flat denials of 2003 and 2004, to an 
acknowledgment that caste discrimination might exist, but only in non-regulated 
fields, and in any case the evidence was weak. This position was elaborated as the 
Bill progressed through Parliament. 
 
8.4.2 Commons Committee Stage 
 
At Commons Committee sixth sitting,
42
 Lynne Featherstone MP (Lib Dem) – later to 
become Equalities Minister in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government which came to power in May 2010 – moved Amendment 111 to outlaw 
discrimination based on a person’s caste by adding caste as a new protected 
characteristic to the list of characteristics in what became EQA s. 4.
43
 She challenged 
the government’s claim that it had found no evidence of caste discrimination, arguing 
that absence of evidence did not necessarily mean absence of discrimination. The 
Bill, she said, had been evolved largely on the basis of engagement with established 
lobby groups, which might not include those who experience caste discrimination. 
She asked what efforts had been made to seek evidence of such discrimination.
44
 If 
the government were not persuaded of the existence of discrimination, she argued for 
                                                 
41
 Ibid., 183-184. 
42
 Commons Committee Stage ran over twenty sittings between 2 June and 7 July 2009. Committee 
Stage involves line-by-line scrutiny by a Bill Committee (a smaller group of MPs), following which 
government may decide to introduce amendments at Report stage. See 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmpublic/cmpbequality.htm for Equality Bill 
Committee, including debates and Bill Committee members (visited 6 February 2013). 
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 HC Equality Bill Committee Deb col 176 11 Jun 2009; amendment at  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmbills/085/amend/pbc0851106m.91-97.html 
(visited 6 February 2013). 
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 Lynne Featherstone; HC Equality Bill Committee Deb col 177 11 Jun 2009. 
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the inclusion of an enabling clause to ‘protect against a future where we discover the 
evidence’, ‘rather than miss the opportunity of a generation to outlaw a potential 
form of discrimination that flies in the face of everything that the Bill tries to do’.45 
The government’s response was dismissive. According to Vera Baird QC, Solicitor-
General, it was not ‘a claim’ but ‘the fact’ that there was no evidence of caste 
discrimination occurring in any regulated fields. Baird maintained that, while 
government was ‘always willing to consider whether there is a case for legislating on 
caste discrimination’, there was insufficient evidence to suggest ‘that caste 
discrimination is a significant problem domestically’ or to justify protecting against 
such discrimination: 
[A]part from the odd piece of anecdotal evidence, none of which we have been able to drive 
down to a factual basis [there is] still no evidence... that the territory which can be covered by 
anti-discrimination legislation is impacted upon by caste at all.
46
   
 
She further stated that government would have been very willing to carry on from its 
August 2007 ‘scoping survey’ to a ‘real investigation if there was the evidence to 
justify such a step’. Officials from the CLG and the Government Equalities Office 
(GEO) (the Department sponsoring the Bill) were continuing to monitor the situation 
and to meet representatives of interested parties. She added: ‘[T]he concern was 
rightly raised, but I hope that it has now been put to rest’.47 On assurance that 
government was actively monitoring the situation, Amendment 111 was withdrawn. 
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 Ibid. See also Mark Harper, ibid., col 178. 
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 Vera Baird, ibid., col 178. 
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 Ibid., col 179 (emphasis added). 
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8.4.3 ACDA Report: November 2009 
 
In November 2009, ACDA published Hidden Apartheid – Voice of the Community, 
described as a scoping study and based on research conducted between August and 
October 2009.
48
 On the question whether caste discrimination occurred in the UK in 
fields covered by discrimination law, 58% of respondents (71% of whom self-
identified as Dalits) claimed to have experienced it in a regulated field; 37% stated 
that this had occurred on several occasions.
49
 85% believed there was no legislation 
in place to protect victims of caste discrimination, while 28% said that as children 
(defined as under twelve years of age) they had been subjected to verbal abuse or 
threatening behaviour based on caste. The study received national and international 
publicity,
50
 but the government dismissed the evidence as anecdotal and 
insufficiently credible to justify amending the Bill to add caste as a protected 
characteristic.
51
  
 
8.4.4 Commons Report Stage and Third Reading 
8.4.4.1 Commons Report Stage 
By the time the Bill reached Commons Report stage,
52
 three new amendments on 
caste had been tabled.
53
 Two added it as a new characteristic to the list of protected 
characteristics, both of which included a definition of ‘persons having the protected 
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(visited 30 September 2012). 
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characteristic of caste’.54 The lengthier of these, moved by Jeremy Corbyn MP (Lab) 
and Rob Marris MP (Lab) and drafted by the author, was the first attempt to define 
caste for legislative purposes in the UK. Sub-clause (1) defined caste as including 
jati and biraderi (the draft commenced with varna but this was dropped as 
unnecessarily complex by the MPs moving the amendment) and a person having the 
protected characteristic of caste as a ‘member of a caste group found within a 
hierarchical group-based system of social stratification, where both membership and 
group and individual status are hereditary, ascribed and permanent’.55 The third 
amendment was an ‘enabling’ provision for the characteristic of caste to be added to 
the legislation by ministerial order at a future date as a new protected characteristic.
56
 
The common feature of these amendments was the formulation of caste as a separate 
protected characteristic. It was government’s rejection of this approach which 
resulted, ultimately, in the subsuming of caste within the protected characteristic of 
race, as this chapter shows later. 
 
Mark Harper (Con) was sceptical of the number of victims of caste discrimination 
cited by ACDA and queried whether their research was ‘robust’ enough to justify 
their claims.
57
 Dr. Harris (Lib Dem) said that it was unsurprising that the government 
had found no problem with caste discrimination, because they only consulted 
nineteen organisations in August 2007, ‘a figure that is narrow by anyone’s terms, 
                                                 
54
 The shorter amendment read as follows: ‘In relation to the protected characteristic of caste (a) a 
reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a person of a 
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[and] all of which were organisations that condone the caste system’.58 The need for 
evidence was challenged by Marris. Caste-based discrimination was wrong, and ‘if 
we recognise it as such, we should legislate; we should not wait for the evidence’. He 
called for caste discrimination to ‘form a tenth strand under the Bill’59 and asked 
government to confirm that, if research demonstrated a problem of such 
discrimination in the UK, it would introduce legislation promptly.
60
   
 
8.4.4.2 Commons Third Reading 
 
Moving the Bill for Third Reading on 2 December 2009, the Solicitor-General 
unexpectedly announced that caste discrimination could be banned, if there was 
need, ‘through measures in the other place’ if the research commissioned by 
government from the Equality and Human Rights Commission could be ‘completed 
quickly’.61 The announcement that research had been commissioned from the EHRC 
was surprising given, first, the government’s insistence that there was no evidence to 
justify expanding its 2007 ‘scoping survey’ into a ‘real investigation’ and second, the 
lack of EHRC engagement hitherto in the growing public debate on the legal 
regulation of caste discrimination. 
 
8.4.5 Enter the Equality and Human Rights Commission  
 
In August 2009, a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by ACDA 
had revealed that, as at that date, no research had been carried out by government on 
                                                 
58
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the issue of caste discrimination since the 2007 ‘scoping survey’.62 Following the 
Solicitor-General’s announcement, a further FOIA request asked the EHRC for 
details of the research she referred to and of any other research on caste 
commissioned by the Solicitor-General or any other government department in the 
past five years.
63
 The EHRC responded thus:  
The Commission has not been commissioned to carry out any research on caste and 
discrimination in the UK by the Solicitor-General or any Government Department in the last 
five years. The Commission is not currently undertaking work on this issue and is not 
currently proposing to undertake research on this issue in future. Consequently, we do not 
have a scope nor response time for such a research [ ]. 
64
 
 
The EHRC further stated that it understood caste discrimination to be discrimination 
based on descent, occurring in African communities as well as in the Hindu 
community, and that there was limited evidence as to its effects on equality of 
opportunity.65 Like the former Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), the EHRC 
was reluctant to consider caste discrimination as a domestic issue.
66
 Its position was 
contradictory. It believed there to be limited evidence of caste discrimination in 
regulated fields (despite by its own admission having carried out no research in the 
area) and it further believed that caste discrimination was already covered as a form 
of descent-based discrimination by existing law on race and religious discrimination. 
Nonetheless, it opposed a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination to reflect this 
                                                 
62
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position, because of unspecified ‘unintended impacts’ on unspecified ‘other 
groups’.67  
 
8.4.6 Lords Second Reading 
 
At Lords Second Reading,
68
 Baroness Flather (Lib Dem) argued that caste 
discrimination ‘blights people’s lives in the UK in the same way as all other 
discrimination’ and called for the Bill to tackle caste discrimination and ‘find a way 
to root out this dreadful practice in this country’.69 The Right Reverend the Lord 
Harries of Pentregarth (former Bishop of Oxford) (Lib Dem) added that 
discrimination against transgender and transsexual people had been prohibited on the 
basis of no more compelling evidence.
70
 The government reiterated that much of the 
ACDA study relied on ‘anecdotal evidence’, so further work was needed to test the 
study’s assertions.71 
 
8.4.7 Lords Committee Stage 
 
Prior to Lords Committee Stage,
72
 ACDA devoted considerable effort to briefing 
those peers willing to table, or support, amendments bringing caste discrimination 
into the Bill. Seven amendments were submitted by Lords Avebury and Harries and 
the Earl of Sandwich, to be moved in Committee.
73
 Amendment 5 sought to add 
caste to the list of protected characteristics in clause 4. Amendment 17 – in similar 
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terms to the amendment tabled at Commons Report stage by Marris and Corbyn – 
sought to define caste as a new protected characteristic, but minus the references to 
jati and biraderi, which were considered unnecessarily legalistic.
74
 Amendment 18 
provided an enabling clause to be inserted allowing caste to be added to the list of 
protected characteristics in the future, by ministerial order.
75
 Other amendments 
sought to include caste as a relevant protected characteristic for combined 
discrimination claims, indirect discrimination claims, to prohibit direct and indirect 
discrimination based on caste and to prohibit harassment based on caste.  
 
8.4.7.1 Lord Lester’s amendment: ‘descent’ as an additional limb of ‘race’ 
 
In a significant development, an amendment was tabled by the Liberal Democrat 
human rights lawyer Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC (Amendment 16) which, instead 
of formulating caste as a new protected characteristic, sought to add descent to the 
definition of the protected characteristic of race in clause 9, so that the under the 
rubric of race the Bill would prohibit unlawful discrimination, harassment and 
victimisation based on descent as well as colour, nationality and ethnic or national 
origin.
76
 The subsuming of descent within race represented a departure from the 
amendments seeking to add caste as a new protected characteristic and opened the 
way for the formulation which was eventually adopted, which provides for caste to 
be ‘an aspect of’ race. 
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8.4.7.2 Lords Committee Stage: day one 
 
On the first day of Lords Committee stage
77
 a Joint Statement, signed by fourteen 
groups and organisations working with or representing Dalits, was submitted to the 
government calling on it to provide protection for victims and future victims of caste 
discrimination in the UK.
78
 An extensive debate on caste took place, focussing 
particularly on the lack of evidence argument.
79
 Lord Avebury, following the 
Solicitor-General’s reference to government consultation with the Hindu Forum of 
Britain (HFB) and the Hindu Council UK (HCUK), argued that these organisations 
‘[did] not speak for the lower castes and the Dalits’. The government had 
commissioned no research of its own at all.
80
 It eventually became apparent that, 
contrary to the Solicitor-General’s statement, no research had yet been 
commissioned, although the government stated its intention to do so.
81
 The 
government reiterated that it was not against legislating, but would not do so 
‘without sufficient evidence of a real problem that can be rectified by discrimination 
legislation’.82 Lord Lester challenged the preoccupation with research, arguing that 
even if there was just one case of caste discrimination, it should be unlawful because 
it was wrong in principle: ‘All we have to do… is to make clear [in the Bill] that 
discrimination based on your ethnic descent is included, which covers a great deal of 
what we call caste discrimination.’83 Why, he asked, was research needed ‘into the 
scientific extent of the problem when all we are talking about is one or two words in 
the Bill?’84 Baroness Thornton responded that Lord Lester was ‘too much of an 
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78
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experienced lawyer to say that one or two words in a Bill are insignificant. These 
words are very significant’.85 Lord Avebury lamented that time had been wasted86 
but nevertheless he was prepared to give the government ‘the benefit of good faith’ 
because he believed they were ‘moving in the right direction’, and he therefore 
withdrew his amendment (amendment 5).
87
 The other amendments on caste – 
including Lord Lester’s – were not moved. 
 
8.5 Objections to the legal regulation of caste discrimination: caste covered by 
existing law 
8.5.1 Government: caste discrimination already unlawful 
 
At Commons Second Reading, Harriet Harman MP (Lab) (Leader of the House and 
Minister for Women and Equality) was asked whether it was possible that, under the 
Bill, ‘discrimination by caste and descent would be absolutely illegal’.88 The minister 
thought that such discrimination was already ‘outwith the law’89 – although she did 
not explain how. This was questioned by Patricia Hewitt MP (Lab), who pointed out 
that existing UK law is not as explicit as Australian law, which defines racial 
discrimination in identical terms to ICERD.
90
 She cited the belief of Caste Watch UK 
‘that current law does not adequately protect those in South Asian, or indeed, other 
communities who find themselves discriminated against on those grounds’.91  
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8.5.2 ICERD, caste and UK discrimination law 
8.5.2.1 Lord Lester and descent  
 
During Second Reading in the Lords on 15 December 2009, Lord Lester raised the 
possibility of addressing caste discrimination by reference to ICERD, arguing that 
race should be ‘interpreted and applied in accordance with ICERD, by which the UK 
is internationally bound’.92 Lord Wallace of Tankerness pointed out that if the 
definition of race in the Bill could include descent, ‘then possibly [ICERD] might 
cover the question of discrimination by caste’.93 On 16 December 2009, the JFS 
judgment examined descent in the context of racial discrimination, opening the door 
to arguments that caste is subsumed within ethnic origins in UK discrimination law 
by virtue of the descent aspect of ‘ethnic’.94 By the time the Bill reached Lords 
Committee stage, Lord Lester had tabled his amendment adding descent to the 
definition of race in the Bill,
95
 stating ‘I believe that there is a problem [with 
transnational caste discrimination that applies in this country as well as elsewhere] 
and that it needs to be covered by a measure dealing with racial discrimination’.96 
Explaining the omission of descent in 1976 from the RRA definition of racial 
grounds, Lord Lester stated that the RRA drafters had regard to the definition in 
ICERD, which he described as the source of the phrase ‘colour, race or ethnic or 
national origins’ (with nationality being added later). Descent was not included but it 
was ‘perfectly plain’ that ‘ethnic descent was included within the concept of 
ethnicity because the concept of ethnicity is about your birthright, where you have 
come from and who your parents and grandparents were’, i.e. ‘what your origins 
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were and what your descent was’.97 Although the inclusion of descent in the RRA as 
a separate category was deemed unnecessary at the time, now, however, Lord Lester 
asked the government to clarify whether and to what extent it considered caste 
discrimination ‘capable of falling within the concept of race as it stands’.98 Calling 
up the principle of the presumption of compatibility – whereby legislation which 
postdates the ratification of an unincorporated Treaty, where the meaning is 
ambiguous (i.e. capable of a meaning which either conforms or conflicts with the 
Treaty obligation), should be construed consistently with the Treaty if it is 
reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning
99
 – he argued that if the question was 
to be litigated, English courts would necessarily have to have regard to ICERD and 
the descent category ‘because we are bound by that Convention and by an obligation 
to give effect in domestic law to the definition in the Convention’, in which case 
‘why not make it clear in the Bill, either by including the word “caste” or “descent” 
so that we do not have to have litigation up to the Supreme Court to decide a fairly 
obvious question?’.100 He argued that if caste is covered by ICERD through descent, 
if the UK is bound by ICERD and if ICERD must be taken into account by UK 
courts in interpreting domestic law, the government should make a Pepper v Hart 
statement
101
 to the effect that descent and (through descent) caste are subsumed 
within the ethnic origins aspect of race, in which case ‘there should be no problem’ 
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in embodying this understanding in statutory language and accepting either his own 
or Lord Avebury’s amendment.102 
 
8.5.2.2 Government reluctance to entertain new categories 
 
The government’s view was that ‘current discrimination law may already cover some 
aspects of caste discrimination where it can be shown that the active discrimination 
was grounded in race or religious discrimination’ and that ‘some victims of caste 
discrimination may already be able to seek redress under existing laws’ – although 
‘the extent to which caste-related issues are covered by existing laws has not been 
tested in the courts’.103 The argument was not entirely clear, but the government 
appeared to be saying that some cases of caste discrimination might be actionable 
under existing law, if subsumed by race or religious discrimination but not if based 
on caste as a sui generis ground of discrimination. This mirrored its position in 2004 
that ‘caste-based discrimination would be unlawful under current legislation if it 
could also be argued that the discrimination was also based on colour, race, 
nationality or ethnic or national origin’.104  
 
8.5.2.3 EHRC: support for descent but opposition to caste 
 
By early January 2010, the EHRC’s position was that caste discrimination was 
discrimination based on descent, which it believed was already covered by existing 
international, European and UK law on race and religious discrimination. As 
explained above, for reasons which were not clear, the EHRC considered that 
including a specific prohibition of caste discrimination ‘may have unintended 
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impacts on other groups’ (although it was not clear which groups the EHRC had in 
mind).
105
 In its Lords Committee Stage Briefing the EHRC expressed its support for 
the amendment to include descent in the definition of race but its opposition to an 
express prohibition of caste discrimination, on the grounds that it considered 
‘existing provisions [in the Bill] related to discrimination on the basis of religion or 
belief are sufficient to prohibit caste discrimination’.106 The EHRC gave two reasons 
for supporting a descent amendment but not a caste amendment. First, it argued that 
caste discrimination was a form of descent-based discrimination as prohibited by 
ICERD, to which the UK is a signatory, and that – following JFS – descent fell under 
the definition of race in existing UK law within the ambit of ‘ethnic’ (although the 
point in JFS was obiter only); while descent was not expressly included in the 
definition of race in the Bill, race must be interpreted so as to prohibit discrimination 
based on descent. Descent was ‘also more consistent with international human rights 
law and jurisprudence’. Second, like the government, it argued that descent included 
caste but was also ‘broader, neutral and sufficiently flexible’ to include other 
(unspecified) ‘new and emerging characteristics on which discrimination may be 
based’. However, unlike the government, the EHRC saw this as an advantage, not a 
disadvantage.
107
  
 
8.5.2.4 Race, caste and the Equality Act 2010 
 
ICERD prohibits racial discrimination, defined as discrimination based on race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. RRA 1976 prohibited discrimination on 
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racial grounds, defined as discrimination based on race, colour, nationality or 
national or ethnic origin (but not descent). In both cases race is a subset of a wider 
umbrella category. In the case of the EQA, the chapeau is race, and s. 9(5)(a) 
provides for caste to be an aspect (i.e. a subset) of race. The EHRC’s argument that 
ICERD prohibited caste discrimination as a form of descent discrimination was 
correct insofar as CERD has interpreted descent to include caste, but ICERD 
contains no express reference to caste and no express prohibition of caste-based 
discrimination. Under ICERD, descent is not a sub-category of race; instead, both 
descent and race are sub-categories of racial discrimination. Moreover, it is within 
the sub-category of descent rather than the sub-category of race (or ethnic origin) that 
CERD has addressed caste. Therefore, the EHRC’s argument that under international 
law caste discrimination ‘is descent-based discrimination which falls under the 
definition of “race”’ was technically incorrect.  
 
Although it was clear to the present author and others at the time that international 
human rights law regarded caste-based discrimination as a form of racial 
discrimination based on descent (rather than race), given the government’s position 
and the time constraints, the pragmatic approach, expressed by certain 
parliamentarians, to obtaining an enabling provision on caste in the Bill was to 
accept the path of least resistance and to agree for caste to be subsumed as a subset of 
race, without entering into the international controversy and theoretical arguments 
about whether caste was or was not a form of racial discrimination as treated by 
CERD.   
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8.5.3 Leaving the matter to the courts 
 
The logical consequence of the argument that caste was theoretically already covered 
by existing discrimination law was that a test case was required to establish the 
principle in the courts and thereby its practical deterrent effect. The first, and most 
high-profile, UK case involving caste discrimination allegations, Begraj and Begraj 
v Heer Manak Solicitors and others, came before the Employment Tribunal in 
August 2011. On 5 February 2013 the case collapsed after the judge recused herself. 
The case is discussed in Chapter 9. Reasons for the lack of cases alleging caste 
discrimination hitherto may include (1) lack of understanding of caste (cited by a 
trade union official involved in an unfair dismissal case in south London involving 
such allegations; the case was resolved internally)
108
 or (2) the absence of express 
provisions, which deters complainants from coming forward and advisors from 
taking on cases, as there are no obvious grounds on which to base a claim; instead, 
claimants may seek to bring cases on other grounds such as religious discrimination, 
as occurred in the Saini and Sahota cases discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. This is 
a weakness of the individual rights model of legislation, where it is left to individuals 
deprived of their rights to enforce the law.  
 
The difficulty in testing allegations of caste discrimination in the courts, ‘if there is 
no basis on which to do so’, was raised at Commons Report stage,109 while at Lords 
Committee stage the absence of a ‘clear remedy in law’ was suggested as one reason 
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why caste discrimination cases had not been brought to the attention of the ‘proper 
authorities’.110 Robin Allen QC argued that it would be unlikely for a caste 
discrimination case to be defended on the basis that caste-based distinctions were 
lawful and were outside existing law on race and religious discrimination.
111
 
Advisors ‘should be confident in characterising [caste discrimination] as merely (sic) 
a specific form of race and religious discrimination’, he suggested.112 Yet, as Lord 
Avebury pointed out, ‘since there is no specific mention of caste in our law, it would 
be a chancy and expensive business for anybody to try this out in the courts’:113   
If we leave it to a marginalised people to come forward with legal cases that will establish 
their right to protection, that is not a policy that should be accepted by a Parliament that has 
always stood up for human rights.
114
 
 
While the Dalit organisations supported the idea of a test case to establish the 
application of existing law to caste discrimination, their primary demand was for 
caste to be included in legislation as a new protected characteristic.  
 
8.6    Objections to the legal regulation of caste discrimination: proliferation 
8.6.1 ‘Rationing’ protection 
 
Grounds-based approaches to discrimination involve rationing protection from 
discrimination to members of groups defined along grounds-related lines.
115
 As 
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Chapter 7 explained, the grounds-based approach is vulnerable to calls to expand the 
‘protectorate’ (those protected by reason of possessing a protected characteristic) by 
adding more characteristics or by making the list non-exhaustive, as well as to calls 
for expansive interpretation of the existing list.
116
 In the UK, for example, prior to 
2003, sex and race discrimination legislation ‘came under pressure to accommodate’ 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and on religion – characteristics not 
protected at that time.
117
 As McColgan points out, ‘the categories to which things, or 
people, are assigned for the purposes of social or, indeed, legal organisation’ are not 
‘preordained’.118  
 
8.6.2 Caste as a new protected characteristic 
 
One explanation for legislative and judicial reluctance to admit claims based on 
‘new’ grounds is that this will lead to the ‘proliferation of the protectorate’119 – the 
creation of ever more classes of protected groups ‘governed only by the 
mathematical principles of permutation and combination’.120 Proliferation was raised 
several times during the Bill’s passage through Parliament. At Commons Committee 
stage, Featherstone made the case for including caste as a new protected 
characteristic on introducing her Amendment to outlaw discrimination based on a 
person’s caste: 
My understanding is that the caste system makes distinctions between different sections of 
society by dividing communities into rigid social groups determined by birth and/or 
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occupation. That type of behaviour is exactly what the Bill... seeks to outlaw, so we ought to 
give serious consideration to whether caste-based discrimination should be specifically 
outlawed by making caste a protected characteristic.
121 
The Solicitor-General retorted that the Amendment invited her to add caste to the list 
of characteristics ‘speculatively’, but she did not propose ‘to accede to that 
invitation’.122  
The case for adding caste was always going to be compounded by a lack of 
understanding, outside the sub-continent, of caste both as an ideological construct 
and as a sui generis ground of discrimination. Mark Harper MP (Con) implied that 
caste was a newly – gratuitously – invented characteristic: 
Part of the point of the Bill is to codify and simplify the law. If we go through the population, 
pick out lots of different groups and invent a new protected characteristic for every single 
one of them, there is a danger that we will make the whole thing very complex.
123
  
He suggested that if evidence became available, caste could be subsumed within 
race, rather than create ‘yet another protected characteristic’. 124 
 
At Commons Report stage, the proliferation argument resurfaced. As explained 
above, three amendments tabled at Report all sought to add caste as a new, separate 
and protected characteristic.
125
 Harper’s comments illustrate the difficulty for many 
of the very concept of caste and discrimination based on caste and the inclination to 
seek to equate it with a more familiar characteristic rather than treating it as a 
hitherto unacknowledged ground of discrimination. Harper observed that ‘some had 
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proposed a new protected characteristic and some propose adding caste 
discrimination to the race discrimination provisions’, before adding that it would 
help ‘if they explained what other type of discrimination caste discrimination is most 
akin to’. One of the central purposes of the Bill, he argued, was to bring together a 
number of strands of discrimination and simplify legislation on them so that it could 
be enforced more effectively in practice. There may be a good case for including 
caste as a protected characteristic, but there may also be a case for including a lot of 
other things. If there was a very large list of protected characteristics, this area of law 
would become ever more complex.
126
   
 
8.6.3 New characteristic, new subset, or neither 
 
At Lords Committee Stage, amendments were tabled by Lords Avebury and Harries, 
to add caste as a new protected characteristic, and by Lord Lester, to add descent to 
race.
127
 During the debate on caste as a new characteristic, Lord Mackay of Clashfern 
reminded the House that the intention of the legislation was to simplify and 
consolidate equality law and that any decision to extend the list of protected 
characteristics must be taken seriously. If there was a good case for caste and 
descent, they should be taken into consideration, but the list could not be extended 
indefinitely and other characteristics might also have a good case.
128
 
 
8.6.3.1 Government objections to expanding the protected characteristics 
 
The government objected to Lord Lester’s descent amendment because it would add 
a new ground to the list. Moreover, through interpretation, descent could cover 
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characteristics not hitherto considered for protection. It could ‘amount to a 
significant addition to the strand-based structure of equality law and, moreover, 
introduce social or class-based elements directly into protected characteristics’ and 
therefore ‘may be an unacceptably high-risk way of dealing with the issue without 
proper examination of all its implications’.129 The government also opposed the 
inclusion of caste as a new characteristic on the grounds that ‘many people may not 
even know what caste means or have a different understanding of it as a concept’: 
As anyone who is aware of the nature of caste will say, certain unique aspects of it mean that 
it is not simply a case of adding “caste” to a list of protected characteristics and anyone 
instantly knowing what it means.
130
 
Dismissing the wording of Amendment 17 (drafted by the author),
131
 Baroness 
Thornton argued that ‘the definition of caste requires great thought to ensure that it is 
correct and that the coverage is appropriate if we decided that caste should be a 
protected characteristic under discrimination legislation’. In particular, she objected 
to the description of caste status as permanent, arguing that ‘for a woman, it can 
change on marriage to someone of a different caste. The amendment would not cover 
such people’.132 This argument – that ‘caste is somehow more fluid than other 
protected categories’ – was dismissed as ‘specious’ by Cambridge academic 
Priyamvada Gopal: ‘Race is not a biologically fixed category either, but likewise a 
historically constructed and shaped construct’, yet it is ‘rightly seen as a category to 
be protected from discrimination’. Caste as a category, argued Gopal, is not 
‘somehow less recognisable’ because a woman’s caste can (sometimes) change upon 
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marriage.
133
 The minister argued that there was insufficient time to arrive at what, to 
government, would be a suitable definition of caste as a new characteristic. For these 
reasons she was also opposed to committing (via an enabling power) to add caste as a 
new, separate and protected characteristic in the future.134 
 
8.6.3.2 The solution: subset rather than new characteristic 
 
The idea of incorporating caste as a subset of another characteristic, rather than as a 
new protected ground, appears to have taken root following the debate at Lords 
Committee stage on 11 January 2010.
135
 At the meeting of 4 February 2010, although 
the inclusion of caste as an independent characteristic was raised, debate coalesced 
around the formulation of descent (or caste) as a sub-category of race, a formulation 
which appeared to be attractive to the government and to some of the 
parliamentarians present. This was the approach adopted in the amendment tabled by 
Lord Avebury at Lords Report Stage. By the time the Commons came to consider the 
Lords’ amendments, the government appeared to have abandoned any idea of adding 
caste as a new, protected ground – rather than ‘inventing a new protected 
characteristic’, categorisation of caste as a subset of another characteristic, and 
persons having the protected characteristic of caste as a ‘subset of persons’, was 
established as the acceptable solution, while race had emerged as the only viable 
‘legal home’ for caste. 136   
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8.7 Meeting on Caste and the Equality Bill, House of Lords: 4 February 2010 
8.7.1 Background 
 
On 4 February 2010, a ‘remarkable’ meeting on caste and the Equality Bill took 
place in the House of Lords.
137
 This meeting, described by Lord Lester as recalling 
the early days of race relations legislation for its sense of passion and momentum,
138
 
marked a turning point in the government’s approach to the legal regulation of caste 
discrimination. It was called by Baroness Thornton, the Labour Minister steering the 
Bill through the Lords, who had been persuaded to listen to the views of Dalit 
organisations on caste discrimination legislation after reading documents (including 
an article by the present author) given to her by Lord Avebury.
139
 The meeting was 
attended by representatives from sixteen organisations working with or representing 
Dalits in the UK;
140
 Lord Avebury; Lord Lester QC; Lord Harries; Baroness 
Northover (Liberal Democrat); Rodney Bickerstaffe (General Secretary of the trade 
union UNISON); two of the academics who had collaborated with ACDA on Voice 
of the Community, including the present author; officials from the GEO; 
representatives from the Bill drafting team and individual victims of caste 
discrimination. The purpose of the meeting was for the government to hear direct 
testimony from individual victims and organisations dealing with caste 
discrimination, to hear arguments as to the inadequacy of existing law for caste 
discrimination and, if appropriate, to consider what form a provision in the Bill on 
caste discrimination might take. 
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8.7.2 The research conundrum  
 
During the meeting the Dalit organisations questioned the need for further research. 
How much discrimination did victims need to demonstrate, they asked, in order to 
persuade the government that a legislative solution was required? The 
parliamentarians pointed out that no research was carried out before the 1965, 1968 
and 1976 race discrimination legislation, nor indeed before the Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000, and that it would be completely unacceptable if research 
was used as an excuse for a delay in acting. The government stated that it intended to 
commission ‘robust research’ to examine the nature and extent of caste 
discrimination in the UK in legally-regulated fields, to assess what public policy and 
legislation was already in place and, in the light of this information, to assess the 
implications for government policy of any mismatch between existing 
discrimination, policy and legislation, including identifying the necessary 
government response. Government representatives explained that the context of the 
Bill was a commitment that it should be evidence-based. The Commons debate on 
caste had been concerned with the lack of an evidence base, but an evidence base had 
been emerging, such that the government now accepted that a more substantial issue 
existed. It was unfortunate, given the stage of the Bill and the forthcoming General 
Election and dissolution of Parliament, that ACDA’s report had not been available in 
2008, because the government research necessary to inform its response would not 
be available until after the election. Nevertheless, the government representatives 
assured the meeting that caste discrimination was ‘an issue whose time had come’, 
that those at the meeting were ‘pushing at an open door’, that government was 
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convinced by what it was hearing and that its response was a matter of ‘how’ not 
‘whether’, and ‘when’ not ‘if’.141  
 
8.7.3 Wording the provision 
 
Regarding the form a provision on caste discrimination might take, the options of 
caste or descent as a new category, alternatively as a subset of race, were discussed. 
The author explained that under international law, descent was a wider legal category 
which included but was not limited to caste. Concern was then expressed that descent 
might be too inclusive a category and therefore caste would be preferable. 
Arguments were also made by some of those present that, technically, caste could be 
put under the definition of race, which already had multiple components, and that it 
would be consonant with the definition of race to include caste (or descent) as an 
expansion or a component thereof.
142
  
 
8.7.4 Dalits faced with a compromise 
The goal of the Dalit organisations was an immediate and express prohibition of 
caste discrimination in the Bill. Against this backdrop, government representatives 
and parliamentarians emphasised the time constraints and the need to get the Bill 
through Parliament to avoid it going into ‘wash-up’.143 The GEO representatives 
explained that it would be very difficult for government to table its own amendment 
at Lords Report stage in the time available, as the agreement of all the other 
ministries and departments would have to be sought. The alternative was for peers to 
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table an amendment which was acceptable to – and therefore would not be opposed 
by – government. Given the overriding need to get the Bill through Parliament before 
the election, the question was what provision could be put into the Bill that (a) would 
not jeopardise the Bill’s progress and (b) would be compatible with the findings of 
the putative research? The government’s preferred solution was to include an 
enabling power allowing descent or caste to be added to the legislation at a later date 
by ministerial order, as a component of race, on completion of the research. The 
Dalit organisations were asked whether they would accept an amendment along these 
lines. It was suggested that this would be similar to s. 81(1) Equality Act 2006 which 
conferred a ministerial power to make regulations about discrimination or 
harassment based on sexual orientation once the legislation came into force.
144
 It 
would be an acknowledgment that the Bill as currently drafted did not adequately 
cover caste, and, if the research indicated that there was a problem, the new 
government would, so it was implied, have no choice but to trigger the power. The 
inclusion of an enabling power was recommended to the Dalit groups by the 
government representatives and parliamentarians as the best they could expect, given 
the timing.
145
  
 
8.7.5 The twin-track approach 
 
The organisations expressed concern about whether the power would actually be 
triggered if there was a change of government, so they were reluctant to sacrifice an 
amendment adding caste (or descent) directly to the Bill. A ‘twin-track’ approach 
was therefore mooted, whereby government would pursue both speedy consultation 
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with ministries and departments regarding two government amendments – one to add 
caste to the Bill as a protected characteristic and the other to include a power to add 
caste by ministerial order at a future date. There was unanimity on the adoption of 
the twin-track approach. Immediately, however, the government representatives 
stressed that no guarantees could be given. If it was decided to include a power in the 
Bill to introduce caste at a later stage once the legislation was enacted, the necessary 
legislation would have to be prepared and issues such as the possible additional 
burdens on employers and the private sector would have to be addressed. Therefore, 
government ‘could not be specific about its response at Report stage’. In the event, 
the twin-track approach was dropped and government did not table its own 
amendment, instead ‘accepting’ (i.e. not opposing) the amendment at Lords Report 
stage providing a ministerial power to add caste as an aspect of race at a future date. 
 
8.8 Finalising the Equality Act  
8.8.1 Lords Report Stage and Third Reading 
 
At Lords Report Stage on 2 March 2010, Lord Avebury moved Amendment 10, 
which provided for the definition of race in clause 9 of the Bill to be amended by 
ministerial order so as to provide for caste to be ‘an aspect of race’:   
(5) A Minister of the Crown may by order  
(a) amend this section [section 9] so as to provide for caste to be an aspect of race;  
(b) amend this Act so as to provide for an exception to a provision of this Act to apply, or not 
to apply, to caste or to apply, or not to apply, to caste in specified circumstances.  
(6)The power under section 205(4)(b), in its application to subsection (5), includes power to 
amend this Act.
146
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The formulation ‘as an aspect of’ was suggested by the GEO.147 Amendment 10 was 
accepted by the government as a ‘proportionate approach’ which would allow it ‘to 
act in an appropriate way in response to the research evidence and any subsequent 
public consultation’.148 The government would consider whether exercising the 
power was a proportionate response, if and when the research showed evidence of 
caste discrimination in Great Britain.
149
 The amendment was a disappointment to the 
Dalit organisations, who believed that the ACDA study contained ample evidence of 
a problem requiring a legislative solution and who wanted an amendment introducing 
an immediate and express prohibition of caste discrimination, with caste as a new 
protected characteristic. Lord Avebury described the amendment as an ‘intermediate 
solution’ whilst remaining optimistic that it would soon be ‘conclusively proved that 
caste discrimination occurs in the fields covered by the Bill’.150 Final amendments 
were made to the Bill during the Third Reading in the Lords on 23 March 2010, 
whereupon the Bill was passed and returned to the Commons. Before that, however, 
the government announced at Report Stage that it had commissioned the National 
Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) to conduct research on the 
nature, extent and severity of caste prejudice and discrimination in Britain and its 
associated implications for future government policy.
151
 The research would be 
‘wide-ranging’ and ‘go beyond the relatively narrow area covered by discrimination 
law to examine caste-based prejudice and discrimination more broadly’.152 The 
outcome would come too late for inclusion in the Bill of a specific provision 
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prohibiting caste discrimination; however, Baroness Thornton reiterated that 
legislating immediately was not the only option – on the contrary, the government 
was unwilling to legislate unless evidence of caste discrimination was produced. In 
this way government’s own delay in commissioning research provided a justification 
for not legislating immediately against caste discrimination. 
 
8.8.2 Consideration of Lords Amendments and Royal Assent 
 
Commons consideration of Lords amendments took place on 6 April 2010. The 
‘caste amendment’ – now Lords Amendment 1 – was agreed by the House as s. 
9(5)(a) of the new legislation. The Solicitor-General defended the government’s 
handling of caste discrimination on the grounds that the ACDA report contained only 
a ‘small amount of mainly anecdotal evidence’, largely about discrimination in 
relation to personal or social situations outside the scope of discrimination law.
153
 If 
the NIESR found evidence of caste discrimination, she said, it would be disclosed 
and discussed with all the stakeholders who had brought the issue to government’s 
attention. She described Amendment 1 as ‘a precautionary measure... because we do 
not yet know what the research will show’.154 It was suggested that whoever formed 
a government after the election should look very clearly at the evidence and make a 
decision ‘depending on whether there is evidence of harm’.155 Two days later, on 8 
April 2010, the Bill received Royal Assent.  
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8.9 Political and ideological objections to the legal regulation of caste 
discrimination 
During the passage of the Bill through Parliament, calls to prohibit caste 
discrimination evoked a number of ideological, political and policy objections on the 
part of government, parliamentarians and other actors, including Hindu 
organisations. These objections are identified and briefly explored in this section.  
 
8.9.1 The arguments outlined 
 
Government and parliamentarians argued that legislation would be damaging to 
community cohesion, that it was not government’s role to interfere with religious or 
cultural practices unless unlawful and that regulation might have (unspecified) 
unintended impacts or unexpected effects on (unidentified) ‘other groups’. These 
arguments relate to caste as a migrant group phenomenon. Caste legislation could be 
characterised as unfairly targeting a specific minority population (South Asians and 
Hindus) and as interference by (white) policymakers in minority religious and 
cultural matters (‘cultural intrusion’). The principal Hindu organisations consulted by 
government – the Hindu Council UK (HCUK) and the Hindu Forum of Britain 
(HFB) – considered that proposals for caste discrimination legislation wrongly 
characterised as discrimination personal choices and associational preferences in 
spheres outside the ambit of discrimination law, denigrated Hinduism and presented 
Hindus as a ‘problem’ and amounted to an attack on the fundamental freedom of 
Hindus to retain their intra-group identities. For these groups, caste was a positive 
source of social or corporate identity and social cohesion. They argued that caste 
discrimination did not occur in the UK, at least not in fields regulated by 
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discrimination law, and that legislation was inappropriate, unnecessary, and an attack 
on Hinduism. These arguments are explored briefly below. 
 
8.9.2 Cultural intrusion and ‘privacy barrier’ arguments 
 
In 2004, in a statement reminiscent of the colonial policy of non-interference in 
‘personal law’ matters, the government acknowledged criticisms ‘levelled at the 
Hindu caste system with regards to the treatment of Dalits’ but added ‘however, it is 
not the role of Government to take a position on the rites, beliefs or practices of any 
particular religious faith, other than where these give rise to conflict with the law.
156
 
During the Equality Bill debates the government affirmed this stance, stating that the 
HFB and the HCUK also considered legislation ‘the wrong option to cure what they 
primarily see as a cultural matter’.157 The HFB, while stating that due to ‘cultural 
practices and tradition’, caste ‘can play a role in social interactions and personal 
choices like marriages, conversations and friendships’, asserted that there was no 
evidence that it was ‘endemic’ in British society, nor did it affect ‘the provision of 
education, employment or goods and services’.158 Moreover, it was not for 
government ‘[to] interfere in personal choices and… social interaction’. Instead, 
community organisations should be empowered to ‘break any existing barriers to 
promote further intra-community integration and cohesion’.159 Rather than becoming 
‘directly involved in legislating caste in the UK’, government should ‘facilitate and 
encourage community organisations and individuals to play a greater role in building 
programmes of awareness and education’.160  
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The HCUK defended the maintenance of caste distinctions in the private and social 
spheres using the language of fundamental rights: 
Hindus too wish to preserve their core beliefs and identities. How can this not be allowed to 
extend to who they wish to socialise with or whom they choose as a life partner? This is 
surely a fundamental freedom for each and every one of us, one in which there is no harm 
per se and which enables Hindus to maintain their distinct identities while simultaneously 
enriching the diverse cultural milieu.
161
   
 
As Chapter 7 explains, one may lawfully choose not to associate privately with 
certain people, even on prohibited grounds (although, as Jaoul points out, ‘even 
though who you marry and who you are willing to share your meal with is a private 
matter, the question of inter-dining can become a public issue leading to the 
institutionalisation of caste once it is introduced in public places’, for example 
workplace and school canteens).
162
 However, the HCUK’s statement appears to 
suggest that calls to include caste as a protected characteristic in domestic 
discrimination law are divisive and somehow opposed to the fundamental human 
right of Hindus to preserve their core beliefs and ‘distinct identities’.163  
 
8.9.3 Community cohesion 
 
At Commons Committee stage, the government asserted that it was ‘socially divisive 
to have legislation against something that is not happening and is needed by no one’, 
it was ‘hardly going to contribute to community cohesion’ and the HFB and HCUK 
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were ‘very sensible’ in opposing caste discrimination legislation ‘having, we are 
satisfied, conscientiously sought what we asked for’164 (i.e. evidence of 
discrimination). The government did not specify whether by ‘community cohesion’ it 
meant inter- or intra-community cohesion (i.e. between South Asians and other 
communities, or internally within the South Asian community), but statements by 
government and Hindu organisations suggest the latter. In an exchange during day 
one of Lords Committee stage, Baroness Flather noted the claim by the National 
Hindu Students Forum that caste was not an issue in Britain, but she suggested that 
this was because it had no ‘non caste-Hindus’ among its members.165 Baroness 
Thornton countered that the case for legislation on caste discrimination was ‘not so 
clear-cut that it universally unites the community it is alleged to affect’.166 Among 
the organisations consulted by the government, she said there ‘was not a consensus’ 
on caste discrimination, while the HFB and the HCUK remained of the opinion that 
legislation was inappropriate.
167
 Baroness Flather retorted that the HFB and the 
HCUK were formed by ‘the three upper castes’, who felt that ‘to consult them about 
caste discrimination is to cast aspersions on them, as if one is saying “you are the lot 
who are discriminating on the basis of caste.” They are not going to admit that they 
discriminate: no-one does’.168  
 
Government arguments that caste discrimination legislation would be divisive and 
damaging to community cohesion, and that the case for legislation did not enjoy 
universal support in ‘the community it is alleged to affect’, make sense only if it is 
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assumed that there is an underlying cultural and social homogeneity within the South 
Asian community – which is not supported by the evidence.169 An extensive body of 
literature exists on the phenomenon of internal (intra-community) discrimination 
experienced by so-called minorities within minorities. Such discrimination is often 
invisible to the majority community or concealed by State policies of multicultural 
accommodation of wider minority group identity, norms and practices.
170
 The 
problem of internal minorities was alluded to in the Equalities Review Interim 
Report (although not included in its Final Report), which noted that ‘analysis [of 
equality] by characteristics such as gender and ethnicity can conceal considerable 
variation within sub-groups’.171 As regards anti-legislation arguments based on 
culture and community cohesion, whether State intervention is perceived as an attack 
on minority culture or religion, or divisive, depends on whose voices are considered 
as representative of the group in question, the extent to which existing intra-group 
diversity (sub-groups), power hierarchies and division are acknowledged and 
recognised
172
 and the willingness of the wider minority group to countenance internal 
challenges to its power hierarchies and dominant norms.    
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8.9.4 Caste discrimination legislation as anti-Hindu 
 
The HFB and the HCUK linked efforts to outlaw caste discrimination to a 
Christian/Western anti-Hindu, pro-Christianity conspiracy. Many Dalit campaigners 
and organisations, according to the HFB, had ‘substantial backing from Christian 
groups’, the reason being that the majority of Indian converts to Christianity were 
Dalits, traditionally ‘the largest target group for evangelical groups operating in 
India’.173 Caste, said the HCUK, ‘was used to justify Christian proselytising and 
domination over the Indian population by Europeans, an excuse that persists 
today’,174 while Christian missionary attacks on the institution of caste and the 
‘Brahmin priestly caste’ were ‘full-fledged anti-Brahmanism, the Indian equivalent 
of anti-Semitism’.175 Support for caste discrimination legislation was thus 
characterised as anti-Hindu and discrimination against Hindus. This was highlighted 
at Lords Committee stage by Baroness Flather, who referred to an article in Asian 
Voice by the National Hindu Students Forum (an organisation ‘affiliated to the 
HFB’) which, she said, accused organisations working for Dalits of attacking 
Hinduism.
176
  
 
 
 
                                                 
173
 Kallidai, n 158 above, 20. 
174
 Sharma, n 161 above, 21. Religious conversion (especially conversion to Christianity) is a highly 
politicised and controversial phenomenon in India; several Indian States have enacted anti-conversion 
laws to restrict conversion, particularly targeting conversion by force or allurement of individuals or 
groups deemed vulnerable; see A. Misra, ‘The Missionary Position: Christianity and Politics of 
Religious Conversion in India’ 17 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (2011) 361–381; S. Sarkar, 
‘Conversions and Politics of Hindu Right’, Economic and Political Weekly, 26 June 1999, 1691-1700; 
L. Jenkins, ‘Legal Limits on Religious Conversion in India’, 71(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 
(2008) 110-127, 110; J. Huff, ‘Religious Freedom in India and Analysis of the Constitutionality of 
Anti-Conversion Laws’, 10(2) Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion (2009) 1-36. 
175
 Sharma, ibid. 
176
 Baroness Flather, n 168 above, col 339. This was a students’ forum, she said, and ‘we need to 
worry about this issue if the young are thinking like that’. 
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8.10 Conclusion 
Caste presents a challenge to Britain’s discrimination law framework. The concept of 
caste has yet to permeate mainstream social, political and legal discourse in the UK. 
This chapter shows that as debates on the Equality Bill progressed through 2009 and 
2010, legislators remained unconvinced of the need for an immediate statutory 
prohibition of caste discrimination. There was also disagreement as to how to 
conceptualise caste legally. This chapter has shown the difficulties experienced by 
government, parliamentarians, equality actors and activists in their efforts to locate 
caste within existing classificatory categories which were not designed with caste in 
mind. The fact is that caste does not fit easily into any of the legal categories 
currently available under UK discrimination law. At different times, different actors 
advanced opposing and sometimes contradictory arguments regarding the most 
appropriate ‘legal home’ for caste. Moreover, for government, caste seemed to be a 
‘Pandora’s box’, the possibility of caste discrimination legislation generating 
unwelcome political tension and intra-community opposition – as anticipated by 
Dalit activists in 2000: 
Asians are already victims of racism in Britain. There may be a curious effect whereby the 
indigenous community may use the Caste divisions amongst the Asians as a weapon of 
further oppression. The Asians could be accused of in-fighting and those Asians who are 
fighting against Racism may see their work being undermined by our outcry against Caste. 
Some thought ought to be given as to how best we can achieve our goals notwithstanding the 
fact there will certainly be a backlash at least from the conservative elements of the Indian 
community for placing Caste System (sic) in the public domain.
177
 
 
                                                 
177
 S. Muman, ‘Caste in Britain’ in Report of the Proceedings of International Conference on Dalit 
Human Rights (London: Voice of Dalit International, 2000) 71-79, 78. 
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The Equality Bill presented an historic opportunity for British Dalits to secure a 
statutory prohibition of caste discrimination as a new protected characteristic in 
domestic law. While the EQA acknowledged caste as a potential ground of 
discrimination in the UK, it fell short of including an immediate, express prohibition 
of discrimination on this ground. Moreover, it envisaged caste as ‘an aspect of race’ 
rather than as a new characteristic. Yet, the inclusion of s. 9(5)(a) in the EQA was 
nevertheless a major advance for the Dalit groups and their supporters, and it 
represented an important stage in the ongoing development of British equality 
legislation. In May 2010, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 
came to power, replacing the Labour Government which had overseen the enactment 
of the EQA. In December 2010, the research on caste discrimination in Britain, 
commissioned from the NIESR by the former Labour Government, was published by 
the GEO.
178
 This research affirmed that caste indisputably exists in Britain, and it 
also found evidence suggesting the occurrence of caste discrimination and 
harassment, and identified legislation as the most useful response.
179
 Yet, despite 
domestic and international calls since December 2010 for the ministerial power in s. 
9(5)(a) EQA to be exercised so as to include an express statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination in the legislation, as at 1 April 2013, the coalition government had not 
exercised the s. 9(5)(a) power. The thesis turns in Chapter 9 to an examination and 
assessment of developments following the enactment of the EQA in April 2010, 
concluding by arguing in favour of a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination in 
domestic law.  
                                                 
178
 H. Metcalfe and H. Rolfe, Caste discrimination and harassment in Great Britain (London: GEO, 
2010). 
179
 Metcalfe and Rolfe, ibid., 14, 22, 63-65. 
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Chapter 9 
Caste Discrimination: Equality Act 2010 and Beyond  
 
9.1 Introduction 
The Equality Act 2010 (EQA) received Royal Assent in April 2010,
1
 a month before 
the Liberal-Democrat coalition government took office. On 1 October 2010, the 
majority of the EQA provisions came into force. In December 2010, ‘Caste 
discrimination and harassment in Great Britain’, the study commissioned from the 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) in April 2010 (NIESR 
study) by the then Labour Government, was published by the Government Equalities 
Office (GEO).
2
 It had been implied by the government at the House of Lords meeting 
on Caste and the Equality Bill on 4 February 2010 (discussed in Chapter 8) that, if a 
ministerial power was inserted into the EQA to make caste an aspect of the protected 
characteristic of race, evidence of caste discrimination would trigger its exercise. 
Following publication of the NIESR study, Dalit groups called on the coalition 
government to exercise the ministerial power immediately.
3
 Over the next two years, 
no decision on the exercise of the s. 9(5)(a) power was made; the government’s 
repeated response was that it had ‘not ruled out legislative responses’, but needed 
time to consider the NIESR study fully to ensure that its response was ‘reasonable 
                                                 
1
 The EQA applies to England, Wales and Scotland but not to Northern Ireland: EQA 2010 s.217; B. 
Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 7. 
2
 H. Metcalfe and H. Rolfe, Caste discrimination and harassment in Great Britain (London: GEO, 
2010).  
3
 Anti-Caste Discrimination Alliance (ACDA), Press Release ‘Evidence of caste discrimination and 
harassment in the UK confirmed in the independent research commissioned by Government’, 16 
December 2010; copy on file with author; ‘Caste Discrimination in the UK – Joint Statement calling 
on the coalition government to enact clause 9(5)(a) of the Equality Act 2010’, 23 December 2010; 
copy on file with author. 
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and proportionate’.4 As of 1 April 2013, the government had yet to publish a written 
response to the NISER report; but on 1 March 2013 it announced that it had decided 
‘not to exercise the caste power contained within the Equality Act 2010 at the present 
time – though we have no plans to remove the power from the Act, in case the 
position should change.’ Instead it had decided ‘to engage with affected 
communities’ by running an educational programme ‘to help tackle this complex and 
sensitive issue’.5 In August 2011, the first claim for unfair dismissal based on caste 
discrimination (Begraj and Begraj v Heer Manak Solicitors and others) came before 
the Birmingham Employment Tribunal, but in February 2013, the tribunal collapsed 
after the judge recused herself from the case; at the time of writing, the claimants 
were considering an appeal; while in November 2012 in a case before the Denbigh 
Employment Tribunal, a complaint of caste discrimination as a form of unlawful 
racial (ethnic origins) discrimination was rejected because the EQA had not yet been 
extended to cover caste as an aspect of race in itself, and because the claim 
concerned the claimant’s status within the same caste as the respondents, therefore 
his caste could not fall within the existing definition of ethnic origins.
6
 Meanwhile, a 
cross-party amendment to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 2012 (ERRB), 
adding caste to the definition of race in EQA s. 9(1) was agreed by majority vote in 
the House of Lords on 4 March 2013. The Bill was returned to the House of 
Commons with amendments, to be considered on 16 April 2013.  
 
This chapter evaluates the NIESR study and the government’s response, government 
arguments for not invoking EQA s. 9(5)(a), the arguments of actors opposed to 
                                                 
4
 Baroness Verma; HL Deb vol 723 col 1098-1100 22 December 2010. 
5
 Ministerial Written Statement, 1 March 2013, Caste; copy on file with author. 
6
 S. Jones, ‘Employment tribunal hearing first claim for caste discrimination collapses: Judge recuses 
herself after visit by police officers’, The Guardian, 14 February 2013; Naveed v Aslam, ET Case No. 
1603968/2011 (unreported), discussed in section 4.2 below. 
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legislation, and the strategic response of Dalit organisations and advocacy groups. 
The chapter considers legal and political developments following the enactment of 
the EQA, including the implications of the Begraj case (which was widely reported 
in the media), the recommendations of the UN Committee for the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 2011 and the UN Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR) in 2012 to the UK on caste discrimination, and the implications of amendment 
of EQA s. 9 via the ERRB. The chapter identifies and examines the principal legal 
and socio-political factors, domestic and international, impacting on government 
decision-making on domestic legal regulation of caste discrimination. The chapter 
concludes with an assessment of the lessons learned from the attempt to secure legal 
regulation of caste discrimination in the domestic setting and the domestic and 
international implications of legal regulation, as well as with a number of policy 
recommendations for government and strategy suggestions for Dalit groups. 
 
9.2 NIESR study: ‘Caste discrimination and harassment in Great Britain’  
9.2.1 Summary and findings 
 
‘Caste discrimination and harassment in Great Britain’ was the first government-
funded study on caste discrimination as a domestic issue. The NIESR study had four 
objectives: to critically review evidence on the nature and extent of caste prejudice 
and discrimination in Britain; to develop a typology of caste discrimination and 
prejudice; to assess its nature and severity through primary research and to assess the 
need for a public policy response and the form this might take.
7
 The aim was to 
identify individuals who perceived themselves to have suffered from, and could 
provide an account of, caste discrimination in regulated fields. The definition of caste 
                                                 
7
 ‘Research into caste systems and the existence and nature of caste prejudice and discrimination in 
Great Britain’, NIESR, March 2010 (copy on file with author).  
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used in the study was taken from the EQA Explanatory Notes (drafted by the GEO in 
consultation with the present author and others).
8
 The study was based on a literature 
review, discussions with ‘interested parties’ and experts (including the present 
author) and qualitative interviews with thirty-two individuals who believed they had 
suffered caste discrimination or harassment.
9
 It affirmed that caste indisputably exists 
in Britain.
10
 It also found that ‘caste discrimination and harassment is likely to occur 
in Britain’.11 The study included evidence suggesting caste discrimination and 
harassment in respect of work and the provision of services,
12
 evidence of caste-
related inter-pupil bullying in schools, which was ‘likely to be addressed differently 
(and less adequately) than bullying related to protected strands’,13 and evidence 
suggesting caste discrimination and harassment falling outside the EQA in relation to 
voluntary work, demeaning behaviour and violence.
14
 The discrimination identified 
in the study was perpetrated by higher castes against lower castes.
15
 The study 
concluded that to reduce caste discrimination, the government could take educative 
or legislative approaches – either would be useful in the public sector, but non-
legislative approaches were less likely to be effective in the private sector and would 
not assist where the authorities themselves are discriminating.
16
 The study concluded 
further that relying on the Indian [South Asian] community to take action to reduce 
                                                 
8
 Equality Act 2010, Explanatory Notes (revised edition August 2010); Section 9, Race; para. 49; 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/contents (visited 16 February 2013); 
for full text see Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
9
 Metcalfe and Rolfe, n 2 above, 7, 9.  
10
 Metcalfe and Rolfe, n 2 above, 14. This finding was in itself significant; see Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
11
 Metcalfe and Rolfe, ibid., 63. 
12
 Ibid., 22. 
13
 Ibid., 63. An educational institution may contravene the EQA if its handling of inter-pupil bullying 
is discriminatory, by treating bullying based on one protected characteristic less seriously than similar 
behaviour based on another protected characteristic, where the reason for the difference in treatment is 
a pupil’s protected characteristic. Additionally, the Education and Inspections Act 2006 s. 89(1)(b) 
imposes a duty on schools to encourage respect for others and in particular to prevent all forms of 
bullying among pupils. 
14
 Ibid., vi. 
15
 Ibid., vi, 18, 58. 
16
 Ibid., 65, 66. 
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caste discrimination was problematic, and that EQA provisions on religious 
discrimination could not cover caste discrimination as effectively as caste-specific 
provisions would do.
17
 As in India, caste in Britain is not religion-specific,
18
 and 
moreover, ‘rejection of caste and membership of a religion which rejects caste does 
not protect against being perceived as having a caste’.19 As for numbers, the study 
cited the 2001 Census figure of almost three million people of South Asian heritage 
in Britain and, in the absence of official statistics, reiterated existing estimates of 
50,000-200,000 people of ‘low caste’ (Dalit) origin.20 It was ‘unable to identify any 
evidence on the extent of caste discrimination, nor any reliable estimates of the size 
of the low caste population, the population most likely to be subject to caste 
discrimination.’21 Only a ‘major programme of research’ could establish the 
percentage of the low caste population that experienced caste discrimination and the 
frequency of discrimination, or whether caste discrimination is ‘dying out’.22 The 
consequences of caste discrimination were identified as reduced confidence and self-
esteem, depression, anger, social isolation, reduced access to care and social 
provision and detrimental effects on employment (e.g. reduced career prospects) and 
education, as well as public consequences such as public violence and reduction in 
community cohesion (if the community is considered wider than a single caste).
23
 
Contradictory views were noted as to whether caste consciousness and caste 
discrimination in Britain were in decline, thus making legislation unnecessary;
24
 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., 61; ‘Caste discrimination and harassment in Great Britain’, GEO, Research Findings No. 
2010/8, 1; available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/equalities/research/caste-
discrimination/caste-discrimination-summary?view=Binary (visited 16 February 2013). 
18
 Metcalfe and Rolfe, n 2 above, 17. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid., 20. 
21
 Ibid., 63. 
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Ibid., 61.  
24
 Ibid., 60. 
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extensive research would be needed to establish whether there had been ‘a 
diminution in caste consciousness and discrimination, and the speed of decline’.25 
 
9.2.2 Caste discrimination in regulated fields 
 
‘As with all discrimination’, said the study, caste discrimination in the workplace is 
often impossible to prove;
26
 the ‘only real test would come through employment 
tribunal cases, an option not available when caste discrimination is not in itself 
unlawful. And, even then, it cannot be assumed that the tribunal will always get to 
the “truth”’.27 Under-reporting of perceived caste discrimination was partly 
explained by lack of knowledge and understanding among non-South Asians.
28
 Some 
victims did not challenge perceived discrimination and harassment because they 
would need to complain to the perpetrators or to people of a higher caste.
29
 Evidence 
was found of caste-based pupil-on-pupil bullying and harassment in schools.
30
 
Schools and teachers’ understanding of casteism was perceived to be inadequate, and 
casteism was perceived as not being treated as seriously as racism by these 
institutions. In relation to the provision of services, evidence was found suggesting 
caste discrimination in social care and health care, but there were no case studies 
reporting humiliating treatment in shops.
31
  
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., 60. 
26
 Ibid., 47.  
27
 Ibid., 48.  
28
 Ibid., 48. 
29
 Ibid., 48. 
30
 Ibid., 28.  
31
 Ibid., 50, 52. 
288 
 
9.2.3 NIESR study: efficacy of existing responses 
 
In the absence of caste-specific legislation, the responses available to alleged victims 
of caste discrimination were identified as: going to the authorities (police, employer, 
school, service provider); speaking to the perpetrators; doing nothing; bringing a 
claim based on existing law and taking the law into one’s own hands (leading 
potentially to violence).
32
 In the case of wholly ‘low caste’ religious groups, where 
religious identity and low caste status completely overlap, individuals may be able to 
rely on existing religion or belief discrimination law.
33
 This does not render caste 
discrimination laws redundant – religion and belief protection cannot cover all caste-
based discrimination, as it is not available to Dalits of other religions or of no 
religion, and it would not cover cases where ‘offensive caste language, but not 
religious language’ is used:’34 ‘if caste discrimination were seen as an issue which 
needed to be tackled and discrimination legislation was an appropriate means to 
achieve this, then reliance on religious discrimination legislation is inadequate’; 
without legislation specifically prohibiting caste discrimination, it would only be 
partially reduced by law.
35
  
 
9.2.4 Limitations and criticisms of the NIESR study 
 
The study was criticised by the British Sikh Consultative Forum (BSCF) for failing 
to assess untested statements against ‘practices in the wider community’ and for 
failing to take into account ‘cutting-edge real field research’ on caste.36 The National 
                                                 
32
 Ibid., 63. 
33
 Ibid., 60. 
34
Ibid., 60-61. 
35
 Ibid., 61, 48. 
36
 Letter, P. McGhan (Department for Communities and Local Government) to L. Pall (ACDA), 3 
August 2011, in response to Freedom of Information Act Request dated 4 July 2011; Attachment D 
(email from BSCF to Lynne Featherstone MP, 11 January 2011); copy on file with author. The 
‘cutting-edge research’ referred to in the BSCF’s email to Lynne Featherstone was not identified. 
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Hindu Students’ Forum (NHSF) argued that the study ‘[did] not show any evidence 
that caste discrimination is a widespread issue within the UK’, was ‘unable to inform 
on the size of the UK population belonging to the so-called “lower castes”’, was 
based on only thirty-two subjects who alleged being subjected to caste discrimination 
and in nineteen cases was ambiguous about the presence of caste as an underlying 
motive.
37
 An anti-legislation lobby meeting in March 2011 with government officials 
and representatives claimed the study lacked an in-depth examination of alleged 
caste discrimination, used out of date examples of caste discrimination and 
inadequate sampling methods, was one-sided for failing to consult adequately with 
Hindu groups, and gave conflicting messages (acknowledging that it was impossible 
to determine whether caste discrimination had occurred, yet recommending the 
introduction of specific caste legislation).
38
 
 
The study’s authors themselves identified inherent problems with the methodological 
approach.
39
 First, quantifying the extent of caste discrimination was ‘outside the 
budget and timescale of the study’.40 Secondly, it was ‘impossible to identify caste 
discrimination with absolute certainty based on the statement of the person who feels 
they have suffered such discrimination; their perception may be erroneous and the 
information provided incomplete’.41 Nevertheless, it was possible to determine the 
likelihood of caste discrimination, on the basis of factors ‘strongly suggestive’ of 
caste discrimination.
42
 Thirdly, the methodological approach was reliant on 
individuals recognising that they had been discriminated against because of caste, 
                                                 
37
 Ibid., Attachment E (letter from NHSF to Theresa May MP, 2 March 2011). 
38
 Letter, GEO to Lord Avebury, 19 January 2012 plus attachment; copy on file with author.  
39
 Metcalfe and Rolfe, n 2 above, 11. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid. These issues also arise with other discrimination grounds. 
42
 Ibid. 
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being willing to talk about this issues and the presence of factors suggestive of caste 
discrimination.
43
 Fourthly, reporting or discussing caste discrimination with a 
stranger may be seen as shameful; hence, ‘the evidence as to whether caste 
discrimination exists can only be drawn from the positive cases, i.e. where it seems 
likely that caste discrimination did occur’.44 It is submitted that a further weakness 
was the small sample of alleged victims interviewed and the limited sources of 
interviewees.
45
 Dalits in the UK constitute a ‘hidden population’ which is not easily 
accessible; in everyday life they may try to conceal their identity and may be 
reluctant to come forward to speak about caste and caste discrimination, especially to 
a stranger. No interviews were sought or conducted, for example, with workers in 
employment sectors or businesses which are wholly or predominantly South Asian. 
Discrimination may be institutional or systemic, and individuals may not be in a 
position to identify patterns of discrimination. Nevertheless, despite its weaknesses 
and limitations, the NIESR report is important because, as the first  government-
commissioned study, it provides independent evidence of the likely existence of 
caste discrimination in the UK which corroborates the findings of earlier studies by 
Dalit groups. 
 
9.3 NIESR study: Government response and Dalit activism 
This section identifies and evaluates the government’s response to the NISER study 
and the reasons given by government between 16 December 2010 and 1 April 2013 
                                                 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid., 12. 
45
 In contrast, an online survey for a 2007 Equalities Review report on discrimination against trans 
people yielded over 870 responses out of an estimated population pool of around 5,000 people; no 
face-to-face interview was involved, and anonymity was guaranteed; S. Whittle, Engendered 
Penalties: Transgender and Transsexual People’s Experiences of Inequality and Discrimination 
(London: Crown Copyright, 2007). 
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for not exercising the power in EQA s. 9(5)(a). It also examines Dalit activism 
during the same period. 
 
9.3.1 Government response: arguments consistent with the previous administration 
 
On 22 December 2010, Baroness Verma (the then government spokesperson for 
Women and Equalities) gave the government’s most detailed public response yet to 
the study. Stressing that this was ‘a different Government from the one who 
commissioned the research study’,46 she stated that while the government had not 
ruled out legislative responses and that the law must ‘play its part’, law had not 
eradicated caste discrimination in India; consequently, individual attitudes needed to 
change and the only way to do that in the UK, ‘if there is discrimination against 
people based on caste’, was to deal with it through existing legislation.47 She also 
suggested that unless the communities practising such discrimination dealt with the 
problem themselves through self-education, legislation would not help.
48
  
 
While it is correct that legislation is not the sole solution, the NIESR study was 
sceptical about leaving caste discrimination to be addressed solely within the Asian 
community or by educative measures alone;
49
 moreover, it did not consider existing 
legislation sufficient to cover all cases of caste discrimination.
50
 It is correct that 
legislation in India has not succeeded in eradicating caste discrimination but, it is 
suggested, this is not a reason for not introducing a statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination in the UK. The limitations of India’s anti-discrimination strategy and 
                                                 
46
 Baroness Verma; HL Deb vol 723 col 1099 22 Dec 2010. 
47
 Ibid.  
48
 Ibid., col 1100. The Baroness’s position was in stark contrast to her strong support for legislation on 
forced marriage and female genital mutilation; Baroness Verma; HL Deb vol 723 col 1604-1609 13 
Jan 2011. 
49
 Metcalfe and Rolfe, n 2 above, 66. 
50
 Ibid., 60, 65. 
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the lessons learned from India are discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. In contrast to 
India, Dalit organisations and their supporters in the UK pointed to the existence in 
this country of a strong rule of law culture and the influence of civil equality 
legislation on behaviour, citing the examples of changed attitudes on race and sex 
equality in areas covered by discrimination legislation.
51
 Liberal arguments for the 
usefulness of discrimination legislation, in particular its educational effect and the 
development of non-discrimination and anti-harassment policies resulting from 
discrimination legislation, were made forcefully by the NIESR.
52
 
 
Baroness Verma also called up the proliferation and community cohesion arguments 
discussed in Chapter 8. When asked about the contradiction of ‘support[ing] 
community cohesion by supporting discrimination’,53 she stated: 
As one who has always supported equality through integration, I think we need to come away 
from the idea that constantly supporting people to be separate is an easier form of dealing 
with the problem now. 
The big picture should be that we can get on with our lives and treat people without having 
to worry that we will offend them in some way because of one issue or another. The law will 
not cover every possibility of discrimination, even if we are constantly legislating to bring in 
more and more groups to protect.
54
 
 
The suggestion that discrimination legislation supports ‘people to be separate’ and is 
somehow opposed to integration confuses domestic measures enabling minorities to 
preserve their distinct identities (associated in the UK with state policies of 
multiculturalism and which Hindu organisations support, at least for Hindus), with 
                                                 
51
 Letter, Dalit organisations to Helen Grant MP, Minister for Women and Equalities, 14 February 
2013; copy on file with author. 
52
 Metcalfe and Rolfe, n 2 above, 64.  
53
 Baroness Falkner of Margravine; HL Deb vol 723 col 1100 22 Dec 2010. 
54
 Baroness Verma; n 46 above (emphasis added). 
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anti-discrimination law designed to protect people from discrimination. Verma’s 
statement also appeared to repudiate caste as a ‘genuine’ ground of discrimination 
and to imply that victims of caste discrimination are over-sensitive and too easily 
offended by casteist behaviour.  
 
9.3.2 Government response: new arguments 
 
In December 2010, Baroness Verma, while describing the NIESR study as ‘a 
valuable guide’ which ‘shows where caste problems exist’,55 stated that the 
government would ‘consider the report in the context of our own equality strategy’, 
to ensure that its response was ‘reasonable and proportionate, bearing in mind that a 
lot of people will be affected by it if it is brought into legislation’.56 By May 2012, 
the government’s position was that while the NIESR study identified evidence 
suggesting the existence of caste discrimination in the UK, the study also noted that 
it was ‘impossible to determine categorically that discrimination within the meaning 
of the [Equality Act] has occurred’.57 The government had therefore considered 
representations from both ‘those who want the government to legislate and those 
who are opposed to such legislation’.58 The government thus introduced arguments 
which differed from those advanced (publicly, at least) by the previous 
administration: (1) how legislation against caste discrimination sat with its equality 
and human rights agenda, including the regulatory burden and cost impact of 
legislation, and (2) the views of those opposed to legislation. 
 
                                                 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
57
 Lynne Featherstone; HC Deb vol 545 col 432-433W 21 May 2012. 
58
 Ibid. 
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9.3.2.1 The Coalition equality agenda: reducing ‘red tape’ and costs 
 
Pre-election, the Conservative Party described itself as being ‘determined to fight 
prejudice and discrimination wherever it exists’.59 At the same time, its 2010 election 
manifesto promised ‘No to Bureaucracy’ and an end to ‘Big Government’,60 a key 
aim being to reduce what it saw as the regulatory burden on business (‘red tape’). 
This was translated post-election into the ‘Red Tape Challenge’, a government 
website inviting individuals to identify legislation they wanted to see scrapped, saved 
or simplified.
61
 The potential cost of putting EQA s. 9(5)(a) into effect was advanced 
by government as one reason for not announcing a decision on the provision. The 
Equality Act Impact Assessment (EAIA) – published before the NIESR study – had 
advised that in relation to caste discrimination, the government could choose to do 
nothing (i.e. rely on existing law), legislate immediately or include an enabling 
power to add caste in the future as a subset of race.
62
 Doing nothing was rejected as 
potentially more costly than introducing legislation, because the lack of a test case 
and legal uncertainty meant that the cost of processing caste discrimination cases 
based on race or religious discrimination law might be greater than through a specific 
                                                 
59
 ‘Contract for Equalities’, Conservative Party Equalities Manifesto 2010, 2; available at 
http://www.conservatives.com/news/news_stories/2010/05/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/Ma
nifesto/Equalities-Manifesto.ashx (visited 18 February 2013). 
60
 Conservative Party Manifesto 2010; available at 
http://media.conservatives.s3.amazonaws.com/manifesto/cpmanifesto2010_easyread.pdf (visited 18 
February 2013); see also A. Sparrow & P. Wintour, ‘Coalition reconsidering Tory plan to scrap 
Human Rights Act’, The Guardian 19 May 2010. 
61
 See http://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/home/index/ (visited 18 February 2013). 
Controversially, ‘Equalities’ was one of the ‘Spotlight Themes’ of the Red Tape Challenge; see 
http://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/themehome/equalities-act/ (visited 18 February 
2013).  
62
 Equality Act Impact Assessment (EAIA), Final Version (London: GEO, 2010) 249-250. Impact 
Assessments assist policy-makers in identifying the need for legislative or other intervention and 
‘using the available evidence, in consultation with relevant stakeholders…explore proposals that best 
achieve the policy objectives while minimising the costs and burdens imposed in achieving the 
objectives’; Impact Assessment Guidance (London: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
2011) 4-5. 
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statutory route.
63
 Legislating immediately was considered premature in the absence 
of independent evidence on the extent of discrimination and the numbers affected; 
moreover, adding caste to the definition of race would extend the public sector 
Equality Duty in EQA s. 149 to caste, which would ‘have an effect on public bodies, 
including government departments’.64 An enabling power was considered the least 
risky option because it allowed a decision to be made in the light of available 
evidence as to whether ‘more than a very small number of people’ were affected by 
caste discrimination
65
 and whether there was ‘a real need for caste discrimination to 
be prohibited by the EQA’, as well as to amend the EQA accordingly by means of 
secondary legislation.
66
  
 
9.3.2.2 Regard for anti-legislation views 
 
Between December 2010 and March 2013, a recurring government argument was the 
need to have regard for the views of those opposed to caste discrimination 
legislation. In December 2010, Baroness Verma had referred to ‘consultations and 
meetings with people right across the caste system to ensure that both sides of the 
argument [were] put’.67 In November 2011, she informed the House that during 
CERD’s examination in Geneva, in August 2011, of the UK’s 20th report submitted 
pursuant to Article 9 of the International Convention for the Elimination of Racial 
                                                 
63
 EAIA, ibid., 250. In March 2011 the government announced it would not introduce the EQA dual 
discrimination provisions on grounds of cost; see ‘Plan for Growth’, at http://cdn.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_growth.pdf (visited 17 February 2013).  
64
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discrimination, advance equality of opportunity, and foster good relations between groups when 
carrying out their activities. For a critique of s.149 see L. Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering 
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158, 156. 
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 EAIA, ibid., 247. 
66
 EAIA, ibid., 245 (emphasis added). ACDA estimated 8,000 potential caste discrimination claims a 
year, of which 240 successful cases, compared to 129 successful race discrimination claims in 2008; 
ACDA, letter to Lynne Featherstone MP; 31 January 2011; copy on file with author. 
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 Baroness Verma; n 42 above (emphasis added). 
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Discrimination (ICERD), the UK delegation informed CERD that there was ‘no 
consensus of opinion with regards to the need for legislative protection against caste 
discrimination, even among those communities potentially most affected by it’ – 
ministers had been considering the NIESR report together with representations ‘both 
in favour of legislation and opposing it’, but had not yet made a final decision.68 
When asked which persons or organisations within the UK opposed bringing s. 
9(5)(a) into force, Baroness Verma referred to a meeting on 15 March 2011, chaired 
by Lord Dholakia, attended by the Minister for Equalities and other government 
officials, at which the issue of caste legislation was discussed and various 
participants spoke in opposition to s. 9(5)(a); however, since this was ‘an 
independent meeting organised by concerned groups and individuals to lobby the 
government on the issue’, there was no government record of who participated or 
spoke.
69
 It transpired that this was an anti-caste legislation lobby meeting organised 
by the Hindu Forum of Britain (of which Lord Dholakia is a patron), to which none 
of the Dalit organisations were invited and of which they were unaware.
70
 The 
government’s assertion to CERD in Geneva in August 2011 (which Lord Avebury 
challenged as unjustified)
71
 was based on the opposition to caste discrimination 
legislation expressed at this meeting. By ‘communities potentially most affected’, the 
government meant not only those identified by the NIESR study as being most at risk 
of caste discrimination (i.e. Dalits) but also a wide range of Hindu and Sikh 
communities. The government’s argument was that these ‘wider communities’ did 
not agree on the need for legislation to address caste discrimination, and the 
introduction of such legislation, drafted as referring simply to ‘caste’ rather than to 
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 HL Deb vol 732 col WA239-240 23 Nov 2011 (emphasis added). 
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 HL Deb vol 733 col WA12 28 Nov 2011. 
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 Letter, Lord Avebury to Baroness Verma, 4 December 2011 (P1104126); copy on file with author. 
71
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any specific caste in particular, would have a ‘significant impact’ on these 
communities more generally; consensus of opinion in favour of legislation existed 
only among those communities most susceptible to being victims of caste 
discrimination or harassment.
72
 In July 2012, following the UN Human Rights 
Council’s examination of the UK under the UPR mechanism, the UPR Working 
Group recommended that the UK introduce a national strategy to eliminate caste 
discrimination through the immediate implementation of EQA s. 9(5)(a).
73
 In its 
response, the government declared its non-support for the recommendation and 
reiterated that it was still considering the available evidence, including the NIESR 
study, together with ‘correspondence and representations put forward both by those 
who want the government to legislate and those who are opposed to such legislation 
being introduced’, before reaching any conclusion on whether to introduce a specific 
prohibition of caste discrimination in the EQA.
74
  
 
9.3.2.3 Government arguments assessed 
 
Government’s argument that there was no consensus of opinion in favour of caste 
discrimination legislation and that the introduction of legislation was problematic 
because it could directly affect a wide range of Hindu and Sikh communities, not 
limited to those of any specific caste (i.e. that it would have wider coverage than 
simply alleged discrimination against Dalits by higher castes), was difficult to 
understand. Protection against race and sex discrimination, for example, is not 
restricted to the most likely victims of such discrimination but is available to anyone, 
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 Letter, Baroness Verma to Lord Avebury, 2 February 2012; copy on file with author; letter, Lynne 
Featherstone to Baroness Prashar, 17 May 2012; copy on file with author. 
73
 Report of the Working Group on the UPR (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), 
UN Doc. A/HRC/21/9, 6 July 2012, para. 110.61. 
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 UN Doc. A/HRC/21/9/ Add.1, 17 September 2012, para. 21 and Annexe document, p. 30. 
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irrespective of sex or race, who is a victim of discrimination on these grounds. 
Theoretically, a ‘high caste’ person who believes they have suffered discrimination 
because of their caste could use caste discrimination legislation to seek redress. 
Further, it was extraordinary that the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation 
should be dependent on the views of those who, according to the NIESR study, were 
most likely to be the perpetrators of such discrimination (i.e. higher castes).
75
 The 
purpose of anti-discrimination legislation is to safeguard the fundamental right to 
equality and non-discrimination, so for this reason the inclusion of equalities in the 
Red Tape Challenge was itself controversial. Unlike other (technical) legislation, 
where there may be good grounds for consulting those likely to be affected by its 
introduction, anti-discrimination legislation has moral, ethical and social policy 
dimensions. Its form should be discussed with those considered the most likely 
‘primary beneficiaries’, but its introduction should not be contingent on the support 
of those identified by independent research as the most likely discriminators. During 
the parliamentary debates on the Equality Bill, parliamentarians argued that if caste-
based discrimination is accepted as morally wrong, it should be legislated against 
without waiting for the evidence.
76
 Lord Lester argued that ‘if there was just one case 
of an employer discriminating against a worker or would-be worker because of caste, 
should that not be unlawful just as if it was because of colour, being Jewish or 
anything else?
77
 The role of law as an educative device was also reiterated.
78
 It was 
argued that including the term ‘caste’ in the Bill would itself ‘have a huge 
educational effect’.79 In September 2012, in a letter to Dr. Hywel Francis MP, Chair 
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76
 Rob Marris; HC Deb vol 501 col 1203 2 Dec 2009; The Earl of Sandwich; HL Deb vol 716 col 336 
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of the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), Lord McNally (Liberal Democrat 
Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, Minister and Government Spokesperson for 
the Ministry of Justice) repeated that there was ‘no consensus of opinion among the 
wider Hindu and Sikh communities’ on the need for legislation, citing the NIESR 
study that ‘proof either way [of the existence of caste discrimination] was 
impossible’80 and questioning the usefulness of legislation for victims. This 
prompted the director of the NIESR study to write to him clarifying that the 
statement ‘proof either way was impossible’ was ‘a philosophical point over the 
nature of knowledge and proof’ and that ‘the evidence strongly suggests that caste 
discrimination and harassment, including of the type which would fall under the 
Equality Act, exists in Britain’.81  
 
9.3.3 Dalit activism subsequent to the NIESR study 
 
Following publication of the NIESR study, Dalit organisations and activists 
continued to lobby the government to introduce legislation against caste 
discrimination, arguing that ‘victims of caste discrimination should be accorded 
similar legal protection as that afforded to other British citizens experiencing 
discrimination in the UK’82 and that the government ‘should treat caste 
discrimination like any other form of unacceptable discrimination’.83 They lobbied 
CERD in Geneva during its examination of the UK’s 20th report in August 2011, 
securing a recommendation in CERD’s Concluding Observations to the UK that the 
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government invoke EQA s. 9(5)(a).
84
 They lobbied the UN Human Rights Council 
ahead of the UPR examination of the UK in May 2012, securing the aforementioned 
recommendation by the UPR Working Group for the immediate implementation of 
EQA s. 9(5)(a),
85
 and they engaged with the All Party Parliamentary Group on Dalits 
(APPGD),
86
 which in October 2012 met with John Wadham, General Counsel of the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), leading to an EHRC policy 
statement in support of ‘the enactment of s. 9(5)(a) Equality Act 2010’ (sic) – thus 
reversing the EHRC’s previous opposition to caste-specific legislation. The EHRC 
recommended that in light of ‘the findings of the government-commissioned NIESR 
paper on caste discrimination, legal protection under the Equality Act 2010 for those 
experiencing discrimination in Britain should be as comprehensive as possible’.87  
 
On 17 January 2011, ninety-one individuals, including the director of the NIESR 
study and the present author (as an invited expert), attended a meeting in the House 
of Lords, called by Lord Avebury and the Dalit groups and chaired by Lord Avebury, 
to put the case to Lynne Featherstone, then Minister for Women and Equalities, for 
invoking s. 9(5)(a). The minister declined to comment on the NIESR study and 
declined to indicate when, or even whether, the government would reach a decision 
on s. 9(5)(a), repeating simply that the government was ‘considering’ the NIESR 
                                                 
84
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report.
88
 On 28 November 2012, a further conference took place in the House of 
Lords, also organised by the Dalit groups and Lord Avebury (again acting as Chair), 
to put the case to government for the power in s. 9(5)(a) to be exercised. By then, 
government responsibility for equalities had moved from the Home Office to the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) under Maria Miller MP.
89
 
Speakers once again included the director of the NIESR study and the present author 
(as an invited expert) in addition to the director of the Northern Ireland Council for 
Ethnic Minorities, a policy officer from Liberty, an employment partner from the law 
firm Thomas Eggar, and Baroness Thornton, Shadow Spokesperson on Equalities. 
Stressing that the principle of equal treatment was at the heart of Britain’s human 
rights framework, Liberty called for the immediate exercise of the s. 9(5)(a) power, 
while Baroness Thornton stated that on the basis of the NIESR evidence, had Labour 
been in power, s. 9(5)(a) would have been activated.
90
 Lord Avebury suggested that 
government inaction was due to lobbying by high caste groups and that government 
arguments about lack of consensus on legislation were equivalent to not legislating 
on racial discrimination because white people may object.
91
 Following the 
conference, Lord Avebury sent a Joint Statement signed by thirty-six organisations to 
the Minister for Equalities stressing the ‘moral importance of legislative equality for 
Dalits’.92 He also wrote to the prime minister berating the government for its inaction 
on caste discrimination and the blocking of progress by ‘high caste persons’ despite 
                                                 
88
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calls for action from the EHRC, Liberty and UN bodies.
93
 Although no DCMS 
representative attended, the November 2012 conference together with the ECHR’s 
policy shift served to increase the pressure on government to respond to demands for 
legal protection from caste discrimination and to explain the reasons for government 
inaction.
94
 
 
9.3.4 Legal implications of the non-exercise of the s. 9(5)(a) power 
 
This subsection highlights briefly the legal implications should the s. 9(5)(a) power 
remain unexercised. It was suggested at the House of Lords meetings in January 
2011 and November 2012 that a court might interpret the inclusion of s. 9(5)(a) in 
the EQA as meaning that Parliament intended to exclude caste from EQA protection 
unless and until the s. 9(5)(a) power was exercised, because it would not have 
included the power if it thought caste was already covered by other provisions; 
therefore, unless and until the power was invoked, claimants would be deprived of a 
remedy.
95
 Parliamentary debates leading to the enactment of the EQA do not suggest 
that this was Parliament’s intention – yet the absence of an order extending s. 9 EQA 
‘so as to provide for caste to amount of itself to an aspect of race’ was one reason 
why an Employment Tribunal in the unreported case of Naveed v Aslam in 
November 2012 considered a claim of caste discrimination ‘doomed to fail’.96 
Opposition by some parliamentarians to including an express prohibition of caste 
discrimination in the EQA was partly because they believed that caste discrimination 
was already covered by existing religious or race discrimination provisions (the 
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ECHR’s position in January 2010). The point of s. 9(5)(a) was to provide legal 
certainty so that claimants would not have to make complicated legal arguments. 
Conversely, the primary legal implication of the non-exercise of the s. 9(5)(a) power 
is the absence of legal certainty. The fact that as at 1 April 2013 s. 9(5)(a) had not 
been repealed leaves open the possibility that caste may yet be added as an aspect of 
race. The EAIA raised another issue, namely that ‘someone with a legal interest in 
the exercise of the power may bring judicial review proceedings regarding the 
exercise or lack of exercise of the power’. As at 1 April 2013, this had not happened, 
but it remains a theoretical possibility. 
 
9.4 Legal developments since the Equality Act 2010 
Two developments following the enactment of the Equality Act 2010 are considered 
below. These are (1) two employment tribunal cases involving caste discrimination 
allegations, the first and most high profile being the Begraj case and (2) an 
amendment to the Enterprise Regulatory Reform Bill 2012 to secure a ministerial 
order adding caste to the definition of race in EQA s. 9(1).  
 
9.4.1 Begraj and Begraj v Heer Manak Solicitors and others 
 
In August 2011, Britain’s first caste discrimination case, Begraj and Begraj v Heer 
Manak Solicitors and others (Begraj), came before the Birmingham Employment 
Tribunal,
97
 but on 14 February 2013, after more than thirty days of hearings and 
while substantive issues were still being heard, the judge, on an application by the 
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respondents, recused herself from the case because of the possibility of an 
appearance of bias. At the time of writing, the claimants’ lawyers were considering 
an appeal.
98
 Amardeep and Vijay Begraj had claimed unfair dismissal, caste 
discrimination and race and religious discrimination. In addition Amardeep Begraj 
had claimed sex discrimination. The case tested the question whether discrimination 
or harassment based on caste was prohibited under existing provisions on race and 
religion or belief.
99
 Vijay Begraj was a Dalit, and at the time the claim was lodged he 
did not assert membership of a religion which correlates directly to caste status.
100
 
His wife, Amardeep, was from a higher caste Jat Sikh background, as were their 
mutual (former) employers, Heer Manak Solicitors. The couple alleged that they 
suffered discrimination following their inter-caste marriage (which occurred during 
the course of their employment with the respondents and of which the respondents 
disapproved). In the absence of a caste as a statutory protected characteristic they 
argued that the discrimination they suffered was because of race, or religion or belief. 
In relation to religion or belief, it could have been argued that a belief that one is free 
to marry whoever one wishes, irrespective of caste considerations, constitutes a 
protected belief which satisfies the Grainger test.
101
 In relation to race it has been 
argued that the use of ‘includes’ in the EQA definition of race indicates that the 
definition is not exhaustive and that it is therefore open to a tribunal to find that caste 
is an aspect of race, ‘even if it does not strictly fall within colour, nationality, ethnic 
or national origins’ (although this was not the outcome in Naveed).102 Since Begraj 
pre-dated the EQA, the claimants had to argue that caste fell within race or ethnic 
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origins under the RRA. Possible arguments were that caste falls within ethnic origins 
following R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS and Ors which, as 
Chapter 7 of this thesis explains, opened up arguments that caste is subsumed within 
ethnic origins by virtue of the latter involving consideration of a person’s antecedents 
or descent.
103
 The High Court, in 2011, held that cultural, family and social 
conditions or customs, as well as being a minority group within a larger community, 
can be a ‘part of ethnicity’ within the meaning of the EQA.104 The EQA implements 
the EU ‘Race Directive’ implementing the principle of equal treatment irrespective 
of racial or ethnic origin,
105
 which in Recital 3 refers to protection against 
discrimination for all persons as a universal right recognised inter alia in the 
International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
106
 
Race and ethnic origin are not defined in the Directive, but the reference to ICERD 
suggests that the Directive seeks to give effect to the principle of non-discrimination 
as understood in international law, particularly ICERD. It was therefore open to the 
tribunal to refer to the Court of Justice of the EU for a preliminary ruling under 
Article 267 TFEU the question whether race and/or ethnic origin in the Race 
Directive (and hence in the EQA) are to be interpreted as including caste.
107
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9.4.1.1 Legal implications of Begraj  
 
Despite its collapse, the Begraj case illustrated the gap in British discrimination law 
vis-à-vis caste. Only in certain cases can existing provisions on religion or belief 
discrimination capture caste discrimination. Only by ‘racing’ or ‘ethnicising’ caste 
could caste discrimination be caught by existing race discrimination provisions. A 
successful argument that caste is captured by race or ethnic origins would have 
benefitted the individual claimants in Begraj and would have been a huge step 
towards acknowledging both the existence of caste discrimination in the UK and its 
unacceptability – and this should not be underestimated. There are however a number 
of dangers. Such an approach would have masked the specificities of caste, while 
‘ethnicising’ caste may have unintended consequences, including entrenching the 
notion of caste as an identity category/identity label in the UK and the elevation of 
jati identities into ‘freestanding’ ethnic identities.108 Paradoxically, a finding in 
Begraj that caste was captured by existing provisions on race/ethnic origins might 
have strengthened the government’s argument, domestically and before UN bodies, 
that a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination was unnecessary because it can be 
dealt with through existing law. Such an argument should be resisted, as an 
Employment Tribunal decision is not binding precedent. In the absence of 
legislation, unless religious discrimination provisions can be used, claimants must 
argue that caste is captured by race/ethnic origins with the associated time and costs 
implications for all parties (including the courts). Consistency of outcome is not 
guaranteed and the principle will remain precarious unless and until a binding 
precedent is established; even a binding precedent can be overturned. It is possible 
that a successful argument for caste as a subset of race/ethnic origins might, in time, 
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result in a body of case law emerging such that caste will simply become treated in 
Britain as another aspect of race, both sociologically and in law. Nevertheless, a 
statutory prohibition of caste discrimination will simplify the process of dealing with 
caste discrimination claims (and hence reduce costs). It will provide legal certainty 
and it will send a public policy message that caste discrimination is socially 
unacceptable and actionable legally. Securing a statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination should therefore be pursued as an aim, regardless of whether an 
appeal is lodged in Begraj and regardless of the outcome of future cases. The 
question of what form a statutory prohibition should take – caste as a subset of race 
as in s. 9(5)(a), or caste or descent as a new, separate characteristic, or descent as a 
subset of race – is discussed in section 9.6 below. Finally, the very fact that a claim 
of caste discrimination went before a tribunal might provide encouragement to future 
claimants. Conversely, the collapse of Begraj before reaching judgment on the 
merits, combined with the negative financial and psychological consequences of this 
for the claimants, may act as a deterrent. 
 
9.4.2 Legal implications of Naveed v Aslam 
 
In November 2012 the Employment Tribunal found that the complaint of racial 
discrimination in the form of discrimination based on caste was ‘doomed to fail’ for 
two reasons (1) because no order has yet been made extending s. 9 of the EQA so as 
to provide for caste to amount of itself to an aspect of race; (2) it was ‘quite 
impossible’ for the claimant’s caste to fall under the existing definition of ethnic 
origins because he accepted the possibility of movement within the Arain caste to 
which both he and the respondents belonged, therefore it was his status (i.e. class) 
within the same caste as the respondents which led to his alleged (mis)treatment. 
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Hence there was no liability for racial discrimination. Whether the parties in fact 
belonged to different jatis or sub-castes within the major Arain caste or biraderi is 
unclear.
109
 What Naveed illustrates is (1) the difficulty of bringing a caste 
discrimination claim in the absence of a statutory prohibition, compounded by the 
fact that the non-exercise of the EQA s. 9(5)(a) power is itself open to contradictory 
interpretations; (2) that legislation must be coupled with education, training and 
guidance on caste and caste discrimination for employers, advice workers, lawyers, 
the judiciary and the police. 
 
9.4.3 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 2012 
9.4.3.1 ERRB: Lords Grand Committee 
 
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 2012 (ERRB) was intended inter alia to 
‘cut unnecessary red tape for businesses’ by repealing ‘unnecessary legislation’.110 
Ironically it provided a vehicle to re-ignite parliamentary debate about the legal 
regulation of caste discrimination. At Lords Grand Committee stage on 9 January 
2013,
111
 a novel amendment was moved by Baroness Thornton (Labour), Lord 
Harries of Pentregarth (Liberal Democrat), Lord Avebury (Liberal Democrat) and 
Lord Crisp (a cross-bencher)to add caste to the definition of race in EQA s. 9(1).
112
 
Parliamentarians supporting the amendment argued that the need for caste 
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discrimination legislation was clear.
113
 As to the reasons for government inaction, 
Lord Harries suggested these were (1) a general reluctance to legislate given the 
major educational problem (2) pressure from India and (3) opposition from those 
primarily responsible for discrimination.
114
 As for (1) and (2), good law, he said, was 
a ‘major tool of education’, and he personally had seen no pressure coming from 
India. As for (3), he described as ‘absurd’ the government’s recurring argument that 
there was no consensus on the need for legislation ‘among those communities 
potentially most affected’, comparing it to arguing against abolishing apartheid in 
South Africa ‘because other people in the country might be affected by the 
legislation’.115 Lord Avebury added that while legislation might not ‘stamp out the 
societal roots of racism, misogyny or homophobia’, it was the ‘main tool for dealing 
with the overt manifestations of prejudice and a powerful signal of society’s 
disapproval of the underlying ingrained attitudes of hatred and prejudice against the 
other’.116 Moreover, it would be ‘grossly illogical’ to forego the use of a weapon (i.e. 
law) against caste discrimination which has proved effective in the case of all the 
other protected characteristics; consequently, there would have to be some reason of 
principle as to why caste should be treated differently from those other 
characteristics, and in his view there was none.
117
 Lord Debden (Con) argued that it 
was impossible for the government to build a case that caste discrimination was 
different from any other forms of discrimination, as there was an overwhelming 
majority of parliamentarians in both Houses, he said, who felt that caste should not 
be treated any differently from race or sexual orientation.
118
 Baroness Stowell, for 
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the government, insisted government was ‘not resisting legislation in deference to 
high caste views’ but was ‘concerned that legislation would be a disproportionate 
response’ – the prohibition of discrimination against Romany Gypsies and Irish 
Travellers, she said, had come about through case law not legislation.
119
 She also 
questioned (again) the extent of caste discrimination, at which Lord Avebury pointed 
to gender reassignment which was introduced as a statutory protected characteristic 
despite the small number of people covered.
120
 The debate concluded without a vote. 
  
9.4.3.2 Towards a presumption in favour of legislation? 
 
Following a direct appeal by Baroness Thornton during the Lords Grand Committee 
debate to the Equalities Minister to meet with Dalit organisations and activists,
121
 a 
meeting took place on 6 February 2013 between Helen Grant, junior Minister for 
Women and Equalities, Baroness Northover and five representatives of Dalit 
organisations. Lord Avebury, Baroness Thornton and three GEO officials were also 
in attendance. This was the first meeting between the government and Dalit 
organisations since publication of the NIESR study, despite the Dalits’ repeated 
requests. Afterwards, a joint letter was sent to the minister by the groups present, 
stressing the consensus among Dalit organisations on the need for legislative 
protection from caste discrimination and providing further information on the likely 
numbers affected, examples of approaches to caste discrimination in other countries, 
the condemnation of caste discrimination in international human rights law and 
examples of how EQA protection would help tackle caste discrimination in 
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Britain.
122
 The letter argued that lack of legal redress for caste discrimination goes 
against all principles of equality and non-discrimination. To the Dalit groups the 
meeting appeared to mark a step towards a presumption in favour of legislation, but 
on 1 March 2013, the minister issued a Ministerial Written Statement announcing 
that the government had decided ‘not to exercise the caste power’ (sic) at the present 
time.123 Instead, government announced the appointment of the organisation Talk For 
A Change ‘to engage with affected communities to run an educational programme to 
help tackle this complex and sensitive issue’ with a view to ‘find[ing] practical 
solutions to the problems and harm that caste-based prejudice can cause’.124 The 
government also requested the EHRC to ‘examine… the nature of caste prejudice 
and harassment as evidenced by existing studies, and the extent to which this 
problem is likely to be addressed by either legislative or other solutions’ and to 
publish its findings later in 2013.
125
 In a letter to the Anti-Caste Discrimination 
Alliance (ACDA) on the same day, the minister declared herself unconvinced that 
introducing caste-specific legislation was the best or most proportionate way of 
tackling the issue, choosing instead to take action via ‘an educational initiative’ – 
despite the NIESR’s contrary finding.126 Coterminous with the minister’s statement, 
the EHRC issued a statement appearing to contradict its position in October 2012, 
agreeing that caste was ‘an extremely complex area’ with limited relevant case law 
and empirical research, and that it would ‘look at the existing evidence and provide 
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expert analysis on the extent to which the problem was likely to be addressed, by 
either legislative or other solutions’.127 
 
9.4.3.3 Lords Report Stage: day two 
 
At Lords Report stage on 4 March 2013,
128
 an amendment to the ERRB to add caste 
to the definition of race in EQA s. 9(1) as s. 9(1)(d) was moved by Lord Harries of 
Pentregarth.
129
 Following intensive lobbying, Dalit organisations secured cross-party, 
cross-bench support for the amendment and organised a demonstration (‘Unite for 
Dignity’) outside Parliament on the day of the debate. The amendment was agreed by 
a resounding majority.
130
 Those in favour argued that refusal to provide a legal 
remedy for caste discrimination, far from protecting community cohesion, was a 
recipe for lack of integration and poorer community relations; that it made no sense 
that other unacceptable discrimination was covered by the law, but not 
discrimination based on caste;
131
 that absence of consensus was not used as an 
argument for blocking legislation protecting other discriminated groups; that the real 
reason was not that education would work better than legislation, or that legislation 
was disproportionate, but that the government had been swayed by the opposition to 
legislation of some Hindus and Sikhs, who wrongly believed that legislation was 
designed to label them as persecuting Dalits,
132
 and that legislation – as noted by the 
Race Relations Board in 1967 – was essential as an unequivocal declaration of public 
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policy, to provide protection and redress, to provide legal certainty and for its 
educative side-effects.
133
 
 
9.5 Factors bearing on the legal regulation of caste discrimination in domestic 
law 
This thesis has sought to draw out the multiplicity of factors bearing upon caste 
discrimination and its legal regulation in India and the UK, as well as in international 
human rights law. Figure 1, below, provides a model for bringing together those 
factors in the domestic and international arenas impacting both negatively and 
positively, for and against, the legal regulation of caste discrimination in the UK. 
These factors are discussed below.  
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9.5.1 Domestic factors: legal 
 
The prospect of a single Equality Act created the ‘opportunity space’ for Dalit 
activists and their supporters to advance demands for a statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination within the context of a broader national debate about rights and 
equality. That said, throughout the Equality Bill debates, the legal categorisation of 
caste – the capture of caste in law – presented a problem. The formulation of race in 
the EQA is not on all fours with the formulation of racial discrimination in ICERD. 
Although the government has not challenged CERD’s use of descent to address caste 
under ICERD, Parliament chose ‘caste’, not descent, to capture caste in domestic 
law; but it chose to create caste as a subset of race rather than as a separate new 
category. Descent was considered too broad, risking the possibility of claims of 
discrimination based on social class, while the creation of a tenth protected 
characteristic was politically unacceptable.
134
 Internationally, Dalit activists and 
advocacy groups have sought to keep caste away from racial discrimination and 
descent, in favour of the new category of discrimination based on work and descent. 
UK parliamentarians appeared less squeamish about the term ‘caste’, and about 
linking caste with race, but they did not endorse an immediate statutory prohibition 
of caste discrimination, and government has not brought in the legislation, despite 
the recommendations of CERD and the UN UPR, arguing that it is not convinced 
that legislation is the best way of dealing with the problem. This thesis supports a 
pragmatic approach, namely the immediate implementation of EQA s. 9(5(a), thus 
making caste an aspect of race in domestic law, as well as considering separating out 
caste from race in the medium term based on its unique nature. 
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9.5.2 Domestic factors: socio-political 
 
In addition to the concerns voiced explicitly by the government about legislation, it is 
submitted that there are other, underlying, socio-political factors impacting on 
government’s decision as to whether to legislate. Firstly, in the context of recession 
in Western economies, competition amongst Western nations to establish a ‘special 
relationship’ with India is intense. India is the UK’s largest non-EU market. 
Furthermore, India is the third largest investor in the UK, and of the 1,200 Indian 
companies in the EU, seven hundred are in the UK, with Tata being one of the UK’s 
largest manufacturing employers.
135 
It would therefore be unsurprising if the UK 
government were anxious about alienating the Indian business and political 
establishment by introducing caste discrimination legislation in the UK.
136
  
 
Secondly, for many years British Dalits struggled to make their case. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Dalits are an ‘invisible community’ in the UK.137 Among 
South Asians in Britain, writes a UK-based Dalit, the issue of caste has been 
marginalised and denied politically and intellectually. For the wider community, 
Dalits did not even exist in the UK; their history, culture and traditions are not 
covered in the textbooks: ‘There are Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, but no Dalits’.138 
Moreover, he writes, non-Dalits tended to be dominant among South Asians in 
Britain, monopolising ‘all the jobs that require interfacing with the host English 
community’.139 The Dalit cause is not well-understood by the mainstream British 
public. Historically, Dalits have had only limited access to key political actors and 
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decision-makers. In contrast, organisations opposed to caste discrimination 
legislation, such as the HFB and the HCUK, have long benefitted from close links 
with senior parliamentarians such as Lord Dholakia (patron of the HFB) and 
Baroness Verma,
140
 who as South Asians can call up a familiarity with caste but who 
as non-Dalits may not conceptualise caste discrimination in Britain as a form of 
discrimination requiring the same legal treatment as other forms of discrimination 
(despite its being unlawful in India). In the past, Dalit groups have been 
insufficiently united – as with other social movements they have suffered from 
ideological divisions and factionalism, and the campaign for caste discrimination 
legislation suffers from an apparent lack of involvement among women and young 
Dalits. Nevertheless, Dalit organisations were remarkably united, and focussed, in 
their campaign for the inclusion of EQA s. 9(5)(a) and for its activation. 
 
Thirdly, for many years caste discrimination was not taken up by mainstream 
equality actors.
141
 The EHRC supported the inclusion of descent in the EQA but was 
opposed to the inclusion of caste, arguing that caste discrimination was covered by 
existing provisions.
142
 It declared itself willing to support a suitable case to test this 
proposition
143
 but declined to support the Begraj case. Various factors may account 
for the reluctance of equality actors to associate themselves with efforts to secure 
legal regulation of caste discrimination. First, insufficient awareness and 
understanding of caste and discrimination based on caste; second, the reluctance of 
victims to come forward; and third, the historical inability of small, voluntary 
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associations and interest groups to capture the attention of discrimination industry 
actors.
144
  
 
Lastly, the political cost of introducing caste discrimination legislation may have 
been seen as too high by government. During the first two years of coalition there 
was pressure to present a united front, especially given the unpopularity of many 
coalition policies. As such, there may have been a fear of losing South Asian votes. 
There has been consistent strong opposition to caste legislation by Hindu and Sikh 
organisations who argue that legislation will reinforce or even create afresh long-
abandoned caste distinctions and discrimination; that legislation will result in people 
having no choice but to be labelled by caste despite the disinterest in caste identity 
other than among the elderly; and that there is no valid evidence of the existence of 
caste discrimination in spheres covered by equality law.
145
 
 
9.5.2.1 Caste and the multicultural conundrum 
 
The following subsections posit a link between state policies on multiculturalism and 
‘faith communities’, and government reluctance to legislate for caste discrimination. 
In 1972, Anthony (now Lord) Lester and Geoffrey Bindman warned that, in a society 
which is plural culturally as well as racially, cultural diversity may create tensions 
similar to those arising from racial differences. While ‘some of the problems of 
cultural diversity can be safely left to solve themselves’, not all can: ‘cultural 
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tolerance must not become a cloak for oppression and injustice within the immigrant 
communities themselves’.146 Jaoul argues that British multiculturalism has favoured 
the development of a British form of caste discrimination which,  
even though it is a by-product of caste in India, needs to be dealt with as a British 
phenomenon that has much to do with existing British policies and that therefore needs to be 
addressed by British law on discrimination.
147
 
 
Jaoul criticises ‘the British multicultural approach’ for accepting that ‘caste taboos 
are part of Hindu religion and that the State has no right in interfering in such 
internal matters’.148 Further, because multicultural policies ‘boast of being 
progressive and anti-racist’, they give a ‘new legitimacy’ to tolerance of casteism in 
British society. However, says Jaoul, modern multiculturalism cannot be blamed 
alone – the British Raj incorporated caste as a convenient building block of the 
colonial order because it provided an indigenous, religious sanctification to 
inequality and ‘could be an effective warrant of social order in a country divided in a 
multitude of castes and communities’.149  
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Thus, 
[t]he kind of governance based on the mediation of community leadership that is advocated 
by multiculturalists can… be traced back to the colonial techniques to rule India by taking 
advantage of its cultural diversity.
150
 
 
For Patel, the problem lies more in the shift in state social policy in the late 1990s 
from liberal multiculturalism to ‘faith-based multiculturalism’,151 bolstered by the 
inclusion of religion as a category for the first time in the 2001 Census, alongside 
‘increasing self-identification in terms of religion [and] demands that the public 
space should recognise religious claims and religious differences’.152 Ethnic minority 
communities became reframed as ‘faith communities’153 and religion emerged as the 
‘main badge’ of minority identity154 (the movement from ‘race to religion’).155 
Underpinning this approach is the idea of religion as a ‘common value’.156 However, 
this is not necessarily positive or benign. According to Patel, it has provided an 
opportunity for certain ‘“faith groups” to use the terrain of multiculturalism to further 
an authoritarian and patriarchal agenda’ which poses a threat to human rights.157 The 
danger, argues Kundnani, is a ‘tokenistic and unthinking approach to minority 
representation’, whereby – in the case of South Asian communities – ‘under the 
guise of multiculturalism, leaders of communalist [sectarian] groups can easily 
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become accepted as authentic representatives of Asian “culture”’. As a result, he 
claims, the most reactionary elements in the community are given undue influence.
158
   
 
9.5.2.2 ‘Community cohesion’ and ‘faith communities’ 
 
‘Community cohesion’ (damage to which was cited by both the Labour and Coalition 
Governments as a reason for not legislating against caste discrimination) was the 
Labour Government’s policy response to the 2001 civil disturbances in northern 
England
159
 – widely understood as resulting from a decline in, or a lack of, social (or 
community) cohesion.
160
 The main theme of community cohesion was that cultural 
pluralism and integration were compatible.
161
 Religion was central to this vision – 
ethnic minority communities, re-labelled ‘faith communities’, were identified as 
‘important sources of social capital’ with a key role to play in issues such as urban 
regeneration and tackling antisocial behaviour.
162
 However, social or community 
cohesion in caste societies, historically, has meant intra-caste or intra-group cohesion 
or solidarity, rather than inter-caste or inter-group cohesion. The terms ‘community’ 
and ‘caste’ are often used interchangeably in India; and Ambedkar described caste as 
an antisocial, divisive, anti-cohesive force.
163
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9.5.2.3 Caste and the ‘Hindu community’  
 
British Hindu organisations opposed to caste discrimination legislation have sought 
to present the ‘Hindu community’ as a ‘clearly articulated group’ and themselves as 
its representatives. But there are problems with this approach. The ‘Christian 
theological model’, says Searle-Chatterjee, addresses religion as ‘a separable and 
definable phenomenon which has crystallised into six or so distinct “major” 
faiths.’164 Within this ‘world religions’ paradigm, Hinduism is seen as a distinct 
religion and ‘Hindu’ as a distinct and ‘bounded’ religious identity, ‘to which other 
identities of class, caste, gender, etc. are subordinate’.165 However, scholars suggest 
that such a view of Hinduism is neither historically, geographically or culturally 
accurate.
166
 Searle-Chatterjee explains that in the [Indian] sub-continent, it was not 
religion but caste ‘which more frequently provided a basis for identification, even 
though the institution of caste was, historically, more fluid and segmental than the 
British realised. It is not surprising that in Britain many Indian organisations, 
including ‘religious’ ones, are caste-based’.167 The word ‘Hindu’, says Searle-
Chatterjee, is used ‘with very different meanings at different levels of the caste 
system’; ‘lower’ castes have traditionally used ‘Hindu’ to refer to ‘upper’ castes but 
not to themselves, while ‘high’ castes often used it ‘to refer to those who were seen 
as truly Indian’, that is, ‘not having any religious link or allegiance to “foreign” 
traditions’ (such as Christianity).168 Lack of awareness of popular religious practices 
on the subcontinent, argues Searle-Chatterjee, combined with the idea that religions 
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are ‘bounded unities’, has resulted in the use of ‘Hindu’ as an identity label in the 
UK.
169
 This has made it possible for organisations such as the HFB to ‘construct a 
monolithic “Hindu” voice and community in the UK’,170 despite the deeply contested 
nature of the word ‘Hindu’, and to promote themselves as the institutional face of a 
homogenised Hinduism, representative of all Hindus in the UK,
171
 thereby enabling 
them – along with certain other minority religious organizations – to exert ‘an 
unprecedented influence on State policy towards minorities’.172 Furthermore, Searle-
Chatterjee argues that Western academic accounts of Hindus in Britain promote a 
monolithic picture of Hinduism ‘suffused uncritically’ with positive images173 - 
partly due to sensitivity to accusations of ethnocentricity or racism, and partly to a 
prevailing view that ‘religion, in any form, is primarily benign and positive, with 
socially integrative functions’.174 The result, she writes, is that ‘many kinds of social 
and cultural contradictions disappear from [Western academic] writing [on 
Hinduism]’.175 Kundnani argues that the reputation of Hinduism as inherently 
tolerant, humane and peaceful has meant that fundamentalists within UK Hindu 
communities often escape scrutiny. For too long, he claims, communalism 
(sectarianism) in British Asian communities has escaped discussion, while 
fundamentalism is a charge levelled only at ‘other sections’ of the Asian community 
(i.e. Muslims).
176
 Concurring, Priyamvada Gopal argues that 
[i]n the current climate of a national preoccupation with Islam… British Hindu and Sikh 
communities have become even less accountable for some of the more unsavoury features of 
their collective existence. This has been particularly so as some of their high-profile 
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spokespeople have made concerted attempts to distance both communities from Muslims, 
arguing that they are better assimilated and make a more positive contribution to the “host” 
community.
177  
 
There is an associated issue. Chetan Bhatt is particularly critical of what he calls the 
‘disingenuous humanism’ of Hindutva discourse. According to Bhatt, an ‘important 
attempt’ is being made by Hindutva organisations in the West to rearticulate the 
concept of dharma as a universal human philosophy, a natural law for the whole of 
humanity’, inherently tolerant and open.178 In this conceptualisation of Hinduism, 
varna is considered an essential aspect of natural law which recognises equality of 
soul but also hierarchical classification based on personal qualities, whereas jati is 
conceived as a ‘false system of classification and division that was imposed by 
foreign imperialists’.179 Hindutva is a right-wing, xenophobic, religio-political 
ideology propagated and promoted by the Hindu Nationalist movement in India, 
whose agenda, argue some scholars, is reflected in certain aspects of Hinduism in the 
UK.
180
 The movement consists of three organisations based in India,
181
 which in the 
UK, says Zavos, ‘present themselves as cultural and social organisations and 
downplay their political agenda’, emphasising cultural and charitable work and 
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presence in 150 countries); Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a political party, and Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(VHP), a cultural organisation which has a strong presence in the UK. 
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distancing themselves from [right-wing Hindu] organisations in India.
182
 Parita 
Mukta concurs that the tenets of Hindu nationalism, which she argues are 
problematic for minorities, ‘are being disseminated and made acceptable within 
British politics’: 
[Three points must be made]. One is the construction of a monolithic (and seemingly 
innocent) “religious” community which British politicians support in the name of cultural 
plurality and diversity. Second is the lack of political attentiveness to global formations 
which are anti-democratic in their thrust towards minorities in the homeland. Thus, the 
limited and contingent exigencies of the politics of multiculturalism (within Britain) have not 
been able to embrace a vision which takes account of international human rights. The darker 
side of “multiculturalism” in Britain is both exclusivist and supportive of a genocidal VHP in 
India. Thirdly, the prominent space carved out by Hindutva forces within British politics 
overrides the significance of democratic movements and impulses which organize outside the 
boundaries of religion and caste.
183
 
 
An examination of Hindu nationalist rhetoric and caste tensions in Britain is outside 
the scope of this thesis; rather, the purpose of the preceding section is to draw 
attention to an issue which, it is submitted, is relevant for an understanding of caste 
and caste discrimination in this country and which therefore merits further 
investigation.
184
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9.5.3 International factors: legal 
 
At the same time as transnational Dalit advocacy networks were reorienting the 
framing of caste discrimination towards discrimination based on work and descent 
and away from CERD and racial discrimination,
185
 British Dalits were basing their 
campaign for domestic legislative reform on the rights contained in ICERD. 
Recommendations to the UK to introduce legislation prohibiting descent-based and 
caste-based discrimination were made by CERD in 2003 and again in 2011, when the 
addition of caste ‘as an aspect of race’, as envisaged by EQA s. 9(5)(a), was 
recommended.
186
 In 2012, the UPR Working Group recommended immediate 
implementation of EQA s. 9(5)(a).
187
 These UN recommendations were heavily 
relied on by British Dalit activists and their supporters in their campaign for domestic 
legislative reform.  
 
We now turn, in the light of all the above, to lessons learned, and legal, social and 
political recommendations on the legal regulation of caste in the UK. 
 
9.6 The legal regulation of caste in the UK: lessons learned 
9.6.1 Legal arena 
 
As UK citizens, British Dalits are entitled to protection from discrimination based on 
caste – a principle recognised in India since 1950 (even if not fully realised). 
Moreover, Dalits are entitled to core basic rights, namely equality of treatment and 
equality of opportunity to lead an unimpaired and peaceful life. Caste discrimination 
is a social problem which has moved from one social system (in India) to another (in 
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187
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the UK). This thesis argues that domestic legislation is an essential (albeit not the 
sole) element in addressing caste discrimination in the UK. Caste-specific legislation 
has been criticised because of the alleged difficulty of proving the occurrence of 
caste discrimination, but this has not prevented the development of legislation 
covering discrimination on other grounds. It has also been criticised on grounds of 
cost, despite the Equality Act Impact Assessment advice that the lack of a specific 
statutory route for processing caste discrimination cases might be more costly 
(because of legal uncertainty) than introducing legislation. Although there would be 
initial ‘familiarisation’ costs, this thesis submits that as the concepts of caste, and 
discrimination based on caste, become more familiar, the costs associated with 
unfamiliarity will diminish. Discrimination legislation not only provides a vital route 
to redress but also serves a wider educational purpose, reducing the acceptability of 
such discrimination. This is particularly necessary for caste discrimination, because 
the vast majority of the population is currently almost entirely ignorant of caste 
issues. Legislation provides recognition of the problem and sends an important 
public policy message: 
[It] creates the climate in which employers, service providers and others will take the line of 
least resistance, i.e. comply with the law rather than with their own prejudices… In other 
words legislation provides a valuable encouragement and support for those in a position to 
discriminate, but it also creates a broader educational climate.
188
  
 
Legislation would push employers, educators and providers of goods and services to 
develop non-discrimination and anti-harassment policies, which would in turn reduce 
                                                 
188
 Lord Lester; meeting, 17 January 2011, n 88 above. This is not a new argument; in 1966, during 
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cols 897-905 16 December 1966. 
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the acceptability of caste discrimination and harassment, and lead to greater 
understanding of the issues amongst the non-Asian population. As a consequence, 
this would render such discrimination more visible, making it easier for victims to 
raise the problem.
189
 Arguably, this could be achieved through education; certainly, 
policies to combat caste discrimination could be introduced in the public sector 
without legislation. However, the NIESR study argued that without legislation it is 
questionable whether such policies would be properly implemented, and without 
legislation the private sector ‘would be largely untouched’.190 Legislation is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving rights and equalities; 
nevertheless, ‘a change in culture affecting people’s hearts and minds depends upon 
having legislation in place in the first place’.191 The NIESR study suggests that 
extending anti-discrimination legislation to cover caste specifically, and extending 
criminal law to address caste-motivated harassment and violence, would be a more 
effective approach than education in terms of providing redress to victims. A 
particularly valuable feature of the EAQ in relation to caste – and hence a good 
reason for bringing caste expressly under the EQA ‘umbrella’ - are the provisions on 
harassment. The EQA in s. 26 covers three types of harassment; s. 26(1) covers 
unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic which has the purpose 
or effect of violating the complainant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the complainant. It is submitted 
that this provision may prove to be particularly useful for targeting casteist 
behaviour. 
 
                                                 
189
 Hilary Metcalfe; meeting, 17 January 2011, ibid. 
190
 Ibid.; see also Research Findings, n 17 above.  
191
 Lord Lester, meeting, 17 January 2011, n 88 above.  
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This thesis argues that education (in the workplace and among the community) and 
legislation are both required, moreover that both civil and criminal legislation are 
necessary; the problems with India’s reliance solely on criminal legislation to address 
caste discrimination have been addressed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. While 
welcoming the government’s proposed community educational programme on caste 
and caste discrimination, this thesis endorses the introduction of a statutory 
prohibition of caste discrimination alongside the educational route. Adding caste to 
the definition of the protected characteristic of race in EQA s 9(1) is a pragmatic 
solution. It is submitted that there is a growing presumption in favour of a statutory 
prohibition via this means - the alternative to which is to amend the EQA by adding 
caste as a new, tenth, protected characteristic. The inadequacy of existing domestic 
categories available for caste, and the fact that they are not aligned with international 
human rights law, has been shown elsewhere. It is submitted that the domestic 
categorisation of caste should be revisited. The UK could follow ICERD and create a 
new category of descent, including but not limited to caste, or a new category of 
caste, rather than subsuming caste within race. However, while recommending that 
the UK introduce a prohibition of descent-based discrimination in domestic law, 
CERD appears to be agnostic as to how this is achieved; in 2011, CERD 
recommended the exercise of the power in EQA s. 9(5)(a) to make caste an aspect of 
race – not the introduction of differently-formulated legislation.192  
 
In addition, the EHRC should be required and enabled (in terms of resources) to 
support test cases on caste discrimination. Resources should also be provided (for 
example through the GEO) for legal education, training and familiarisation on caste 
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for the judiciary, law enforcement agents, the legal profession, law students, advice 
centre workers and trades union representatives. Government departments (e.g. the 
GEO) and national human rights bodies (e.g. the EHRC) should provide information 
on caste discrimination on their websites, and responsibility for raising awareness of 
caste discrimination should be allocated to an identified department. As regards the 
UK’s international law obligations, not only should the UK ensure that its domestic 
legislation is compliant with ICERD but it should also cooperate with CERD by 
complying fully with CERD’s recommendations on descent-based discrimination. 
The UK should also engage with the UN Draft Principles and Guidelines on 
Discrimination based on Work and Descent.
193
 As regards multiculturalism and 
international human rights law generally, the UK must ensure that in accommodating 
cultural diversity in accordance with international law,
194
 where cultural practices are 
violative of the core rights of others, culture (or religion) should not be available as a 
defence to discrimination, nor as a shield to scrutiny. In terms of international human 
rights law and the impact of international human rights treaties ‘on the ground’, 
scholars have argued that ‘the success or failure of any international human rights 
system should be evaluated in accordance with its impact on human rights practices 
on the domestic level’.195 Heyns and Viljoen argue that it is difficult to establish a 
direct causal link between the UN treaty system and domestic legislative or policy 
reforms, while Grugel and Peruzzotti posit that (in relation to children’s rights) non-
State actors have largely been unsuccessful in using the Geneva mechanisms to bring 
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about change.
196
 In contrast, in British Dalits’ campaign for legislative reform, the 
ICERD regime and the ‘Geneva mechanisms’ proved to be key tools. The value of 
the ICERD regime as a tool for the promotion of a domestic agenda on Dalit rights in 
other diaspora states therefore merits further research. 
 
9.6.2 Social policy 
 
In the arena of social policy, the process of achieving social change is as important 
as securing legislation and case law. There is insufficient knowledge among the 
wider UK population about caste and forms of caste discrimination in the diaspora. 
Education and awareness-raising among the wider population – as also among the 
judiciary, police and critical services – is essential. Of particular importance is 
education in schools and among the young about caste and caste discrimination. The 
importance of caste-aware teaching in religious education was highlighted by 
Nesbitt.
197
 Extra-curricular means of educating the young about caste discrimination 
should be supported. The research by ACDA and the NIESR highlighted the 
existence of inter-student, caste-related harassment and bullying in schools and 
universities, which needs to be addressed at the institutional level. The government 
must develop a focus on caste and engage proactively with UK citizens of Dalit 
heritage through positive engagement with Dalit groups. It is important that Dalit 
voices on caste discrimination are taken seriously, especially those of women and the 
young. An Advisory Committee – including young people – could be established to 
facilitate proactive engagement with Dalits, but it must also be understood that Dalits 
are a heterogeneous category. High-level acknowledgement of the issue would 
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generate greater awareness of discrimination against Dalits and afford the issue 
greater credibility and legitimacy with the public at large. 
 
9.6.3 Political arena 
 
The UK’s policies on multiculturalism call for re-examination – a more sophisticated 
approach needs to be taken by government to minorities, especially religious 
monitories. An understanding of the internal workings and structures of minority 
groups needs to be developed, instead of looking at minority groups as homogenous 
entities, while decisions should be made and policies developed in full knowledge 
and understanding of the internal workings of minority groups. The policy focus on 
religion as the ‘main badge’ of minority identity has contributed to a predominantly 
‘religious rites and practices’ conceptualisation of caste and caste discrimination in 
the UK,
198
 in contrast to the UN framing of caste discrimination as a discrimination 
and human rights issue.
199
 Hence, it was primarily the views of mainstream minority 
religious groups which were sought on the legal regulation of caste discrimination, 
but in the context of an ideology of hierarchy, their views were not necessarily the 
same as the views of those on the receiving end of caste discrimination. Government 
and its representatives need to develop a greater critical awareness of the 
relationships between religious and political organisations and actors overseas, as 
well as UK organisations and actors. In the context of multiculturalism the question 
arises whether Hindu caste groups should be treated as ‘cultural groups’ from an 
international human rights law cultural rights perspective.
200
 Chapter 2 of this thesis 
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showed that the notion of castes (jatis) as distinct ‘cultural groups’ was argued by 
caste groups wishing to protect caste-related rights and privileges before colonial 
courts in British India, while Chapter 1 of this thesis considered Natrajan’s argument 
against treating castes as ‘cultural communities’. Where protection is demanded for 
an aspect of ‘culture’ or ‘core identity’ which is violative of the core rights of others, 
this should be questioned.  
 
9.6.4 International policy 
 
In terms of international policy, the government should demand that British 
businesses in India and other caste-affected states comply with the Ambedkar 
Principles
201
 and with UK discrimination law on caste (whether statute or case law). 
Compliance should be monitored. In addition, UK businesses in India should be 
encouraged to adopt British equal opportunities approaches to caste, and the 
government should provide or fund familiarisation, training and advice on caste as 
necessary, rewarding those businesses which comply. Indian businesses and 
investors operating in the UK should be monitored for compliance with Indian law 
on caste discrimination, and they should also be required to comply with relevant UK 
discrimination law and with equal opportunities best practice. Supplier diversity 
(using Dalit suppliers, along the lines called for in India’s Bhopal Declaration 
2002)
202
 should be encouraged and rewarded. In relation to India generally, the UK 
government should adopt an open approach to caste discrimination, acknowledge 
that it is a problem in the UK as well as India (and elsewhere) and be open about the 
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need for global solutions; in other words, stop treating caste discrimination as if it 
were a taboo issue. A more robust approach to caste discrimination and to India 
should be adopted, including political and diplomatic pressure on India to implement 
its ICERD obligations on caste. A bi- or multi-lateral government-level working 
group on caste discrimination should be established, so that other countries can learn 
from India – which could position itself as the most experienced state in measures to 
eradicate caste discrimination – and India can learn from others’ equal opportunities 
and anti-discrimination practice. The UK government should mainstream caste 
discrimination through all its political, diplomatic, aid and trade relations with India 
and other caste-affected states, and it should make trade and aid conditional on action 
on caste discrimination.  
 
9.7 Conclusion 
The UK can learn much from India’s successes and failures in using law to address 
caste discrimination. In order to deal with the discrimination associated with a social 
phenomenon such as caste, a holistic strategy including legislation, education and 
social policy measures is required. A wider rights-based approach should be adopted, 
consistent with the turn towards a proactive approach to rights and equality as 
signalled by the EQA, in contrast to the pre-EQA narrower, anti-discrimination 
approach. The existing prohibited grounds of discrimination in British law were not 
designed with caste discrimination in mind and do not capture it adequately. Only in 
a limited number of cases can religious discrimination provisions capture caste 
discrimination. Only by ‘racing’ or ‘ethnicising’ caste can caste discrimination be 
caught by race as currently defined. In 1975, the racial discrimination White Paper 
stated: 
335 
 
To fail to provide a remedy against an injustice strikes at the rule of law. To abandon a whole 
group of people in society without legal redress against unfair discrimination is to leave them 
with no option but to find their own redress. 
203
 
In 2007, the Discrimination Law Review acknowledged that discrimination law 
‘needs to keep pace with and reflect the changes in our Society’.204 To this end, its 
Consultation Paper accepted that it is necessary to review who is protected from 
discrimination and to consider the case for updating the grounds or personal 
characteristics protected under discrimination law ‘in order to ensure that the law 
remains a dynamic reflection of our society’s attitudes’ – where this is both 
necessary and proportionate and once any additional regulatory burden has been 
considered.
205
 While legislation alone cannot ‘untwist the mind’,206 it can act as a 
disincentive to discriminatory behaviour, challenge the cultural consensus and 
provide legal redress for discrimination.
207
 Caste discrimination has been found to 
exist in this country but is yet to be brought within the ambit of discrimination 
legislation. To do so would acknowledge such discrimination as unacceptable and 
unlawful, wherever it occurs. This thesis submits that there is a growing presumption 
in favour of legislation and that a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination may be 
introduced in this country, perhaps even in the lifetime of the present Parliament. 
Until this happens, British Dalits are obliged to continue their campaign to secure the 
possibility of legal redress for those in the UK – however few in number – who are 
or might be subject to caste discrimination.  
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Chapter 10 
Conclusions 
 
The Persistence of Caste 
As this thesis has explained, caste is a unique form of hereditary social stratification 
associated primarily with South Asia and its diaspora.
1
 It has existed for over three 
thousand years, and is complex, deep-rooted and difficult to understand and to 
theorise. It is distinguished by its religious underpinnings in orthodox Hinduism and 
by the concept of Untouchability. Central to orthodox Hinduism is the presupposition 
that individuals are not empirically equal at birth, that inequality is the result of 
freely chosen behaviour in this life and previous lives and hence that a person’s caste 
in this life is of their own making. Classical Hindu law was instrumental in 
constructing and maintaining the ideology of caste and its normative framework, 
which naturalises a hierarchical system of ‘graded inequality’ entailing rights for the 
‘higher castes’ and civil, political, social and economic disabilities and 
discrimination for the ‘lower castes’. The lot of the Dalits is Untouchability, the 
ultimate denial of rights and dignity. Although doctrinal support for caste exists only 
in Hinduism, caste and discrimination based thereon exist among South Asian 
adherents of Sikhism, Islam and Christianity as well as Hinduism. In India, Dalits 
have been kept ‘outside the fold’ by the exercise by the dominant castes of social, 
economic and political power, both individual and systemic. Caste-based 
discrimination, margnalisation and exclusion have been a reality for thousands of 
years in India and other parts of South Asia. More recently, in Britain, caste 
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discrimination was identified in 2010 in government-commissioned research as 
strongly likely to exist in the country.
2
  
 
Caste in India 
 
In 1945, Ambedkar described the caste system as ‘a legal system maintained at the 
point of a bayonet’.3 On gaining independence in 1947, India legally abolished 
Untouchability and criminalised its practice, and introduced Constitutional 
affirmative action policies in favour of Dalits in political representation, public 
employment and higher education.
4
 Yet, de facto, Dalits in India continue to suffer 
from Untouchability and caste-related social, economic, occupational and 
educational inequality and discrimination and violence.
5
 This thesis has sought to 
explain why that is the case. India needs to take the suffering of the Dalits seriously. 
The gap between their legal status and sociological status is vast. Casteism remains 
entrenched ideologically, materially, and psychologically. Furthermore, caste in 
contemporary India has become institutionalised as a tool of political mobilisation, 
even as a depoliticised, benign view of caste as cultural or ethnic identity is 
promoted. India’s reliance on criminal legislation to address caste discrimination has 
proved insufficient and flawed.
6
 Criminal law is not designed to address institutional 
or systemic discrimination – it suggests that casteist behaviour is ‘abnormal’ or 
’exceptional’ rather than ‘everyday’. Moreover, enforcement is weak; frequently, 
those responsible for enforcement of the law are themselves perpetrators. Alongside 
criminal law, India needs civil anti-discrimination legislation to provide remedies for 
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discrimination falling short of the criminal threshold, together with economic 
initiatives and a large-scale public education programme designed to tackle deep-
rooted, entrenched attitudes. India has the world’s oldest and most extensive 
measures on caste discrimination.
7
 Rather than seeing UN mechanisms as a threat, 
India should use these as tools to hone its policies and practices and to disseminate 
its experience worldwide. Criminal law aside, since 1950, reservations have been the 
principal vehicle for achieving caste equality, to the exclusion of a broader debate on 
equality, its meaning, and how to achieve it. However, despite being the world’s 
oldest and most extensive affirmative action scheme, the effectiveness of India’s 
reservations policy has never been adequately monitored. India could use CERD 
General Recommendation No. 32 (on special measures) as a template for a 
monitoring regime which could be developed as a ‘best practice’ model for other 
countries. A wide-ranging debate at all levels of civil society needs to be initiated on 
caste, Untouchability and caste discrimination, and on the kind of society India wants 
to be in the twenty-first century. 
 
Capturing Caste 
 
As Chapters 2-9 have evidenced, caste is an elusive concept, difficult to define and 
categorise legally. A key theme that emerges from this thesis is the challenge of 
capturing caste in law. It appears in no international instrument and has proved very 
difficult to capture under conventional international grounds of discrimination. 
Following Independence, India’s failure to dismantle Untouchability and 
discrimination based on caste using domestic law led to Dalits taking their 
grievances to UN human rights bodies. In 1996, in response to the realities of caste 
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discrimination in India, CERD addressed caste discrimination under ‘descent’ in 
Article 1(1) of the International Convention for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), thereby classifying it as a form of racial discrimination. In 
2002, CERD affirmed ‘descent’ as including caste and ‘analogous systems of 
inherited status’.8 India, however, has consistently rejected CERD’s linkage of caste 
and racial discrimination via descent. Descent is also rejected by Japan as a category 
for capturing discrimination against its Burakumin population.
9
 Discrimination based 
on work and descent (DWD) offers an alternative to the CERD racial 
discrimination/descent approach, but India opposed the appointment in 2005 of the 
UN Special Rapporteurs on DWD – on the grounds that caste was really the intended 
target of scrutiny – and has not engaged with the UN Draft Principles and Guidelines 
(DPGs) on DWD. India has not opposed the identification of caste by other 
international human rights bodies as an impediment to the enjoyment of other rights, 
but it has resisted international scrutiny of caste discrimination via descent, arguing 
that caste is a domestic issue which is being addressed by domestic measures.
10
 The 
question is therefore whether caste can really be caught by existing categories, or 
whether it requires a separate international category. For now, India seems unlikely 
to support a caste-specific instrument (such as a Declaration). However, in the long 
term a caste-specific instrument may prove more effective in targeting caste than 
using proxies such as descent or work and descent. Meanwhile, international human 
rights law imposes clear obligations to prohibit descent-based discrimination 
(including caste discrimination) and it also prohibits DWD. Dalit activists and 
transnational advocacy groups, stressing the distinct, transnational and global nature 
of caste discrimination, have argued for a re-strategising of the Dalit stand – ‘without 
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in any way deflecting the stand taken by CERD’ – away from a ‘caste as racial 
discrimination’ perspective towards a discourse based on ‘descent and work-based 
discrimination and violence’.11 Their call for the adoption of a broad, human rights-
based approach to the eradication of caste discrimination echoes Ambedkar’s 
analysis six decades earlier of the need for a holistic strategy involving legislation, 
affirmative action, economic and social policies, and education. However, there are 
practical and policy problems with the DWD approach.
12
 First, the concept and 
definition of DWD lacks precision. The term is artificial, having been devised largely 
in order to avoid focussing on caste discrimination as the principal manifestation of 
such discrimination and India as the country most affected by it. Secondly, the lack 
of input from South Asian caste-affected states, or from African states affected by 
DWD, weakens the credibility and legitimacy of the DPGs. Thirdly, a Declaration 
directed at the elimination of DWD is unlikely to secure Indian support unless the 
close conceptual linkage between DWD and caste discrimination is removed. 
Nevertheless, Dalits and transnational advocacy networks are promoting the UN 
DPGs as a tool which provides ‘an international reference point for action’ and 
which can be applied in their existing format as a framework for the elimination of 
caste discrimination. In the meantime, the issue of caste discrimination needs to be 
mainstreamed into all UN bodies and agencies, similar to the UN strategy for 
combating discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 
 
Caste in the United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom may become the first non-South Asian country to introduce in 
domestic legislation a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination and harassment. 
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Unlike India, the UK has not challenged ICERD’s categorisation of caste 
discrimination as a form of descent-based racial discrimination. The Equality Act 
2010 (EQA) provides in s. 9(5)(a) for caste to be added by ministerial order, at a 
future date, to the definition of the protected characteristic of race. However, as at 1 
April 2013 no such order had been made despite recommendations to this effect by 
CERD and the UN UPR – neither of which questioned the UK’s putative 
categorisation of caste as a subset of race. Various reasons explain government 
reluctance to legislate: disagreement as to the existence of discrimination of the type 
covered by the EQA and as to the numbers affected; the argument that caste 
discrimination is already prohibited under existing law on religious and racial 
discrimination; the influence of actors opposed to legislation, who have argued that it 
is a disproportionate response to a non-existent problem, and belief that the 
introduction of statutory protection runs counter to the government’s ideological 
imperative to reduce public and private sector ‘legislative burden’.13 This thesis 
shows that caste discrimination is not captured adequately by existing religious 
discrimination provisions, while its capture by existing provisions on ethnic origins 
or race is uncertain and could result in the elevation of jati identities into separate, 
‘freestanding’ ethnic identities – the antithesis of Ambedkar’s call for the 
‘annihilation of caste’.14 The thesis has recommended the introduction of statutory 
protection against caste discrimination and harassment in domestic law.
15
 Activation 
of EQA s. 9(5)(a) represents a pragmatic solution, but in the medium term the 
separation of caste from race should be considered on the grounds of caste’s unique 
nature. The alleged difficulty in proving discrimination (in the case of caste) did not 
prevent the development of legislation covering discrimination on other grounds. The 
                                                 
13
 See above, Chapter 8 sections 8.4-8.6, section 8.9; Chapter 9 section 9.5.  
14
 See above, Chapter 7, section 7.3.4.5. 
15
 See above, Chapter 9 sections 9.4.1.1, 9.5.1, 9.6.1. 
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government must take the issue of caste discrimination seriously. First, allowing 
deep-rooted, caste-based factionalism and fracture to persist among a growing South 
Asian population is damaging to intra- and inter-community cohesion and stores up 
long-term problems for the future. Secondly, caste discrimination is unlawful under 
international human rights law; the UK’s international obligations require it to be 
addressed. Thirdly, legislation sends a message that this type of discrimination is not 
acceptable socially or legally. On 1 March 2013 – over over two years since the 
publication of the NIESR research - the government announced its decision not to 
tackle caste discrimination through legislation at the present time but through an 
education programme instead, having been less than transparent about the reasons for 
its delay in making a decision sooner (evidenced by Dalit groups’ extensive resort to 
the Freedom of Information Act).
16
  
 
Moving Forward 
 
An important question is whether the problem to be addressed is caste per se, or 
simply caste discrimination; moreover, whether the two can in fact be separated. In 
the UK it is too early to tell whether the assertion of Dalit identity (in particular Dalit 
religious identities) in the context of Dalit political mobilisation will inadvertently 
reinforce caste and/or the discrimination associated with caste divisions; or whether 
caste can – or should – be retained as an aspect of cultural diversity de-coupled from 
discrimination.
17
 Further research is needed on this issue. Recent (unpublished) 
research claims that the younger generation of British Dalits, while supporting the 
legal prohibition of caste discrimination in the UK, ‘are less affected by ascriptions 
of caste inferiority because they identify less with caste hierarchy’, even 
                                                 
16
 See, for example, Chapter 8 section 8.2, section 8.4.5; Chapter 9, section 9.2.4, above.  
17
 See above, Chapter 7 section 7.3.4.5. 
343 
 
‘embrac[ing] caste difference and assert[ing] a separate identity, freed from the yoke 
of inferiority.’18 Older research suggests that notions of caste hierarchy, 
Untouchability and inferiority underpin caste-based bullying among the young, for 
example in schools.
19
 Further research is required on the complex relationship 
between caste identity and caste discrimination in the UK, as well as on the forms 
and extent of caste discrimination and its increase, decline or diversification. 
Regardless of whether domestic law is amended to prohibit caste discrimination, 
British Dalits must become involved in awareness-raising, education and training for 
young people in schools and universities, for employers, in the workplace, in the 
justice system and for the general public. If domestic law is amended, the Public 
Sector Equality Duty in s. 149 EQA 2010 would apply to caste, requiring public 
bodies to exercise greater sophistication in dealing with South Asian minority groups 
by not treating such groups as homogenous, undifferentiated entities. Dalit groups 
must also grapple with the paradox of promoting caste (jati) identities in the name of 
challenging caste discrimination. 
 
The Limits of Law 
 
Law is one of the primary means by which states and the international community 
address and seek to rectify discrimination and inequality. Non-discrimination and 
equality have become fundamental normative elements of national, regional and 
international legal systems. This research highlights the difficulty of capturing caste 
in international and domestic law, and has suggested some solutions. It also 
highlights the dynamic relationship between universal human rights standards and 
                                                 
18
 M. Dhanda. ‘Held back by in-fighting: the fraught struggles for recognition of Dalits in 
Wolverhampton’; paper presented at the international conference ‘The Internationalisation of Dalit 
and Adivasi Activism’, University of London, 26 June 2012. Unpublished. 
19
 See above, Chapter 6. 
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domestic protection from human rights violations, and the importance of connecting 
UN standards to national law, especially where national law has not succeeded in 
eradicating deep-rooted forms of discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion. The 
thesis calls for creative, holistic responses to the problem of caste discrimination, 
driven by a human rights approach, which include yet go beyond legislative reform. 
Finally, the thesis highlights the importance of activism in securing legal, political 
and social change. There has been a great deal of focus on transnational advocacy 
networks in recent years, but the case of the British Dalits shows that domestic, 
grassroots activism by determined activists on a low budget but with the right skills 
and strategy can succeed in putting the issue of caste into the political and legal 
mainstream.  
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